Had the U.S. joined the League of Nations after World War I, would anything have been different in the 1930s and beyond?

[WolfBear]

Had the U.S. joined the League of Nations after World War I (such as by having Woodrow Wilson die of his stroke and having the new U.S. President Thomas Marshall be more willing to compromise afterwards), would anything have been different in the 1930s and beyond?

Basically, I am curious as to whether a U.S. which would have been a League of Nations member as well as a Franco-British ally (had Woodrow Wilson died or not been so stubborn, he might have been able to get a U.S. treaty of alliance with Britain and France passed by the U.S. Senate in 1919) would have affected French and British foreign policy starting from 1933 (which is when Hitler came to power in Germany) in any way.

In our TL, the U.S. essentially stuck its head up its ass after the end of World War I and largely ignored developments in Europe--even after 1933. In this TL, would Americans have been more willing to have U.S. troops fight and die in another European war? Or would the U.S. in this TL have been an even more avid supporter of appeasement than Britain and France were in our TL--up to the point of perhaps discouraging Britain and France from giving a security guarantee to Poland in early 1939?

Any thoughts on this?

[Don P]

Post by WolfBear
Had the U.S. joined the League of Nations after World War I (such as by having Woodrow Wilson die of his stroke and having the new U.S. President Thomas Marshall be more willing to compromise afterwards), would anything have been different in the 1930s and beyond?
. . .
In our TL, the U.S. essentially stuck its head up its ass after the end of World War I and largely ignored developments in Europe--even after 1933. In this TL, would Americans have been more willing to have U.S. troops fight and die in another European war? Or would the U.S. in this TL have been an even more avid supporter of appeasement than Britain and France ?

Alternative #3: American participation in League/Locarno diplomacy and
worldwide economic growth (no banking crashes) maintain social progress
in Europe sufficiently that no government feels the need to rearm or
sees any likely profit from going to war. (However, the USA was actually
quite involved in China and Japan 1920-40, and the degree of foreign
involvement did not inhibit Japanese expansionism or stabilize China.)

[WolfBear]

Post by Don P

Post by WolfBear
Had the U.S. joined the League of Nations after World War I (such as by having Woodrow Wilson die of his stroke and having the new U.S. President Thomas Marshall be more willing to compromise afterwards), would anything have been different in the 1930s and beyond?
. . .
In our TL, the U.S. essentially stuck its head up its ass after the end of World War I and largely ignored developments in Europe--even after 1933. In this TL, would Americans have been more willing to have U.S. troops fight and die in another European war? Or would the U.S. in this TL have been an even more avid supporter of appeasement than Britain and France ?

Alternative #3: American participation in League/Locarno diplomacy and
worldwide economic growth (no banking crashes) maintain social progress
in Europe sufficiently that no government feels the need to rearm or
sees any likely profit from going to war. (However, the USA was actually
quite involved in China and Japan 1920-40, and the degree of foreign
involvement did not inhibit Japanese expansionism or stabilize China.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ontario, Canada)

How would greater U.S. participation in international affairs have prevented the Great Depression, though?

[Dan]

Some of the economic issues of the 30’s came from how we handled the 20’s

UK allies France Belgium Russia owed UK money they could not affoard to repay
UK owed US that it could not affoard to repay
Germany was forced to repay reparations which they could not affoard to repay
Soviets had disowned debts of the Tsar

A more involved US would have changed the merry go round of unplayable debt and might have ended with a better outcome but it is a might.

A US more involved would probably have seen US forces on the Rhine during the initial occupation not pulling out in the early 20’s but staying as originally intended to 1935, OTL Britain pulled out in 1930 and France in 1932. Britain and France pulled back partly because of cost and partly because they were no longer trusting each other to back each other up. Add in US and you could have had a different ‘Western’ view.

What that does to Weimar politics I haven’t a clue, could be Germany gradually evolves closer to Bonn like West Germany, or more likely you still have large Nazi and Communist Party forces and we end up with chaos and war even if it does take an extra few years.

