Discussion:
Would Stalin have insisted on territorial revisions in Eastern Europe as the price for an alliance with Britain and France in 1939?
(too old to reply)
WolfBear
2018-03-29 20:21:48 UTC
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I've been curious about this--if Britain and France would have actually managed to ally with the Soviet Union in 1939, would Stalin have insisted on territorial revisions in Eastern Europe--specifically around the Soviet periphery--as the price for this alliance?

I mean, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact looked like a pretty good deal for Stalin
in 1939 (and it would have been, had France not fallen and had the Soviet Union not been invaded). Thus, I am wondering if Britain and France would have been willing to offer Stalin similar concessions (annexation of the Baltic states, expansion up to the Curzon Line, annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, et cetera) in exchange for an alliance with them in 1939.

Also, would Stalin have actually made territorial revision a precondition for an alliance with Britain and France in 1939? Or would he have been willing to compromise in regards to this--feeling that a common front to stop Hitler is more important?

Anyway, any thoughts on this?
jerry kraus
2018-03-30 13:14:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by WolfBear
I've been curious about this--if Britain and France would have actually managed to ally with the Soviet Union in 1939, would Stalin have insisted on territorial revisions in Eastern Europe--specifically around the Soviet periphery--as the price for this alliance?
I mean, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact looked like a pretty good deal for Stalin
in 1939 (and it would have been, had France not fallen and had the Soviet Union not been invaded). Thus, I am wondering if Britain and France would have been willing to offer Stalin similar concessions (annexation of the Baltic states, expansion up to the Curzon Line, annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, et cetera) in exchange for an alliance with them in 1939.
Also, would Stalin have actually made territorial revision a precondition for an alliance with Britain and France in 1939? Or would he have been willing to compromise in regards to this--feeling that a common front to stop Hitler is more important?
Anyway, any thoughts on this?
No, of course not. All Stalin wanted was security against that lunatic Hitler, he had plenty of territory as it was. The problem was, Poland categorically refused to work with the Soviets, and Britain effectively refused to work with the Soviets, in terms of their utter lack of cooperation with them, despite conciliatory lip service. Stalin was by far the most rational person at the table in the late 1930's, at least in terms of foreign policy. He really just wanted peace and stability. The others, including France and Britain, all had axes to grind. Britain and France wanted Stalin to take Hitler down for the, and, that's exactly what they ultimately arranged.
Eric Van De Hey
2018-03-31 01:07:06 UTC
Permalink
Post by jerry kraus
No, of course not. All Stalin wanted was security against that lunatic Hitler, he had plenty of territory as it was.
Codswallop on several levels.

Firstly: if you want security "against that lunatic Hitler"< it pays *Not To SUPPORT THAT LUNATIC'S REMILITARIZATION in the first place.*

But that is what the Bolshevik state- and particularly Stalin- did throughout the interbellum. Starting with Hitler's Imperialist/Monarchist predecessors in the Reichswehr in the early 1920's (if that), and with Hitler himself in 1935 at the latest.

The Hitler-Stalin Credit Agreement of 1935 was dedicated to financing illegal German Rearmament. This was something the Soviets knew from the start of negotiations over it, because the German negotiators told them. And yet the Soviets went ahead with it anyway in an attempt to patch up what ripples had emerged in the German-Soviet underground relations and to pay down some of their debts.

In one of the earliest ethical discourses in recorded history- and certainly within the Western Canon- Socrates (or Plato) rejects the idea that proper ethics is merely a matter of giving someone what they are owed under the idea that if you borrow an axe from someone to cut wood, and in the meantime that person goes insane and comes to you asking for that axe back it is irrational and immoral to abet him. Because giving him the axe would be giving him the tool to murder other people. This is what the Soviet-German Credit Agreement of 1935 amounts to, and it would be bad enough.

However, the year *AFTER* that, Stalin approached Hitler AGAIN for negotiations for an Even Larger Credit Agreement to help finance the Third Reich and especially illegal German rearmament. This goes well and truly beyond returning the axe to a murderous, homicidal lunatic. This is not only doing that, but LAUNCHING INTO A SALES PITCH designed to try and sell the homicidal lunatic an even greater amount of flesh-cutting implements on credit.

Ironically, it was *Hitler* who refused this since he believed the old credit agreement would suffice and he preferred to avoid public agreements with the Soviets if he could. Which along with the Spanish Civil War's outbreak was one of the two crucial links that led to the deterioration of Nazi-Soviet relations in the mid '30s.

If "All Stalin wanted was security against that Lunatic Hitler" this makes absolutely zero sense whatsoever. Especially that second move.

However, if you realize that Stalin was a totalitarian, expansionist lunatic with his own agenda and a vested interest in pending the Versailles Peace it starts to come together.

And secondly: Stalin didn't see himself as having "Plenty" of territory, and wanted more (as the annexation of Moldavia, the Baltic Three, parts of Finland, and so on showed). And Stalin's at least stated ideology was never about territory per se, it was about economic control. And spreading that form of control and social organizaiton globally.
Post by jerry kraus
The problem was, Poland categorically refused to work with the Soviets, and
Britain effectively refused to work with the Soviets, in terms of their utter > lack of cooperation with them, despite conciliatory lip service.
Firstly, this is not true. The Allies were perhaps neve Committed to a policy of alliance with Stalin to contain Hitler (but then again *Neither Was Stalin* as the events of the early and late 1930's show) but they certainyl broached the possibility

Secondly: It is EXCEEDINGLY hard to blame anybody else for refusing to work with the Soviets according to their own policy when the Soviets off half-heartedly about this Popular Front Against Fascism but did not take many concrete steps towards it, and then when *one did suddenly form, the Soviets were unwilling to work with it.* Or rather, were unwilling to work wholeheartedly with the non-Stalinist Communist elements.

