WI: France invades Germany in 1939

[Jerry Kraus]

One of the topics that historians speculate about, from time to time,
is what would have happened if the French, upon declaring war on Nazi
Germany for their invasion of Poland, had actually decided to fight
the Germans. It is rather unusual to declare war on a nation, while
it is invading an ally, and do absolutely nothing, as was largely the
case until the Germans crushed France almost a year later. While
Germany did possess a more powerful military than France at the time,
most of it was clearly occupied in crushing the Poles, to the east.
What would have happened, if the French had mobilized as quickly as
possible, thrust into Germany with infantry and armor, and attempted
to do as much damage, and take as much territory, as they possibly
could?

How would this have affected Germany's invasion of Poland?

How much of Germany would France have taken? How far into Germany
would they have got?

What would have been the Soviet Union's response, bearing in mind the
Russo-German non-aggression pact?


Also, why exactly didn't the French attack Germany, immediately:

1. Simple, fear of armed conflict?

2. Communist influence in France?

3. Fear of a combined Russo-German counterattack?

[Michele]

Post by Jerry Kraus
One of the topics that historians speculate about, from time to time,

Yes, in fact it has been done many times. I'm glad you noticed my reply to
your assumption of a waltzing French advance onto Berlin in another thread.

Post by Jerry Kraus
is what would have happened if the French, upon declaring war on Nazi
Germany for their invasion of Poland, had actually decided to fight
the Germans. It is rather unusual to declare war on a nation, while
it is invading an ally, and do absolutely nothing, as was largely the
case until the Germans crushed France almost a year later.

"Absolutely" and "largely" are in contradiction. The French invaded
Germany - a little bit of it. This is doing "largely nothing" - it is not
doing "absolutely nothing".
That said, it is not all that unusual. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, a large
Coalition did largely nothing for months, until it was ready. During the
Napoleonic wars, Britain did largely nothing for years, while its allies
were overrun.

While

Post by Jerry Kraus
Germany did possess a more powerful military than France at the time,
most of it was clearly occupied in crushing the Poles, to the east.
What would have happened, if the French had mobilized as quickly as
possible,

They did mobilize as quickly as it was possible for their army under their
current organization.

thrust into Germany with infantry and armor, and attempted

Post by Jerry Kraus
to do as much damage, and take as much territory, as they possibly
could?
How would this have affected Germany's invasion of Poland?
How much of Germany would France have taken? How far into Germany
would they have got?
What would have been the Soviet Union's response, bearing in mind the
Russo-German non-aggression pact?
1. Simple, fear of armed conflict?
2. Communist influence in France?
3. Fear of a combined Russo-German counterattack?

The French could not have attacked before they did. Their army and their
plans were geared for the defense. The Maginot Line and the advantages of
defense over offense were what they had learned from WWI, and BTW, the
Maginot sucked a lot of their military budget. They would have been very
capable of _defending_ "immediately", not of attacking. They still carried
out a much smaller attack than what they could have done, and did not push
it as much as they could have done. There were several reasons for this
apart from this defensive mentality. They expected they would have taken
much heavier losses; they expected the Poles would not fall so quickly; they
faced German air superiority (most of the single-engine fighters were there
on the Western border by September 5); and after having dithered for these
reasons, they were taken aback by the Soviet move, that sealed the Polish
fate.

That said, if they had pushed more, they would have achieved little of
consequence. The frontage was short and cramped, so that if they had wanted
to send all of their divisions on the attack, they could simply not have fed
their logistical tails. The terrain was ideal for the defense (it wasn't for
nothing that the border was there); and it was fortified. The Germans had
sent most of their forces East, but by no means all of them.
And even if the French had ignored all that as well as the heavy losses they
would have taken by insisting in these conditions, they would not have gone
far for the very simple reasons that they were no Blitzkrieg-makers (let
alone the fact that even the Germans' Blitz, eventually, did not attack
across that terrain and against the Maginot). Their offensive would have
gone at the speed of the infantryman, tanks being seen as a supporting
weapon for him.

Assuming they started an all-out offensive on September 7, in ten days they
would have taken most of the Saar (I can explain later why not to advance to
the North or South of it, unless you prefer to look at a map yourself), and
possibly a bit of Pfalz. Even today, that is not a densely populated area
thick with industries, it's woods and national parks. They would probably
have taken Kaiserslautern, the biggest city in the region, with a very
serious full-fledged battle under enemy air superiority. That would have
probably been the real best scenario.
At which point... September 17... we know what happened on the Polish
eastern border.

Would such a slightly more successful French advance deter the Soviets?
Difficult to say. In OTL, by the time the Soviets moved, the French had
invanded and had taken a few kms. Then they had stopped. In this ATL, they
will not have taken that many more kms - but they'd still be moving, albeit
slowly. It is possible the Soviets wait it out a bit more, to see if the
Germans manage to stop the French. I don't think they'd wait a whole lot
more, because already as it was in OTL, the Germans had to move back in
places, and Stalin would not rely on that.

And the Germans _would_ have stopped the French. Even assuming no Soviet
invasion, by September 15 they can certainly start redeploying West, using
their inner lines and excellent railways. That would leave the end of the
Polish campaign a bit prolonged and way untidier, but would not save the
Poles, regardless of any Soviet timidity.

