Alex Milman
2018-02-10 19:43:04 UTC
The best way (short of unrealistic proposal that both sides possessed some sanity) to avoid this "conflict of interests" would be an early partition of the region between these two competitors.
The realistic time frame would be 1787 - 91 when Russia and Austria allied against the Ottomans.
Changes from OTL:
1st, Prince Potemkin is never given command of an army. He was a reasonably good military administrator but as an independent field commander he was beyond being pathetic.
2nd, Russian strategy should be along the lines defined by Fieldmarhal Munnich in a war of 1735 - 39 with an advance toward Istanbul being the main goal (as was demonstrated by the wars of the XIX, this was the most reliable way to force the Ottomans to talk). In OTL it was all "upside down": the main effort had been spent on securing the earlier conquest of the Crimea, hence the bigger Russian army wasted a lot of time (and people) moving toward Ochakov and laying a "formal siege" on it while a much smaller army was operating in Moldavia handicapped by its size and supply problems (courtesy of Potemkin). With the sizes switched (and Potemkin out of the picture) operations in Moldavia could be conducted on a greater scope while Ochakov still being taken (practically everybody involved expressed an opinion that it could be taken by storm as soon as the Russian troops arrived; Potemkin was sitting there for half a year fearing to order an assault and losing people to the diseases). In the worst case scenario, the Ottoman army invading the Crimea would be isolated and unavailable on the main strategic direction.
3rd, At the time of Catherine II Russian army amounted to 500K with garrison troops. The war with the Ottomans involved 2 armies: 85K and 35K. When Sweden attacked an additional army of 30K had been assembled (with a big effort) and when around 1791 Prussia started making noises, there was seemingly nothing left. Assuming that Russian College of War (of which Potemkin was President) is marginally competent, surely it should be able to figure out how to add 100 - 200K to the "effective" troops. Probably just having extra 20 - 30K near St-Petersburg would eliminate a danger of the Swedish attack (in OTL Swedes had something like 30 - 35K with the land operations ending in a stalemate) and extra 50 - 100K in Moldavia could make a lot of difference if led properly. All that would leave a reserve big enough to cool down Prussian enthusiasm.
4th, Nice but not quite necessarily under that scenario, Austrian commander in chief, Lacy, is not as fond of "cordon strategy" as he was in OTL allowing concentration of the Austrian forces (approximately 135K) on the strategically important directions. Also, something should be done to deal with the Austrian habit to concentrate on the geographic points instead of enemy's forces (in OTL Suvorov managed to deal with that problem during the Italian campaign so it was not an impossible task).
That's pretty much it. When the war starts the main Ottoman army (as I understand, never more than 100K at any geographic point) is being squeezed between 135K Austrians advancing into Serbia and 130 - 150K Russians advancing through Moldavia with 30 - 40K more blocking 20K Ottomans in Ochakov and operating on Kuban River line. Taking for granted an estimate given by a Frenchman participating in that war, Russian field victory over the Ottomans would be guaranteed with a numbers ratio 1:4 in Ottoman favor (to be fair, he also remarked that the Ottomans managed to beat the Austrians with the same ration in Austrian favor :-)), the allies keep advancing and by the time the Ottomans figured out that they ARE beaten Austrians are in possession of Serbia (and Bosnia - Herzegovina) while the Russians are occupying Moldavia Walachia and Bulgaria and are inconveniently close to Istanbul (as was the case twice in the XIX).
The Ottomans are out of the armies, Swedes are either beaten or neutralized and Prussia has to consider not only the Russian troops on a border but also those potentially coming from the Ottoman theater.
France, a traditional Ottoman ally, was at that point (in OTL) playing neutrality (signing a trade treaty with Russia and apologizing for the presence of the French "volunteers" on the Ottoman side). Not that, with all its ongoing problems, it could do too much, anyway. Neither could or would Britain (balance of power on one hand but traditionally close trade relations with Russia OTOH).
Prussia is making bellicose noises but, with a significant Russian military presence in the border area (including what's left of Poland after the 1st Partition) and Austria being in a better than OTL position is not going to war.
The victors got what each of them occupied leaving the Ottoman empire in Europe with Greece and Istanbul area.
The future Russian-Ottoman wars of the XIX century (if they happen at all with Istanbul being within an easy reach from the Russian border) are limited to the Caucasus theater .
With each of the victors being in at the _direct_ possession of its own piece of a Balkan pie (and no free pieces left), there are no OTL rivalry over spheres of influence and no minor players causing BIG problems. Eventually, the Ottomans may lose Greece and Albania but this is not critical as far as the OTL conflicts are involved.
