A different WWII Japanese strategy

John Dallman
Roosevelt will probably be unable to take the USA to war with Japan over
this, at least for a while. That's the gamble in this plan, which is why not
attacking anything American is so important.

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?

With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-09 16:35:39 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

Alex Milman

2018-02-09 18:40:31 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

But, IIRC, in his declaration of war speech Hitler was referencing to some kind of a naval accident in his list of the American anti-German activities so, perhaps, in this ATL Japanese still could be provoked in some kind of action with a resulting OTL-like effect upon the American public opinion.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-09 19:25:42 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

Ehh, possibly but personally I have some doubts about it. OTL a lot of
people believed or wanted to believe that it was actually the Germans
who attacked Pearl apparently, it was already known to the public that
Germany and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance and there is a
significant emotional difference between a couple of small ships taking
a couple shots at each other on the other side of the world versus a
major naval base being attacked with massive casualties. Given those
the American public took being at war with Germany too in stride as
something expected anyways. I doubt many cared about Germany's
diplomatic reasons for the declaration of war.

If Japan is going to the kind of lengths proposed to avoid conflict with
the US, I can easily see them shrugging off occasional shooting
incidents. They could sacrifice a lower rank CO or two, especially as
the US was already expanding its military and would likely accelerate
that in this ATL.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

Alex Milman

2018-02-09 20:05:25 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

Ehh, possibly but personally I have some doubts about it. OTL a lot of
people believed or wanted to believe that it was actually the Germans
who attacked Pearl apparently, it was already known to the public that
Germany and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance and there is a
significant emotional difference between a couple of small ships taking
a couple shots at each other on the other side of the world versus a
major naval base being attacked with massive casualties. Given those
the American public took being at war with Germany too in stride as
something expected anyways. I doubt many cared about Germany's
diplomatic reasons for the declaration of war.
If Japan is going to the kind of lengths proposed to avoid conflict with
the US, I can easily see them shrugging off occasional shooting
incidents. They could sacrifice a lower rank CO or two, especially as
the US was already expanding its military and would likely accelerate
that in this ATL.

So, if we assume that the US is at war with Germany but not Japan, we have an extended Soviet scenario (also at war with Germany only). An interesting aspect absent in the case of the SU would be Lend Lease to the UK which _IS_ at war with Japan. Unless there is a guarantee (why would FDR give it?) that the US help is going strictly for the purposes of fighting against Germany, the Japanese would have a hard time accepting such a type of neutrality.

A byproduct of that schema would be a greater volume of the US supplies coming to the SU through the Soviet Pacific ports.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-09 21:00:51 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

Ehh, possibly but personally I have some doubts about it. OTL a lot of
people believed or wanted to believe that it was actually the Germans
who attacked Pearl apparently, it was already known to the public that
Germany and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance and there is a
significant emotional difference between a couple of small ships taking
a couple shots at each other on the other side of the world versus a
major naval base being attacked with massive casualties. Given those
the American public took being at war with Germany too in stride as
something expected anyways. I doubt many cared about Germany's
diplomatic reasons for the declaration of war.
If Japan is going to the kind of lengths proposed to avoid conflict with
the US, I can easily see them shrugging off occasional shooting
incidents. They could sacrifice a lower rank CO or two, especially as
the US was already expanding its military and would likely accelerate
that in this ATL.

So, if we assume that the US is at war with Germany but not Japan, we have an extended Soviet scenario (also at war with Germany only). An interesting aspect absent in the case of the SU would be Lend Lease to the UK which _IS_ at war with Japan. Unless there is a guarantee (why would FDR give it?) that the US help is going strictly for the purposes of fighting against Germany, the Japanese would have a hard time accepting such a type of neutrality.
A byproduct of that schema would be a greater volume of the US supplies coming to the SU through the Soviet Pacific ports.

If Japan doesn't attack the US, I don't see why Germany would declare
war on the US.

Japan can protest all they want about US Lend-Lease going to the UK but
since I would expect that the massive bulk of it would be going across
the Atlantic there really isn't much else they can do about it. They
already felt the US wasn't being "neutral" because of the embargoes and
economic sanctions levied against them.

As for more LL to the Soviet Union thru the Pacific, how much more could
the Trans-Siberian Railroad have handled? If the SU could have taken in
more via the safer Pacific ports why were the western allies shipping so
much via Murmansk which was much riskier?

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

Alex Milman

2018-02-10 16:32:00 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

Ehh, possibly but personally I have some doubts about it. OTL a lot of
people believed or wanted to believe that it was actually the Germans
who attacked Pearl apparently, it was already known to the public that
Germany and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance and there is a
significant emotional difference between a couple of small ships taking
a couple shots at each other on the other side of the world versus a
major naval base being attacked with massive casualties. Given those
the American public took being at war with Germany too in stride as
something expected anyways. I doubt many cared about Germany's
diplomatic reasons for the declaration of war.
If Japan is going to the kind of lengths proposed to avoid conflict with
the US, I can easily see them shrugging off occasional shooting
incidents. They could sacrifice a lower rank CO or two, especially as
the US was already expanding its military and would likely accelerate
that in this ATL.

So, if we assume that the US is at war with Germany but not Japan, we have an extended Soviet scenario (also at war with Germany only). An interesting aspect absent in the case of the SU would be Lend Lease to the UK which _IS_ at war with Japan. Unless there is a guarantee (why would FDR give it?) that the US help is going strictly for the purposes of fighting against Germany, the Japanese would have a hard time accepting such a type of neutrality.
A byproduct of that schema would be a greater volume of the US supplies coming to the SU through the Soviet Pacific ports.

If Japan doesn't attack the US, I don't see why Germany would declare
war on the US.

Because there was a thing called "Lend Lease", which made US neutrality questionable, to put it mildly. The same for the German U-boat activities: either the US ships going to Britain are not attacked (which makes the whole thing a little bit bizarre) or they are being attacked with a perfect excuse for the US to enter the war (see WWI).

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Japan can protest all they want about US Lend-Lease going to the UK but
since I would expect that the massive bulk of it would be going across
the Atlantic there really isn't much else they can do about it.

Which answers to your rhetorical question about Germany and its reasons for declaring a war on the US. :-)

And, taking into an account that the US help could go to Australia and New Zealand, Japanese would have to start worrying about it as well.

Post by Dimensional Traveler
They
already felt the US wasn't being "neutral" because of the embargoes and
economic sanctions levied against them.

And if they feel that US is not neutral, then the whole house of card at the foundation of this ATL is crumbling.

Post by Dimensional Traveler
As for more LL to the Soviet Union thru the Pacific, how much more could
the Trans-Siberian Railroad have handled?

Taking into an account amounts of equipment and personnel transported by that road in few months between capitulation of Germany and Soviet declaration of war on Japan, it could carry a LOT. Not to mention that, in OTL it was carried only non-military products brought by the Soviet ships (not too many of which had been available), which means that most probably it was operating well below its capacity. In ATL there would be no limitation on a nature of goods and much greater volume because the US shipping would be added.

Post by Dimensional Traveler
If the SU could have taken in
more via the safer Pacific ports why were the western allies shipping so
much via Murmansk which was much riskier?

See above. Because the US happened to be at war with Japan and the cargo could be carried to the Far East ports only by the Soviet ships. And the SU did not have a big merchant fleet in general and on the Pacific specifically.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-10 17:05:39 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

Ehh, possibly but personally I have some doubts about it. OTL a lot of
people believed or wanted to believe that it was actually the Germans
who attacked Pearl apparently, it was already known to the public that
Germany and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance and there is a
significant emotional difference between a couple of small ships taking
a couple shots at each other on the other side of the world versus a
major naval base being attacked with massive casualties. Given those
the American public took being at war with Germany too in stride as
something expected anyways. I doubt many cared about Germany's
diplomatic reasons for the declaration of war.
If Japan is going to the kind of lengths proposed to avoid conflict with
the US, I can easily see them shrugging off occasional shooting
incidents. They could sacrifice a lower rank CO or two, especially as
the US was already expanding its military and would likely accelerate
that in this ATL.

So, if we assume that the US is at war with Germany but not Japan, we have an extended Soviet scenario (also at war with Germany only). An interesting aspect absent in the case of the SU would be Lend Lease to the UK which _IS_ at war with Japan. Unless there is a guarantee (why would FDR give it?) that the US help is going strictly for the purposes of fighting against Germany, the Japanese would have a hard time accepting such a type of neutrality.
A byproduct of that schema would be a greater volume of the US supplies coming to the SU through the Soviet Pacific ports.

If Japan doesn't attack the US, I don't see why Germany would declare
war on the US.

Lend-Lease and the actions against U-Boats had been going on for some
time and neither side had declared war over it. It took the Japanese
attack to prod Germany into it. Without out that attack nothing in the
Atlantic has changed so why would _Germany_ do something different?

Which answers to your rhetorical question about Germany and its reasons for declaring a war on the US. :-)

Germany didn't care that much about Japan.

Post by Alex Milman
And, taking into an account that the US help could go to Australia and New Zealand, Japanese would have to start worrying about it as well.

And a carrier raid against the Lend-Lease convoys could discourage that,
but would almost certainly invoke a US declaration of war which is what
Japan is actively trying to avoid in this ATL.

Post by Dimensional Traveler
They
already felt the US wasn't being "neutral" because of the embargoes and
economic sanctions levied against them.

And if they feel that US is not neutral, then the whole house of card at the foundation of this ATL is crumbling.

Which might have something to do with why the Japanese didn't try this
in real life. :) That's not to say that its an ASB level ATL but
realistically I think that best Japan could get would be a delay of the
start of war with the US. Whether that is better or worse for Japan I
don't know.

Post by Dimensional Traveler
As for more LL to the Soviet Union thru the Pacific, how much more could
the Trans-Siberian Railroad have handled?

Post by Dimensional Traveler
If the SU could have taken in
more via the safer Pacific ports why were the western allies shipping so
much via Murmansk which was much riskier?

In prior discussions of Soviet Far East ports and Lend-Lease, people
have mentioned that the bulk was actually carried by US ships flying
Soviet flags of convenience. (Or maybe the ships themselves were part
of the Lend-Lease shipments. ;) ) The Japanese didn't attack these
convoys because they didn't want to piss off the Soviets who had handed
them their military ass in multiple pieces not too many years prior.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

pyotr filipivich

2018-02-15 04:30:18 UTC

Post by Dimensional Traveler
As for more LL to the Soviet Union thru the Pacific, how much more could
the Trans-Siberian Railroad have handled? If the SU could have taken in
more via the safer Pacific ports why were the western allies shipping so
much via Murmansk which was much riskier?

If memory serves, the SU was importing a lot of Lend Lease (etc)
through the Pacific port - on SU (or neutral) flagged ships, right up
until August 1945. And there wasn't a lot of options for landing
cargo on the Pacific coast outside of Vladivostok.

But anything which landed in Vladivostok had another 10 days to
get to Moscow by train. So, Murmansk was a "viable" alternative. For
some value of "viable".

tschus
pyotr

--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-10 03:12:52 UTC

On Fri, 9 Feb 2018 11:25:42 -0800, Dimensional Traveler

Post by Dimensional Traveler
I doubt many cared about Germany's
diplomatic reasons for the declaration of war.

I agree - if you've listened to Hitler's speech it was fairly clear he
was talking to Germans, not the foreign diplomatic corp or press.

Post by Dimensional Traveler
If Japan is going to the kind of lengths proposed to avoid conflict with
the US, I can easily see them shrugging off occasional shooting
incidents. They could sacrifice a lower rank CO or two, especially as
the US was already expanding its military and would likely accelerate
that in this ATL.