Are there any other reasons apart from the abov efor the French not to
attack? Certainly. They thought that any war would be for the long haul,
like WWI, which suited them fine because they (and the British) were playing
catch-up with the Germans as to military readiness. They were behind on the
armaments curve, but the combined output of France and Britain should have
helped them in reaching the German spending and readiness. Time was on their
side, they thought. Note that Hitler was of the same opinion (he wanted to
attack France in November!). They were sure the Germans would have to attack
them (and again they were right). They believed they could easily win such a
defensive campaign (and here they were wrong), bleeding the Germans white,
while the British choked their trade on the seas, and attacking them at
leisure, in 1940 or even 1941.

The Communist influence was there but it was largely irrelevant in September
1939. The French Communists themselves had been taken by surprise by the
Pact with the devil, and you don't readjust the propaganda and influence the
workers in 15 days. If it had any weight, that would be months later.

A fear of a joint Soviet-German counterattack is of course off the wall.

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that Jerry

Post by Jerry Kraus
One of the topics that historians speculate about, from time to time,
is what would have happened if the French, upon declaring war on Nazi
Germany for their invasion of Poland, had actually decided to fight
the Germans. It is rather unusual to declare war on a nation, while
it is invading an ally, and do absolutely nothing, as was largely the
case until the Germans crushed France almost a year later. While
Germany did possess a more powerful military than France at the time,
most of it was clearly occupied in crushing the Poles, to the east.
What would have happened, if the French had mobilized as quickly as
possible, thrust into Germany with infantry and armor, and attempted
to do as much damage, and take as much territory, as they possibly
could?
How would this have affected Germany's invasion of Poland?

Zilch. That campaign was already underway.

I suspect that if the Germans had seriously considered the French
a threat, they would not have moved the army east to invade Poland.

Post by Jerry Kraus
How much of Germany would France have taken? How far into Germany
would they have got?

Pretty far, considering the forces on the ground. Unfortunately,
as Napoleon observed, the spirit is to the material as three is to
one. The French army in 1939 was not Offensive but Defensive in
spirit.

Post by Jerry Kraus
What would have been the Soviet Union's response, bearing in mind the
Russo-German non-aggression pact?

The Soviets would have thought "We get half of Poland. The
Germans get diverted by being invaded by the French. This is good for
Russia." Stalin knows that his Army is a "rebuilding" phase following
the purges, so avoiding a major war is a good thing.

Post by Jerry Kraus
1. Simple, fear of armed conflict?

We all know how the children of "baby boom" post WW2 form a
demographic "pig in the python" as that surge of fecundity moves
through the years. France after the Great War had a "missing pig in
their python." There was dearth of marrigable men, which meant as
well that there was going to be a dearth of young men coming of age
starting in 1936.
The French military was very concerned about the lack of manpower
in 1938, hence the defensive mind set which lead to the series of
Forts from the Swiss border to the coast. Unfortunately, they didn't
fortify the Belgian portion, but that was politics. If the Germans
had attacked France directly, and had used the same tactic as the last
war, it would have worked.

As it was, in 1940, when the Germans swung through the lowlands
(again) using Combined Arms tactics, the Generals in Paris were not
calling their sons in the field, but their grandsons. The entire
French Military Academy class of 1914 had been killed in the war. I
do not know what the survival rate was for the next three classes. But
after such a calamity, the French command (as well as the populace)
was anti-war.

Post by Jerry Kraus
2. Communist influence in France?
3. Fear of a combined Russo-German counterattack?

Remember that the Third German Empire and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic had a Non-Aggression Pact, not a Mutual Defense
Agreement. If Germany and France had gone to war, it would have been
an intramural conflict between two reactionary bourgeoisie
governments. "War is a bayonet with a worker at each end."


tschus
pyotr

[Michele]

Post by pyotr filipivich
Pretty far, considering the forces on the ground. Unfortunately,
as Napoleon observed, the spirit is to the material as three is to
one. The French army in 1939 was not Offensive but Defensive in
spirit.

It was, but they wouldn't have gone pretty far, considering the forces on
the ground _and_ the type of ground _and_ the fortifications _and_ the
German air superiority _and_ the fact that a successful attack, no matter
what fancy new doctrine it relies on, still needs a 3:1 ratio at the pointy
end.


If the Germans

Post by pyotr filipivich
had attacked France directly, and had used the same tactic as the last
war, it would have worked.

Which has much to say in favor of the _German_ fortifications facing the
French, should they decide to go the other way directly.

Post by pyotr filipivich

Post by Jerry Kraus
3. Fear of a combined Russo-German counterattack?

Remember that the Third German Empire and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic had a Non-Aggression Pact, not a Mutual Defense
Agreement. If Germany and France had gone to war, it would have been
an intramural conflict between two reactionary bourgeoisie
governments. "War is a bayonet with a worker at each end."

Yeah.

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that

Post by Michele

Post by pyotr filipivich
Pretty far, considering the forces on the ground. Unfortunately,
as Napoleon observed, the spirit is to the material as three is to
one. The French army in 1939 was not Offensive but Defensive in
spirit.

It was, but they wouldn't have gone pretty far, considering the forces on
the ground _and_ the type of ground _and_ the fortifications _and_ the
German air superiority _and_ the fact that a successful attack, no matter
what fancy new doctrine it relies on, still needs a 3:1 ratio at the pointy
end.