WWI (in its OTL form) is avoided. :-)
The realistic time frame would be 1787 - 91 when Russia and Austria allied against the Ottomans.
Changes from OTL:
1st, Prince Potemkin is never given command of an army. He was a reasonably good military administrator but as an independent field commander he was beyond being pathetic.
2nd, Russian strategy should be along the lines defined by Fieldmarhal Munnich in a war of 1735 - 39 with an advance toward Istanbul being the main goal (as was demonstrated by the wars of the XIX, this was the most reliable way to force the Ottomans to talk). In OTL it was all "upside down": the main effort had been spent on securing the earlier conquest of the Crimea, hence the bigger Russian army wasted a lot of time (and people) moving toward Ochakov and laying a "formal siege" on it while a much smaller army was operating in Moldavia handicapped by its size and supply problems (courtesy of Potemkin). With the sizes switched (and Potemkin out of the picture) operations in Moldavia could be conducted on a greater scope while Ochakov still being taken (practically everybody involved expressed an opinion that it could be taken by storm as soon as the Russian troops arrived; Potemkin was sitting there for half a year fearing to order an assault and losing people to the diseases). In the worst case scenario, the Ottoman army invading the Crimea would be isolated and unavailable on the main strategic direction.
3rd, At the time of Catherine II Russian army amounted to 500K with garrison troops. The war with the Ottomans involved 2 armies: 85K and 35K. When Sweden attacked an additional army of 30K had been assembled (with a big effort) and when around 1791 Prussia started making noises, there was seemingly nothing left. Assuming that Russian College of War (of which Potemkin was President) is marginally competent, surely it should be able to figure out how to add 100 - 200K to the "effective" troops. Probably just having extra 20 - 30K near St-Petersburg would eliminate a danger of the Swedish attack (in OTL Swedes had something like 30 - 35K with the land operations ending in a stalemate) and extra 50 - 100K in Moldavia could make a lot of difference if led properly. All that would leave a reserve big enough to cool down Prussian enthusiasm.
4th, Nice but not quite necessarily under that scenario, Austrian commander in chief, Lacy, is not as fond of "cordon strategy" as he was in OTL allowing concentration of the Austrian forces (approximately 135K) on the strategically important directions. Also, something should be done to deal with the Austrian habit to concentrate on the geographic points instead of enemy's forces (in OTL Suvorov managed to deal with that problem during the Italian campaign so it was not an impossible task).
That's pretty much it. When the war starts the main Ottoman army (as I understand, never more than 100K at any geographic point) is being squeezed between 135K Austrians advancing into Serbia and 130 - 150K Russians advancing through Moldavia with 30 - 40K more blocking 20K Ottomans in Ochakov and operating on Kuban River line. Taking for granted an estimate given by a Frenchman participating in that war, Russian field victory over the Ottomans would be guaranteed with a numbers ratio 1:4 in Ottoman favor (to be fair, he also remarked that the Ottomans managed to beat the Austrians with the same ration in Austrian favor :-)), the allies keep advancing and by the time the Ottomans figured out that they ARE beaten Austrians are in possession of Serbia (and Bosnia - Herzegovina) while the Russians are occupying Moldavia Walachia and Bulgaria and are inconveniently close to Istanbul (as was the case twice in the XIX).
The Ottomans are out of the armies, Swedes are either beaten or neutralized and Prussia has to consider not only the Russian troops on a border but also those potentially coming from the Ottoman theater.
France, a traditional Ottoman ally, was at that point (in OTL) playing neutrality (signing a trade treaty with Russia and apologizing for the presence of the French "volunteers" on the Ottoman side). Not that, with all its ongoing problems, it could do too much, anyway. Neither could or would Britain (balance of power on one hand but traditionally close trade relations with Russia OTOH).
Prussia is making bellicose noises but, with a significant Russian military presence in the border area (including what's left of Poland after the 1st Partition) and Austria being in a better than OTL position is not going to war.
The victors got what each of them occupied leaving the Ottoman empire in Europe with Greece and Istanbul area.
The future Russian-Ottoman wars of the XIX century (if they happen at all with Istanbul being within an easy reach from the Russian border) are limited to the Caucasus theater .
With each of the victors being in at the _direct_ possession of its own piece of a Balkan pie (and no free pieces left), there are no OTL rivalry over spheres of influence and no minor players causing BIG problems. Eventually, the Ottomans may lose Greece and Albania but this is not critical as far as the OTL conflicts are involved.
WWI (in its OTL form) is avoided. :-)