Remember Yamamoto's dictum that Japan would run rampant in the first
year of a US-Japanese war but would not dare to predict anything
beyond that.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-10 05:50:04 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Fri, 9 Feb 2018 11:25:42 -0800, Dimensional Traveler

Post by Dimensional Traveler
I doubt many cared about Germany's
diplomatic reasons for the declaration of war.

I agree - if you've listened to Hitler's speech it was fairly clear he
was talking to Germans, not the foreign diplomatic corp or press.

Remember Yamamoto's dictum that Japan would run rampant in the first
year of a US-Japanese war but would not dare to predict anything
beyond that.

The rest of Japan's response seems to have pretty much been "Okay, fine,
we'll just beat them inside a year!" (As it turned out, they actually
only had six months but details.... :D )

Maybe the POD for the TL is Yamamoto was more persuasive and was able to
actually make the Japanese government understand they _couldn't_ beat
the US in that year.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

pyotr filipivich

2018-02-15 04:30:18 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda Gulf of Tonkin Incident to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, theres no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

I don't know, but wasn't there some kind of fiction about only
attacking "unidentified hostile submarines."? After all, we were
Officially Neutral, and willing to sell things to all comers.

--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-15 07:47:50 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

I don't know, but wasn't there some kind of fiction about only
attacking "unidentified hostile submarines."? After all, we were
Officially Neutral, and willing to sell things to all comers.

Well, who else besides Germany would have had submarines shooting at
merchant shipping in the Atlantic at the time?

As for selling to all comers, was Germany at all interested in buying
from the US? Germany had sympathizers and supporters in the US, Henry
Ford and Lindberg infamously among them.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

pyotr filipivich

2018-02-15 17:25:14 UTC

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

I don't know, but wasn't there some kind of fiction about only
attacking "unidentified hostile submarines."? After all, we were
Officially Neutral, and willing to sell things to all comers.

Well, who else besides Germany would have had submarines shooting at
merchant shipping in the Atlantic at the time?
As for selling to all comers, was Germany at all interested in buying
from the US? Germany had sympathizers and supporters in the US, Henry
Ford and Lindberg infamously among them.

I recall reading that one of the problems the US had in 1942 was
machine tools. Seems that Krupp had retained a monopoly on tungsten
carbide, which mean the US (and the allies) had to find new sources in
a hurry.

--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-15 17:51:08 UTC

Could Roosevelt pull off a kinda “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” to get a war with
the Japanese and the Axis, where aggressive U.S. naval forces goad some
hot headed Japanese captain into attacking an American ship?
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, there’s no way to know who strayed over the line.

US destroyers were already engaging German U-Boats IIRC and it doesn't
seem to have affected isolationism.

I don't know, but wasn't there some kind of fiction about only
attacking "unidentified hostile submarines."? After all, we were
Officially Neutral, and willing to sell things to all comers.

Well, who else besides Germany would have had submarines shooting at
merchant shipping in the Atlantic at the time?
As for selling to all comers, was Germany at all interested in buying
from the US? Germany had sympathizers and supporters in the US, Henry
Ford and Lindberg infamously among them.

Wasn't a lack of tungsten one of the problems that plagued the German
jet development programs? Or am I thinking some other metal.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

John Dallman

2018-02-15 23:53:00 UTC

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Wasn't a lack of tungsten one of the problems that plagued the
German jet development programs? Or am I thinking some other metal?

Primarily nickel and chromium for jet engines. Tungsten was desirable for
anti-tank ammunition, but the limited supplies the Germans has access to
required that it be reserved for machine tools.

John

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-16 02:43:51 UTC

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Wasn't a lack of tungsten one of the problems that plagued the
German jet development programs? Or am I thinking some other metal?

Primarily nickel and chromium for jet engines. Tungsten was desirable for
anti-tank ammunition, but the limited supplies the Germans has access to
required that it be reserved for machine tools.

Thank you.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

pyotr filipivich

2018-02-17 00:33:46 UTC

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Wasn't a lack of tungsten one of the problems that plagued the
German jet development programs? Or am I thinking some other metal?

Primarily nickel and chromium for jet engines. Tungsten was desirable for
anti-tank ammunition, but the limited supplies the Germans has access to
required that it be reserved for machine tools.

Thank you - I knew there were bottlenecks in strategic metals, but
couldn't recall them.

--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-16 02:53:54 UTC

On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 09:25:14 -0800, pyotr filipivich

Post by Ed Stasiak
With the Philippines and other territories still in American hands but in the

Post by Ed Stasiak
midst of the Japanese Empire, Roosevelt could order destroyers to patrol
about and arrogantly challenge any shipping in the area and with no GPS
and primitive radio tech, theres no way to know who strayed over the line.

Which STILL doesn't automatically mean war as the fates of the Reuben
James and Kearsage proves.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-15 16:40:12 UTC

On Wed, 14 Feb 2018 20:30:18 -0800, pyotr filipivich

Post by pyotr filipivich
I don't know, but wasn't there some kind of fiction about only
attacking "unidentified hostile submarines."? After all, we were
Officially Neutral, and willing to sell things to all comers.

Which was itself 'some kind of fiction' since in a war with one side
having naval supremacy that means one side only having the ability to
trade with the neutral.

As I'm quite sure both Lloyd George and Wilson knew as did Churchill
and FDR 20 years later.

pyotr filipivich

2018-02-15 17:25:14 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Wed, 14 Feb 2018 20:30:18 -0800, pyotr filipivich

Which was itself 'some kind of fiction' since in a war with one side
having naval supremacy that means one side only having the ability to
trade with the neutral.
As I'm quite sure both Lloyd George and Wilson knew as did Churchill
and FDR 20 years later.

Well, yes. Just like those "fair and honest" elections, where one
party keeps the other party's voters from reaching the polls.

--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-16 02:55:23 UTC

On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 09:25:14 -0800, pyotr filipivich

Post by The Horny Goat
Which was itself 'some kind of fiction' since in a war with one side
having naval supremacy that means one side only having the ability to
trade with the neutral.
As I'm quite sure both Lloyd George and Wilson knew as did Churchill
and FDR 20 years later.

Well, yes. Just like those "fair and honest" elections, where one
party keeps the other party's voters from reaching the polls.

With respect economic blockade in wartime and voter suppression are
somewhat different subjects!

pyotr filipivich

2018-02-17 00:33:46 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 09:25:14 -0800, pyotr filipivich

Well, yes. Just like those "fair and honest" elections, where one
party keeps the other party's voters from reaching the polls.

With respect economic blockade in wartime and voter suppression are
somewhat different subjects!

True. But "truth is the first casualty in war". And "Politics
is war by other means." (Or is it "War is politics by other means"?)

tschus
pyotr

--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.

Alex Milman

2018-02-09 19:54:35 UTC

Post by John Dallman
I'm reading volume VI/I of *Germany and the Second World War*, a vast
sort-of-official history by the Research Institute for Military History
in Potsdam. The English translation is published by Oxford University
Press. It's really good.
This volume is "The Global War," part of which is about the development
of Japanese plans before they joined the war, and their conduct of it up
to the end of 1942. There's an interesting what-if, although it relies on
two fairly unlikely things: the Japanese Army and Navy actually
co-operating, and their having some insight into US politics of the
period.
There was a period of negotiations between the US and Japan before Pearl
Harbour, which historically didn't get anywhere, because the Japanese
Army was unwilling to stop trying to conquer China. The WI strategy
starts there, with the Japanese showing willingness to stop that,
"although it will take some time to achieve a stable situation allowing
us to withdraw without China collapsing into anarchy, or worse,
Communism." While taking about that with the US administration, they also
assure the isolationists in Congress that they want to end European
colonialism in Asia, but are keen to have a trading relationship with the
USA.
Then, when the Japanese go to war, they do not attack any US territory or
holdings. Pearl Harbour, the Philippines and the Aleutians are left
strictly alone. They attack the Dutch holdings in the East Indies, and
the British in Malaya. Once they are established ashore in both of those
places, they re-gather their transports, and attack the British in Ceylon,
aiming to take the island, and the Vichy French in Madagascar, likewise.
They can then follow up by taking Diego Garcia and other Indian Ocean
islands belonging to European powers.
Roosevelt will probably be unable to take the USA to war with Japan over
this, at least for a while. That's the gamble in this plan, which is why
not attacking anything American is so important.
If the Japanese can avoid war with the USA, they're in a good position.
They've severely undermined the British position in India, which is a
huge problem. They can also cut off supplies to the British armies in
North Africa, which were already having to go the long way around Africa.

Weren't the Brits still pretty much in control of the Med?

Post by John Dallman
That allows Rommel to take Egypt, followed by the Levant, and to start
towards Iraq and Iran.

Rommel had very limited human and technical resources in his disposal and big problems with the supplies. Dislodging the Brits from Egypt would be highly problematic even under the best case (for him) scenario and going further would require a completely different logistics (unless his troops are moving towards Iraq and Iran on foot).

Post by John Dallman
And suddenly the Axis powers have access tofir oil,

"Suddenly" they'd get very little because oil can't be used in the cars and tanks and it is highly optimistic to assume that the Brits would not destroy the available refineries or that Rommel would carry all necessary equipment and specialist with him.

If anything, there is an example of the German drive to the Northern Caucasus where they found the oil rigs and other equipment destroyed.

Post by John Dallman
the Lend-Lease route
through Iran to the USSR is cut off,

Well, ALL this being accomplished by a single Afrika Korps or, let's be generous, Panzer Army Africa (as of August 1942: Afrika Korps, Italian X Corps, Italian XXI Corps, Italian XX Motorised Corps, Italian 133rd Armored Division Littorio; total 9 divisions)?

As for conquest of Egypt (a trifle on the way to Iran), in the 1st Battle of Alamein Rommel had 96K troops (40K German) vs. 150K British and corresponding ratio of the planes, tanks and artillery pieces.

Soviet-British forces in Iran amounted to 200K with approximately 1000 tanks in the Soviet armies only.

Of course, it is interesting to speculate if Hitler would abstain from declaring war on the US in an absence of Japanese move but anyway, the Lend Lease was already going on making "Rommel conquers the world" scenario highly unlikely.

John Dallman

2018-02-09 22:42:00 UTC

Post by John Dallman
huge problem. They can also cut off supplies to the British
armies in North Africa, which were already having to go the
long way around Africa.

Weren't the Brits still pretty much in control of the Med?

No. The forces on Malta were taking a heavy toll on shipments from Italy
to Africa, but the Italians were making it hard to run convoys through
the Med. Nobody was really in control in late 1941.

Post by Alex Milman
Rommel had very limited human and technical resources in his
disposal and big problems with the supplies. Dislodging the Brits
from Egypt would be highly problematic even under the best case
(for him) scenario

If there's no supplies from the UK, they start running out of spares and
ammunition quite fast. Egypt is practical, but the next thing to do, on
reflection, is to take Malta.

Post by Alex Milman
the Lend-Lease route through Iran to the USSR is cut off,
Well, ALL this being accomplished by a single Afrika Korps

Actually, that's accomplished by the Japanese cutting off the transport
of Lend-Lease to the Persian Gulf. The stuff all got there by ship.

For the rest, OK, the numbers don't stack up.

John

Alex Milman

2018-02-10 17:05:59 UTC

Post by John Dallman
huge problem. They can also cut off supplies to the British
armies in North Africa, which were already having to go the
long way around Africa.

Weren't the Brits still pretty much in control of the Med?

No. The forces on Malta were taking a heavy toll on shipments from Italy
to Africa, but the Italians were making it hard to run convoys through
the Med. Nobody was really in control in late 1941.