Hmm ... I have no specifics, but my understanding is that pretty
much the bulk of the German Army was in the east. The French _might_
have been able to achieve local superiority, and punched through, but
then what? I seem to recall they did well at the eastern end of the
line, but were reluctant to advance out of the range of the Maginot
Line's guns.

Post by Michele
If the Germans

Post by pyotr filipivich
had attacked France directly, and had used the same tactic as the last
war, it would have worked.

Which has much to say in favor of the _German_ fortifications facing the
French, should they decide to go the other way directly.

Yes. Both sides had dug in preparing for The Great War 2.0, but
the Wehrmacht (having lost The Great War 1.0) had come up with some
New Ideas. And despite being Germans, decided that going around the
enemy's fortifications was still a good idea, too.

Post by Michele

Post by pyotr filipivich

Post by Jerry Kraus
3. Fear of a combined Russo-German counterattack?

Remember that the Third German Empire and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic had a Non-Aggression Pact, not a Mutual Defense
Agreement. If Germany and France had gone to war, it would have been
an intramural conflict between two reactionary bourgeoisie
governments. "War is a bayonet with a worker at each end."

Yeah.

[Michele]

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that

Post by Michele

Post by pyotr filipivich
Pretty far, considering the forces on the ground. Unfortunately,
as Napoleon observed, the spirit is to the material as three is to
one. The French army in 1939 was not Offensive but Defensive in
spirit.

It was, but they wouldn't have gone pretty far, considering the forces on
the ground _and_ the type of ground _and_ the fortifications _and_ the
German air superiority _and_ the fact that a successful attack, no matter
what fancy new doctrine it relies on, still needs a 3:1 ratio at the pointy
end.

Hmm ... I have no specifics, but my understanding is that pretty
much the bulk of the German Army was in the east. The French _might_
have been able to achieve local superiority, and punched through, but
then what?

I do have the specifics. If we only count the 1. and 2. Welle
Infanteriedivisionen, the Germans had 23 of them on that short frontage. The
French should have employed 69 to achieve a strategic 3:1 ratio, which would
have been nonsense.
Or they could achieve a tactical 3:1 ratio, for instance on the Saar front.
This would have required sending 33 divisions on a very short frontage to
face the 11 1. and 2. Welle enemy divisions there. 33 divisions that would
have to have their logistical end basically in Metz, deployed between
Thonville and Sarreguemines... uhm.
or they could achieve a tactical 3:1 ratio on an even shorter frontage.
Which is what they did.


I seem to recall they did well at the eastern end of the

Post by pyotr filipivich
line, but were reluctant to advance out of the range of the Maginot
Line's guns.

They were reluctant to advance out of the range of their artillery of any
kind. That's their doctrine at the time.

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that

Post by Michele

Post by pyotr filipivich
I seem to recall they did well at the eastern end of the
line, but were reluctant to advance out of the range of the Maginot
Line's guns.

They were reluctant to advance out of the range of their artillery of any
kind. That's their doctrine at the time.

Makes sense. It had worked in the last war, so...

I got my first degree in History, so I have some conceit on the
subject. One of those "minor" details is that history is "obvious"
only in retrospect. there was no calendar in Berlin in 1914 with Aug
22 circled "Start World War One" (Or "The Great War"). Hitler wasn't
Starting World War Two on September 1, just advancing Germany's cause.
Etc.
The French didn't realize they were about to face Lightning War,
and a four year occupation.
The Great War had been a national trauma, leaving much of Europe
in a similar state as the US post Vietnam - "Why Bother?" (You've got
Dadaism, surrealism, Freudianism and quantum physics - "nothing" is as
it was.) The French military was just as traumatized, and prepare The
Maginot Line - because as the French saw things, they were not going
to have the manpower to repeat the last war, so this time they would
be prepared, and Defend France at the Border. (Well, most of it).

There is another thread about a "Better Go at Pearl Harbor" where
the Americans don't get as bad a pounding. Given a POD of 0500 on
Sunday, there isn't much which can be done, because the Army and Navy
are at Peace, and it is Sunday Morning, for crying out loud... Which
is why the response of Navy personnel to the initial Japanese aircraft
diving on their ships was "Stupid inconsiderate Army Pilots."
The French were prepared for the last war, but not for World War
Two. Just as Europe had been prepared in 1914 for variations on the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and the Balkan wars of 1910 &1912; not
World War One.

Rant mode off. B-)

tschus
pyotr

[Stephen Graham]

Post by pyotr filipivich
The French were prepared for the last war, but not for World War
Two. Just as Europe had been prepared in 1914 for variations on the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and the Balkan wars of 1910 &1912; not
World War One.

After years of reading Louis Capdebosq's posts in
soc.history.war.world-war-ii and other things, I think it's more
accurate to say that French were prepared for something more than World
War One; they just weren't prepared for the World War Two that actually
occurred.

[Michele]

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that

Post by Michele

Post by pyotr filipivich
I seem to recall they did well at the eastern end of the
line, but were reluctant to advance out of the range of the Maginot
Line's guns.

They were reluctant to advance out of the range of their artillery of any
kind. That's their doctrine at the time.

Makes sense. It had worked in the last war, so...
I got my first degree in History, so I have some conceit on the
subject. One of those "minor" details is that history is "obvious"
only in retrospect. there was no calendar in Berlin in 1914 with Aug
22 circled "Start World War One" (Or "The Great War"). Hitler wasn't
Starting World War Two on September 1, just advancing Germany's cause.
Etc.

