Rich Rostrom
2018-09-11 08:43:52 UTC
Supposing that Operation FLASH (the timebomb on
Hitler's plane in March 1943) had succeded...
The Schwarz Kapelle believed that with Hitler gone,
they could displace the Nazi regime with a coup
d'état. We'll assume they were right, and that they
achieve such a coup within three months of FLASH (by
June 1943).
The first goal of the SK in power would be to
extricate Germany from the war; but they would not
surrender unconditionally, as demanded by the Allies.
Instead they would seek peace on a negotiated basis.
It is generally believed that the Allies would reject
any such overture from Germany, even from a new regime
which repudiated Nazism. WW I had been concluded on a
similar basis, and within a few years, Germany had
resumed its bad behavior.
Thus it was generally believed by Allied leaders that
Germany had to be completely conquered and forcibly
reformed to purge its militaristic and aggressive
tendencies.
However... As of summer 1943, the US and Britain had
not engaged Germany on land in a major way. Their
contribution to the ground war was limited to the
North African campaign and the invasion of Sicily,
both peripheral theaters.
Meanwhile, the USSR had for two years fought
desperately against the main strength of the German
army, inflicting (and suffering) far greater
casualties.
From Stalin's point of view, this revealed the secret
US/UK plan: let the USSR do the fighting, and then
move in at the last minute to take control of the
victory.
Is it possible that (in the situation assumed above),
Stalin would conclude that the US and UK were
implacably determined on unconditional surrender,
_and_ _would_ _fight_ _to_ _the_ _last_ _Soviet_ _to_
_achieve_ _it_?
IOW, unconditional surrender would be achieved at the
Soviets' cost.
Or he might suspect that British-American determination
to achieve unconditional surrender might disappear at
the end of the war; the US/UK finding that the new
regime was acceptable, and making a deal with them to
exclude the USSR.
There are other configurations.
But the main idea is that Stalin might prefer an
immediate peace with limited gains but no further
cost. (E.g. Germany agrees that the USSR can
occupy and vassalize Romania.) Added bonus attraction:
Germany keeps fighting the US/UK.
Might Stalin therefore decide that an immediate deal
was preferable? Particularly if the neo-German regime
offered a good deal?
Hitler's plane in March 1943) had succeded...
The Schwarz Kapelle believed that with Hitler gone,
they could displace the Nazi regime with a coup
d'état. We'll assume they were right, and that they
achieve such a coup within three months of FLASH (by
June 1943).
The first goal of the SK in power would be to
extricate Germany from the war; but they would not
surrender unconditionally, as demanded by the Allies.
Instead they would seek peace on a negotiated basis.
It is generally believed that the Allies would reject
any such overture from Germany, even from a new regime
which repudiated Nazism. WW I had been concluded on a
similar basis, and within a few years, Germany had
resumed its bad behavior.
Thus it was generally believed by Allied leaders that
Germany had to be completely conquered and forcibly
reformed to purge its militaristic and aggressive
tendencies.
However... As of summer 1943, the US and Britain had
not engaged Germany on land in a major way. Their
contribution to the ground war was limited to the
North African campaign and the invasion of Sicily,
both peripheral theaters.
Meanwhile, the USSR had for two years fought
desperately against the main strength of the German
army, inflicting (and suffering) far greater
casualties.
From Stalin's point of view, this revealed the secret
US/UK plan: let the USSR do the fighting, and then
move in at the last minute to take control of the
victory.
Is it possible that (in the situation assumed above),
Stalin would conclude that the US and UK were
implacably determined on unconditional surrender,
_and_ _would_ _fight_ _to_ _the_ _last_ _Soviet_ _to_
_achieve_ _it_?
IOW, unconditional surrender would be achieved at the
Soviets' cost.
Or he might suspect that British-American determination
to achieve unconditional surrender might disappear at
the end of the war; the US/UK finding that the new
regime was acceptable, and making a deal with them to
exclude the USSR.
There are other configurations.
But the main idea is that Stalin might prefer an
immediate peace with limited gains but no further
cost. (E.g. Germany agrees that the USSR can
occupy and vassalize Romania.) Added bonus attraction:
Germany keeps fighting the US/UK.
Might Stalin therefore decide that an immediate deal
was preferable? Particularly if the neo-German regime
offered a good deal?
--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.