WolfBear
2018-02-17 23:27:29 UTC
I've been curious about this--what do you think the optimal borders for Israel in 1949 are?
This question was inspired by this information in this Times of Israel article:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-trump-era-begins-what-does-israel-actually-want-in-the-west-bank/
"In December 1948, during a lull in the fighting in Israel’s War of Independence, the cabinet ministers of the newly declared Jewish state gathered in Tel Aviv to consider a final military push to expel the Egyptian army from the country’s south and Iraqi troops from the northern West Bank cities of Qalqilya and Tulkarem, both of which lie scarcely nine miles from the Mediterranean coast and form Israel’s perilously narrow coastal waistline just north of Tel Aviv.
During the cabinet meeting, interior minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum phrased a question that has plagued Israelis ever since: Is it wise to take control of territories with large Palestinian populations? Israel’s expansions up to that point in the war were into areas that were either sparsely populated to begin with, or from which Arab populations had largely fled; or into places of such desperate strategic significance, such as Lod and Ramle, that Israeli forces simply expelled some of the Arab residents.
David Ben Gurion (left) and then-major general Ariel Sharon during a bus ride along the Israeli Army positions on the Egyptian border in 1973 (Photo credit: IDF/Flash90)
David Ben Gurion (left) and then-major general Ariel Sharon during a bus ride along the Israeli army positions on the Egyptian border in 1973. (IDF/Flash90)
The historian Benny Morris described Gruenbaum’s concern as stemming from the understanding that Israel “could not hold territory packed with Arabs.”
The question returned even more forcefully a few months later, when Yigal Allon, the most successful field commander of the nascent IDF, urged prime minister David Ben-Gurion to order the conquest of the West Bank, an operation he thought could be concluded in a matter of days. This was particularly true after a February ceasefire with Egypt freed up a great deal of Israel’s over 100,000 troops to contend with a Jordanian fighting force in the West Bank of perhaps 12,000. Again Israel’s leaders demurred, and for the same reason: Could a Jewish nation state afford to extend its sovereignty over large non-Jewish populations?
In other words, the West Bank as it is defined today — a distinct territory that is neither Israel nor Jordan — was not, as is commonly believed, forged by Jordanian military success in holding the Israelis at bay in the 1948-49 war. It was created, rather, by the Israeli fear of the consequences that might flow from absorbing large numbers of Palestinians. That concern has not waned in 70 years. It is still the primary argument on both right and left against annexation of the West Bank and for the establishment of a Palestinian state."
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Basically, the information in the article above states that Israel had a golden chance of capturing the West Bank in 1949 but chose not to take it due to its large Arab population.
However, was this calculation correct? Indeed, do you think that Israel should have captured the West Bank and obtained better borders for it in the east in 1949? Basically, I am thinking of selectively annexing parts of the West Bank while either giving the rest of the West Bank to Jordan in exchange for a peace treaty or creating a pro-Israeli Palestinian puppet state in the rest of the West Bank.
Indeed, any thoughts on this? Also, if you think that Israel could have obtained better borders in 1949, what do you think that these better borders should have looked like?
This question was inspired by this information in this Times of Israel article:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-trump-era-begins-what-does-israel-actually-want-in-the-west-bank/
"In December 1948, during a lull in the fighting in Israel’s War of Independence, the cabinet ministers of the newly declared Jewish state gathered in Tel Aviv to consider a final military push to expel the Egyptian army from the country’s south and Iraqi troops from the northern West Bank cities of Qalqilya and Tulkarem, both of which lie scarcely nine miles from the Mediterranean coast and form Israel’s perilously narrow coastal waistline just north of Tel Aviv.
During the cabinet meeting, interior minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum phrased a question that has plagued Israelis ever since: Is it wise to take control of territories with large Palestinian populations? Israel’s expansions up to that point in the war were into areas that were either sparsely populated to begin with, or from which Arab populations had largely fled; or into places of such desperate strategic significance, such as Lod and Ramle, that Israeli forces simply expelled some of the Arab residents.
David Ben Gurion (left) and then-major general Ariel Sharon during a bus ride along the Israeli Army positions on the Egyptian border in 1973 (Photo credit: IDF/Flash90)
David Ben Gurion (left) and then-major general Ariel Sharon during a bus ride along the Israeli army positions on the Egyptian border in 1973. (IDF/Flash90)
The historian Benny Morris described Gruenbaum’s concern as stemming from the understanding that Israel “could not hold territory packed with Arabs.”
The question returned even more forcefully a few months later, when Yigal Allon, the most successful field commander of the nascent IDF, urged prime minister David Ben-Gurion to order the conquest of the West Bank, an operation he thought could be concluded in a matter of days. This was particularly true after a February ceasefire with Egypt freed up a great deal of Israel’s over 100,000 troops to contend with a Jordanian fighting force in the West Bank of perhaps 12,000. Again Israel’s leaders demurred, and for the same reason: Could a Jewish nation state afford to extend its sovereignty over large non-Jewish populations?
In other words, the West Bank as it is defined today — a distinct territory that is neither Israel nor Jordan — was not, as is commonly believed, forged by Jordanian military success in holding the Israelis at bay in the 1948-49 war. It was created, rather, by the Israeli fear of the consequences that might flow from absorbing large numbers of Palestinians. That concern has not waned in 70 years. It is still the primary argument on both right and left against annexation of the West Bank and for the establishment of a Palestinian state."
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Basically, the information in the article above states that Israel had a golden chance of capturing the West Bank in 1949 but chose not to take it due to its large Arab population.
However, was this calculation correct? Indeed, do you think that Israel should have captured the West Bank and obtained better borders for it in the east in 1949? Basically, I am thinking of selectively annexing parts of the West Bank while either giving the rest of the West Bank to Jordan in exchange for a peace treaty or creating a pro-Israeli Palestinian puppet state in the rest of the West Bank.
Indeed, any thoughts on this? Also, if you think that Israel could have obtained better borders in 1949, what do you think that these better borders should have looked like?