This is one thing. You are right, we tend to judge history with the benefit
of hindsight. There is nothing wrong with that, provided we don't start to
blame the actual historical decision makers for not having that hindsight
themselves...

Post by pyotr filipivich
The French didn't realize they were about to face Lightning War,
and a four year occupation.
The Great War had been a national trauma, leaving much of Europe
in a similar state as the US post Vietnam - "Why Bother?" (You've got
Dadaism, surrealism, Freudianism and quantum physics - "nothing" is as
it was.) The French military was just as traumatized, and prepare The
Maginot Line - because as the French saw things, they were not going
to have the manpower to repeat the last war, so this time they would
be prepared, and Defend France at the Border. (Well, most of it).
There is another thread about a "Better Go at Pearl Harbor" where
the Americans don't get as bad a pounding. Given a POD of 0500 on
Sunday, there isn't much which can be done, because the Army and Navy
are at Peace, and it is Sunday Morning, for crying out loud... Which
is why the response of Navy personnel to the initial Japanese aircraft
diving on their ships was "Stupid inconsiderate Army Pilots."
The French were prepared for the last war, but not for World War
Two. Just as Europe had been prepared in 1914 for variations on the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and the Balkan wars of 1910 &1912; not
World War One.

This is entirely another kettle of fish.

Because, you see, the French weren't prepared for Blitzkrieg, yes - but the
Germans were. Not to mention the fact that individual thinkers, even in
France, as well as in Britain and elsewhere, _had_ conceived similar ideas.
("Vers l'armée de métier", by a certain unknown officer...). The Germans
were certainly advantaged in that they had lost WWI, which is a motivation
for rethinking, but the Italians, winners in WWI, had developed the guerra
celere.

In other words, while nobody knew (at least, not for certain), on August 30,
1939, that WWII was about to begin and would last many years and would span
the world and wreck Europe, there were people who knew about Blitzkrieg or
versions thereof, and people who planned to use it, and, even in the Armée,
people who were lobbying hard for it. Therefore, other people who did not
know about it, or thought it would not work, could not claim it was
impossible for them to know about it.

I always insisted that the French had their ways of doing things (of
mobilizing the army, of planning an offensive, of advancing at a given
speed); it was difficult for them to change those things, given their
situation, their past experiences etc. It was, however, not theoretically
impossible.

Since this is an alternate-history forum, we should think in terms of PODs.
Until now, the implicitly proposed POD was that the French Staff decided on
September 1 to do things differently. That is, IMHO, impossible.
It doesn't mean that we cannot try to imagine a different, earlier POD.
Years before, something happens that has the French strategists be more open
to the idea of maneuvered offensive by combined-arms units; and to the
proposal of having a small proportion of their army as a professional,
quickly mobilized rapid reaction force; and to spending a tad less on fixed
fortifications and a tad more on C3; etc...

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that

Post by Michele
In other words, while nobody knew (at least, not for certain), on August 30,
1939, that WWII was about to begin and would last many years and would span
the world and wreck Europe, there were people who knew about Blitzkrieg or
versions thereof, and people who planned to use it, and, even in the Armée,
people who were lobbying hard for it. Therefore, other people who did not
know about it, or thought it would not work, could not claim it was
impossible for them to know about it.
I always insisted that the French had their ways of doing things (of
mobilizing the army, of planning an offensive, of advancing at a given
speed); it was difficult for them to change those things, given their
situation, their past experiences etc. It was, however, not theoretically
impossible.

Yes.

Post by Michele
Since this is an alternate-history forum, we should think in terms of PODs.
Until now, the implicitly proposed POD was that the French Staff decided on
September 1 to do things differently. That is, IMHO, impossible.
It doesn't mean that we cannot try to imagine a different, earlier POD.
Years before, something happens that has the French strategists be more open
to the idea of maneuvered offensive by combined-arms units; and to the
proposal of having a small proportion of their army as a professional,
quickly mobilized rapid reaction force; and to spending a tad less on fixed
fortifications and a tad more on C3; etc...

To use an old phrase "You go to war with the army you have." And
that begins at the strategic level, with the Command Staff getting (or
not getting) a good idea. A"cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well. (It would be interesting to try and guess
what the Germans would have done, if the French had their own
Blitzkrieg doctrine.)

I will admit, it has been many years since I decided to not put
more energies into the Second World War. There is a lot of history,
and now, all of a sudden, I'm trying to learn what happened to the
Roman Empire for the thousand years or so after the Goths sacked Roma.

tschus
pyotr

[Rich Rostrom]

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

(It would be interesting to try and guess
what the Germans would have done, if the French had their own
Blitzkrieg doctrine.)

Develop their own doctrine, on the belief they could do
it better. What else? Well, pursue some kind of super-
weapon technology, perhaps.

ObWI: Hitler has to delay German re-armament, or to
refrain from large scale conventional re-armament. There
is no chance of conquering the world with German arms...
He reads somewhere (Douhet? Wells?) about the possibility
of decisive air/missile war, and someone in Germany
picks up on the idea of atomic weapons. (The delay in
the war allows the reports of chain reactions to make
it into the general literature, instead of being embargoed.)
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Rich Rostrom

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

(It would be interesting to try and guess
what the Germans would have done, if the French had their own
Blitzkrieg doctrine.)

