If Hughes wins in 1916 and the Democrats win in 1920, 1924, and 1928, who would the Republican nominee be in 1932?

Post by WolfBear
If Charles Evans Hughes wins in 1916 and the Democrats win in 1920,
1924, and 1928, who would the Republican nominee be in 1932?
Specifically, I am curious as to who exactly the Republican version of
FDR could be in this TL.

The popular and progressive businessman-humanitarian Herbert Hoover.
Hoover pledges a "new deal for the American people" and his campign theme is
"He fed the starving during the World War. He can bring food and hope to
those who suffer today in our miserable Rooseveltvilles." .

--
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net

WolfBear

2018-02-23 21:28:43 UTC

Makes sense.

Also, a couple of additional questions:

1. Is the Great Depression likely to be as severe in this TL as it was in our TL?

2. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle domestic policy in this TL? Would it be a Republican version of FDR's New Deal? Also, would anything be different?

3. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle foreign policy in this TL--especially if Hitler and the Nazis still come to power in Germany in this TL?

Rob

2018-02-24 00:52:43 UTC

Makes sense.
1. Is the Great Depression likely to be as severe in this TL as it was in our TL?

Who knows, it depends on authorial choice. It also depends on differences in banking policies, tariffs, handling of war debts and how a whole host of other Democratic Administration choices, as well as the knock-ons of the those policies, and even random butterflies affect global markets.

It is hard to predict what Democratic 1920s administrations' attitudes would be towards organized labor for instance.

Post by WolfBear
2. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle domestic policy in this TL? Would it be a Republican version of FDR's New Deal? Also, would anything be different?

Less beholden to the southern states, although, OTOH, Hoover and the GOP would probably want to use this opportunity to crack open "the solid south".

There are a whole bunch of things that could be different. Hoover could possibly take a variety of economic interventionist measures but still not support pro-organized labor policies.

Or, he could ultimately use almost all FDR's OTL playbook.

Post by WolfBear
3. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle foreign policy in this TL--especially if Hitler and the Nazis still come to power in Germany in this TL?

Hard to tell, Hoover's personal experiences between 1916 and 1932 would be different from OTL, and that may be formative.

Going by his attitude towards Japan and later attitude toward WWII and early Cold War Democratic foreign policy, Hoover may have an isolationist inclination. On the other hand, that might be a product of his post-presidential, crotchety old conservative persona seeking to cut down FDR's legacy to restore his own.

An equally interesting question is what foreign policies do the Democratic Administrations of the 1920s pursue?

What are their thoughts on the League or an alliance with Britain and France?

What are their attitudes on war debts and reparations?

How are patterns of military spending different from OTL?

I could see Democratic Presidents be just as interventionist in the Caribbean as the Republicans of the era, or, because of a little less coziness with corporations or other reasons, they might adopt the non-interventionist "Good Neighbor" policy earlier.

I could see a Democratic President elected in 1920, with a greater Irish constituency, possibly demagoguing Irish independence and increasing Anglo-US tension and from there maybe inadvertently reviving the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

I think a 1920s Democratic Administration to grant the Philippines independence or pass a law mandating a date-certain for Filipino independence that falls within the 1930s.

WolfBear

2018-02-24 04:31:12 UTC

Makes sense.
1. Is the Great Depression likely to be as severe in this TL as it was in our TL?

OK.

Post by Rob
It is hard to predict what Democratic 1920s administrations' attitudes would be towards organized labor for instance.

Were the Democrats split on this issue?

Post by WolfBear
2. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle domestic policy in this TL? Would it be a Republican version of FDR's New Deal? Also, would anything be different?

Less beholden to the southern states, although, OTOH, Hoover and the GOP would probably want to use this opportunity to crack open "the solid south".

Completely agreed. Of course, this could create problems if Hoover and the GOP attempt to simultaneously court both poor White Southern voters and Black voters.

Post by Rob
There are a whole bunch of things that could be different. Hoover could possibly take a variety of economic interventionist measures but still not support pro-organized labor policies.

What difference would this have made, though?

Post by Rob
Or, he could ultimately use almost all FDR's OTL playbook.

OK.

Post by WolfBear
3. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle foreign policy in this TL--especially if Hitler and the Nazis still come to power in Germany in this TL?

Hard to tell, Hoover's personal experiences between 1916 and 1932 would be different from OTL, and that may be formative.

OK.