And yet the British convoys had been passing through and Italian Navy was destroyed leaving the Axis with only air force as a tool. Taking into an account that Germany needed air force elsewhere as well, this tool was hardly adequate for the task of stopping British shipping on the Med.

If there's no supplies from the UK,

But this was not the case in OTL and would not be in ATL so this is a pointless speculation.

Post by John Dallman
they start running out of spares and
ammunition quite fast.

And the same was going for the Axis forces, especially when they were advancing further from their bases.

Post by John Dallman
Egypt is practical,

Not at all, short of the above OTL level incompetence of the British command and even then highly questionable. Not to mention that the Axis forces got close to Egypt only in mid-1942 (the 1st Battle of Alamein).

Post by John Dallman
but the next thing to do, on
reflection, is to take Malta.

I have to disappoint you: importance of Malta was obvious to BOTH sides as early as 1940 (statements to this effect are available). But there is a big difference between understanding something and being able to accomplish the task. Italian bombing was inadequate for the intended purpose of destroying RAF defenses and the ports, which made
planned combined German–Italian amphibious landing impossible.

Post by Alex Milman
the Lend-Lease route through Iran to the USSR is cut off,
Well, ALL this being accomplished by a single Afrika Korps

Actually, that's accomplished by the Japanese cutting off the transport
of Lend-Lease to the Persian Gulf.

Japanese navy did not have limitless resources and in your schema it is already all over the place with a complete disregard to the supply lines and other "trifles". But, even if we decide to ignore the technicalities (like Persian Gulf being on the wrong side of India, etc.), the whole thing would be quite low on Japanese set of the priorities. Why would they bother about Lend Lease to the Soviet Union if it was a friendly neutral to Japan and, among other things, an important oil supplier (Japan had licences on oil extraction from Northern Sakhalin)?

Rich Rostrom

2018-02-11 10:03:19 UTC

Post by John Dallman
No. The forces on Malta were taking a heavy toll on shipments from Italy
to Africa, but the Italians were making it hard to run convoys through
the Med. Nobody was really in control in late 1941.

And yet the British convoys had been passing through

Umm, wrong. There was _no_ British shipping through
the Med in 1941 or 1942. There were some costly
high-risk convoys to Malta.

Post by Alex Milman
and Italian Navy was destroyed leaving the Axis with
only air force as a tool.

Umm, wrong. The Italian navy was crippled, but far from
destroyed. It was Italian warships that escorted Axis
merchant shipping to Africa.

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-10 03:22:52 UTC

On Fri, 9 Feb 2018 11:54:35 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
Well, ALL this being accomplished by a single Afrika Korps or, let's be generous, Panzer Army Africa (as of August 1942: Afrika Korps, Italian X Corps, Italian XXI Corps, Italian XX Motorised Corps, Italian 133rd Armored Division Littorio; total 9 divisions)?
As for conquest of Egypt (a trifle on the way to Iran), in the 1st Battle of Alamein Rommel had 96K troops (40K German) vs. 150K British and corresponding ratio of the planes, tanks and artillery pieces.
Soviet-British forces in Iran amounted to 200K with approximately 1000 tanks in the Soviet armies only.
Of course, it is interesting to speculate if Hitler would abstain from declaring war on the US in an absence of Japanese move but anyway, the Lend Lease was already going on making "Rommel conquers the world" scenario highly unlikely.

Suppose for the sake of argument Rommel conquers the Persian Gulf. You
then get the scenario I have written about numerous times here if the
Germans had conquered the Caucasian oil fields.

Even if the oil rigs are captured intact (!!!) you have the problem of
moving the crude to a refinery and from there to somewhere where it
can actually do Germany some good. In this case you probably get
Turkish logistical help but even with that it's still a stretch to get
significant quantities of oil flowing to the German economy by
mid-1943.

Sure Britain has lost most of its oil supply but can get oil from the
US. (Libya was not yet producing oil till OTL's postwar era; not sure
about Venezuela)

I'm NOT saying Britain losing Kuwait wouldn't be huge - I am saying
it's definitely not a case of Churchill having to say "You know how I
said we would never surrender? I didn't mean it!"

And all of this is a best case scenario for Germany.

Alex Milman

2018-02-10 17:10:18 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Fri, 9 Feb 2018 11:54:35 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Suppose for the sake of argument Rommel conquers the Persian Gulf.

Just to make you happy. :-)

Post by The Horny Goat
You
then get the scenario I have written about numerous times here if the
Germans had conquered the Caucasian oil fields.

Which they, strictly speaking, did (Northern Caucasus). Yes, we had been discussing this more than once.

Post by The Horny Goat
Even if the oil rigs are captured intact (!!!) you have the problem of
moving the crude to a refinery and from there to somewhere where it
can actually do Germany some good.

Exactly.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-11 02:27:24 UTC

On Sat, 10 Feb 2018 09:10:18 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
Suppose for the sake of argument Rommel conquers the Persian Gulf.

Just to make you happy. :-)

In fairness Alex you probably know that I regularly employ the
reductio ad absurdem argument in this newsgroup.

I have previously used the argument with respect to arguing that
assuming the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack had destroyed not only the
entire fleet at Pearl Harbor but EVERY US ship in the Pacific Ocean
and argued that OTL's rate of US naval construction in 1943 and 1944
would STILL defeat Japan at most 6 months after VJ day.

Alex Milman

2018-02-11 04:49:57 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 10 Feb 2018 09:10:18 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
Suppose for the sake of argument Rommel conquers the Persian Gulf.

Just to make you happy. :-)

In fairness Alex you probably know that I regularly employ the
reductio ad absurdem argument in this newsgroup.

As you could notice, I did not make any objection against your argument (with which I happen to be in a complete agreement).

Post by The Horny Goat
I have previously used the argument with respect to arguing that
assuming the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack had destroyed not only the
entire fleet at Pearl Harbor but EVERY US ship in the Pacific Ocean
and argued that OTL's rate of US naval construction in 1943 and 1944
would STILL defeat Japan at most 6 months after VJ day.

Yes, while ago I saw a table of the naval production of Japan, GB and the US during WWII. Looked rather depressing from the Japanese perspective. Add to this a completely different scope of the personnel training during the war and the only question is how did Japan manage to stay in war for so long (perhaps quality on the top was a separate factor :-)).

Basically, it was a good illustration of a difference between being ready for a war (and fighting it with what you have by the time it started) and being ready for a long war (and fighting it with what you can produce during the war).

The Horny Goat

2018-02-11 07:31:37 UTC

On Sat, 10 Feb 2018 20:49:57 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 10 Feb 2018 09:10:18 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
Suppose for the sake of argument Rommel conquers the Persian Gulf.

Just to make you happy. :-)

In fairness Alex you probably know that I regularly employ the
reductio ad absurdem argument in this newsgroup.

As you could notice, I did not make any objection against your argument (with which I happen to be in a complete agreement).

Yes I did.

Yes, while ago I saw a table of the naval production of Japan, GB and the US during WWII. Looked rather depressing from the Japanese perspective. Add to this a completely different scope of the personnel training during the war and the only question is how did Japan manage to stay in war for so long (perhaps quality on the top was a separate factor :-)).
Basically, it was a good illustration of a difference between being ready for a war (and fighting it with what you have by the time it started) and being ready for a long war (and fighting it with what you can produce during the war).

While I don't disagree with your argument the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
was pretty much your first "come as you are war" and most potential
wars since then (including Warsaw Pact vs NATO in the 80s) would have
been that.

I'd argue a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in the 50s would have been about the
last war where long term production (in the sense of 1941-45) would
have carried the day. (Where the main question is do the Soviets get
to the Rhine and if so how much further?)

It is likely a Cuban Missile Crisis nuclear war would have meant
something like 20-40 million American dead with large scale
devastation in Europe and disaster in the Soviet Union - I've not read
ANY potential scenario taking place in the 1960s or 70s where the war
ends on relatively good terms for them. ("relatively good" meaning in
the sense of 1941-45 where tremendous losses were sustained but the
Soviet Union could be considered to have won something important)

General Hackett's August 1985 The Third World War and The Third World
War: The Untold Story strike me as a relatively credible scenario for
that date. They were definitely not books I expected a paratroop
general to write!

What all these scenarios have in common is the United States on the
winning side but having endured losses on a scale that their victory
would be considered "pyrrhic" which is the best reason for avoiding
war in the first place.

In the modern era NO ONE wants a long war even if they win - I'm quite
sure Saddam Hussein did not expect to fight Iran for 8 years! That's
pretty much the ONLY really long war in the modern era.

So while I accept your premise on military production, nearly all wars
in the modern era have been "come as you are" affairs.

Alex Milman

2018-02-11 16:45:30 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 10 Feb 2018 20:49:57 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 10 Feb 2018 09:10:18 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
Suppose for the sake of argument Rommel conquers the Persian Gulf.

Just to make you happy. :-)

In fairness Alex you probably know that I regularly employ the
reductio ad absurdem argument in this newsgroup.

As you could notice, I did not make any objection against your argument (with which I happen to be in a complete agreement).

Yes I did.

Yes, while ago I saw a table of the naval production of Japan, GB and the US during WWII. Looked rather depressing from the Japanese perspective. Add to this a completely different scope of the personnel training during the war and the only question is how did Japan manage to stay in war for so long (perhaps quality on the top was a separate factor :-)).
Basically, it was a good illustration of a difference between being ready for a war (and fighting it with what you have by the time it started) and being ready for a long war (and fighting it with what you can produce during the war).

I'd say that this is more applicable to the 6 Days War which was a typical blitz when potential did not really matter because the opponents had been kicked out of war in a very short time.

In 1973 the Arabs tried to play their blitz but it failed and, while the war was not long enough to become competition of the economic potentials there were couple significant factors typical for the longer term wars: 1st, supplies and 2nd general preparedness to the war (aka, competence on all levels).

The Egyptian war plan was "come as you are war": it was complicated with everything seemingly taken into the consideration and it worked, initially. OTOH, Israeli did not have "The Plan" but rather a set of the "block-scenarios" which they could use and combine dynamically. As soon as the Egyptians hit the 1st problem their plan started crumbling and they could not improvise and react properly on the changing circumstances. With the Israeli it was other way around (hence comes general preparedness on all levels). BTW, this is the _Soviet_ evaluation of the war.

Post by The Horny Goat
I'd argue a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in the 50s would have been about the
last war where long term production (in the sense of 1941-45) would
have carried the day. (Where the main question is do the Soviets get
to the Rhine and if so how much further?)

Ah, IMHO, all these plans were created with the intention never to be used: probably the last thing the Soviet leadership wanted was a major war with the West: where the goodies would be coming from? Not to mention that (just for argument sake) a successful war would mean addition of the millions of people with the alien ideology. Even the "junior" members of the Block had been causing problems on a regular basis (and had ideological base considerably relaxed comparing to the SU) so can you imagine the problems related to the addition of the tens of millions people poisoned by capitalism? 1950s - 80s were not 1920s - 30s in the terms of "ideological cannibalism" and killing people by millions would not be an attractive solution. As far as I can tell, attitude on the top was along the lines formulated by Leo X: "God gave us a Papacy, let's enjoy it".

Of course, the military plans had to be developed: the military had to be kept busy and the fear always was a good tool for a little bit of a blackmailing (especially in the economic area).

Post by The Horny Goat
It is likely a Cuban Missile Crisis nuclear war would have meant
something like 20-40 million American dead with large scale
devastation in Europe and disaster in the Soviet Union - I've not read
ANY potential scenario taking place in the 1960s or 70s where the war
ends on relatively good terms for them.