[Alex Milman]

Post by Dan
Some of the economic issues of the 30’s came from how we handled the 20’s
UK allies France Belgium Russia owed UK money they could not affoard to repay
UK owed US that it could not affoard to repay
Germany was forced to repay reparations which they could not affoard to repay
Soviets had disowned debts of the Tsar
A more involved US would have changed the merry go round of unplayable debt and might have ended with a better outcome but it is a might.

How exactly would "involved" US achieve paying the debts? You can start with Russia.

Post by Dan
A US more involved would probably have seen US forces on the Rhine during the initial occupation not pulling out in the early 20’s but staying as originally intended to 1935,

More involved US does not automatically mean more aggressive US with a much greater staying army and readiness to pay for the exercise you described.

Post by Dan
OTL Britain pulled out in 1930 and France in 1932. Britain and France pulled back partly because of cost and partly because they were no longer trusting each other to back each other up. Add in US and you could have had a different ‘Western’ view.

You would not: the Brits and French still would not trust each other and the whole thing still would be expensive. A separate question is how the US taxpayers (or at least Congress) could be persuaded to keep spending big amounts of money on something which is clearly not US business. Neither would the US be able to provide unified "Western" view because League of Nations was pretty much a front for the British and French helping themselves with the parts of Ottoman Empire and on most other issues being (AFAIK) pretty much impotent.

Of course, it is rather questionable if the Great Depression had been caused by the unpaid British debts. Stock market crashes (1st London than the US) had been caused by a speculative boom of the late 1920's and the good harvests creating oversupply and a resulting financial ruin of the small farmers. None of these things was unrelated to the American or British foreign policy and it does not look like the US at that time possessed superior wisdom in dealing with the situation (it took WWII to finish the Great Depression).

[David Tenner]

Post by Don P

Post by WolfBear
Had the U.S. joined the League of Nations after World War I (such as by
having Woodrow Wilson die of his stroke and having the new U.S.
President Thomas Marshall be more willing to compromise afterwards),
would anything have been different in the 1930s and beyond? . . .
In our TL, the U.S. essentially stuck its head up its ass after the end
of World War I and largely ignored developments in Europe--even after
1933. In this TL, would Americans have been more willing to have U.S.
troops fight and die in another European war? Or would the U.S. in this
TL have been an even more avid supporter of appeasement than Britain
and France ?

Alternative #3: American participation in League/Locarno diplomacy and
worldwide economic growth (no banking crashes) maintain social progress
in Europe sufficiently that no government feels the need to rearm or
sees any likely profit from going to war. (However, the USA was actually
quite involved in China and Japan 1920-40, and the degree of foreign
involvement did not inhibit Japanese expansionism or stabilize China.)

It is simply not true that the US ignored developments in Europe in the
1920's in OTL. Non-membership in the League did not at all prevent the US
from reciognizing its stake in a peaceful Europe. In particular, in the
1923 Ruhr occupation crisis, the US decidedly acted in favor of the
British position (of concilating Germany) and against the mmore punitive
French one:

"By the end of 1923 the franc had fallen by 40% and France, far from
profiting from the occupation, found itself in desperate need of loans to
balance its budget and continue postwar reconstruction. Even if complete
German political collapse could be averted, which was by no means certain,
success was impossible and failure would be a domestic disaster.

"The Anglo-American intervention may well have averted a German civil
war, a Franco-German war, a general European war, or all three. This feat
was achieved with dollars rather than bullets. The American government,
officially disinterested in the matter of reparations because of its
rejection of the Versailles settlement, nevertheless asked a committee of
bankers headed by Charles Dawes to go to Europe and assist in resolution
of the matter. They managed to resolve the situation by by rescheduling
German debts,avoiding a concrete total for the time being, and arranging
for a loan of $200 million to Germany for the purposes of reparations
payment and currency stabilization.

"Had this been the extent of the American contribution, its relevance to
European security would be debatable. The United States in fact
accomplished quite a bit more. The French had received an emergenvy loan
of $100 million but needed additional funds. Secretary of State Hughes
had already expressed privately his conviction that occupation would lead
to war;...communicating through Ambassador Herrick, he quietly made it
clear to the French government that the initial loan was conditional upon
French support at the upcoming London Conference, where the Dawes Plan
would be implemented. In London, the French were forced as a condition
of the Dawes loan to renounce their right to implement military or
territorial sanctions against Germany, although they were permitted to
delay evacuation of the Ruhr for a year.

