David Tenner
2005-01-14 08:11:23 UTC
A thought provoked by the thread about what would be the largest nation
after 1949 likely to "go communist":
In May 1959 Commentary magazine published an article by Walter Laqueur
entitled "As Iraq Goes Communist."
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/Summaries/V27I5P7-1.htm The article is
not available online except to subscribers, and I have not yet read it, so
I don't know what Laqueur's arguments were, but as of May 1959, it did
seem quite plausible that Iraq was "going communist." The Iraqi Communist
Party certainly seems to have had advance knowledge of the military revolt
that overthrew the monarchy and brought Abdul-Karim Qassem to power on
July 14, 1958: "It is clear, according to Batatu, that officers close to
Qassem kept the leading members of the National Unity Front [which
included the ICP] fairly well posted on what was going on. Thus, the
communist party centre placed all the party organisations on alert on the
night of July 13-14, only giving the vaguest of reasons for taking this
step."
http://www.soviet-empire.com/ussr/viewtopic.php?t=28574 (All quotations
in this post are from that site, unless otherwise indicated.)
Although the ICP was not totally satisfied with Qassem, they did support
him as an "anti-imperialist" and an opponent of Arab nationalism in either
its Nasserite or Ba'athist forms. They hoped to take advantage of the
split between Qassem and his pro-Nasser deputy, Abdul-Salam Arif. After
Arif's removal:
"The next months saw a hardening of the positions of what now developed
into two distinct sides, the communists and their sympathisers and the
nationalists and theirs. One must not forget that despite the ICP's
support for Qassem, he still regarded them with suspicion, believing that
if he publicly allied with them he would lose more support at home, and
also isolate potential allies abroad. It was not until the end of January
1959 that the party was given official permission to publish their
newspaper legally, the 'Ittihad al-Sha'ab'. In addition, Qassem could
still not be persuaded by the ICP to appoint any communists to his cabinet
or to any high executive position. Nevertheless, he did appoint communist
sympathisers, such as Ibrahim Kubba and Naziha al-Dulaymi."
The nationalists then attempted to overthrow Qassem. First there was a
plot by veteran pan-Arabist poltician Rashid Ali, which failed utterly,
due to lack of secrecy. This was a prelude to a much more serious revolt
in Mosul in March 1959. This revolt was also crushed, and for a while the
ICP did seem to many observers (as the title of Laqueur's article shows)
to be on the verge of power. Indeed, apparently there was a debate within
the ICP on whether they should seize power: "However, after heated
arguments in the politburo it was decided not to embark on such an action.
It claimed that while it may succeed in taking power, its original
analysis of the essentially bourgeois character of the revolution was
correct. In addition, the party's opponents would be able to combine
successfully against it; a civil war would follow in which the left would
be defeated."
In any event, June-July 1959 seems to have marked the turning point for
the ICP: In late June, Qassem began to arrest or forcibly retire officers
sympathetic to the ICP and to restrict the role and operation of the ICP-
backed "People's Resistance Forces" (PRF). In July, there was conflict in
Kirkuk between the Kurds (who feared Arab nationalism and looked to the
ICP as a counterweight to pan-Arabism) and the fiercely anti-Communist
Turkomen, in which a number of Turkomen were killed: "Although this was
not a pre-meditated attack by the Kurds or the ICP, it was seized upon by
enemies of the ICP and by Qassem in particular since it gave him a chance
to distance himself from the communists and to try to end his
identification with them. Mass arrests took place in Baghdad of prominent
communists and further restrictions were put on the activities of the
People's Resistance, and control of the Peasants' Union was taken away
from the communist controlled General Federation of Peasant Unions and
given to provincial governors. This was the beginning of a sharp decline
of communist influence in Iraq." Evenutally the party's newspaper was
banned and it lost control of the trade unions, student union, etc. In
February, 1963, the Ba'athists and their allies seized control, and killed
Qassem and many Communists. This was the end of any real power of the
ICP; true, in the 1970s it was legalized and even got a couple of seats in
the cabinet (perhaps Saddam Hussein did this to please the Soviet Union,
with which he had good relations at the time) but of course Saddam would
not allow the ICP any real power, and it was soon subjected to severe
repression.
