David Tenner
2008-10-11 00:43:57 UTC
The significance of a Clay victory over Polk in the closely contested 1844
presidential election--no annexation of Texas? no Mexican War? no American
Civil War?--has often been discussed in this group. We have also
discussed things which might have prevented Polk's victory. The key to
reversing the outcome probably lies in the North rather than the South--if
Clay had won New York (where the Liberty party vote probably cost Clay the
state) he would have won the election, whereas carrying the two closest
Polk states in the South--Louisiana and Georgia--would not have been
enough. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1844.txt OTOH,
the suggestion often made that Clay should have been more consistent and
firm in his opposition to Texas annexation, while it might have given him
New York, might also have cost him Tennessee, which he very narrowly
carried against the Tennesseean Polk in OTL; and without Tennessee, even
carrying New York would not be enough unless Clay carried Pennsylvania as
well. (And carrying Pennsylvania would be difficult, given Polk's adroit
and IMO not entirely honest handling of the tariff issue. [1]) Again, it
is argued that Frelinghuysen was a poor choice for a running mate, because
his Protestant moralism hurt the Whigs with immigrants. OTOH, with a
running mate other than Frelinghuysen, I am uncertain that Clay would have
carried New Jersey--and winning New York would not be enough if he lost
New Jersey. The Whigs' dalliance with the Nativists has also been
criticized, yet it presumably gained as well as lost the Whigs some votes.
As a possible way of gaining New York for Clay without losing him any
other state, it has been suggested that the popular Van Burenite Silas
Wright decline to run for Governor. Finally, I have argued that maybe Clay
actually did win but was "counted out" through Democratic frauds in
Louisiana (especialy in Plaquemines Parish) and in New York (where Whigs
alleged that thousands of immigrants had been illegally naturalized).
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/aeabb01fe6f6c411
(But even if such fraud was decisive, it is hard to see a realistic POD
for reversing it. Congress, dominated by Democrats, was unlikely to look
past the official returns, regardless of the evidence of fraud.)
However, there is one other possible scenario for a Clay victory that had
not occurred to me until I read Charles Sellers' chapter "Election of
1844" in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Fred L. Israel, and William P. Hansen
(eds), *History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968, Volume I.*
This is simply to have the election take place on one day! I was aware
that presidential elections used to be held on diffferent days in
different states, but was unaware how this had helped Polk until I read
Sellers' account (p. 795):
"The voting was scheduled for different days in different states.
Pennsylvania and Ohio voted on November 1, followed by most of the states
on the fourth, but New York did not vote until the following day, and the
balloting was not wound up until Delaware and Vermont voted on the
twelfth. This scheduling proved advantageous for Polk. On the first day
of voting, the Pennsylvania Demcorats reduced the Whig-Native October
majority in Philadelphia by some 1,400 votes. This 'glorious news,'
guaranteeing Pennsylvania to the Democrats, was rushed to New York, where
the city Democrats dispatched a 'locomotive printing office' on board a
steamboat up the Hudson to scatter the glad tidings throughout the state.
"By the eve of the election, New York City was in a hubbub: 'Little knots
of men at every corner. The political head quarters of the different
parties thronged. Tammany Hall a perfect jam from 8 AM till after
midnight.' That day the Democrats took 497 new voters to the city court
to be naturalized, creating such a crush that the courtroom windows had to
be opened to let people in and out. Providence seemed to be smiling on
the Democratic cause. A rainstorm in the morning had forced postponement
of a Nativist demonstration which the Democrats had feared would provoke a
riot and damage their cause.
"By now, the desperate Whigs were hoping for 'salvation through a
*miracle,* to be worked by the Native Americans [this of course refers to
the anti-immigrant group, not to Red Indians--DT].' The miracle did not
occur. The Natives elected three of the four congressmen from the city,
but the Philadelphia returns influenced many of the Democratic Nativists
to stick with Polk in the presidential voting, and he carried the city by
nearly 2,000. On the other hand the Nativist agitation provoked an
immense and unanimously Democratic turnout of foreign-born voters, while
the abolitionists in western New York failed to support Clay as strongly
as the Whigs had hoped..."
Had New York and Pennsylvania both voted on November 4, there would be no
returns from Philadelphia to lift the spirits of the New York Democrats.
Also, the Nativist demonstration and possible accompanying riot and
backlash might have taken place, since the morning rainstorm would not be
until the next day. Whether this would be enough to enable Clay to carry
New York, I do not know, but it is at least another possibility to
consider.
[1] As Sellers points out, the Kane letter (to a Philadelphia Van
Burenite) was not the straddle some historians have accused it of being.