The Cuban Crisis was a byproduct of activities of 2 dimwits, JFK and Nikita, who could not understand consequences of their actions (sounds like pre-WWI scenario). Fortunately, none of them had an absolute power and the crisis was diffused by both sides rolling back the steps which led to the crisis (understandably, JFK got a better PR on the West but Nikita got his share on the East before he was removed from power).

Post by The Horny Goat
("relatively good" meaning in
the sense of 1941-45 where tremendous losses were sustained but the
Soviet Union could be considered to have won something important)
General Hackett's August 1985 The Third World War and The Third World
War: The Untold Story strike me as a relatively credible scenario for
that date. They were definitely not books I expected a paratroop
general to write!

Well, basing my judgement strictly on the idiotic premise, the 3rd WW in 1985, I'd say that this is exactly what one can expect from such a person. BTW, watching various former military "experts" on TV leaved me with an impression that idiocy as a professional military disease was not limited to the Soviet Union. :-)

Post by The Horny Goat
What all these scenarios have in common is the United States on the
winning side but having endured losses on a scale that their victory
would be considered "pyrrhic" which is the best reason for avoiding
war in the first place.

Read "The Yanks are coming!", it describes a really scary scenario: the war starts, the SU capitulates and the US is trying to build capitalism on the occupied territory. :-)

Post by The Horny Goat
In the modern era NO ONE wants a long war even if they win - I'm quite
sure Saddam Hussein did not expect to fight Iran for 8 years! That's
pretty much the ONLY really long war in the modern era.
So while I accept your premise on military production, nearly all wars
in the modern era have been "come as you are" affairs.

You missed the point. Of course a prolonged war is rarely (if ever) expected but, as often as not, the expectations proved to be wrong, the war proves to be a prolonged affair and this is when potential kicks in.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-12 02:41:17 UTC

On Sun, 11 Feb 2018 08:45:30 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
Basically, it was a good illustration of a difference between being ready for a war (and fighting it with what you have by the time it started) and being ready for a long war (and fighting it with what you can produce during the war).

I'd say that this is more applicable to the 6 Days War which was a typical blitz when potential did not really matter because the opponents had been kicked out of war in a very short time.
In 1973 the Arabs tried to play their blitz but it failed and, while the war was not long enough to become competition of the economic potentials there were couple significant factors typical for the longer term wars: 1st, supplies and 2nd general preparedness to the war (aka, competence on all levels).
The Egyptian war plan was "come as you are war": it was complicated with everything seemingly taken into the consideration and it worked, initially. OTOH, Israeli did not have "The Plan" but rather a set of the "block-scenarios" which they could use and combine dynamically. As soon as the Egyptians hit the 1st problem their plan started crumbling and they could not improvise and react properly on the changing circumstances. With the Israeli it was other way around (hence comes general preparedness on all levels). BTW, this is the _Soviet_ evaluation of the war.

To a certain extent 1973 was as well though in 1973 both sides
depended on re-supply (from existing stocks) by the Americans and
Soviets respectively. What triggered the final ceasefire was the
Soviet ultimatum that they would directly land troops if the Egyptian
Third Army (I'm going from memory here may have the number wrong)
which was encircled was forced to surrender.

In response to THAT the US went to Defcon 3 as did NATO. (My wife's
uncle who had retired from the Canadian airforce in 1972 was visiting
at her parents when a young very worried officer came to their door
while they were having dinner. He asked if he could speak to 'the
colonel' and if there was a room where they could speak privately. She
found out later that he had received sealed mobilization orders and 20
years later told her that he had been given 48 hour recall notice and
that if recalled he would have been commanding a squadron in Norway)

Ah, IMHO, all these plans were created with the intention never to be used: probably the last thing the Soviet leadership wanted was a major war with the West: where the goodies would be coming from? Not to mention that (just for argument sake) a successful war would mean addition of the millions of people with the alien ideology. Even the "junior" members of the Block had been causing problems on a regular basis (and had ideological base considerably relaxed comparing to the SU) so can you imagine the problems related to the addition of the tens of millions people poisoned by capitalism? 1950s - 80s were not 1920s - 30s in the terms of "ideological cannibalism" and killing people by millions would not be an attractive solution. As far as I can tell, attitude on the top was along the lines formulated by Leo X: "God gave us a Papacy, let's enjoy it".
Of course, the military plans had to be developed: the military had to be kept busy and the fear always was a good tool for a little bit of a blackmailing (especially in the economic area).

Nevertheless the reports I've read suggest that that was the American
estimate of a war in October 1961. The fabled "missile gap" JFK talked
about in the 1960 election was a myth and while the Soviets certainly
had the ability to more than decimate Europe, they didn't have enough
missiles with long enough range to destroy America - that came in the
Johnson and Nixon eras.

I agree a war in 1985 would require quite a different casus belli than
Hackett did. In my opinion he had a story to write and to put America
and the Soviets at war at that time in the first place required a bit
of 'handwavium'

Read "The Yanks are coming!", it describes a really scary scenario: the war starts, the SU capitulates and the US is trying to build capitalism on the occupied territory. :-)

Alex Milman

2018-02-12 19:26:13 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Sun, 11 Feb 2018 08:45:30 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

I'd say that this is more applicable to the 6 Days War which was a typical blitz when potential did not really matter because the opponents had been kicked out of war in a very short time.
In 1973 the Arabs tried to play their blitz but it failed and, while the war was not long enough to become competition of the economic potentials there were couple significant factors typical for the longer term wars: 1st, supplies and 2nd general preparedness to the war (aka, competence on all levels).
The Egyptian war plan was "come as you are war": it was complicated with everything seemingly taken into the consideration and it worked, initially. OTOH, Israeli did not have "The Plan" but rather a set of the "block-scenarios" which they could use and combine dynamically. As soon as the Egyptians hit the 1st problem their plan started crumbling and they could not improvise and react properly on the changing circumstances. With the Israeli it was other way around (hence comes general preparedness on all levels). BTW, this is the _Soviet_ evaluation of the war.

To be more precise, what triggered the ceasefire was the fact that the Egyptian 3rd Army was surrounded and at Israeli's mercy (they did not have, AFAIK, an intention to proceed with its annihilation because it was much more valuable as a hostage than as a pile of the corpses). The rest were the Soviet face-saving declarations and US/NATO declarations as an answer to the Soviet declarations (a lot of noise with an understanding that nobody will go beyond the noise). You may consider them as the ritual dances of that period.:-)

[]

Ah, IMHO, all these plans were created with the intention never to be used: probably the last thing the Soviet leadership wanted was a major war with the West: where the goodies would be coming from? Not to mention that (just for argument sake) a successful war would mean addition of the millions of people with the alien ideology. Even the "junior" members of the Block had been causing problems on a regular basis (and had ideological base considerably relaxed comparing to the SU) so can you imagine the problems related to the addition of the tens of millions people poisoned by capitalism? 1950s - 80s were not 1920s - 30s in the terms of "ideological cannibalism" and killing people by millions would not be an attractive solution. As far as I can tell, attitude on the top was along the lines formulated by Leo X: "God gave us a Papacy, let's enjoy it".
Of course, the military plans had to be developed: the military had to be kept busy and the fear always was a good tool for a little bit of a blackmailing (especially in the economic area).

Nevertheless the reports I've read suggest that that was the American
estimate of a war in October 1961.

Oh please, there are always "estimates" of that type: there are plenty of people who are being paid by government and/or by the media to make "researches" (or whatever) to this effect. Military expenditures has to be justified and scaring the population (at least from time to time) ... er... "consolidates the nation" (ditto for the other side).

Post by The Horny Goat
The fabled "missile gap" JFK talked
about in the 1960 election was a myth and while the Soviets certainly
had the ability to more than decimate Europe,

Well, putting aside the mental deficiencies of the males of this specific family, did anybody ask a seemingly obvious question: why would they do such a thing? Just for the fun of it? To build socialism on the nuclear ruins? To prevent conquest of the SU by the Princedom of Monaco?

To be fair, the same goes for other side with a difference that asking questions above in public would be quite unhealthy.

Post by The Horny Goat
they didn't have enough
missiles with long enough range to destroy America

Again, just for fun?

Post by The Horny Goat
- that came in the
Johnson and Nixon eras.

And did any of the sides try to destroy the other side? Outside, of course, "Doctor Strangelove" scenario and mentality set: I doubt that the leaders on both sides did not cherish an idea of spending the rest of their lives in a comfortable bunker eating canned food. :-)

I agree a war in 1985 would require quite a different casus belli than
Hackett did.

Which was what exactly?

Post by The Horny Goat
In my opinion he had a story to write and to put America
and the Soviets at war at that time in the first place required a bit
of 'handwavium'

Read "The Yanks are coming!", it describes a really scary scenario: the war starts, the SU capitulates and the US is trying to build capitalism on the occupied territory. :-)

The Horny Goat

2018-02-12 21:09:11 UTC

On Mon, 12 Feb 2018 11:26:13 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
To a certain extent 1973 was as well though in 1973 both sides
depended on re-supply (from existing stocks) by the Americans and
Soviets respectively. What triggered the final ceasefire was the
Soviet ultimatum that they would directly land troops if the Egyptian
Third Army (I'm going from memory here may have the number wrong)
which was encircled was forced to surrender.

I think the Israelis knew a surrender of 3rd Army would likely mean
the fall of Sadat with complications they didn't want to contemplate.

Post by The Horny Goat
The fabled "missile gap" JFK talked
about in the 1960 election was a myth and while the Soviets certainly
had the ability to more than decimate Europe,

Surely in that era not Monaco but Grand Fenwick!

Post by Alex Milman
To be fair, the same goes for other side with a difference that asking questions above in public would be quite unhealthy.

Post by The Horny Goat
they didn't have enough
missiles with long enough range to destroy America

Again, just for fun?

Which begs the question what would the Kremlin have considered
'victory' in that era?

Secondly with respect to JFK and his clan, JFK is recorded around that
time that he 'didn't want to be the greatest war criminal since Tojo'.
(As one whose war service was in the Pacific it's not surprising he
chose to mention a Japanese rather than German leader)

Post by The Horny Goat
- that came in the
Johnson and Nixon eras.

Doctor Strangelove was a great movie and Herman Kahn even analysed a
situation where both sides had 'Doomsday Machines'.

Read "The Yanks are coming!", it describes a really scary scenario: the war starts, the SU capitulates and the US is trying to build capitalism on the occupied territory. :-)

This is why I consider Bush 41 one of the great presidents - the end
of the Soviet Union could have gone badly in so many ways. A Hackett
1985 scenario, Soviet nuclear scientists and engineers going to Iran,
NK etc. I feel the same way about PW Botha who while I don't consider
him a good human being consider him a great human being who in the way
he handled the transition served his country well. (One of my
employees is a South African and has told me she considers that a fair
statement)

Post by Alex Milman
You missed the point. Of course a prolonged war is rarely (if ever) expected but, as often as not, the expectations proved to be wrong, the war proves to be a prolonged affair and this is when potential kicks in.

I take your point. Certainly in 1914 neither Germany, Britain or
France expected a long war (not sure about the rest of them).

And if 'We'll Hang Out the Washing on the Siegfried Line" means
anything at least some Brits felt that way in 1939 though why I'm
unsure.

Alex Milman

2018-02-13 20:12:13 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Mon, 12 Feb 2018 11:26:13 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

I think the Israelis knew a surrender of 3rd Army would likely mean
the fall of Sadat with complications they didn't want to contemplate.

Post by The Horny Goat
The fabled "missile gap" JFK talked
about in the 1960 election was a myth and while the Soviets certainly
had the ability to more than decimate Europe,

Surely in that era not Monaco but Grand Fenwick!

Wasn't Great Fenwick conquering the US?

Post by Alex Milman
To be fair, the same goes for other side with a difference that asking questions above in public would be quite unhealthy.

