WI Truman Pro Indonesia November 15, 1945

[Allen W. McDonnell]

WI President Truman recognizes the independent government of Indonesia
November 15, 1945 and hints to the Dutch that if they let the islands go
peacefully they will get a lot of help rebuilding their European country in
1946 and for as long as it takes to restore them to 1939 standards of
living?

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Allen W. McDonnell
WI President Truman recognizes the independent government of Indonesia
November 15, 1945 and hints to the Dutch that if they let the islands go
peacefully they will get a lot of help rebuilding their European country
in 1946 and for as long as it takes to restore them to 1939 standards of
living?

The Dutch were just like the French and British in Nov. 1945 viz. hoped
to restore (and profit from) their 1940 overseas empires. Among
these only Britain had elected a non-imperialist new government
(that ordered in 1946 independence for Burma, India and Ceylon.)
1. The USA was not ready in Nov. 1945 to give any peacetime
economic aid to European allies. (The Marshall Plan started only
in 1947 after Americans learned Britons had gone hungry in order
to supply minimum diet to Germans in the BZO, and after the threat
of Communist takeover of eastern Europe was recognized.)
2. There seems no American reason to offer special treatment
to the Netherlands (or Indonesia) in preference to any other country.

[Allen W. McDonnell]

The Dutch were not just like the British and French in 1945 in a very key
way. The USA had been trying for decades to get full market access to
European overseas markets and there was a lot of pressure on the government
from lobbyists to make this happen in any way possible. It has been argued
that the only real reason for the USA to go to war with Japan was because
they were cutting off acces to the huge market of China, both as a
extraction area and as a consumer base. The Dutch overseas Empire had one
real jewell in it as far as business was concerned, Indonesia. In 1945 the
Dutch have almost no army or navy and a very war weary population, but they
still resisted Indonesian independence for a long time after the war because
they saw it as their one hope for a return to prosperity.

If the USA had recognized Indonesia once it formed a functioning government
it would have really opened the doors of the new country to trade both of
products coming into the islands and raw materials flowing out to the USA,
which was the only fully functioning major economy in 1945. Indonesia would
have been very grateful for international recognition, but for the Dutch it
would have been a serious blow to their hopes for the future. By promising
to help the Dutch on the one hand while recognizing Indonesia on the other
hand the USA will get the best of both worlds, access to the biggest market
in the southern hemisphere and a clear political statement that if European
countries dismantel or open access to their Empires they will get a lot of
help from America with rebuilding.

[Rob]

Don brings up some good points on how Indonesia (and the Netherlands) were really not high priorities for the US leaders in the immediate postwar while the entire world demanded their attention.

I take it from Allen's posts he believes the more optimistic scenario for US economic and diplomatic gains in Indonesia that I sketched out rather than one that sees Indonesia remaining as neutral to hostile as it was in the OTL Cold War. He also is optimistic for what the Netherlands can gain economically and what the US is willing to give to help.

On the ground in Indonesia, things would probably be more complicated than as described in the OP, where the US recognizes independent Indonesia, secures Dutch acquiescence and boom, Indonesia is simply independent without fighting.

Rather I suspect if the US recognized the Indonesian Republic in areas it controlled in Java and Sumatra, this republic and the Netherlands would probably still dipute, haggle, and violently contest each other's claims to all the other islands in the archipelago, from Borneo to New Guinea.

[Allen W. McDonnell]

Post by Rob
On the ground in Indonesia, things would probably be more complicated than
as described in the OP, where the US recognizes independent Indonesia,
secures Dutch acquiescence >and boom, Indonesia is simply independent
without fighting.
Rather I suspect if the US recognized the Indonesian Republic in areas it
controlled in Java and Sumatra, this republic and the Netherlands would
probably still dipute, haggle, and >violently contest each other's claims
to all the other islands in the archipelago, from Borneo to New Guinea.

I believe if the USA had recognized Indonesia at all in 1947 it would have
been the whole deal, not two islands out of hundreds. I envision 1947
Indonesia as streching from the Indian Ocean all the way to the center of
New Guinea Island. I think if they get all of that they won't be to
interested in Malaysia, there is plenty of only lightly occupied and
undeveloped territory if they get the whole island group as they did
eventually in the late 1960's OTL.

[Rob]

Post by Allen W. McDonnell
I believe if the USA had recognized Indonesia at all in 1947 it would have
been the whole deal, not two islands out of hundreds. I envision 1947
Indonesia as streching from the Indian Ocean all the way to the center of
New Guinea Island.

OK -

I think if they get all of that they won't be to

Post by Allen W. McDonnell
interested in Malaysia, there is plenty of only lightly occupied and
undeveloped territory if they get the whole island group as they did
eventually in the late 1960's OTL.

On the one hand, the Indonesians have less frustration and bitterness to avenge while they have more territory to develop. On the other hand, the Indonesians have an even greater headstart in political development compared to their neighbors in Malaysia, East Timor and Papua New Guinea and have more time in which to nurture ambitions to "round out" to full control of islands they partially control (ie, Borneo, Timor, Papua).

Supposing the Indonesians just leave Malaysia alone, maybe the main regional security worry in Borneo is about Filipino-Malaysian rivalry over Sabah?