There are two ways I can see of having the ICP come to power:
(1) One, mentioned above, was for them to strike in the spring of 1959
when they were at the height of their power. They had important
sympathizers in the army, they strongly influenced the PRF, they
controlled the trade unions, the peasant union, etc.--and they even had
sympathizers holding high posts within the regime. Indeed,even those
politburo members who opposed a coup acknowledged that it might be
successful for a while, but thought that a civil war would follow which
the Left would lose. That the IRC and its allies would indeed lose seems
likely but not certain--would their opponents (Ba'athists, Nasserites, the
remaining monarchists, etc.) be able to unite? And then of course there
is the question of outside aid--would the USSR help the ICP? (The US
would presumably aid the ICP's opponents, acting through Turkey, Iran, and
friendly Arab states.) I wouldn't put the odds in favor of the Left in an
Iraqi civil war, but I wouldn't rule out their prospects, either. One
possiblity: they lose most of the country but retain control of
Kurdistan?
(2) Alternatively, they might have succeeeded by getting along better with
Qassem and gradually gaining more and more influence within his regime.
Obviously, the Kirkuk massacre hurt the ICP badly here, but even before
that, Qassem seems to have begun to curb the ICP's influence. So maybe
what we need is a Qassem who underestimates the communist menace and
overestimates the nationalist one, rather than vice versa as in OTL. (In
1963 the ICP appealed to Qassem for arms to help them resist the Ba'athist
coup that they said was imminent, but Qassem, confident that he could
defeat the coup on his own, declined.)
Obviously, communist parties face serious obstacles in Muslim countries.
Still, South Yemen was officially "Marxist-Leninist" for many years, so I
would not rule out the possibility of a Communist Iraq. Admittedly,
though, the IRC had only a brief window of opportunity under Qassem, and
it is questionable whether their leadership had the competence to take
advantage of it.
Any thoughts? (I do want to look up Laqueur's article...)
after 1949 likely to "go communist":
In May 1959 Commentary magazine published an article by Walter Laqueur
entitled "As Iraq Goes Communist."
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/Summaries/V27I5P7-1.htm The article is
not available online except to subscribers, and I have not yet read it, so
I don't know what Laqueur's arguments were, but as of May 1959, it did
seem quite plausible that Iraq was "going communist." The Iraqi Communist
Party certainly seems to have had advance knowledge of the military revolt
that overthrew the monarchy and brought Abdul-Karim Qassem to power on
July 14, 1958: "It is clear, according to Batatu, that officers close to
Qassem kept the leading members of the National Unity Front [which
included the ICP] fairly well posted on what was going on. Thus, the
communist party centre placed all the party organisations on alert on the
night of July 13-14, only giving the vaguest of reasons for taking this
step."
http://www.soviet-empire.com/ussr/viewtopic.php?t=28574 (All quotations
in this post are from that site, unless otherwise indicated.)
Although the ICP was not totally satisfied with Qassem, they did support
him as an "anti-imperialist" and an opponent of Arab nationalism in either
its Nasserite or Ba'athist forms. They hoped to take advantage of the
split between Qassem and his pro-Nasser deputy, Abdul-Salam Arif. After
Arif's removal:
"The next months saw a hardening of the positions of what now developed
into two distinct sides, the communists and their sympathisers and the
nationalists and theirs. One must not forget that despite the ICP's
support for Qassem, he still regarded them with suspicion, believing that
if he publicly allied with them he would lose more support at home, and
also isolate potential allies abroad. It was not until the end of January
1959 that the party was given official permission to publish their
newspaper legally, the 'Ittihad al-Sha'ab'. In addition, Qassem could
still not be persuaded by the ICP to appoint any communists to his cabinet
or to any high executive position. Nevertheless, he did appoint communist
sympathisers, such as Ibrahim Kubba and Naziha al-Dulaymi."