"American intervention in Germany was also critical in securing the
success of the Dawes Plan. Ambassador Alonson B. Houghton convinced
Stressemann, now Foreign Minister, and his government to approve the Dawes
Plan; he even provided a draft of a letter of acceptance, which the
Germans used verbatim. He also provided the necessary swing votes when he
convinced the leaders of the Nationalist Party (DNVP) that a 'no' vote
would so sour American public opinion that no future loans would be
forthcoming....

"American influence also played a major role in the establishment of the
European security structure that replaced the unstable Versailles
arrangementand lasted into the 1930s. Early in 1925 Germany, cognizant of
continuedFrench insecurity and wary of a potential Franco-British security
pact, proposed a multilateral agreement to alleviate its neighbors’
concernsvia arbitration treaties and guarantees of borders. The following
monthswitnessed a series of exchanges between the French, the Germans, and
theBritish, each of the first two offering conditions unacceptable to the
other and the third attempting to mediate. For months, nothing came of the
discussions.

"At that point, President Coolidge issued what has been called 'America’s
Peace Ultimatum to Europe.' Coolidge again used the fact that, with
British loan markets closed, America was the only source of the loans that
were needed to fuel reconstruction. American government officials in
Europe made it clear that, absent peace and security on the continent,
further loans would be discouraged. The result,the Treaty of Locarno,was
signed by Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy and
constituted a mutual guarantee of the German-French and German-Belgian
borders and demilitarized the Rhineland.53 In so doing, it replaced the
inherently unstable Versailles security structure in Western Europe..."

https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/579_mythofusisol.pdf

As the article notes, "the security policy of the 1920s relied on banks
rather than tanks, and the former were more e?ective than the latter would
have been: American financial muscle was more than adequate to manage
security-related quarrels on the war-torn European continent..."

[WolfBear]

Post by David Tenner

Post by Don P

Post by WolfBear
Had the U.S. joined the League of Nations after World War I (such as by
having Woodrow Wilson die of his stroke and having the new U.S.
President Thomas Marshall be more willing to compromise afterwards),
would anything have been different in the 1930s and beyond? . . .
In our TL, the U.S. essentially stuck its head up its ass after the end
of World War I and largely ignored developments in Europe--even after
1933. In this TL, would Americans have been more willing to have U.S.
troops fight and die in another European war? Or would the U.S. in this
TL have been an even more avid supporter of appeasement than Britain
and France ?

Alternative #3: American participation in League/Locarno diplomacy and
worldwide economic growth (no banking crashes) maintain social progress
in Europe sufficiently that no government feels the need to rearm or
sees any likely profit from going to war. (However, the USA was actually
quite involved in China and Japan 1920-40, and the degree of foreign
involvement did not inhibit Japanese expansionism or stabilize China.)