Develop their own doctrine, on the belief they could do
it better. What else? Well, pursue some kind of super-
weapon technology, perhaps.
ObWI: Hitler has to delay German re-armament, or to
refrain from large scale conventional re-armament. There
is no chance of conquering the world with German arms...
He reads somewhere (Douhet? Wells?) about the possibility
of decisive air/missile war, and someone in Germany
picks up on the idea of atomic weapons. (The delay in
the war allows the reports of chain reactions to make
it into the general literature, instead of being embargoed.)
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

Would Germany have enough of what it takes to create a bomb?
Heisenberg seems to have screwed up the critical mass, the pile they
thought up nearly went critical and the amount of electrical power
needed to do the uranium to sufficient U-235 probably was just about
what the country had. Then we look for the delivery system.
It's Iran with less knowledge of what it takes and what works.

AH will be a quivering mass of syphillitic flesh.

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that Rich

Post by Rich Rostrom

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
B-)

Post by Rich Rostrom

(It would be interesting to try and guess
what the Germans would have done, if the French had their own
Blitzkrieg doctrine.)

Develop their own doctrine, on the belief they could do
it better. What else? Well, pursue some kind of super-
weapon technology, perhaps.

Or done some serious thinking about the Air/Land Battle. You're
going to need a lot more fighters to A) cover the CAS, and b)
intercept his efforts.
Or there might be more effort into building a Super Bomber, which
could fly over the French Flak/Fighters.

But those are political decisions, as much as military. Which
goes back to an earlier point: the French Government starting in 1920,
believed militarism was done for, and in the 1930s, was trying to
figure out how to do the next war on the cheap - manpower wise. So
they spent the Budget on fixed position. They'd worked last time ...

[Anthony Buckland]

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that Rich

Post by Rich Rostrom

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
...

What a coincidence. Some of mine arrived in Britain the]
same year!

[Phil McGregor]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 22:32:25 -0700, "Anthony Buckland"

Post by Anthony Buckland

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that Rich

Post by Rich Rostrom

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
...

What a coincidence. Some of mine arrived in Britain the]
same year!

Blasted sassenach foreigners '-P

Phil (McGregor)

Author, Space Opera (FGU); RBB #1 (FASA); Road to Armageddon;
Farm, Forge and Steam; Orbis Mundi; Displaced (PGD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that

Post by Phil McGregor
On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 22:32:25 -0700, "Anthony Buckland"

Post by Anthony Buckland

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that Rich

Post by Rich Rostrom

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
...

What a coincidence. Some of mine arrived in Britain the]
same year!

Blasted sassenach foreigners '-P

You'd like a former girlfriend. Half of her family was sorting out
things on this continent when the other half arrived and screwed
things up.

I'm from that bunch which kept traveling west for millennium,
looking for pretty girls and good beer. I do find it "funny" that one
part of the family went to England from Knorway directly, and the
other part took the long route through France. (There was a good
reason we left. Not enough good beer.)

tschus
pyotr

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that

Post by Anthony Buckland

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that Rich

Post by Rich Rostrom

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
...

What a coincidence. Some of mine arrived in Britain the]
same year!

Small world wasn't it?


pyotr

[The Horny Goat]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 22:32:25 -0700, "Anthony Buckland"

Post by Anthony Buckland

Post by pyotr filipivich

Post by Rich Rostrom
WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
...

What a coincidence. Some of mine arrived in Britain the]
same year!

Hmmmm. Didn't know you were part Norwegian!

[Phil McGregor]

Post by Phil McGregor
On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 22:32:25 -0700, "Anthony Buckland"

Post by Anthony Buckland

Post by pyotr filipivich

Post by Rich Rostrom
WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
...

What a coincidence. Some of mine arrived in Britain the]
same year!

Hmmmm. Didn't know you were part Norwegian!

He *could* be "just" part French (or Breton, whom, I understand,
prefer not to be thought of as French at all, if possible ... quite
understandably to us Scots ;-) ... not *all* the inhabitants of
Normandy were descended from Vikings ... and, of course, William had
Bretons in his force and mercenaries of various stripes as well.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU); RBB #1 (FASA); Road to Armageddon;
Farm, Forge and Steam; Orbis Mundi; Displaced (PGD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by The Horny Goat

Post by Anthony Buckland

Post by pyotr filipivich
To me, it seems obvious. But my ancestors left France in 1066.
...

What a coincidence. Some of mine arrived in Britain the]
same year!

Hmmmm. Didn't know you were part Norwegian!

He *could* be "just" part French (or Breton, whom, I understand,
prefer not to be thought of as French at all, if possible ... quite
understandably to us Scots ;-) ... not *all* the inhabitants of
Normandy were descended from Vikings ... and, of course, William had
Bretons in his force and mercenaries of various stripes as well.

I was of course pointing out that the Normans were NOT the only ones
who invaded England in 1066!

I'm pretty sure most everyone here who takes the time to think about
it knows that but I'm equally sure everyone read your joke and
understood it to be Normans, no?

(I strongly suspect there's a sizable minority here who if you go back
940 years probably DO have both Norman and Norweigian forebears in the
family shrubbery - given where mine came from in England and Ireland
I'd not bet against it myself!)

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that The

Post by The Horny Goat

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by The Horny Goat
Hmmmm. Didn't know you were part Norwegian!

He *could* be "just" part French (or Breton, whom, I understand,
prefer not to be thought of as French at all, if possible ... quite
understandably to us Scots ;-) ... not *all* the inhabitants of
Normandy were descended from Vikings ... and, of course, William had
Bretons in his force and mercenaries of various stripes as well.