Post by Rob
Going by his attitude towards Japan and later attitude toward WWII and early Cold War Democratic foreign policy, Hoover may have an isolationist inclination. On the other hand, that might be a product of his post-presidential, crotchety old conservative persona seeking to cut down FDR's legacy to restore his own.

How much did Hoover want to get involved in foreign affairs during his Presidency?

Post by Rob
An equally interesting question is what foreign policies do the Democratic Administrations of the 1920s pursue?

To answer this question, we'd first need to figure out who the 1920s Democratic Presidents are in this TL. For instance, if Woodrow Wilson's stroke is delayed by a year or more and he wins in 1920, we'd almost certainly see an internationalist foreign policy--a policy which will likely be continued by his successor after 1924.

Post by Rob
What are their thoughts on the League or an alliance with Britain and France?

Again, depends on who the Democratic Presidents in the 1920s are.

Post by Rob
What are their attitudes on war debts and reparations?

Probably not much different from Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover in our TL, no?

Post by Rob
How are patterns of military spending different from OTL?

Perhaps slightly more spending on the military, but probably not by very much--at least until the late 1930s.

Post by Rob
I could see Democratic Presidents be just as interventionist in the Caribbean as the Republicans of the era, or, because of a little less coziness with corporations or other reasons, they might adopt the non-interventionist "Good Neighbor" policy earlier.

Agreed.

Post by Rob
I could see a Democratic President elected in 1920, with a greater Irish constituency, possibly demagoguing Irish independence and increasing Anglo-US tension and from there maybe inadvertently reviving the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

If so, this could have major consequences on developments in Asia later on. Indeed, would Japan have actually had the nerve to invade China in 1931 and 1937 if it was still a British ally? Somehow, I doubt it.

Post by Rob
I think a 1920s Democratic Administration to grant the Philippines independence or pass a law mandating a date-certain for Filipino independence that falls within the 1930s.

Agreed.

Also, didn't the Hoover administration propose to Poland in 1931 that it hand the Polish Corridor back to Germany? If so, this fact combined with Hoover's antipathy towards the Soviet Union during World War II in our TL could result in alt-President Hoover pushing Britain and France to avoid making military commitments to Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, et cetera). Indeed, Hoover might believe that, this way, the odds of a Nazi-Soviet war would become more likely--and let's face it, Hoover would probably prefer to see the Nazis and Soviets tearing each other to shreds while the U.S., Britain, and France remain neutral and watch.

In turn, could Britain's 1939 Polish Guarantee be completely butterflied away in this TL--with Poland becoming a Nazi German ally instead?

The Horny Goat

2018-02-24 16:09:10 UTC

Post by WolfBear
Also, didn't the Hoover administration propose to Poland in 1931 that it hand the Polish Corridor back to Germany? If so, this fact combined with Hoover's antipathy towards the Soviet Union during World War II in our TL could result in alt-President Hoover pushing Britain and France to avoid making military commitments to Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, et cetera). Indeed, Hoover might believe that, this way, the odds of a Nazi-Soviet war would become more likely--and let's face it, Hoover would probably prefer to see the Nazis and Soviets tearing each other to shreds while the U.S., Britain, and France remain neutral and watch.
In turn, could Britain's 1939 Polish Guarantee be completely butterflied away in this TL--with Poland becoming a Nazi German ally instead?

For that you would need a different Mein Kampf.

You will recall the discussions here a couple of years ago on the
general subject of "Germany allies with Ukraine vs Russia then turns
on them after the Soviet Union surrenders" - I suspect in the scenario
you're talking about something like that would happen.

Rob

2018-03-09 01:47:13 UTC

1st of all, as others have said we cannot assume that Republicans would not win in one more of 1920, 1924 or 1928. Though it is reasonable that the Democrats *could* be the victors in all 3 POTUS elections of the 1920s.

Makes sense.
1. Is the Great Depression likely to be as severe in this TL as it was in our TL?

OK.

Post by Rob
It is hard to predict what Democratic 1920s administrations' attitudes would be towards organized labor for instance.

Were the Democrats split on this issue?

Probably, especially along regional lines. Parties were not ideologically monolithic then.

Post by WolfBear
2. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle domestic policy in this TL? Would it be a Republican version of FDR's New Deal? Also, would anything be different?

Less beholden to the southern states, although, OTOH, Hoover and the GOP would probably want to use this opportunity to crack open "the solid south".

Completely agreed. Of course, this could create problems if Hoover and the GOP attempt to simultaneously court both poor White Southern voters and Black voters.