The nationalists then attempted to overthrow Qassem. First there was a
plot by veteran pan-Arabist poltician Rashid Ali, which failed utterly,
due to lack of secrecy. This was a prelude to a much more serious revolt
in Mosul in March 1959. This revolt was also crushed, and for a while the
ICP did seem to many observers (as the title of Laqueur's article shows)
to be on the verge of power. Indeed, apparently there was a debate within
the ICP on whether they should seize power: "However, after heated
arguments in the politburo it was decided not to embark on such an action.
It claimed that while it may succeed in taking power, its original
analysis of the essentially bourgeois character of the revolution was
correct. In addition, the party's opponents would be able to combine
successfully against it; a civil war would follow in which the left would
be defeated."
In any event, June-July 1959 seems to have marked the turning point for
the ICP: In late June, Qassem began to arrest or forcibly retire officers
sympathetic to the ICP and to restrict the role and operation of the ICP-
backed "People's Resistance Forces" (PRF). In July, there was conflict in
Kirkuk between the Kurds (who feared Arab nationalism and looked to the
ICP as a counterweight to pan-Arabism) and the fiercely anti-Communist
Turkomen, in which a number of Turkomen were killed: "Although this was
not a pre-meditated attack by the Kurds or the ICP, it was seized upon by
enemies of the ICP and by Qassem in particular since it gave him a chance
to distance himself from the communists and to try to end his
identification with them. Mass arrests took place in Baghdad of prominent
communists and further restrictions were put on the activities of the
People's Resistance, and control of the Peasants' Union was taken away
from the communist controlled General Federation of Peasant Unions and
given to provincial governors. This was the beginning of a sharp decline
of communist influence in Iraq." Evenutally the party's newspaper was
banned and it lost control of the trade unions, student union, etc. In
February, 1963, the Ba'athists and their allies seized control, and killed
Qassem and many Communists. This was the end of any real power of the
ICP; true, in the 1970s it was legalized and even got a couple of seats in
the cabinet (perhaps Saddam Hussein did this to please the Soviet Union,
with which he had good relations at the time) but of course Saddam would
not allow the ICP any real power, and it was soon subjected to severe
repression.
There are two ways I can see of having the ICP come to power:
(1) One, mentioned above, was for them to strike in the spring of 1959
when they were at the height of their power. They had important
sympathizers in the army, they strongly influenced the PRF, they
controlled the trade unions, the peasant union, etc.--and they even had
sympathizers holding high posts within the regime. Indeed,even those
politburo members who opposed a coup acknowledged that it might be
successful for a while, but thought that a civil war would follow which
the Left would lose. That the IRC and its allies would indeed lose seems
likely but not certain--would their opponents (Ba'athists, Nasserites, the
remaining monarchists, etc.) be able to unite? And then of course there
is the question of outside aid--would the USSR help the ICP? (The US
would presumably aid the ICP's opponents, acting through Turkey, Iran, and
friendly Arab states.) I wouldn't put the odds in favor of the Left in an
Iraqi civil war, but I wouldn't rule out their prospects, either. One
possiblity: they lose most of the country but retain control of
Kurdistan?
(2) Alternatively, they might have succeeeded by getting along better with
Qassem and gradually gaining more and more influence within his regime.
Obviously, the Kirkuk massacre hurt the ICP badly here, but even before
that, Qassem seems to have begun to curb the ICP's influence. So maybe
what we need is a Qassem who underestimates the communist menace and
overestimates the nationalist one, rather than vice versa as in OTL. (In
1963 the ICP appealed to Qassem for arms to help them resist the Ba'athist
coup that they said was imminent, but Qassem, confident that he could
defeat the coup on his own, declined.)
Obviously, communist parties face serious obstacles in Muslim countries.
Still, South Yemen was officially "Marxist-Leninist" for many years, so I
would not rule out the possibility of a Communist Iraq. Admittedly,
though, the IRC had only a brief window of opportunity under Qassem, and
it is questionable whether their leadership had the competence to take
advantage of it.
Any thoughts? (I do want to look up Laqueur's article...)
--
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net