Post by The Horny Goat
they didn't have enough
missiles with long enough range to destroy America

Again, just for fun?

Which begs the question what would the Kremlin have considered
'victory' in that era?

Strictly my personal opinion (not being a confidant of any of the Kremlin personalities of any period):

Spreading social disease (also known as "Marxism") in the "s--thole" countries all over the world (aka, places where it would expect a minimal risk of a direct opposition from the US). That they had been doing quite successfully wasting money which they did not have but getting nice propaganda pieces for the domestic consumption.

The rest, I'd guess, was a part of an idiotic game popular on both sides: not to let a potential opponent to get ahead of you militarily, just in case.

Post by The Horny Goat
Secondly with respect to JFK and his clan, JFK is recorded around that
time that he 'didn't want to be the greatest war criminal since Tojo'.

His father was smart (but really repulsive) person. His male (perhaps females as well but they are less known) descendants were not/are exactly the brightest apples on any tree (but consider themselves entitled to the public offices just because of their names) and the fact that JFK from time to time could utter something reasonably intelligent does not compensate for the fact that his ineptitude (together with one of his counterpart) produced a danger of WWIII out of nothing. Of course, comparing to his brother Ted he could pass for an intellectual giant.

Post by The Horny Goat
(As one whose war service was in the Pacific it's not surprising he
chose to mention a Japanese rather than German leader)

Post by The Horny Goat
- that came in the
Johnson and Nixon eras.

Doctor Strangelove was a great movie and Herman Kahn even analysed a
situation where both sides had 'Doomsday Machines'.

Great. But can you imagine non-caricature leader of world's superpower looking forward to the life in a bunker? That's why the whole idea seems quite fantastic.

Read "The Yanks are coming!", it describes a really scary scenario: the war starts, the SU capitulates and the US is trying to build capitalism on the occupied territory. :-)

This is why I consider Bush 41 one of the great presidents - the end
of the Soviet Union could have gone badly in so many ways.

As far as it depended on Papa Bush it DID went badly (of course, there were numerous other factors but he "helped"). He and his successors stuck to Brzezinski Doctrine and it was only a matter of time when post-Soviet Russia would start to kick back.

Then, of course, thanks to his "wisdom", we got ourselves involved into the mess out of which we still can't get out. Bad guy as it was, Saddam DID ask about our position regarding Kuwait and got an answer that we don't care. Then, after Kuwait was occupied, Saudi freaked out and when Saudi click their fingers, Bush family jumps to an attention. Remember conditions under which our troops had been allowed into Saudi territory (which they were defending)? We did not even get any money for the services rendered and the rest was plain silly (except for the victory itself, which was a given): you DON't finish wars that way.

To his credit, he handled things reasonably well in Somalia (leaving aside the fact that there was no reason for us getting there) by making some kind of an agreement with the biggest of the local bandits.

Of course, it can be argued that GWB (for whom I voted twice as the lesser of the available evils) screwed things up even more.

Post by The Horny Goat
A Hackett
1985 scenario, Soviet nuclear scientists and engineers going to Iran,
NK etc. I feel the same way about PW Botha who while I don't consider
him a good human being consider him a great human being who in the way
he handled the transition served his country well.

It seems that now South Africa is well on the way to "s--thole" category (at least that's what I heard from the people visiting it as the tourists).

Post by The Horny Goat
(One of my
employees

So, you are ...er... "a rotten exploiter of the working class"? :-)

Post by The Horny Goat
is a South African and has told me she considers that a fair
statement)

I take your point. Certainly in 1914 neither Germany, Britain or
France expected a long war (not sure about the rest of them).

But they were able to jump start their military production much faster than Russian Empire.

Post by The Horny Goat
And if 'We'll Hang Out the Washing on the Siegfried Line" means
anything at least some Brits felt that way in 1939 though why I'm
unsure.

An idea that the people always learn from the past mistakes is somewhat optimistic.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-14 06:32:29 UTC

On Tue, 13 Feb 2018 12:12:13 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
Surely in that era not Monaco but Grand Fenwick!

Wasn't Great Fenwick conquering the US?

Indeed they were but the Soviets would deplore imperialism whether it
came from Washington or Grand Fenwick.

Post by Alex Milman
Spreading social disease (also known as "Marxism") in the "s--thole" countries all over the world (aka, places where it would expect a minimal risk of a direct opposition from the US). That they had been doing quite successfully wasting money which they did not have but getting nice propaganda pieces for the domestic consumption.

From what I have read soldiers of the Red Army were just as adept at
spreading social diseases as the men of imperialist armies.

Post by Alex Milman
The rest, I'd guess, was a part of an idiotic game popular on both sides: not to let a potential opponent to get ahead of you militarily, just in case.

Herman Kahn explained in great detail the benefits of having political
leaders with 'the button' seeming to act crazy. Read what he has to
say in both On Thermonuclear War and On Escalation: Metaphors and
Scenarios about the game of 'chicken'.

Post by The Horny Goat
Secondly with respect to JFK and his clan, JFK is recorded around that
time that he 'didn't want to be the greatest war criminal since Tojo'.

While I agree with all that, it's not surprising that someone whose
war service was as a naval officer in the Pacific that he would invoke
a Japanese rather than German villain.

Post by Alex Milman
And did any of the sides try to destroy the other side? Outside, of course, "Doctor Strangelove" scenario and mentality set: I doubt that the leaders on both sides did not cherish an idea of spending the rest of their lives in a comfortable bunker eating canned food. :-)

Doctor Strangelove was a great movie and Herman Kahn even analysed a
situation where both sides had 'Doomsday Machines'.

Great. But can you imagine non-caricature leader of world's superpower looking forward to the life in a bunker? That's why the whole idea seems quite fantastic.

Sellers' image of 7 women to every man was great comedy but no not
something any American power figure really wanted to 'enjoy'.

Read "The Yanks are coming!", it describes a really scary scenario: the war starts, the SU capitulates and the US is trying to build capitalism on the occupied territory. :-)

Got a cite or a link for that one? Sounds interesting.

Post by The Horny Goat
This is why I consider Bush 41 one of the great presidents - the end
of the Soviet Union could have gone badly in so many ways.

As far as it depended on Papa Bush it DID went badly (of course, there were numerous other factors but he "helped"). He and his successors stuck to Brzezinski Doctrine and it was only a matter of time when post-Soviet Russia would start to kick back.
Then, of course, thanks to his "wisdom", we got ourselves involved into the mess out of which we still can't get out. Bad guy as it was, Saddam DID ask about our position regarding Kuwait and got an answer that we don't care. Then, after Kuwait was occupied, Saudi freaked out and when Saudi click their fingers, Bush family jumps to an attention. Remember conditions under which our troops had been allowed into Saudi territory (which they were defending)? We did not even get any money for the services rendered and the rest was plain silly (except for the victory itself, which was a given): you DON't finish wars that way.

Well again - his decision to hire any Russian nuclear physicist that
wanted to work for America or NATO get hundreds of them out of Iran or
North Korea who were CERTAINLY willing to pay them much more than
Russia could 1991-2000.

Post by Alex Milman
To his credit, he handled things reasonably well in Somalia (leaving aside the fact that there was no reason for us getting there) by making some kind of an agreement with the biggest of the local bandits.
Of course, it can be argued that GWB (for whom I voted twice as the lesser of the available evils) screwed things up even more.

Since I'm a Canadian and sort of believe in the BoP I'll leave that
there :)

It seems that now South Africa is well on the way to "s--thole" category (at least that's what I heard from the people visiting it as the tourists).

While I agree would you prefer them as a 'nuclear armed s__thole'?
Because THAT's what Botha prevented.

Post by The Horny Goat
(One of my
employees

So, you are ...er... "a rotten exploiter of the working class"? :-)

Yes I have a small business that is marginally making it but certainly
not nearly well enough to buy me yachts, private jets and the usual
toys that go with the 1% (or more likely 0.01%)

I take your point. Certainly in 1914 neither Germany, Britain or
France expected a long war (not sure about the rest of them).

But they were able to jump start their military production much faster than Russian Empire.

Not to mention both Britain and France having a much stronger economy
than Russia in 1914. The Moscow building you know as the "Lubyanka"
was originally an insurance company building - not that western ideas
of insurance were all that prevalent in Imperial Russia (or for that
matter in the Soviet Union)

(Which isn't all that surprising as most of the British jurisprudence
on cheques , promissary notes and insurance - which was adopted both
in America and anywhere else who draws their legal roots from the UK -
were based on the practices of the Royal East India Company which had
no real counterpart in Russia)

Post by The Horny Goat
And if 'We'll Hang Out the Washing on the Siegfried Line" means
anything at least some Brits felt that way in 1939 though why I'm
unsure.

An idea that the people always learn from the past mistakes is somewhat optimistic.

Militarily of course they don't. The main "lesson learned" from
1914-18 was that 'maintaining a continuous front wins wars' which is
what built the Maginot line and was why the defeat at Sedan was such a
disaster.

Alex Milman

2018-02-14 16:58:54 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 13 Feb 2018 12:12:13 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by The Horny Goat
Surely in that era not Monaco but Grand Fenwick!

Wasn't Great Fenwick conquering the US?

Indeed they were but the Soviets would deplore imperialism whether it
came from Washington or Grand Fenwick.

Well, I'd assume that at least initially conquest of the US by GF would be greeted as a victory of <whatever> over the imperialism. What's next is unpredictable: more than one friend turned out to be a capitalist stooge. :-)

From what I have read soldiers of the Red Army were just as adept at
spreading social diseases as the men of imperialist armies.

You are confusing the intended (spreading Marxism) and unintended (spreading other social diseases) consequences. While the 1st was REALLY important, the 2nd belonged to the insignificant "byproducts of the method" and could be safely ignored.

Also keep in mind that, while the modern medicine can cure most of the diseases of the 2nd category, the 1st is almost incurable: the only known cure is to force a patient to live in the "worker's paradise" environment for few decades and even then the results are not guaranteed.

Post by Alex Milman
The rest, I'd guess, was a part of an idiotic game popular on both sides: not to let a potential opponent to get ahead of you militarily, just in case.

Herman Kahn explained in great detail the benefits of having political
leaders with 'the button' seeming to act crazy.

The "benefit" (meaning has to be carefully defined) is obvious: you never know where you are when you are dealing with unpredictable idiot so you have to be careful and perhaps accommodate him within the "reasonable limits".

OTOH, an obvious drawback for his own side is exactly the same: you never know into which trouble the ruling idiot can put you in the next few minutes. At that point scenario forks:

(a) If the inner circle is composed of the idiots similar to the leading one, then "sky is the limit" (the world revolution, conquest of the world, conquest of Mars, whatever else can come to their mind).

(b) If in reality members of the inner circle want to enjoy benefits of their position, then they may try to replace excessively aggressive idiot with somebody more predictable who is sharing their attitude (rhetoric is not important). Fortunately, in the case of the SU this option prevailed.

Post by The Horny Goat
Read what he has to
say in both On Thermonuclear War and On Escalation: Metaphors and
Scenarios about the game of 'chicken'.

Can you give a synopsis? It is highly unlikely that I'll start reading these books even if I find them on the web.

Post by The Horny Goat
Secondly with respect to JFK and his clan, JFK is recorded around that
time that he 'didn't want to be the greatest war criminal since Tojo'.

While I agree with all that, it's not surprising that someone whose
war service was as a naval officer in the Pacific that he would invoke
a Japanese rather than German villain.

Doctor Strangelove was a great movie and Herman Kahn even analysed a
situation where both sides had 'Doomsday Machines'.