In it, Polk specifically endorsed both "protection" and "discrimination,"
actually using both of these dangerous terms several times: "In adjusting
the details of a revenue tariff, I have heretofore sanctioned such
moderate discriminating duties, as would produce the amount of revenue
needed, and at the same time afford reasonable incidental protetion to our
home industry." He opposed, he said, "a tariff for protection *merely,*
and not for revenue." Pennsylvania Democrats were so jubilant that they
even claimed that Polk was a better protectionist than Clay, and took
credit for the 1842 tariff! This tariff had of course been a Whig measure
(though some Democrats, especially from protectionist states like
Pennsylvania, had voted for it) reluctantly signed by Tyler becuase the
government badly needed revenue. But the Pennsylvania Democrats actually
mounted banners throughout the state reading
"POLK, DALLAS, SHUNK
and the
DEMOCRATIC TARIFF OF 1842
WE DARE THE WHIGS TO REPEAL IT"
That last line was perhaps the ultimate in impudence. As Sellers notes,
"Furious at this all too successful imposture, the Whigs demanded that he
[Polk] say whether he favored the Tariff of 1842, but he refused to
answer."
The real question about the Kane letter is not whether it was a straddle--
it made Polk seem as protectionist as Clay, since it embraced the
principle of "discrmination" and since Clay too said he favored a tariff
for revenue *as well as* protection--but whether Polk really meant it.
(Incidentally, Polk's adviser Robert Walker had wanted him to use the word
"aid" instead of "protection" and to dodge the question of discrimination.
*That* would have been a straddle.) At the same time he wrote this
letter, Polk was privately assuring Southerners that one of the first acts
of his administration would be to lower duties to the 20 percent *ad
valorem* level specified in the 1833 tariff! If those assurances had
become public, or if the Kane letter had never been published (Polk had
second thoughts about it and urged that it not be published but by that
time it was too late--the Pennsylvania Democrats had already published it
and were making much use of it) Polk would probably have lost
Pennsylvania. Until I read Sellers, I thought that losing Pennsylvania
would make no difference, because it did not have enough electoral votes
to swing the election to Clay. But given the earlier balloting in
Pennsylvania and the apparent influence of its results on New York voters,
losing Pennsylvania might also cost Polk New York--and therefore the
election. Besides, there were protectionists in New York state as well as
Pennsylvania, though as a great ceenter for international commerce, New
York City was more pro-free-trade than were more exclusively
manufacturing-oriented cities.
presidential election--no annexation of Texas? no Mexican War? no American
Civil War?--has often been discussed in this group. We have also
discussed things which might have prevented Polk's victory. The key to
reversing the outcome probably lies in the North rather than the South--if
Clay had won New York (where the Liberty party vote probably cost Clay the
state) he would have won the election, whereas carrying the two closest
Polk states in the South--Louisiana and Georgia--would not have been
enough. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1844.txt OTOH,
the suggestion often made that Clay should have been more consistent and
firm in his opposition to Texas annexation, while it might have given him
New York, might also have cost him Tennessee, which he very narrowly
carried against the Tennesseean Polk in OTL; and without Tennessee, even
carrying New York would not be enough unless Clay carried Pennsylvania as
well. (And carrying Pennsylvania would be difficult, given Polk's adroit
and IMO not entirely honest handling of the tariff issue. [1]) Again, it
is argued that Frelinghuysen was a poor choice for a running mate, because
his Protestant moralism hurt the Whigs with immigrants. OTOH, with a
running mate other than Frelinghuysen, I am uncertain that Clay would have
carried New Jersey--and winning New York would not be enough if he lost
New Jersey. The Whigs' dalliance with the Nativists has also been
criticized, yet it presumably gained as well as lost the Whigs some votes.
As a possible way of gaining New York for Clay without losing him any
other state, it has been suggested that the popular Van Burenite Silas
Wright decline to run for Governor. Finally, I have argued that maybe Clay
actually did win but was "counted out" through Democratic frauds in
Louisiana (especialy in Plaquemines Parish) and in New York (where Whigs
alleged that thousands of immigrants had been illegally naturalized).
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/aeabb01fe6f6c411
(But even if such fraud was decisive, it is hard to see a realistic POD
for reversing it. Congress, dominated by Democrats, was unlikely to look
past the official returns, regardless of the evidence of fraud.)
However, there is one other possible scenario for a Clay victory that had
not occurred to me until I read Charles Sellers' chapter "Election of
1844" in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Fred L. Israel, and William P. Hansen
(eds), *History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968, Volume I.*
This is simply to have the election take place on one day! I was aware
that presidential elections used to be held on diffferent days in
different states, but was unaware how this had helped Polk until I read
Sellers' account (p. 795):
"The voting was scheduled for different days in different states.
