David Tenner
2018-02-08 04:54:39 UTC
Some Republicans in 1956 were worried that with President Eisenhower's
health likely to be a campaign issue, having Richard Nixon "one heartbrat
away" from the presidency would be politically disadvantageous. Harold
Stassen, for example, proposed to "dump Nixon" and replace him on the
ticket with Governor Christian Herter of Massachusetts. Ike never
expressed any sympathy for the "dump Nixon" movement. Yet some think that
he shared it concerns, because he urged Nixon to accept a Cabinet position
instead of running again for vice-president.
I think that more attention should be paid to the possibility that Ike was
absolutely sincere when he tried to persuade Nixon that taking a Cabinet
post, and thus getting important executive experience, would be a better
base for a successful presidential campaign in 1960 than remaining as
vice-president. After all, the last sitting VP to be elected president (as
opposed to becoming president by the incumbent president's death) was
Martin Van Buren in 1836. Irwin F. Gellman makes the argument for Ike's
sincerity in *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon,
1952-1961,* pp. 311-313:
"Eisenhower's attitude toward Nixon in the second spot from Christmas 1955
until the end of April 1956 seemed baffling. The president never uttered
an unkind or unpleasant word about his vice president, constantly called
him a friend, and expressed his admiration. Yet he also doggedly held to
the belief that Nixon should take a cabinet post and futilely encouraged
people like Robert Anderson, who had no desire for the job, to seek the
vice presidency.
"The president did not seem to understand that if Nixon did not run for
re-election, opponents would perceive this as a demotion, damaging his
future political prospects. It is possible that that the president had no
better grasp of partisan politics than he had of politics within the
faculty when he served as Columbia University president. Ike was a
brilliant bureaucratic manager, a skill that he had learned in the Army
and brought to the federal bureaucracy. The Army's way of grooming a
promising young officer was to give him a succession of assignments, so
that if and when he reached the high levels of command, he could call upon
to wide range of experience. Nixon had done extremely well as vice
president; now he could best burnish his credentials by accepting a new
assignment.
"Nixon, acutely conscious of political actions, knew that a move from
second in line to the presidency to a cabinet post, no matter how
carefully or often it was explained, would look like a demotion. If such a
move were even thought to be under consideration, his position would look
tenuous. A relentless striver from high school onward, he felt strongly
that if he were removed from the 1956 ticket, the public would conclude
that he had been dumped. Partly out of vanity and, partly out of political
savvy, he knew that it was not enough that he somehow maneuver his way
onto the ticket. Leaders were drafted for their posts. Eisenhower had to
pronounce him acceptable or even welcome, and possibly Nixon wanted to be
asked.
"The president's physical problems may have contributed to the clumsy
manner in which he dealt with the situation. The media reported, in minute
and glowing detail, on his heart and his ileum, but not on the president's
discomfort, the medications he was taking, or the extent of his inability
to function during his recovery. I na meeting with New York Times
columnist Arthur Krock on the afternoon on April 6, 1960, the president
explained why he thought Nixon should have joined the cabinet. Ike "had no
thought of trying to side-track Vice President Richard M. Nixon in 1956
when he suggested that Nixon might think a cabinet or equivalent post
would better serve his aspirations to be nominated for President in
196o." He reminded Nixon that no vice president since Martin Van Buren had
been elected president. Nixon considered the president's argument and
rejected it. He thought that "an appointive post would be taken as a
demotion" and also believed that because of the opportunities that the
president had given him, his public approval would rise. While Ike
considered six other Republicans who could fill the presidency, he
concluded that "none had qualifications superior to Nixon's.".
"In the spring of 1970, Robert Anderson sat down for an oral history. He
recalled that Ike had approached him on several occasions throughout 1955
for the second spot because he felt "that Anderson was the best qualified
to run" and that the GOP would accept him. Ike never discussed Nixon, but
he was not the president's "first choice." Even with Ike's flattery,
Anderson refused to budge; he was not enticed to enter elective politics
and remained a Texas Democrat until after the 1956 presidential election.
"In a conversation with Dillon Anderson, an Eisenhower National Security
Council (NSC) adviser, on February 9,1968, the former president reiterated
that "he was honestly trying to give Dick some good advice." When White
House counsel Bernard Shanley recalled the drama over the 1956 vice-
presidential ticket almost two decades after the fact, he said that the
president sincerely felt that Nixon was "at a dead end with this job of
Vice President." If he "were smart," he would take an equally significant
cabinet post, "and then you'll have a real launching pad for the future."
During two reminiscences, Attorney General Brownell held that Ike thought
if Nixon wanted to run for the president, he needed "some administrative
experience" like a cabinet position.