Post by Rob
There are a whole bunch of things that could be different. Hoover could possibly take a variety of economic interventionist measures but still not support pro-organized labor policies.

What difference would this have made, though?

You have to ask? This is huge. Widespread unionization of the American industrial workforce, after the passage of the Wagner Act, was a much bigger factor in the creation of the American "middle-class working class" than any government welfare programs.

Post by Rob
Or, he could ultimately use almost all FDR's OTL playbook.

OK.

Post by WolfBear
3. How would an alt-Hoover administration handle foreign policy in this TL--especially if Hitler and the Nazis still come to power in Germany in this TL?

Hard to tell, Hoover's personal experiences between 1916 and 1932 would be different from OTL, and that may be formative.

OK.

How much did Hoover want to get involved in foreign affairs during his Presidency?

I think he wanted to shrink military involvement, Presaging FDR's "Good Neighbor" Policy, he hoped to conclude US occupations of Caribbean countries.

He wanted to see international cooperation on economic matters however.

Post by Rob
An equally interesting question is what foreign policies do the Democratic Administrations of the 1920s pursue?

----His internationalism could perhaps torpedo his nomination if backlash against the war is what gives Democrats their chance.

At a minimum, Wilson would have to thread the needle of saying how Hughes did everything all wrong, implying he would do everything better and yet also stay sufficiently close to the sentiments of the American people, which would likely be against foreign policy overreach.

Post by Rob
What are their thoughts on the League or an alliance with Britain and France?

Again, depends on who the Democratic Presidents in the 1920s are.

Post by Rob
What are their attitudes on war debts and reparations?

Probably not much different from Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover in our TL, no?

Post by Rob
How are patterns of military spending different from OTL?

Perhaps slightly more spending on the military, but probably not by very much--at least until the late 1930s.

Why more than Republicans?

Agreed.

Post by Rob
I think a 1920s Democratic Administration to grant the Philippines independence or pass a law mandating a date-certain for Filipino independence that falls within the 1930s.

Agreed.
Also, didn't the Hoover administration propose to Poland in 1931 that it hand the Polish Corridor back to Germany?

I never heard of this.

Post by WolfBear
If so, this fact combined with Hoover's antipathy towards the Soviet Union during World War II in our TL >could result in alt-President Hoover pushing Britain and France to avoid making military commitments to >Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, et cetera).

Who knows?

Actually, would the Democrats of the 1920s be more willing to recognize the USSR?

------

One direction I have seen threads with this PoD go in is the idea that the Democrats own the 1920s and when the Great Depression comes, the Republicans become the "New Deal" party. Only it's even better because without dependence on southern votes, they can be pro-Civil Rights earlier.

Maybe.

Another question is if say Hooverite Republicans are the men of the New Deal and World War Two, do they have the same commitment to a free trade postwar order, or remain wedded to traditional pre-Depression Republican support for protectionism.

Rich Rostrom

2018-03-06 02:50:53 UTC

Post by WolfBear
If Charles Evans Hughes wins in 1916 and the
Democrats win in 1920, 1924, and 1928, who would the
Republican nominee be in 1932?

If Hughes wins in 1916... it is still likely that the
US declares war against Imperial Germany in 1917. But
it is not very likely that the Hughes administration
conducts the war effort in the same way as the Wilson
administration.

The 1920 Republican landslide was (IMO) as much a
repudiation of Wilson's specific style as of the war.

Thus it is hardly inevitable that the Democrats would
dominate the 1920s as the Republicans did OTL.

Even if the Democrats win in 1920, it is not hardly
certain that they would manage the post-war economic
shocks as effectively as Harding and Treasury Sec.
Andrew Mellon did.

The period from 1896 to 1930 was a period of almost
unbroken Republican domination. Even in 1910 to 1918,
the Democrats never got a popular majority for
President (which the Republicans did seven times in
the longer period). The Dems held the Senate three times,
once by 16 seats, whereas the Republicans held the Senate
14 times, 7 times by 20 seats or more. Republican
dominance of the House was nearly as complete. The only
gap was during the progressive/conservative split of
1910-1914, which had been largely healed by 1916.

Being the war party might ding the Republicans in 1920
but IMO not a permanent shift.

Post by WolfBear
Specifically, I am curious as to who exactly the
Republican version of FDR could be in this TL.

By 1932, there would be so many changes that the
conditions of the election, and the likely leading
figures of the Republicans, would be completely
unlike OTL.