Pennsylvania and Ohio voted on November 1, followed by most of the states
on the fourth, but New York did not vote until the following day, and the
balloting was not wound up until Delaware and Vermont voted on the
twelfth. This scheduling proved advantageous for Polk. On the first day
of voting, the Pennsylvania Demcorats reduced the Whig-Native October
majority in Philadelphia by some 1,400 votes. This 'glorious news,'
guaranteeing Pennsylvania to the Democrats, was rushed to New York, where
the city Democrats dispatched a 'locomotive printing office' on board a
steamboat up the Hudson to scatter the glad tidings throughout the state.
"By the eve of the election, New York City was in a hubbub: 'Little knots
of men at every corner. The political head quarters of the different
parties thronged. Tammany Hall a perfect jam from 8 AM till after
midnight.' That day the Democrats took 497 new voters to the city court
to be naturalized, creating such a crush that the courtroom windows had to
be opened to let people in and out. Providence seemed to be smiling on
the Democratic cause. A rainstorm in the morning had forced postponement
of a Nativist demonstration which the Democrats had feared would provoke a
riot and damage their cause.
"By now, the desperate Whigs were hoping for 'salvation through a
*miracle,* to be worked by the Native Americans [this of course refers to
the anti-immigrant group, not to Red Indians--DT].' The miracle did not
occur. The Natives elected three of the four congressmen from the city,
but the Philadelphia returns influenced many of the Democratic Nativists
to stick with Polk in the presidential voting, and he carried the city by
nearly 2,000. On the other hand the Nativist agitation provoked an
immense and unanimously Democratic turnout of foreign-born voters, while
the abolitionists in western New York failed to support Clay as strongly
as the Whigs had hoped..."
Had New York and Pennsylvania both voted on November 4, there would be no
returns from Philadelphia to lift the spirits of the New York Democrats.
Also, the Nativist demonstration and possible accompanying riot and
backlash might have taken place, since the morning rainstorm would not be
until the next day. Whether this would be enough to enable Clay to carry
New York, I do not know, but it is at least another possibility to
consider.
[1] As Sellers points out, the Kane letter (to a Philadelphia Van
Burenite) was not the straddle some historians have accused it of being.
In it, Polk specifically endorsed both "protection" and "discrimination,"
actually using both of these dangerous terms several times: "In adjusting
the details of a revenue tariff, I have heretofore sanctioned such
moderate discriminating duties, as would produce the amount of revenue
needed, and at the same time afford reasonable incidental protetion to our
home industry." He opposed, he said, "a tariff for protection *merely,*
and not for revenue." Pennsylvania Democrats were so jubilant that they
even claimed that Polk was a better protectionist than Clay, and took
credit for the 1842 tariff! This tariff had of course been a Whig measure
(though some Democrats, especially from protectionist states like
Pennsylvania, had voted for it) reluctantly signed by Tyler becuase the
government badly needed revenue. But the Pennsylvania Democrats actually
mounted banners throughout the state reading
"POLK, DALLAS, SHUNK
and the
DEMOCRATIC TARIFF OF 1842
WE DARE THE WHIGS TO REPEAL IT"
That last line was perhaps the ultimate in impudence. As Sellers notes,
"Furious at this all too successful imposture, the Whigs demanded that he
[Polk] say whether he favored the Tariff of 1842, but he refused to
answer."
The real question about the Kane letter is not whether it was a straddle--
it made Polk seem as protectionist as Clay, since it embraced the
principle of "discrmination" and since Clay too said he favored a tariff
for revenue *as well as* protection--but whether Polk really meant it.
(Incidentally, Polk's adviser Robert Walker had wanted him to use the word
"aid" instead of "protection" and to dodge the question of discrimination.
*That* would have been a straddle.) At the same time he wrote this
letter, Polk was privately assuring Southerners that one of the first acts
of his administration would be to lower duties to the 20 percent *ad
valorem* level specified in the 1833 tariff! If those assurances had
become public, or if the Kane letter had never been published (Polk had
second thoughts about it and urged that it not be published but by that
time it was too late--the Pennsylvania Democrats had already published it
and were making much use of it) Polk would probably have lost
Pennsylvania. Until I read Sellers, I thought that losing Pennsylvania
would make no difference, because it did not have enough electoral votes
to swing the election to Clay. But given the earlier balloting in
Pennsylvania and the apparent influence of its results on New York voters,
losing Pennsylvania might also cost Polk New York--and therefore the
election. Besides, there were protectionists in New York state as well as
Pennsylvania, though as a great ceenter for international commerce, New
York City was more pro-free-trade than were more exclusively
manufacturing-oriented cities.
--
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net
David Tenner
***@ameritech.net