Great. But can you imagine non-caricature leader of world's superpower looking forward to the life in a bunker? That's why the whole idea seems quite fantastic.

Sellers' image of 7 women to every man was great comedy but no not
something any American power figure really wanted to 'enjoy'.

Can't tell: never was a "power figure". However, it seems that this goal (or even a higher score) had been achieved by quite a few prominent figures without a need to get into a bunker.

Read "The Yanks are coming!", it describes a really scary scenario: the war starts, the SU capitulates and the US is trying to build capitalism on the occupied territory. :-)

Got a cite or a link for that one? Sounds interesting.

Unfortunately, no: got it many years ago in the local library. And I'm not 100% about the tittle because there seems to be a completely serious book with almost the same title about the US in WWI.

Post by The Horny Goat
This is why I consider Bush 41 one of the great presidents - the end
of the Soviet Union could have gone badly in so many ways.

As far as it depended on Papa Bush it DID went badly (of course, there were numerous other factors but he "helped"). He and his successors stuck to Brzezinski Doctrine and it was only a matter of time when post-Soviet Russia would start to kick back.
Then, of course, thanks to his "wisdom", we got ourselves involved into the mess out of which we still can't get out. Bad guy as it was, Saddam DID ask about our position regarding Kuwait and got an answer that we don't care. Then, after Kuwait was occupied, Saudi freaked out and when Saudi click their fingers, Bush family jumps to an attention. Remember conditions under which our troops had been allowed into Saudi territory (which they were defending)? We did not even get any money for the services rendered and the rest was plain silly (except for the victory itself, which was a given): you DON't finish wars that way.

Since I'm a Canadian and sort of believe in the BoP I'll leave that
there :)

Fine by me. :-)

It seems that now South Africa is well on the way to "s--thole" category (at least that's what I heard from the people visiting it as the tourists).

While I agree would you prefer them as a 'nuclear armed s__thole'?
Because THAT's what Botha prevented.

Post by The Horny Goat
(One of my
employees

So, you are ...er... "a rotten exploiter of the working class"? :-)

Yes I have a small business that is marginally making it but certainly
not nearly well enough to buy me yachts, private jets and the usual
toys that go with the 1% (or more likely 0.01%)

Just out of a pure curiosity, what is it?

I take your point. Certainly in 1914 neither Germany, Britain or
France expected a long war (not sure about the rest of them).

But they were able to jump start their military production much faster than Russian Empire.

Not to mention both Britain and France having a much stronger economy
than Russia in 1914.

Of course. This is why Russia was the 1st to drop out.

Post by The Horny Goat
The Moscow building you know as the "Lubyanka"
was originally an insurance company building

All-Russian Insurance Company

Post by The Horny Goat
- not that western ideas
of insurance were all that prevalent in Imperial Russia (or for that
matter in the Soviet Union)
(Which isn't all that surprising as most of the British jurisprudence
on cheques , promissary notes and insurance - which was adopted both
in America and anywhere else who draws their legal roots from the UK -
were based on the practices of the Royal East India Company which had
no real counterpart in Russia)

Actually, as far as Imperial Russia was involved, insurance was a very popular and flourishing business. Popular enough to be mocked in the "Modern Idyll" by Saltykov-Schedrin (1883) where the heroes are planning to start a company providing a _mandatory_ life insurance in Russia. :-)

Or you can (or most probably can't :-)) read an earlier short novel "Good grain" by Leskov (1884) which is dedicated to the subject of cargo (grain) insurance and the ways of ...er... dealing with certain problems to _almost_ everybody's satisfaction. To support your point about the roots, the insurance company which ends up paying for the crap is either British or at least created along the British lines. The important point is that the business was all over the place by the late XIX.

Post by The Horny Goat
And if 'We'll Hang Out the Washing on the Siegfried Line" means
anything at least some Brits felt that way in 1939 though why I'm
unsure.

An idea that the people always learn from the past mistakes is somewhat optimistic.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-14 19:55:57 UTC

On Wed, 14 Feb 2018 08:58:54 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
(b) If in reality members of the inner circle want to enjoy benefits of their position, then they may try to replace excessively aggressive idiot with somebody more predictable who is sharing their attitude (rhetoric is not important). Fortunately, in the case of the SU this option prevailed.

I assume you're talking about 1964 since Brezhnev's and Kosygin's
ouster of Khrushchev was about the only time that happened.

I suppose 1991 with the slow motion ouster of Gorbachev but I would
argue that Yeltsin wasn't nearly as in control of things as Brezhnev
and Kosygin were in 1964.

(I was 9 years old and not nearly so conversant with political affairs
- the following year were my first political memories in the form of
Churchill's funeral and my grandfather's first of two runs for
Parliament - that was the year I met John Diefenbaker which isn't a
notable achievement when you're the grandson of a Conservative
candidate)

I definitely remember nearly every night coming home from work in
August 1991 and saying "Holy sh**!!!!" in front of the TV - saying
"can you believe THIS?" was about the mildest thing I said to the
missus that week.

Alex Milman

2018-02-15 16:56:47 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Wed, 14 Feb 2018 08:58:54 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

I assume you're talking about 1964 since Brezhnev's and Kosygin's
ouster of Khrushchev was about the only time that happened.

Yes, indeed.

Post by The Horny Goat
I suppose 1991 with the slow motion ouster of Gorbachev but I would
argue that Yeltsin wasn't nearly as in control of things as Brezhnev
and Kosygin were in 1964.

This was a completely different thing because, to misquote Balzac, "people also had something to do with it". :-)

It was quite clear that, as soon as Russian Federation becomes a meaningful administrative entity, the SU is doomed. Decades earlier there was an attempt to make RSFSR equivalent to other republics (starting with having its own Communist party) but Uncle Joe understood the implications and dealt with the situation in his usual manner.

Post by The Horny Goat
(I was 9 years old and not nearly so conversant with political affairs
- the following year were my first political memories in the form of
Churchill's funeral and my grandfather's first of two runs for
Parliament - that was the year I met John Diefenbaker which isn't a
notable achievement when you're the grandson of a Conservative
candidate)
I definitely remember nearly every night coming home from work in
August 1991 and saying "Holy sh**!!!!" in front of the TV - saying
"can you believe THIS?" was about the mildest thing I said to the
missus that week.

Really? I did not pay too much attention to it mostly because things were almost annoyingly obvious and completely unsurprising (well, and I had to keep my 1st job in the US).

The Horny Goat

2018-02-15 23:22:49 UTC

On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:56:47 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
It was quite clear that, as soon as Russian Federation becomes a meaningful administrative entity, the SU is doomed. Decades earlier there was an attempt to make RSFSR equivalent to other republics (starting with having its own Communist party) but Uncle Joe understood the implications and dealt with the situation in his usual manner.

"All republics are equal but some are more equal than others"?

Post by The Horny Goat
I definitely remember nearly every night coming home from work in
August 1991 and saying "Holy sh**!!!!" in front of the TV - saying
"can you believe THIS?" was about the mildest thing I said to the
missus that week.

Really? I did not pay too much attention to it mostly because things were almost annoyingly obvious and completely unsurprising (well, and I had to keep my 1st job in the US).

1991 was the year that made CNN - between the first Gulf War in
Jan/Feb and the Soviet coup in August quite a few of us had it on
screen nearly every waking hour. Who could forget New Year's Eve at
the Kremlin with the images of the hammer and sickle descending and
the tricolor ascending in its place?

(I can guarantee that if you saw it any time that day you would
remember it1)

Alex Milman

2018-02-16 16:52:37 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:56:47 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

"All republics are equal but some are more equal than others"?

In this specific case, "less equal". :-)

RSFSR did not have its own communist party and some of the administrative structures (don't ask me which because I simply don't remember) which other republics had: these functions had been handled on the union level.

Quite predictably, when the Russian Federation got a complete government of its own, the end of the SU was easy to predict. Probably some personally popular political and administrative genius could postpone the obvious but Gorby was not just inept politician and administrator but also probably the most hated person in the Soviet space.

Really? I did not pay too much attention to it mostly because things were almost annoyingly obvious and completely unsurprising (well, and I had to keep my 1st job in the US).

1991 was the year that made CNN - between the first Gulf War in
Jan/Feb and the Soviet coup in August quite a few of us had it on
screen nearly every waking hour.

Well, how about a need to work for living? :-)

The "coup" was as pathetic as it could possibly be but it gave Yeltsin an opening for doing what he was doing the best: a spectacular gesture (the earlier ones made his popularity skyrocketing).

Post by The Horny Goat
Who could forget New Year's Eve at
the Kremlin with the images of the hammer and sickle descending and
the tricolor ascending in its place?
(I can guarantee that if you saw it any time that day you would
remember it1)

I most probably saw it but was not as impressed as you: for me it was just the next obvious (and welcomed) step of a long process in the expected direction. Starting from the early 1980's conversations about Russia getting out of the SU had been routine in my "environment" and one of my then co-workers even predicted the date with a great accuracy in 1988.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-16 20:30:36 UTC

On Fri, 16 Feb 2018 08:52:37 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
The "coup" was as pathetic as it could possibly be but it gave Yeltsin an opening for doing what he was doing the best: a spectacular gesture (the earlier ones made his popularity skyrocketing).

Interesting - most of us in the west were gobsmacked by Yanaev and his
crew. Most North Americans (especially those who remembered the
darkest days of Nixon) would have figured America would be more likely
for a coup than the Soviets though neither seemed likely.

After August what happened seemed likely to play out as it did but for
most North Americans Jan-Aug 1991 was nothing short of amazing.

I understand that with your background you would have seen a different
picture.

Alex Milman

2018-02-16 21:12:53 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Fri, 16 Feb 2018 08:52:37 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Interesting - most of us in the west were gobsmacked by Yanaev and his
crew. Most North Americans (especially those who remembered the
darkest days of Nixon) would have figured America would be more likely
for a coup than the Soviets though neither seemed likely.
After August what happened seemed likely to play out as it did but for
most North Americans Jan-Aug 1991 was nothing short of amazing.
I understand that with your background you would have seen a different
picture.

Of course (I was watching this circus from the safety of MA which allowed to eliminate the emotions).

The idiots involved were too much of the "apparatchiks" to figure out that the orders you are issuing will not necessarily be executed. Plus, for the putsch you need enough of the loyal troops but what was there for the low-ranking officers and the soldiers? Their life conditions in the SU were abysmal and ideology ceased to work for the most of them. OTOH, the processes which were going on since the late 1980's gave hope for a better future (during the meetings preceding the 1st multi-party elections militia was EXTREMELY polite, this I can tell from a personal experience).

Not that these idiots had a clear idea how to proceed after they arrested/detained/<whatever> Gorby (short of the "nuclear suitcase" nobody cared about him).

The Horny Goat

2018-02-17 00:21:58 UTC

ROn Fri, 16 Feb 2018 13:12:53 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
The idiots involved were too much of the "apparatchiks" to figure out that the orders you are issuing will not necessarily be executed. Plus, for the putsch you need enough of the loyal troops but what was there for the low-ranking officers and the soldiers? Their life conditions in the SU were abysmal and ideology ceased to work for the most of them. OTOH, the processes which were going on since the late 1980's gave hope for a better future (during the meetings preceding the 1st multi-party elections militia was EXTREMELY polite, this I can tell from a personal experience).

CNN covered in great detail a press conference involving longwinded
statements by both Yanaev and Pugo. I well remember in the following
week my surprise in hearing Pugo had shot himself.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-14 20:05:47 UTC

On Wed, 14 Feb 2018 08:58:54 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
The rest, I'd guess, was a part of an idiotic game popular on both sides: not to let a potential opponent to get ahead of you militarily, just in case.

I'm pretty sure paranoia wasn't invented during the Cold War!