It is simply not true that the US ignored developments in Europe in the
1920's in OTL. Non-membership in the League did not at all prevent the US
from reciognizing its stake in a peaceful Europe. In particular, in the
1923 Ruhr occupation crisis, the US decidedly acted in favor of the
British position (of concilating Germany) and against the mmore punitive
"By the end of 1923 the franc had fallen by 40% and France, far from
profiting from the occupation, found itself in desperate need of loans to
balance its budget and continue postwar reconstruction. Even if complete
German political collapse could be averted, which was by no means certain,
success was impossible and failure would be a domestic disaster.
"The Anglo-American intervention may well have averted a German civil
war, a Franco-German war, a general European war, or all three. This feat
was achieved with dollars rather than bullets. The American government,
officially disinterested in the matter of reparations because of its
rejection of the Versailles settlement, nevertheless asked a committee of
bankers headed by Charles Dawes to go to Europe and assist in resolution
of the matter. They managed to resolve the situation by by rescheduling
German debts,avoiding a concrete total for the time being, and arranging
for a loan of $200 million to Germany for the purposes of reparations
payment and currency stabilization.
"Had this been the extent of the American contribution, its relevance to
European security would be debatable. The United States in fact
accomplished quite a bit more. The French had received an emergenvy loan
of $100 million but needed additional funds. Secretary of State Hughes
had already expressed privately his conviction that occupation would lead
to war;...communicating through Ambassador Herrick, he quietly made it
clear to the French government that the initial loan was conditional upon
French support at the upcoming London Conference, where the Dawes Plan
would be implemented. In London, the French were forced as a condition
of the Dawes loan to renounce their right to implement military or
territorial sanctions against Germany, although they were permitted to
delay evacuation of the Ruhr for a year.
"American intervention in Germany was also critical in securing the
success of the Dawes Plan. Ambassador Alonson B. Houghton convinced
Stressemann, now Foreign Minister, and his government to approve the Dawes
Plan; he even provided a draft of a letter of acceptance, which the
Germans used verbatim. He also provided the necessary swing votes when he
convinced the leaders of the Nationalist Party (DNVP) that a 'no' vote
would so sour American public opinion that no future loans would be
forthcoming....
"American influence also played a major role in the establishment of the
European security structure that replaced the unstable Versailles
arrangementand lasted into the 1930s. Early in 1925 Germany, cognizant of
continuedFrench insecurity and wary of a potential Franco-British security
pact, proposed a multilateral agreement to alleviate its neighbors’
concernsvia arbitration treaties and guarantees of borders. The following
monthswitnessed a series of exchanges between the French, the Germans, and
theBritish, each of the first two offering conditions unacceptable to the
other and the third attempting to mediate. For months, nothing came of the
discussions.
"At that point, President Coolidge issued what has been called 'America’s
Peace Ultimatum to Europe.' Coolidge again used the fact that, with
British loan markets closed, America was the only source of the loans that
were needed to fuel reconstruction. American government officials in
Europe made it clear that, absent peace and security on the continent,
further loans would be discouraged. The result,the Treaty of Locarno,was
signed by Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy and
constituted a mutual guarantee of the German-French and German-Belgian
borders and demilitarized the Rhineland.53 In so doing, it replaced the
inherently unstable Versailles security structure in Western Europe..."
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/579_mythofusisol.pdf
As the article notes, "the security policy of the 1920s relied on banks
rather than tanks, and the former were more e?ective than the latter would
have been: American financial muscle was more than adequate to manage
security-related quarrels on the war-torn European continent..."
--
David Tenner

Very interesting!

That said, though, would the U.S. have been more involved in European affairs *in the 1930s* if it would have remained a Franco-British ally and if it would have been a League of Nations member?

Also, if so, how would this have affected the run-up to World War II (and, for that matter, World War II itself)?

[jerry kraus]

Post by WolfBear
Had the U.S. joined the League of Nations after World War I (such as by having Woodrow Wilson die of his stroke and having the new U.S. President Thomas Marshall be more willing to compromise afterwards), would anything have been different in the 1930s and beyond?
Basically, I am curious as to whether a U.S. which would have been a League of Nations member as well as a Franco-British ally (had Woodrow Wilson died or not been so stubborn, he might have been able to get a U.S. treaty of alliance with Britain and France passed by the U.S. Senate in 1919) would have affected French and British foreign policy starting from 1933 (which is when Hitler came to power in Germany) in any way.
In our TL, the U.S. essentially stuck its head up its ass after the end of World War I and largely ignored developments in Europe--even after 1933. In this TL, would Americans have been more willing to have U.S. troops fight and die in another European war? Or would the U.S. in this TL have been an even more avid supporter of appeasement than Britain and France were in our TL--up to the point of perhaps discouraging Britain and France from giving a security guarantee to Poland in early 1939?
Any thoughts on this?

Depends on how active and aggressive and U.S. was, in international affairs. Obviously, it was very active in the United Nations, at least at first. If the U.S. is as passive as Britain and France were in the League of Nations, it probably wouldn't have mattered a great deal, at all.