I was of course pointing out that the Normans were NOT the only ones
who invaded England in 1066!
I'm pretty sure most everyone here who takes the time to think about
it knows that but I'm equally sure everyone read your joke and
understood it to be Normans, no?
(I strongly suspect there's a sizable minority here who if you go back
940 years probably DO have both Norman and Norweigian forebears in the
family shrubbery - given where mine came from in England and Ireland
I'd not bet against it myself!)

Bwahahahaha.

As a friend of mine used to say "English has its roots in Saxon
bar girls saying to Norman men at arms 'We go PX now Big Boy?'"

[Michele]

Post by Rich Rostrom

A "cultural" change, such that, in this
case, the French come up with a French Way of Lightning War, and the
counters to that as well.

WI someone proposes "lightning war", mechanized war,
air war, as an alternative to the ground based slaughter of
WW I? France suffered worst from it - might that not be
attractive enough to win sufficient support?

Someone did. I suppose you are arguing it should happen earlier, years
before "Vers l'armée de métier"?

Post by Rich Rostrom

(It would be interesting to try and guess
what the Germans would have done, if the French had their own
Blitzkrieg doctrine.)

Develop their own doctrine, on the belief they could do
it better.

Yes. Otherwise one would not have started any war in history.

What else? Well, pursue some kind of super-

Post by Rich Rostrom
weapon technology, perhaps.

Tank killing? More organic AT batteries to the infantry division. The
hollow-charge warhead on a rocket was a development during the war, but the
possibility existed to have it deployed a few years earlier. Even more
rudimentary AT weapons in the hands of the infantry could be way more
widespread than they actually were in 1939. The HEAT round for
larger-caliber barrels can also come online earlier. Tank destroyers can be
on strength at the beginning of the war. CAS aircraft will have started
mounting AT weaponry (guns at least, rockets too) already in 1938.

Post by Rich Rostrom
ObWI: Hitler has to delay German re-armament, or to
refrain from large scale conventional re-armament. There
is no chance of conquering the world with German arms...
He reads somewhere (Douhet? Wells?) about the possibility
of decisive air/missile war, and someone in Germany
picks up on the idea of atomic weapons. (The delay in
the war allows the reports of chain reactions to make
it into the general literature, instead of being embargoed.)
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

But Hitler lacks a) time and b) money and c) electric power.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Michele
but the
possibility existed to have it deployed a few years earlier.

Interest in the Monroe effect was reignited by demonstration at Zurich
in January 1939 of what was claimed to be a new explosive. The first
combat use was as a demolition charge used by the Germans at Eben Emael.
The first projectile was the British No. 68 rifle grenade. (Hogg, Tank
Killers page 40-41). I suppose you could put it further forward but
existing AT rifles were effective against interwar tanks. It was the
possibility of heavier tanks being developed that drove the development
both of bigger AT guns and better infantry AT weapons.

One problem is that if development of the shaped charge had started
earlier more effort would have been put into basic research rather than
producing weapons.

Ken Young

[The Horny Goat]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 14:24:08 -0700 (PDT), Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
ObWI: Hitler has to delay German re-armament, or to
refrain from large scale conventional re-armament. There
is no chance of conquering the world with German arms...
He reads somewhere (Douhet? Wells?) about the possibility
of decisive air/missile war, and someone in Germany
picks up on the idea of atomic weapons. (The delay in
the war allows the reports of chain reactions to make
it into the general literature, instead of being embargoed.)
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

To do that requires a REALLY big POD - that the political leaders
fully understood the long-term importance of nuclear weapons in 1939.

Given it took a letter from Einstein to get FDR's attention ya gotta
wonder!

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that The

Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 14:24:08 -0700 (PDT), Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
ObWI: Hitler has to delay German re-armament, or to
refrain from large scale conventional re-armament. There
is no chance of conquering the world with German arms...
He reads somewhere (Douhet? Wells?) about the possibility
of decisive air/missile war, and someone in Germany
picks up on the idea of atomic weapons. (The delay in
the war allows the reports of chain reactions to make
it into the general literature, instead of being embargoed.)
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

To do that requires a REALLY big POD - that the political leaders
fully understood the long-term importance of nuclear weapons in 1939.

Okay, instead of getting rejected by the Art Institute, A.H. gets
ejected by the Polytechnic physics program.

Post by The Horny Goat
Given it took a letter from Einstein to get FDR's attention ya gotta
wonder!

[Jerry Kraus]

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that The

Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 14:24:08 -0700 (PDT), Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
ObWI: Hitler has to delay German re-armament, or to
refrain from large scale conventional re-armament. There
is no chance of conquering the world with German arms...
He reads somewhere (Douhet? Wells?) about the possibility
of decisive air/missile war, and someone in Germany
picks up on the idea of atomic weapons. (The delay in
the war allows the reports of chain reactions to make
it into the general literature, instead of being embargoed.)
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

To do that requires a REALLY big POD - that the political leaders
fully understood the long-term importance of nuclear weapons in 1939.

        Okay, instead of getting rejected by the Art Institute, A.H. gets
ejected by the Polytechnic physics program.  

Post by The Horny Goat
Given it took a letter from Einstein to get FDR's attention ya gotta
wonder!