Post by The Horny Goat
Read what he has to
say in both On Thermonuclear War and On Escalation: Metaphors and
Scenarios about the game of 'chicken'.

Can you give a synopsis? It is highly unlikely that I'll start reading these books even if I find them on the web.

The first was written around 1959-60 the latter about 4-5 years later
(going from memory here)

Probably the first's high point was Kahn's insistence that how one
ENDS a war is at least as important as how it started. You understand
of course that a one sentence summary of a 600-700 page book is going
to be imprecise!

The latter argued for an 'escalation ladder' ranging from normal
diplomatic conditions (rung 1) to conventional war (rung 12) to
'crossing the nuclear threshhold' for instance a show of force with no
real intent to do damage (rung 13) all the way through counterforce
(only hit military), countervalue (hit population centers and
industry) through rung 44 "spasm war" (which he defined as 'push all
the buttons and trust in the almighty')

The obvious event that came between the two books was the Cuban
Missile Crisis.

Kahn started with the RAND corporation and ended up founding the
Hudson Institute and after those two books focussed more on 'futures
research' which he discussed at length in his 1967 book 'The Year
2000' where he presented several possible scenarios - of which I'd say
we live in what he would call "Standard scenario with Soviet
Collapse". His view was that the main powers were USA, USSR, Europe
and Japan.

Post by The Horny Goat
Doctor Strangelove was a great movie and Herman Kahn even analysed a
situation where both sides had 'Doomsday Machines'.

Great. But can you imagine non-caricature leader of world's superpower looking forward to the life in a bunker? That's why the whole idea seems quite fantastic.

Sellers' image of 7 women to every man was great comedy but no not
something any American power figure really wanted to 'enjoy'.

Can't tell: never was a "power figure". However, it seems that this goal (or even a higher score) had been achieved by quite a few prominent figures without a need to get into a bunker.

Alex Milman

2018-02-15 17:10:19 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Wed, 14 Feb 2018 08:58:54 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Alex Milman
The rest, I'd guess, was a part of an idiotic game popular on both sides: not to let a potential opponent to get ahead of you militarily, just in case.

I'm pretty sure paranoia wasn't invented during the Cold War!

Paranoia on a state/national level is an old and venerable disease which is not limited to any single country. You can safely trace it few centuries back (and probably much more).

Post by The Horny Goat
Read what he has to
say in both On Thermonuclear War and On Escalation: Metaphors and
Scenarios about the game of 'chicken'.

Can you give a synopsis? It is highly unlikely that I'll start reading these books even if I find them on the web.

Now, THIS is a very important and good point!

To use a safe example, look at Nappy: he clearly did not know how to end wars against Hapsburgs.

Post by The Horny Goat
You understand
of course that a one sentence summary of a 600-700 page book is going
to be imprecise!
The latter argued for an 'escalation ladder' ranging from normal
diplomatic conditions (rung 1) to conventional war (rung 12) to
'crossing the nuclear threshhold' for instance a show of force with no
real intent to do damage (rung 13) all the way through counterforce
(only hit military), countervalue (hit population centers and
industry) through rung 44 "spasm war" (which he defined as 'push all
the buttons and trust in the almighty')

I read at least couple books with the more or less similar scenarios and quite agree that if certain threshold is passed than it is practically impossible to stop the further escalation. This is why the "inner circle" would be interested in avoiding the 1st step: they have much more to lose than the ordinary citizens.

Post by The Horny Goat
The obvious event that came between the two books was the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
Kahn started with the RAND corporation and ended up founding the
Hudson Institute and after those two books focussed more on 'futures
research' which he discussed at length in his 1967 book 'The Year
2000' where he presented several possible scenarios - of which I'd say
we live in what he would call "Standard scenario with Soviet
Collapse". His view was that the main powers were USA, USSR, Europe
and Japan.

In 1967 it was quite difficult to imagine China as a main power.

Dimensional Traveler

2018-02-15 17:49:16 UTC

The problem I have with the "escalation ladder" is that it requires both
sides to be following it. Apparently the whole idea of limiting a
western European WW3 to 'non-nuclear' was entirely in the minds of
western planners. The former CCCP planners had no such ideas and their
plans for such a war included using everything they had from the very
beginning, chemical, biological and nuclear, according to former Soviet
military documents that the West got access to after the Soviet Union
collapsed.

--
Inquiring minds want to know while minds with a self-preservation
instinct are running screaming.

Alex Milman

2018-02-15 20:00:12 UTC

The problem I have with the "escalation ladder" is that it requires both
sides to be following it.

If leadership on BOTH sides is stupid enough to make the initial steps then the things could easily get out of control (like WWI).

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Apparently the whole idea of limiting a
western European WW3 to 'non-nuclear' was entirely in the minds of
western planners.

I'm not quite sure that they were really THAT limited in their thinking. What if the enemy decides to go beyond the conventional weapons? I don't believe that they refused to consider such an option.

Post by Dimensional Traveler
The former CCCP planners had no such ideas and their
plans for such a war included using everything they had from the very
beginning, chemical, biological and nuclear, according to former Soviet
military documents that the West got access to after the Soviet Union
collapsed.

I did not see these documents and can't comment but it looks rather too stupid even for the Soviet military: what's the point in a war if you can't benefit from its results? Let's put it this way: there was nothing about the offensive war in the training of the reserve officers (not a convincing argument but better than nothing). :-)

Was it the ONLY plan for a future war or are you talking about variety of projects produced by each of the military branches and then published in not 100% honest way? Or even disclosed in not 100% honest way? I'm not sure if and why the post-Soviets would completely disclose the old documents: it seems that even those related to pre-WWII plans are only partially disclosed (hence numerous theories about the Soviet plans for WWII).

The Horny Goat

2018-02-16 02:52:45 UTC

On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 12:00:12 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Apparently the whole idea of limiting a
western European WW3 to 'non-nuclear' was entirely in the minds of
western planners.

I'm not quite sure that they were really THAT limited in their thinking. What if the enemy decides to go beyond the conventional weapons? I don't believe that they refused to consider such an option.

I did not see these documents and can't comment but it looks rather too stupid even for the Soviet military: what's the point in a war if you can't benefit from its results? Let's put it this way: there was nothing about the offensive war in the training of the reserve officers (not a convincing argument but better than nothing). :-)
Was it the ONLY plan for a future war or are you talking about variety of projects produced by each of the military branches and then published in not 100% honest way? Or even disclosed in not 100% honest way? I'm not sure if and why the post-Soviets would completely disclose the old documents: it seems that even those related to pre-WWII plans are only partially disclosed (hence numerous theories about the Soviet plans for WWII).

I have heard that story about Soviet war plans but find it less than
fully credible as I fail to see the utility to the Soviet Union of
conquering West Germany and Benelux if all they are conquering is
radioactive debris. And no doubt acquiring radioactive debris of their
own.

In Hackett's scenario when the Warsaw Pact had been stopped west of
Hamberg and a breakthrough south of there forced where the Americans
and British drove NE to the Baltic thus making a significant pocket on
both sides of the German - Danish border they then nuked Birmingham
and demanded a ceasefire. NATO said yes AFTER first destroying Minsk
with 3 nukes - one American, one British, one French.

While his book didn't cover this, given his terms of peace between
NATO and Warsaw Pact something like OTL's 1989-91 would surely have
occured not long after the book ended.

Again - what's the point of conquering rubble? I don't know ANY 20th
century leader besides Hitler who wanted that - and Hitler only wanted
that fate for Moscow and Leningrad both of which he wanted to turn
into lakes. (Though how one does that for Leningrad without connecting
Lake Ladoga to the sea is a complete mystery to me!) He wanted to turn
the rest of European Russia into cropland for the Reich.

Alex Milman

2018-02-16 17:11:09 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 12:00:12 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Apparently the whole idea of limiting a
western European WW3 to 'non-nuclear' was entirely in the minds of
western planners.

I'm not quite sure that they were really THAT limited in their thinking. What if the enemy decides to go beyond the conventional weapons? I don't believe that they refused to consider such an option.

I did not see these documents and can't comment but it looks rather too stupid even for the Soviet military: what's the point in a war if you can't benefit from its results? Let's put it this way: there was nothing about the offensive war in the training of the reserve officers (not a convincing argument but better than nothing). :-)
Was it the ONLY plan for a future war or are you talking about variety of projects produced by each of the military branches and then published in not 100% honest way? Or even disclosed in not 100% honest way? I'm not sure if and why the post-Soviets would completely disclose the old documents: it seems that even those related to pre-WWII plans are only partially disclosed (hence numerous theories about the Soviet plans for WWII).

Of course. But as a foreigner you probably had been missing one critical piece of knowledge (quite related to what you wrote above). What was the Soviet elite doing with their children in the terms of education and occupation?

Giving them an education enabling future work abroad in the CAPITALIST countries as the diplomats, trade representatives, etc. (the stupid ones still were sticking to the Party career, I knew one "specimen" of that type). As you understand, there is no much sense to sent your child to be <whoever> in the midst of a nuclear waste.

Ditto for the goodies which could be obtained only in the rotten capitalist camp (from those for the personal usage and all the way to the strategic ones like computers to be copied).

Post by The Horny Goat
In Hackett's scenario when the Warsaw Pact had been stopped west of
Hamberg and a breakthrough south of there forced where the Americans
and British drove NE to the Baltic thus making a significant pocket on
both sides of the German - Danish border they then nuked Birmingham
and demanded a ceasefire. NATO said yes AFTER first destroying Minsk
with 3 nukes - one American, one British, one French.

Cool, even if extremely stupid: while I can imagine that the Brits would care about Birmingham, it is extremely hard to imagine who in the SU would care about Minsk (except, of course, for its citizens).

Post by The Horny Goat
While his book didn't cover this, given his terms of peace between
NATO and Warsaw Pact something like OTL's 1989-91 would surely have
occured not long after the book ended.

You mean the West would supply the SU grain in exchange to allowing the Soviet Jews to leave? :-)

Seriously, none of the sides gains anything that would be worthy of a devastation.

Post by The Horny Goat
Again - what's the point of conquering rubble?

It seems that the military (in general) tend NOT to ask this question.

Post by The Horny Goat
I don't know ANY 20th
century leader besides Hitler who wanted that - and Hitler only wanted
that fate for Moscow and Leningrad both of which he wanted to turn
into lakes. (Though how one does that for Leningrad without connecting
Lake Ladoga to the sea is a complete mystery to me!)

And how one does this for Moscow circa 1941 is even a greater mystery for me: there are no great lakes (just some artificial reservoirs), no great rivers, hills, and the city itself had been spread over a considerable space in octopus-like style (narrow populated areas with the villages or empty spaced in between).

Post by The Horny Goat
He wanted to turn
the rest of European Russia into cropland for the Reich.

No a nuclear wasteland.

Dean

2018-02-16 18:44:35 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 12:00:12 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

Post by Dimensional Traveler
Apparently the whole idea of limiting a
western European WW3 to 'non-nuclear' was entirely in the minds of
western planners.

I'm not quite sure that they were really THAT limited in their thinking. What if the enemy decides to go beyond the conventional weapons? I don't believe that they refused to consider such an option.

I did not see these documents and can't comment but it looks rather too stupid even for the Soviet military: what's the point in a war if you can't benefit from its results? Let's put it this way: there was nothing about the offensive war in the training of the reserve officers (not a convincing argument but better than nothing). :-)
Was it the ONLY plan for a future war or are you talking about variety of projects produced by each of the military branches and then published in not 100% honest way? Or even disclosed in not 100% honest way? I'm not sure if and why the post-Soviets would completely disclose the old documents: it seems that even those related to pre-WWII plans are only partially disclosed (hence numerous theories about the Soviet plans for WWII).