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

David Tenner

2018-03-06 04:47:05 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by WolfBear
If Charles Evans Hughes wins in 1916 and the
Democrats win in 1920, 1924, and 1928, who would the
Republican nominee be in 1932?

(1) It is hard for me to see *any* peace treaty being genuinely popular.
German-Americans will say it is too harsh on Germany. Polish-Americans will
say that it didn't give enough German territory to Poland. Italian-Americans
will complain that it didn't give Italy enough, South Slavic Americans will
on the contrary complain that it gave Italy too much at Yugoslaviia's
expense. Austrian-Americans will resent Italy's getting the South Tyrol.
Irish-Americans will complain that the US, while fighting for the freedom of
small nations on the Continent, had neglected Irish freedom. Jewish voters
may think Hughes didn't do enough to prevent pogroms in eastern Europe.
Etc., etc.

Insofar as the chief difference between Wilson's peace and a Republiccan one
is likely to be less emphsais on a League of Nations and more on an old-
gashioned alliance with the UK and France--while that may be wise policy, it
is likely to be even more unpopular, going even more clearly against the
traditional American disdain of "entangling alliances" than the League did.

(2) The economic situation in 1920 is going to be bad under any
administration. First there will be inflation--which people will blame on
the "profiteers." Because of the association of Republicans with big
business, that might hurt Hughes even more than it did Wilson. Profiteer-
bashing may well have been irrational, as Keynes thought: "In the latter
stages of the war all the belligerent governments practiced, from necessity
or incompetence, what a Bolshevist might have done from design. Even now,
when the war is over, most of them continue out of weakness the same
malpractices. But further, the governments of Europe, being many of them at
this moment reckless in their methods as well as weak, seek to direct on to a
class known as 'profiteers' the popular indignation against the more obvious
consequences of their vicious methods. These 'profiteers' are, broadly
speaking, the entrepreneur class of capitalists, that is to say, the active
and constructive element in the whole capitalist society, who in a period of
rapidly rising prices cannot but get rich quick whether they wish it or
desire it or not. If prices are continually rising, every trader who has
purchased for stock or owns property and plant inevitably makes profits. By
directing hatred against this class, therefore, the European governments are
carrying a step further the fatal process which the subtle mind of Lenin had
consciously conceived. The profiteers are a consequence and not a cause of
rising prices...."
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/ess_inflation.html
But rational or not, such hatred was widespread. Frederick Lewis Allen
imagined a middle-class couple in 1919: "Mr. Smith tells his wife that 'these
profiteers are about as bad as the I. W. W.'s.' He could make no stronger
statement." http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/allen/ch1.html The inflation
will be followed by a necessary but equally unpopular deflation.
See
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/2MxBjocPtUA/Tne16RWpRDsJ
for why I do not think Harding's OTL policies vis-a-vis the recession deserve
the praise they get from some conservatives and libertarians nowadays.

Besides the specific problems America faced in 1920, there would also be a
more general dissarisfaction with the administration for leading the US into
the War. As one observer said, "It was not exactly a feeling that we should
or could have kept out of the war, but rather, an annoyed feeling that the
war should somehow have avoided us."

For all these reasons, I think that a decisive Democratic victory in 1920 is
likely. Now of course that doesn't mean that they would necessarily stay in
power the whole decade; indeed, I could see the Republicans winning control
of the House in 1922. But it does look like the recession would end well
before 1924 regardless of the party in the White House, and that would make
re-election of a Democratic president in this ATL likely. After all, one
reason the Republicans kept winning the White House in 1896-1908 is that they
had a reputation as the party of prosperity (the worst effects of the Panic
of 1907 were over by the time of the election of 1908) and the Democrats were
associated with the depression of the 1890's . If the Democrats could
establish themselves as the party of prosperity in the 1920's, there is no
particular reason to expect the 1894-1910 dominance of the Republicans to
resume.

--
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net

WolfBear

2018-03-06 05:23:44 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by WolfBear
If Charles Evans Hughes wins in 1916 and the
Democrats win in 1920, 1924, and 1928, who would the
Republican nominee be in 1932?