"If these opinions left any doubt as to the president's motivation, Milton
Eisenhower, in the summer of 1983, recalled staying at the White House
over the weekend when his brother talked to Nixon. Ike's admiration for
him had increased with time. Ike offered Nixon a cabinet post because he
did not see the vice presidency as "a good political springboard" for the
top spot. According to his brother, the president never seriously
considered another running mate in 1956. Milton stressed that while his
brother might have preferred Robert Anderson, "he did not feel strongly
enough about this to bring the matter to a climax.""
https://books.google.com/books?id=0UQJCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA311
It has to be said that Gellman has something of a pro-Nixon bias, and his
statement that Ike "never uttered an unkind or unpleasant word about his
vice president" is contradicted by Emmett John Hughes, who claimed that
Ike told him, "The fact is, of course, I've watched Dick a long time and
he just hasn't grown. So I just haven't honestly been able to believe that
he is presidential timber."
https://books.google.com/books?id=TvmRvRikXPMC&pg=PA240 Gellman dismisses
this by noting that Ike denied saying it
https://books.google.com/books?id=0UQJCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 after Hughes
published his account in late 1962. But this denial proves very little; it
is hardly likely that Ike would *admit* in 1962 to saying such a thing
about Nixon. And actually, Ike's denial was neither immediate nor totally
unequivocal. "Eisenhower was upset by Hughes's memoir--he regarded him as
a turncoat--and worried how his words would strike an already despondent
Nixon, but he said nothing about it until early December, when the editor
of the Augusta Chronicle tracked him down. He conceded that he might have
said Nixon wasn't ready for the presidency in 1956, but that was not the
same as saying that Nixon wasn't ready for the presidency, period..."
https://books.google.com/books?id=TvmRvRikXPMC&pg=PA240
A more substantial objection, I think, is that if Ike *really* believed
Nixon was not fit to be president, he would have dumped him from the
ticket, regardless of any political embarrassment it would have caused--
and Ike was certainly popular enough to withstand any such embarrassment.
Instead, all he did was suggest that Nixon take a Cabinet position--
accounts differ of what he offered, but the one I have seen most often is
Defense--and when Nixon rejected the idea, kept him on the ticket.
So let's say that Nixon does agree to step down as vice-president to take
a Cabinet position in 1956--let's say State or Defense, the two most
prestigious positions, and probably the only two it is plausible he would
accept. What effect does this have on Nixon's presidential prospects in
1960? (Of course that partly depends on who Ike chooses as running mate.
I'm nost sure how willing Republicans would be to accept a recent convert
from the Democrats like Anderson, though they did so in 1940...)
health likely to be a campaign issue, having Richard Nixon "one heartbrat
away" from the presidency would be politically disadvantageous. Harold
Stassen, for example, proposed to "dump Nixon" and replace him on the
ticket with Governor Christian Herter of Massachusetts. Ike never
expressed any sympathy for the "dump Nixon" movement. Yet some think that
he shared it concerns, because he urged Nixon to accept a Cabinet position
instead of running again for vice-president.
I think that more attention should be paid to the possibility that Ike was
absolutely sincere when he tried to persuade Nixon that taking a Cabinet
post, and thus getting important executive experience, would be a better
base for a successful presidential campaign in 1960 than remaining as
vice-president. After all, the last sitting VP to be elected president (as
opposed to becoming president by the incumbent president's death) was
Martin Van Buren in 1836. Irwin F. Gellman makes the argument for Ike's
sincerity in *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon,
1952-1961,* pp. 311-313:
"Eisenhower's attitude toward Nixon in the second spot from Christmas 1955
until the end of April 1956 seemed baffling. The president never uttered
an unkind or unpleasant word about his vice president, constantly called
him a friend, and expressed his admiration. Yet he also doggedly held to
the belief that Nixon should take a cabinet post and futilely encouraged
people like Robert Anderson, who had no desire for the job, to seek the
vice presidency.
"The president did not seem to understand that if Nixon did not run for
re-election, opponents would perceive this as a demotion, damaging his
future political prospects. It is possible that that the president had no
better grasp of partisan politics than he had of politics within the
faculty when he served as Columbia University president. Ike was a
brilliant bureaucratic manager, a skill that he had learned in the Army
and brought to the federal bureaucracy. The Army's way of grooming a
promising young officer was to give him a succession of assignments, so
that if and when he reached the high levels of command, he could call upon
to wide range of experience. Nixon had done extremely well as vice
president; now he could best burnish his credentials by accepting a new
assignment.
"Nixon, acutely conscious of political actions, knew that a move from
second in line to the presidency to a cabinet post, no matter how
carefully or often it was explained, would look like a demotion. If such a
move were even thought to be under consideration, his position would look
tenuous. A relentless striver from high school onward, he felt strongly
that if he were removed from the 1956 ticket, the public would conclude
that he had been dumped. Partly out of vanity and, partly out of political
savvy, he knew that it was not enough that he somehow maneuver his way
onto the ticket. Leaders were drafted for their posts. Eisenhower had to
pronounce him acceptable or even welcome, and possibly Nixon wanted to be
asked.