--
pyotr filipivich
Most of the intelligentsia haven't studied history, so much
as they've absorbed the Correct Position on "History".- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -

Well, Einstein did, at first. He failed the French test.

[pyotr filipivich]

[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that Jerry

Post by Jerry Kraus

Post by pyotr filipivich
[Default] I missed the Staff meeting, but the Memos showed that The

Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 14:24:08 -0700 (PDT), Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
ObWI: Hitler has to delay German re-armament, or to
refrain from large scale conventional re-armament. There
is no chance of conquering the world with German arms...
He reads somewhere (Douhet? Wells?) about the possibility
of decisive air/missile war, and someone in Germany
picks up on the idea of atomic weapons. (The delay in
the war allows the reports of chain reactions to make
it into the general literature, instead of being embargoed.)
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

To do that requires a REALLY big POD - that the political leaders
fully understood the long-term importance of nuclear weapons in 1939.

        Okay, instead of getting rejected by the Art Institute, A.H. gets
ejected by the Polytechnic physics program.  

Post by The Horny Goat
Given it took a letter from Einstein to get FDR's attention ya gotta
wonder!

--
pyotr filipivich
Most of the intelligentsia haven't studied history, so much
as they've absorbed the Correct Position on "History".- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -

Well, Einstein did, at first. He failed the French test.

So, What If: Hitler gets into the Polytechnic Institute, and
Einstein goes to Art School.
Consider the impact on theoretical physics, cubism, and the Sid
Ceaser Comedy Hour.

tschus
pyotr

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 21 Oct 2008 14:24:08 -0700 (PDT), Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
Net result: Hitler decides that instead of the Blitz, he wants
the Bomb in hand before starting The War. Neither Britain
nor the U.S. nor France is going to spend the money needed
in peacetime...

To do that requires a REALLY big POD - that the political leaders
fully understood the long-term importance of nuclear weapons in 1939.
Given it took a letter from Einstein to get FDR's attention ya gotta
wonder!

In 1942, at the height of war in the east, a young
physicist, Flerov (then in the Red Army), sent Stalin a
letter to alert him to the possibility and importance of
nuclear weapons. Stalin not only read the letter, he
held a conference with senior Soviet scientists to
discuss the matter. They agreed that nuclear weapons
were possible and potentially of immense power, but
said it was not practical to try to develop them during
the war. Stalin agreed, and decided to set up only a
token project until the war was over. But note that at
a time when he was pretty busy, he did respond.

Hitler, ISTM, is an even more likely candidate to
get involved. He was a visionary, and we have
historical evidence that his regime was quite willing
to spend large sums on blue-sky weapons systems.

[v***@gmail.com]

On Oct 17, 10:21 am, Jerry Kraus <***@yahoo.com> wrote:


Historically, during 1938 and 1939 both the West is affraid of the LW.
This fear is the main cause of the phoney war. The West needs a
miliary build-up in order to win against German. While it is often
written today that Great Britain and France should have invaded
Germany in 1938; it is a fact that the LW would have obliterated their
air forces, or at least military thinkers sensed a key vunerability.
Now, we can change this opinion of Allied military intelligence. WI:
Allied intelligence had an inaccurate assessment of LW strentght in
the weaker direction? Now we can have France attempt to occupy the
Rhineland. An airwar will result and France's airforce is oblierated;
France surrenders w/o occupation and then Britain drops out of the war
by 1939.


John Freck

Post by Jerry Kraus
One of the topics that historians speculate about, from time to time,
is what would have happened if the French, upon declaring war on Nazi
Germany for their invasion of Poland, had actually decided to fight
the Germans.  It is rather unusual to declare war on a nation, while
it is invading an ally, and do absolutely nothing, as was largely the
case until the Germans crushed France almost a year later.  While
Germany did possess a more powerful military than France at the time,
most of it was clearly occupied in crushing the Poles, to the east.
What would have happened, if the French had mobilized as quickly as
possible, thrust into Germany with infantry and armor, and attempted
to do as much damage, and take as much territory, as they possibly
could?
How would this have affected Germany's invasion of Poland?
How much of Germany would France have taken?  How far into Germany
would they have got?
What would have been the Soviet Union's response, bearing in mind the
Russo-German non-aggression pact?
1.  Simple, fear of armed conflict?
2.  Communist influence in France?
3.  Fear of a combined Russo-German counterattack?

[Michele]

Post by v***@gmail.com
Historically, during 1938 and 1939 both the West is affraid of the LW.

This fear is the main cause of the phoney war. The West needs a
miliary build-up in order to win against German. While it is often
written today that Great Britain and France should have invaded
Germany in 1938; it is a fact that the LW would have obliterated their
air forces, or at least military thinkers sensed a key vunerability.
Now, we can change this opinion of Allied military intelligence. WI:
Allied intelligence had an inaccurate assessment of LW strentght in
the weaker direction? Now we can have France attempt to occupy the
Rhineland. An airwar will result and France's airforce is oblierated;
France surrenders w/o occupation and then Britain drops out of the war
by 1939.

Why am I not surprised that you have it all wrong?