(1) It is hard for me to see *any* peace treaty being genuinely popular.
German-Americans will say it is too harsh on Germany. Polish-Americans will
say that it didn't give enough German territory to Poland. Italian-Americans
will complain that it didn't give Italy enough, South Slavic Americans will
on the contrary complain that it gave Italy too much at Yugoslaviia's
expense. Austrian-Americans will resent Italy's getting the South Tyrol.
Irish-Americans will complain that the US, while fighting for the freedom of
small nations on the Continent, had neglected Irish freedom. Jewish voters
may think Hughes didn't do enough to prevent pogroms in eastern Europe.
Etc., etc.
Insofar as the chief difference between Wilson's peace and a Republiccan one
is likely to be less emphsais on a League of Nations and more on an old-
gashioned alliance with the UK and France--while that may be wise policy, it
is likely to be even more unpopular, going even more clearly against the
traditional American disdain of "entangling alliances" than the League did.
(2) The economic situation in 1920 is going to be bad under any
administration. First there will be inflation--which people will blame on
the "profiteers." Because of the association of Republicans with big
business, that might hurt Hughes even more than it did Wilson. Profiteer-
bashing may well have been irrational, as Keynes thought: "In the latter
stages of the war all the belligerent governments practiced, from necessity
or incompetence, what a Bolshevist might have done from design. Even now,
when the war is over, most of them continue out of weakness the same
malpractices. But further, the governments of Europe, being many of them at
this moment reckless in their methods as well as weak, seek to direct on to a
class known as 'profiteers' the popular indignation against the more obvious
consequences of their vicious methods. These 'profiteers' are, broadly
speaking, the entrepreneur class of capitalists, that is to say, the active
and constructive element in the whole capitalist society, who in a period of
rapidly rising prices cannot but get rich quick whether they wish it or
desire it or not. If prices are continually rising, every trader who has
purchased for stock or owns property and plant inevitably makes profits. By
directing hatred against this class, therefore, the European governments are
carrying a step further the fatal process which the subtle mind of Lenin had
consciously conceived. The profiteers are a consequence and not a cause of
rising prices...."
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/ess_inflation.html
But rational or not, such hatred was widespread. Frederick Lewis Allen
imagined a middle-class couple in 1919: "Mr. Smith tells his wife that 'these
profiteers are about as bad as the I. W. W.'s.' He could make no stronger
statement." http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/allen/ch1.html The inflation
will be followed by a necessary but equally unpopular deflation.
See
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/2MxBjocPtUA/Tne16RWpRDsJ
for why I do not think Harding's OTL policies vis-a-vis the recession deserve
the praise they get from some conservatives and libertarians nowadays.
Besides the specific problems America faced in 1920, there would also be a
more general dissarisfaction with the administration for leading the US into
the War. As one observer said, "It was not exactly a feeling that we should
or could have kept out of the war, but rather, an annoyed feeling that the
war should somehow have avoided us."
For all these reasons, I think that a decisive Democratic victory in 1920 is
likely. Now of course that doesn't mean that they would necessarily stay in
power the whole decade; indeed, I could see the Republicans winning control
of the House in 1922. But it does look like the recession would end well
before 1924 regardless of the party in the White House, and that would make
re-election of a Democratic president in this ATL likely. After all, one
reason the Republicans kept winning the White House in 1896-1908 is that they
had a reputation as the party of prosperity (the worst effects of the Panic
of 1907 were over by the time of the election of 1908) and the Democrats were
associated with the depression of the 1890's . If the Democrats could
establish themselves as the party of prosperity in the 1920's, there is no
particular reason to expect the 1894-1910 dominance of the Republicans to
resume.
--
David Tenner

I agree that, if the economy recovers by 1924 (as it likely will), the Democrats will probably maintain control of the White House until at least 1932--depending on whether or not the Great Depression still occurs in this TL and how severe it is.

That said, though, a Hughes defeat in 1920 might be narrower than Cox's 1920 defeat in our TL was for two very simple reasons--specifically, Hughes might not have been as authoritarian as Wilson was during the war in our TL and Hughes wouldn't promise Americans a post-WWI utopia in Europe like Wilson did (rather, Hughes would set realistic war aims and accomplish them). In turn, both of these things might result in less anger and in less disappointment in the U.S. and thus in less of a push to have the opposition party win the next election. Of course, the poor economy will probably still screw over Hughes, but the margin of defeat for Hughes in 1920 would probably be smaller than the margin of defeat for Cox in 1920 was in our TL.