Of course. But as a foreigner you probably had been missing one critical piece of knowledge (quite related to what you wrote above). What was the Soviet elite doing with their children in the terms of education and occupation?
Giving them an education enabling future work abroad in the CAPITALIST countries as the diplomats, trade representatives, etc. (the stupid ones still were sticking to the Party career, I knew one "specimen" of that type). As you understand, there is no much sense to sent your child to be <whoever> in the midst of a nuclear waste.
Ditto for the goodies which could be obtained only in the rotten capitalist camp (from those for the personal usage and all the way to the strategic ones like computers to be copied).

It was two American and two British missiles, the French concurred but did not participate. The reason Minsk was chosen was because it was comparable to Birmingham in population and industry. Another stated reason was its geographic location with the Baltics and Poland to the north and Ukraine to the south. Those parts of the SU and WP obviously were concerned.

Post by The Horny Goat
While his book didn't cover this, given his terms of peace between
NATO and Warsaw Pact something like OTL's 1989-91 would surely have
occured not long after the book ended.

You mean the West would supply the SU grain in exchange to allowing the Soviet Jews to leave? :-)
Seriously, none of the sides gains anything that would be worthy of a devastation.

Post by The Horny Goat
Again - what's the point of conquering rubble?

It seems that the military (in general) tend NOT to ask this question.

Post by The Horny Goat
He wanted to turn
the rest of European Russia into cropland for the Reich.

No a nuclear wasteland.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-17 00:20:26 UTC

On Fri, 16 Feb 2018 09:11:09 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

The rationale was that Birmingham was the 2nd city of the UK. Nuking
London would have the Brits "pushing all the buttons".

The Allied choice of Minsk was said to be a target of about equivalent
size - the Allies could not be seen to have one of their major cities
nuked without a response while nuking Leningrad (2nd biggest Soviet
city) would be seen as a major escalation and likely to lead to
further tit for tat exchanges - the Allies were strictly trying to
save face before a ceasefire.

Or so goes the book anyhow

Post by The Horny Goat
While his book didn't cover this, given his terms of peace between
NATO and Warsaw Pact something like OTL's 1989-91 would surely have
occured not long after the book ended.

You mean the West would supply the SU grain in exchange to allowing the Soviet Jews to leave? :-)
Seriously, none of the sides gains anything that would be worthy of a devastation.

At that point in the book the Soviet conventional offensive had been
decisively stopped and Birmingham was said to be about "further
strikes will follow if you do not agree to an immediate peace" while
the Allies felt they could not make NO nuclear response but did not
want to hit a city much larger than Birmingham.

His story did not really go beyond the end of hostilities
significantly.

Post by The Horny Goat
Again - what's the point of conquering rubble?

It seems that the military (in general) tend NOT to ask this question.

Post by The Horny Goat
He wanted to turn
the rest of European Russia into cropland for the Reich.

No a nuclear wasteland.

No Hitler did NOT want that - he wanted European Russia and Ukraine
for "Germany's India" i.e. serfdom for most of the surviving
population of the Soviet Union at least the portion west of the
Archangelsk - Astrakhan line. If that meant working 30-50 million
Russians and other nationalities to death in the process that just
meant more "lebensraum" for true Aryans so he was fine with that.

In all honesty a big part of Germany's problem is that they did NOT
have clearly defined war aims and any study of these necessarily
starts from Mein Kampf and goes through roughly 1942-43 after which
the chief goal was simple survival for Germany.

Dean

2018-02-17 15:15:27 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Fri, 16 Feb 2018 09:11:09 -0800 (PST), Alex Milman

The rationale was that Birmingham was the 2nd city of the UK. Nuking
London would have the Brits "pushing all the buttons".
The Allied choice of Minsk was said to be a target of about equivalent
size - the Allies could not be seen to have one of their major cities
nuked without a response while nuking Leningrad (2nd biggest Soviet
city) would be seen as a major escalation and likely to lead to
further tit for tat exchanges - the Allies were strictly trying to
save face before a ceasefire.
Or so goes the book anyhow

Post by The Horny Goat
While his book didn't cover this, given his terms of peace between
NATO and Warsaw Pact something like OTL's 1989-91 would surely have
occured not long after the book ended.

You mean the West would supply the SU grain in exchange to allowing the Soviet Jews to leave? :-)
Seriously, none of the sides gains anything that would be worthy of a devastation.

At that point in the book the Soviet conventional offensive had been
decisively stopped and Birmingham was said to be about "further
strikes will follow if you do not agree to an immediate peace" while
the Allies felt they could not make NO nuclear response but did not
want to hit a city much larger than Birmingham.
His story did not really go beyond the end of hostilities
significantly.

There was a sequel that did just that.

Post by The Horny Goat
Again - what's the point of conquering rubble?

It seems that the military (in general) tend NOT to ask this question.

Post by The Horny Goat
He wanted to turn
the rest of European Russia into cropland for the Reich.

No a nuclear wasteland.

No Hitler did NOT want that - he wanted European Russia and Ukraine
for "Germany's India" i.e. serfdom for most of the surviving
population of the Soviet Union at least the portion west of the
Archangelsk - Astrakhan line. If that meant working 30-50 million
Russians and other nationalities to death in the process that just
meant more "lebensraum" for true Aryans so he was fine with that.
In all honesty a big part of Germany's problem is that they did NOT
have clearly defined war aims and any study of these necessarily
starts from Mein Kampf and goes through roughly 1942-43 after which
the chief goal was simple survival for Germany.

k***@gmail.com

2018-02-23 06:19:00 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
The rationale was that Birmingham was the 2nd city of the UK. Nuking
London would have the Brits "pushing all the buttons".
The Allied choice of Minsk was said to be a target of about equivalent
size - the Allies could not be seen to have one of their major cities
nuked without a response while nuking Leningrad (2nd biggest Soviet
city) would be seen as a major escalation and likely to lead to
further tit for tat exchanges - the Allies were strictly trying to
save face before a ceasefire.
Or so goes the book anyhow

I vaguely recall that another factor was that nuking Minsk had all the Ukrainians, Transcaucasians, Belorussians etc realise that they were going to go down with the Russian ship. Consequently there was much internal squabbling in the Soviet hierarchy between the Russians and everyone else. I can't recall if it lead to a full-blown coup (it is years since I read it), but it certainly disrupted the internal cohesion of the Soviet Union, just as NATO were starting to turn the tide militarily

Cheers,
KB

The Horny Goat

2018-02-23 17:01:20 UTC

Post by k***@gmail.com
I vaguely recall that another factor was that nuking Minsk had all the Ukrainians, Transcaucasians, Belorussians etc realise that they were going to go down with the Russian ship. Consequently there was much internal squabbling in the Soviet hierarchy between the Russians and everyone else. I can't recall if it lead to a full-blown coup (it is years since I read it), but it certainly disrupted the internal cohesion of the Soviet Union, just as NATO were starting to turn the tide militarily

I think you're right though that angle was not as fully developed as
it doubtless would have been had the book been written in 1991-92
where Hackett would have known secession of the republics wasn't
nearly as science fiction as was thought in the early 80s.

The Horny Goat

2018-02-15 23:24:54 UTC

On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 09:49:16 -0800, Dimensional Traveler

Post by Alex Milman
I read at least couple books with the more or less similar scenarios and quite agree that if certain threshold is passed than it is practically impossible to stop the further escalation. This is why the "inner circle" would be interested in avoiding the 1st step: they have much more to lose than the ordinary citizens.

You're right and towards the end of On Escalation Kahn produced a
"Soviet escalation ladder" based on pronouncements by various
Politburo members from around that time and it was NOT at all the one
he had printed earlier in his book.

pyotr filipivich

2018-02-20 18:59:21 UTC

Post by John Dallman
If the Japanese can avoid war with the USA, they're in a good position.
They've severely undermined the British position in India, which is a
huge problem. They can also cut off supplies to the British armies in
North Africa, which were already having to go the long way around Africa.

Weren't the Brits still pretty much in control of the Med?

For some value of Control. They held the Suez, they held
Gibraltar. And as long as they held Malta, the Axis didn't have the
free run they thought they were entitled.

--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.

Rich Rostrom

2018-02-23 23:45:54 UTC

Post by Alex Milman
Weren't the Brits still pretty much in control of the Med?

For some value of Control. They held the Suez, they
held Gibraltar. And as long as they held Malta, the
Axis didn't have the free run they thought they were
entitled.

The British could harass Axis shipping to Africa, but
not stop it - even in late 1942, when Hitler responded
to TORCH by sending an entire panzer army to Tunisia.

But the Axis could and did cut off all Allied shipping
from transiting the Mediterranean.

So the central Med was under Axis control, with minor
disruption; the eastern and western ends were under
complete Allied control.

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

s***@yahoo.com

2018-02-12 19:22:08 UTC

To be nice to the "missile gap" crowd, as I recall the soviets were working hard to pretend they had those missiles, so some green kid thinking they really do isn't much of a stretch of the imagination.

Nils

Alex Milman

2018-02-12 20:12:56 UTC

jedidiahstott

2018-02-12 22:06:52 UTC

Branching off slightly, but retaining the original WI concept:

Assuming that Japan actually adopts a 'keep the US out of it at any cost" policy, do they _need_ to go to war with Britain?

The fundamental requirement for Japan was oil. That could come (had to come) from the Dutch East Indies. The assumption is that seizing the Dutch East Indies means war with Britain (even if a US war has been averted) . But is that inescapable.

OTL Japan 'took over' the French Indo China territories on the basis that Germany, having conquered France, was entitled to gift those territories to Japan (via Vichy , which was a puppet government , so did as it was told). But Germany had also conquered the Netherlands. So why could not the same pretext have been used there. Germany rules the Netherlands. And therefore Germany can 'gift' the Netherlands eastern territories to Japan . Of course, a military expedition will be needed to take control, but that's _technically_ different to an invasion.

And if Japan has the DEI , can they forgo Malaya ? Which would mean being able to keep peace with Britain

The reality , of course, is that it's all a crock of shit. But, given US reluctance to get into a war unless the were punched in the nose; and given the perilous position of Britain, would either of them have pointed out that the Emperor had no clothes?

I have no idea. It seems like an awfully fragile and tenuous hold onto peace. And could Japan stomach the inferiority position vis-a-vis the US ? And, of course, sooner or later someone will point out that Japn is _not_ backing away from China conquest . But, maybe, it was possible ?

Rich Rostrom

2018-02-14 21:25:02 UTC

Post by jedidiahstott
OTL Japan 'took over' the French Indo China
territories on the basis that Germany, having
conquered France, was entitled to gift those
territories to Japan (via Vichy , which was a puppet
government , so did as it was told). But Germany had
also conquered the Netherlands. So why could not the
same pretext have been used there.

Germany had nothing to do with the Japanese occupation
of Indochina. Indochina was under the control of
_Vichy_ France, and thus was not under Allied
protection. Vichy France was the official government
of France and all its colonies except those few that
had declared for Free France, and was not at war with
Germany.

Vichy France consented to the Japanese occupation
under duress; i.e. Japan told them to consent or be
conquered, though Japan pledged not to interfere with
French internal control or colonial title. Possibly
Germany exerted pressure on Vichy to consent, but they
did not dictate that decision.

The Dutch East Indies were completely different; they
answered to the Dutch government in exile, which was
an Allied government at war with Germany. If Japan
demanded that the Netherlands allow Japanese
occupation of the Indies under threat of invasion,
that would be an act of war, and Japan would thus
enter the ongoing war with Germany.

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

a***@gmail.com

2018-03-17 13:08:21 UTC