- Britain was not an ally of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and had no reason to go
to war.
- _Everybody_ feared the air forces - in the sense that they feared
strategic bombing over cities. In a short campaign in 1938 or 1939, the
issue would be the tactical employment of air power, not strategic bombing -
which anyway would turn out to be an exceptional disappointment for air
force enthusiasts.
- And, finally, these years were years of enormous growth for the Luftwaffe,
in personnel terms at a rate of +200% per year. The Luftwaffe of early 1938
was a new tool with new men and Bf 109 _Ds_. It could certainly obliterate
the Armée de l'Air, if committed continuously and relentlessly to that task
over a long campaign (forgetting for a moment that the best part of it was
in Spain and would have had a difficult time coming back). Only, a) the
Luftwaffe fighter arm itself would be worn down to irrelevancy in such an
effort and b) the campaign would not necessarily be that long.

[v***@gmail.com]

On Oct 18, 4:04 am, "Michele" <***@tin.it> wrote:


Michele, I'm sorry I didn't edit my last post. Your responce is
gibberish.
You must have been confused by my post. I will try to sort things out
for you.

Post by v***@gmail.com

Post by v***@gmail.com
Historically, during 1938 and 1939 both the West is affraid of the LW.

This fear is the main cause of the phoney war. The West needs a
miliary build-up in order to win against German. While it is often
written today that Great Britain and France should have invaded
Germany in 1938; it is a fact that the LW would have obliterated their
air forces, or at least military thinkers sensed a key vunerability.
Allied intelligence had an inaccurate assessment of LW strentght in
the weaker direction? Now we can have France attempt to occupy the
Rhineland. An airwar will result and France's airforce is oblierated;
France surrenders w/o occupation and then Britain drops out of the war
by 1939.
Why am I not surprised that you have it all wrong?
- Britain was not an ally of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and had no reason to go
to war.

The orginal topic remains concentrated on France in 1939. You
statement doesn't directly challenge my statement. Look carefully at
my first statement. Is it wrong? Look at the next sentence; it is
about the phony war. Discuss the Wests' strenght assessment of the LW
and why the phoney happened historically if you care to directly
refute my statement.

Post by v***@gmail.com
- _Everybody_ feared the air forces - in the sense that they feared
strategic bombing over cities. In a short campaign in 1938 or 1939, the
issue would be the tactical employment of air power, not strategic bombing -
which anyway would turn out to be an exceptional disappointment for air
force enthusiasts.

How does your commentary demonstrate that I'm wrong?

Post by v***@gmail.com
- And, finally, these years were years of enormous growth for the Luftwaffe,
in personnel terms at a rate of +200% per year. The Luftwaffe of early 1938
was a new tool with new men and Bf 109 _Ds_. It could certainly obliterate
the Armée de l'Air, if committed continuously and relentlessly to that task
over a long campaign (forgetting for a moment that the best part of it was
in Spain and would have had a difficult time coming back). Only, a) the
Luftwaffe fighter arm itself would be worn down to irrelevancy in such an
effort and b) the campaign would not necessarily be that long.

You are now discussing an ATL and not the historical Allied strenght
assessment of the LW.
Do you care to write an ATL where the LW is worn-down to to
irrelevancy by such a war starting from September 1939? And why do
you think the phoney war happened?


John Freck

[Phil McGregor]

Post by v***@gmail.com
Michele, I'm sorry I didn't edit my last post. Your responce is
gibberish.

Based on long experience, it is not surprising that frackybabe cannot
understand plain English.

Which is to say that Michele's post is not gibberish ... but *your*
post, on the other hand.

Post by v***@gmail.com
You must have been confused by my post. I will try to sort things out
for you.

Frack, *no-one* has *ever* been able to grasp the slightest bit of
clear thinking from a single one of your posts.

So, I guess, this is a first ... an outright admission that your posts
are confusing ...

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU); RBB #1 (FASA); Road to Armageddon;
Farm, Forge and Steam; Orbis Mundi; Displaced (PGD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[John Anderton]

Post by v***@gmail.com
Michele, I'm sorry I didn't edit my last post. Your responce is
gibberish.

Nope, neither his "responce" nor his response were gibberish

Post by v***@gmail.com
You must have been confused by my post.

Possibly, your post was fairly poorly written.

Post by v***@gmail.com
The orginal topic remains concentrated on France in 1939. You
statement doesn't directly challenge my statement. Look carefully at
my first statement. Is it wrong?

Assuming your first statement is "both the West is affraid of the LW",
it's a half-truth (and verging on gibberish). The allies were worried
about air attack, but so were the Germans and, as Michele clearly
wrote, they were mainly worried about one aspect of it (strategic
bombing), not the destruction of their air forces as you implied.

Post by v***@gmail.com
Look at the next sentence; it is
about the phony war. Discuss the Wests' strenght assessment of the LW
and why the phoney happened historically

It happened historically because, although Germany had begun re-arming
first and were therefore some years ahead, France and Britain had a
larger combined economy/industry and they, rightly, decided that the
longer they waited before tackling Germany, the stronger they would be
in relation to Germany.

Post by v***@gmail.com
if you care to directly
refute my statement.

Your statement was that fear of the Luftwaffe made the allies wait
before attacking. It wasn't, it was concerns about the strength of the
German armed forces as a whole and a belief that, in any contest, the
defender would have the advantage.

<snip>

John

[Matt Giwer]

Post by Jerry Kraus
One of the topics that historians speculate about, from time to time,
is what would have happened if the French, upon declaring war on Nazi
Germany for their invasion of Poland, had actually decided to fight
the Germans.

France did in fact invade Germany after its declaration of WWII. The Germans
retreated.

So your proper question is why France did not follow up the invasion instead
of retreating.