Also, as a side note, do you think that the Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate after the 1918 elections in this TL would be willing to ratify a U.S. treaty of alliance with Britain and France? I mean, on the one hand, ex-President Wilson would probably push the Democrats to ratify this treaty; however, on the other hand, Democrats might be more willing to listen to George Washington's 1796 advice against entangling foreign alliances in this TL. Also, for what it's worth, I think that the treaty of alliance would ultimately be ratified by the U.S. Senate in this TL due to ex-President Wilson's influence.

WolfBear

2018-03-06 05:25:15 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by WolfBear
If Charles Evans Hughes wins in 1916 and the
Democrats win in 1920, 1924, and 1928, who would the
Republican nominee be in 1932?

If Hughes wins in 1916... it is still likely that the
US declares war against Imperial Germany in 1917. But
it is not very likely that the Hughes administration
conducts the war effort in the same way as the Wilson
administration.
The 1920 Republican landslide was (IMO) as much a
repudiation of Wilson's specific style as of the war.
Thus it is hardly inevitable that the Democrats would
dominate the 1920s as the Republicans did OTL.
Even if the Democrats win in 1920, it is not hardly
certain that they would manage the post-war economic
shocks as effectively as Harding and Treasury Sec.
Andrew Mellon did.
The period from 1896 to 1930 was a period of almost
unbroken Republican domination. Even in 1910 to 1918,
the Democrats never got a popular majority for
President (which the Republicans did seven times in
the longer period). The Dems held the Senate three times,
once by 16 seats, whereas the Republicans held the Senate
14 times, 7 times by 20 seats or more. Republican
dominance of the House was nearly as complete. The only
gap was during the progressive/conservative split of
1910-1914, which had been largely healed by 1916.
Being the war party might ding the Republicans in 1920
but IMO not a permanent shift.

Post by WolfBear
Specifically, I am curious as to who exactly the
Republican version of FDR could be in this TL.

By 1932, there would be so many changes that the
conditions of the election, and the likely leading
figures of the Republicans, would be completely
unlike OTL.
--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

Please see my reply to David, Rich.

That said, though, could a Hughes Administration have affected the course of WWI itself? After all, Hughes--unlike Wilson--might get the U.S. Congress to declare war on *all* of the Central Powers rather than only on Austria-Hungary. Indeed, could this have resulted in changes to the Entente strategy?

For instance, could the Entente have been smart enough in this TL to try knocking out the Ottoman Empire in 1917 instead of focusing on Germany?

WolfBear

2018-03-06 05:27:43 UTC

Also, one more thing--since Senator Lodge supported unconditional surrender for Germany in World War I in our TL, I suspect that a President Hughes would have likewise demanded unconditional surrender from Germany in World War I in this TL. In turn, this might result in a slightly longer World War I since German morale might be stronger if the Germans knew that the Allies were expecting an unconditional surrender rather than a "generous peace" based on the 14 Points (which probably won't exist in this TL).

Indeed, if Germany's generals are required to sign an unconditional surrender document in order to end the war, then this would probably mean no Stab-in-the-Back Myth in Germany in this TL.

Rob

2018-03-09 01:19:56 UTC

Post by WolfBear
Also, one more thing--since Senator Lodge supported unconditional surrender for Germany in World War I in our TL, I suspect that a President Hughes would have likewise demanded unconditional surrender from Germany in World War I in this TL. In turn, this might result in a slightly longer World War I since German morale might be stronger if the Germans knew that the Allies were expecting an unconditional surrender rather than a "generous peace" based on the 14 Points (which probably won't exist in this TL).
Indeed, if Germany's generals are required to sign an unconditional surrender document in order to end the war, then this would probably mean no Stab-in-the-Back Myth in Germany in this TL.

I don't know. Mike Stone has argued that the Germans will surrender as soon as they get thrown back onto their borders.

I think he would also argue that, if we still have Bolesheviks and a power vacuum between Germany and Russia, Germany is apt to try for a rematch as soon as it can. (There's an argument that the only reason the Germans did not go for a third try was that, in the Cold War context, it meant getting overrun by the Russians.)

m***@gmail.com

2018-03-21 08:18:09 UTC

How do you mean "demand"?

Hughes, like Wilson, is only one man. If GB and France are ready to call it a day, he cannot compel them to continue the war.

Also, of course, the Armistice *was* for all practical purposes an unconditional surrender, since it left Germany totally incapable of renewing the war I don't know offhand about Lodge, but TR, the principal unconditional surrender advocate, was entirely satisfied with Marshal Foch's terms.