Likewise, I wonder about the long-term prospects of Indonesia holding together versus fragmenting via successful sessions (Aceh being the first area to come to mind, but I could imagine many other islands as well -- Malukus, Bali, Irian Jaya, etc.) On the one hand Indonesia becomes a going concern earlier and suffers less damage without the postwar Dutch "police actions", on the other hand, maybe Sukarno and the Indonesian Army have not developed the authority and cohesion earned from successfully fighting off the Dutch and they have trouble mounting efforts to stop attempts at regional breakaway.

I think you're looking for an optimistic Indonesia scenario so what do you think the long-term results of the PoD in the OP will be?

a) Indonesian standard of living up to Malaysian levels based on globally oriented trade and growth priorities combined with more peace.
b) Indonesia being pro-western throughout the Cold War, based initially on an appreciation of the US pro-independence stand. Indonesia by 1946 in its foreign policy orientation becomes a "second Philippines" possibly joining SEATO (maybe it's the Jakarta pact in the ATL instead of the Manila Pact) and sending token forces to Korea.
c) greater domestic peace and pro-American orientation leading to a consistently smaller constituency for the Indonesian Communist party and a correspondingly reduced chance of anti-communist and anti-Chinese massacres in Indonesia?
d) More and more positive Dutch-Indonesian cultural and tourist ties once Western European economies recover in the 1950s.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Allen W. McDonnell
The Dutch were not just like the British and French in 1945 in a very key
way. . . . The Dutch overseas Empire had one real jewell in it as far as
business was concerned, Indonesia. In 1945 the Dutch have almost no army
or navy and a very war weary population, but they still resisted
Indonesian independence for a long time after the war because they saw it
as their one hope for a return to prosperity.

This seems to confirm the sentence complained of:
"The Dutch were just like the French and British in Nov. 1945 viz. hoped
to restore (and profit from) their 1940 overseas empires."

[Rob]

Post by Allen W. McDonnell
WI President Truman recognizes the independent government of Indonesia
November 15, 1945 and hints to the Dutch that if they let the islands go
peacefully they will get a lot of help rebuilding their European country in
1946 and for as long as it takes to restore them to 1939 standards of
living?

An excellent, excellent question. I've asked it myself and speculated as well, although I still posed more questions than answers:

Quoted from AH.com: http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=299053&highlight=indonesia

Firmly on the right side of history, Indonesia, 1945
What if Australia and the United States unequivocally recognized the independence of the Indonesian republic from VJ-Day on, over the entire former Dutch East Indies?

In OTL, the Australians first, and then the Americans, came to gradually support Indonesian independence while all along favoring Dutch-Indonesian compromise, deciding to not tolerate further Dutch efforts from 1949.

What if the two countries opposed Dutch reclamation of the territory from the very beginning and supported immediate independence, with as much UN supervision as the Indonesians would be willing to tolerate?

Their rationale could be that Indonesia is the economic prize of Southeast Asia, and the Dutch are too weak to succeed in retaking and holding the colony.

Also, opposing the Dutch in Indonesia is much lower risk than say, opposing the French in Indochina, because the Netherlands are not a permanent 5 security council member, or an occupying power within Germany. Also, even those already worried about political stability in Europe vis-a-vis communists could see the Netherlands communist party was much weaker than it's French counterpart, peaking at 11% of the vote in the second half of the 1940s. A doubling or trebling of its share still would be far short of a majority.

So first, what are the effects in Indonesia. Sukarno was already dominant on that side. Is he more friendly to the west? Does he align with the US coalition and send troops to Korea? If pro-western at first, does this persist through the 1950s and 1960s, causing Djakarta to never get as interested in Soviet or Chinese ties? Domestically, what happens with the economy and foreign trade patterns? And the balance between left-leaning, Islamic and military political forces. If Sukarno remains in power (and he may not. If there's no war of independence his role in independence may become less appreciated after a time) is he likely to still seek to absorb Malaysia?

(as an aside, did the Japanese occupy Portuguese East Timor or was it neutral during WWII?).

What are the reverberations in Europe and other colonial empires. I am assuming *no* change in US Indochina policy. But, how bitter is the Netherlands at exclusion and what can it do about it? It wouldn't try to resume a neutral stance, would it? Would its economic recovery be damaged?

The British and French will be fearful of US intentions, but I don't think what is done to Netherlands, and not their own empires, makes their European policies change in any material way. Might they seek to delay Indonesian entry into the UN?

Does the example of the Australian and American pro-independence stance in this one instance change expectations in the colonial world and cause earlier difficulties for the other colonial powers in their own territories?

[Rob]

Post by Allen W. McDonnell
WI President Truman recognizes the independent government of Indonesia
November 15, 1945 and hints to the Dutch that if they let the islands go
peacefully they will get a lot of help rebuilding their European country in
1946 and for as long as it takes to restore them to 1939 standards of
living?

How would the Dutch react to this US pressure?

Would the Communist share of the Dutch vote increase?

Would Netherlands still join NATO or resume its historic neutrality instead?

It's been said France could and would cause a lot of trouble if the US had really pressed for Vietnamese independence in 1945. What kind of trouble could or would the Dutch cause?