"The president's physical problems may have contributed to the clumsy
manner in which he dealt with the situation. The media reported, in minute
and glowing detail, on his heart and his ileum, but not on the president's
discomfort, the medications he was taking, or the extent of his inability
to function during his recovery. I na meeting with New York Times
columnist Arthur Krock on the afternoon on April 6, 1960, the president
explained why he thought Nixon should have joined the cabinet. Ike "had no
thought of trying to side-track Vice President Richard M. Nixon in 1956
when he suggested that Nixon might think a cabinet or equivalent post
would better serve his aspirations to be nominated for President in
196o." He reminded Nixon that no vice president since Martin Van Buren had
been elected president. Nixon considered the president's argument and
rejected it. He thought that "an appointive post would be taken as a
demotion" and also believed that because of the opportunities that the
president had given him, his public approval would rise. While Ike
considered six other Republicans who could fill the presidency, he
concluded that "none had qualifications superior to Nixon's.".
"In the spring of 1970, Robert Anderson sat down for an oral history. He
recalled that Ike had approached him on several occasions throughout 1955
for the second spot because he felt "that Anderson was the best qualified
to run" and that the GOP would accept him. Ike never discussed Nixon, but
he was not the president's "first choice." Even with Ike's flattery,
Anderson refused to budge; he was not enticed to enter elective politics
and remained a Texas Democrat until after the 1956 presidential election.
"In a conversation with Dillon Anderson, an Eisenhower National Security
Council (NSC) adviser, on February 9,1968, the former president reiterated
that "he was honestly trying to give Dick some good advice." When White
House counsel Bernard Shanley recalled the drama over the 1956 vice-
presidential ticket almost two decades after the fact, he said that the
president sincerely felt that Nixon was "at a dead end with this job of
Vice President." If he "were smart," he would take an equally significant
cabinet post, "and then you'll have a real launching pad for the future."
During two reminiscences, Attorney General Brownell held that Ike thought
if Nixon wanted to run for the president, he needed "some administrative
experience" like a cabinet position.
"If these opinions left any doubt as to the president's motivation, Milton
Eisenhower, in the summer of 1983, recalled staying at the White House
over the weekend when his brother talked to Nixon. Ike's admiration for
him had increased with time. Ike offered Nixon a cabinet post because he
did not see the vice presidency as "a good political springboard" for the
top spot. According to his brother, the president never seriously
considered another running mate in 1956. Milton stressed that while his
brother might have preferred Robert Anderson, "he did not feel strongly
enough about this to bring the matter to a climax.""
https://books.google.com/books?id=0UQJCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA311
It has to be said that Gellman has something of a pro-Nixon bias, and his
statement that Ike "never uttered an unkind or unpleasant word about his
vice president" is contradicted by Emmett John Hughes, who claimed that
Ike told him, "The fact is, of course, I've watched Dick a long time and
he just hasn't grown. So I just haven't honestly been able to believe that
he is presidential timber."
https://books.google.com/books?id=TvmRvRikXPMC&pg=PA240 Gellman dismisses
this by noting that Ike denied saying it
https://books.google.com/books?id=0UQJCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 after Hughes
published his account in late 1962. But this denial proves very little; it
is hardly likely that Ike would *admit* in 1962 to saying such a thing
about Nixon. And actually, Ike's denial was neither immediate nor totally
unequivocal. "Eisenhower was upset by Hughes's memoir--he regarded him as
a turncoat--and worried how his words would strike an already despondent
Nixon, but he said nothing about it until early December, when the editor
of the Augusta Chronicle tracked him down. He conceded that he might have
said Nixon wasn't ready for the presidency in 1956, but that was not the
same as saying that Nixon wasn't ready for the presidency, period..."
https://books.google.com/books?id=TvmRvRikXPMC&pg=PA240
A more substantial objection, I think, is that if Ike *really* believed
Nixon was not fit to be president, he would have dumped him from the
ticket, regardless of any political embarrassment it would have caused--
and Ike was certainly popular enough to withstand any such embarrassment.
Instead, all he did was suggest that Nixon take a Cabinet position--
accounts differ of what he offered, but the one I have seen most often is
Defense--and when Nixon rejected the idea, kept him on the ticket.
So let's say that Nixon does agree to step down as vice-president to take
a Cabinet position in 1956--let's say State or Defense, the two most
prestigious positions, and probably the only two it is plausible he would
accept. What effect does this have on Nixon's presidential prospects in
1960? (Of course that partly depends on who Ike chooses as running mate.
I'm nost sure how willing Republicans would be to accept a recent convert
from the Democrats like Anderson, though they did so in 1940...)
--
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net