As for the stab in the back myth, why would an unconditional surrender prevent it? It's promoters would still blame the "November Criminals" for having destroyed the army's morale by suing for peace. And as that was what many Germans *wanted* to believe, they would have gone on believing it, any fiddlin' facts to the contrary notwithstanding.

Mike Stone - Peterborough, England.

Always drink upriver from the herd.

The Horny Goat

2018-03-23 03:51:37 UTC

Post by m***@gmail.com
As for the stab in the back myth, why would an unconditional surrender prevent it? It's promoters would still blame the "November Criminals" for having destroyed the army's morale by suing for peace. And as that was what many Germans *wanted* to believe, they would have gone on believing it, any fiddlin' facts to the contrary notwithstanding.

How do you avoid that myth once you have Ebert telling the troops in
December 1918 that they were not defeated?

Please remember who Ebert was - he was certainly no Junker
imperialist.

WolfBear

2018-03-26 23:11:32 UTC

Post by m***@gmail.com

How do you mean "demand"?
Hughes, like Wilson, is only one man. If GB and France are ready to call it a day, he cannot compel them to continue the war.

Yes, that's correct. That said, though, if he wants, he can try persuading Britain and France to demand a formal unconditional surrender from Germany.

Post by m***@gmail.com
Also, of course, the Armistice *was* for all practical purposes an unconditional surrender, since it left Germany totally incapable of renewing the war I don't know offhand about Lodge, but TR, the principal unconditional surrender advocate, was entirely satisfied with Marshal Foch's terms.

Very interesting!

Indeed, did you get this information from an editorial that TR wrote during this time?

That might be true, but please keep in mind that the German generals might be the ones who are signing the unconditional surrender document. Indeed, if they would have objected so badly to this document, why not resign and refuse to sign it?

Post by m***@gmail.com
Mike Stone - Peterborough, England.
Always drink upriver from the herd.

Rob

2018-04-08 23:45:40 UTC

Very interesting!
Indeed, did you get this information from an editorial that TR wrote during this time?

I still think it would be very interesting if the Allies had demanded that the wartime German leadership be the ones to personally sign the armistice. So the Kaiser, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Maybe have the whole governing gang from the beginning of the war, so Betthman Hollweg as well.

The Kaiser and Ludendorff I know fled the country right after the war to the Netherlands and to Sweden. If they want to stay hidden I suppose they could.

Of course, another option the Allies could take if they want to humiliate the Kaiser, Hindenburg and Ludendorff by signing the instrument of surrender, and not have them flee fearing for their lives would be if the Entente agreed to have the Germans sign the instrument of armistice/surrender in a neutral location, like the Netherlands. Maastricht would would not have been that far a trip for anybody.

WolfBear

2018-03-10 07:20:30 UTC

I'll respond to what you wrote in a bit, Rob. However, I have a question for everyone here:

Would the Southern U.S. have still been the most pro-intervention U.S. region in WWII if a Republican was in the White House during this time?

For the record, in our TL, the Southern U.S. was the most pro-intervention region of the U.S. in 1939-1941 (in spite of the fact that a war could encourage African-Americans to be more assertive in their push for civil rights after they'll come back home). However, that was with FDR being in the White House.

Would the Southern U.S. have had the same relatively pro-intervention sentiment in the late 1930s and early 1940s had a Republican been in the White House during this time (and assuming that the Nazis would have still come to power in Germany in this TL--something which is certainly not guaranteed)?

Rob

2018-03-10 13:49:19 UTC

Post by WolfBear
Would the Southern U.S. have still been the most pro-intervention U.S. region in WWII if a Republican was in the White House during this time?
For the record, in our TL, the Southern U.S. was the most pro-intervention region of the U.S. in 1939-1941 (in spite of the fact that a war could encourage African-Americans to be more assertive in their push for civil rights after they'll come back home). However, that was with FDR being in the White House.
Would the Southern U.S. have had the same relatively pro-intervention sentiment in the late 1930s and early 1940s had a Republican been in the White House during this time (and assuming that the Nazis would have still come to power in Germany in this TL--something which is certainly not guaranteed)?

I think so - According to Michael Lind, the only war in which the south was less pro-intervention than other parts of the country was the Spanish-American War. The Appalachian-Ozark districts could be a bit less interventionist than the tidewater and coastal plains.

For the most part, the south was always more sensitive about being bullied and feeling the need to avenge national honor than other parts of the country.

e***@gmail.com

2018-03-17 12:53:53 UTC