I speak of course of the Popular Front that emerged to try and beat out the NAtionalist bloc in the election campaigns of 1935-6, and later organized to resist the Nationalist Coup in one of the great morning stars of the coming world war. Now it is notable that the Soviets were the most active in supporting it out of any major power, which cuts a notable contrast to the ineffective neutrality of the Western Allies.

But take a gander at Orwell or co to see what that "support" entailed.

In addition to being less effective than the Italian and German support, the Soviets were more obsessed with CONTROLLING the Popular Front and purging it of their enemies than actually winning the war. In the acid test of the Popular Front strategy and rhetori- the golden oppertunity to show the Allies and nonalligneds that the Soviets were serious about making a good faith common alliance against Fascism- Stalin was never willing to commit. He would not stop purging Trotskyites and Anarchists. He would not stop trading under the table with Hitler. He kept his aid conditional at best, and apparently decided it was better to have the Popular Front be destroyed by the rebellion than to have it victorious but not under his control.

I don't think it is a coincidence that in the last year of the Spanish Civil War, Stalin kicked out Litvinov- the prophet of Soviet Popular Front and Collective Security policies-, appointed Molotov, and signed the Pact.

And finally: the Poles and British (but especially the Poles) had stellar reasons to worry about collaborating too closely with Stalin and the SOviets. And with hindsight it is clear their worries were correct. That not only was Stalin not fully committed to checking Hitler in a Collective Security allignment, but that the passage of Soviet troops and intel personnel would have eroded Polish sovereignty unless VERY carefully controlled. As indeed we know happened, not just in 1939 and 1944, but from history before. When Pyotrian Greencoats marching across the territory of Poland-Lithuania in the 18th century spelled the end of that commonwealth's independence.'
Post by jerry kraus
Stalin was by far the most rational person at the table in the late 1930's, at > least in terms of foreign policy.
Perhaps, though I still get the feeling you are ignoring the long history of Soviet-German mutual aid.

But rational does not mean Good.

It does not mean Peaceful.

It does not mean Non-Expansionist.
Post by jerry kraus
He really just wanted peace and stability.
Absolutely Not.

If anything, the Soviet State was one of the polities that was hurt the *most* by peace and stability along the terms of the Versailles Settlement. In addition to the ideological motives I outlined in my previous post and how Marxist-Leninism was an inherently expansionist ideology with global pretensions, the Soviet Union had the more practical problem of being diplomatically and strategically isolated from most of the world. Even after the "Thawing out" period of the late 1920's and 1930's when it began to exchange diplomats and regular embassies.

And this was especially true with most of its neighbors, who ranged from naive and accepting (Lithuania mostly, since Poland was the bigger problem) to paranoid but lukewarm (the Chinese KMT) but mostly amounted to Cold, Hostile, and Distrustful. For reasons that again were quite logical. Especially when you start counting up all the terrorist attacks, coup attempts, and so on that were sponsored from Soviet territory against them.
Post by jerry kraus
The others, including France and Britain, all had axes to grind.
Perhaps, but France and Britain ahd much less of an axe to grind in the 1930's than the Soviets did. They were mostly (futilely) trying to put the Versailles settlement back together in a way that limited German power and respected the rights and independence of the Central/Eastern European minors.

This failed catastrophially, but it certainly isn't trying to do it.
Post by jerry kraus
Britain and France wanted Stalin to take Hitler down for the, and, that's
exactly what they ultimately arranged.
At most, I've seen the "Why can't they both fight and lose?" be put forth as this Pipe Dream amidst Western Cabinent government officials about what they Wished could have happened, without any particularly serious idea that it Could happen. And it is easy to see why.

The Third Reich and the Soviet Union had Zero land border up until 1939. Zero.

This waas the entire reason why Poland proved to be a bone in the craw to the last remotely serious interbellum attempt to form a Collective Security alliance between the West, the Soviets, and the Rest because they (UNDERSTANDABLY) were disturstful of their pre war enemies marching across their territory with hundreds of thousands of troops to support a pre war rival that had attacked them. Because without passage through Poland and other neutral states there was no way for the Germans or Soviets to get at each other.

Which was one reason for the partition.
Alex Milman
2018-03-30 15:40:12 UTC
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Post by WolfBear
I've been curious about this--if Britain and France would have actually managed to ally with the Soviet Union in 1939,
Unless you are going to make some drastic changes, this would exclude alliance with Poland (its government was adamantly against the Soviet inclusion) and it seems that in 1939 both French and the Brits had somewhat optimistic opinion regarding the Polish military capacities (to be fair, there was also Polish optimism about their military capacities).

So how would the whole schema work?
Post by WolfBear
would Stalin have insisted on territorial revisions in Eastern Europe--specifically around the Soviet periphery--as the price for this alliance?
IIRC, this his requirement.
Post by WolfBear
I mean, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact looked like a pretty good deal for Stalin
in 1939 (and it would have been, had France not fallen and had the Soviet Union not been invaded).
Yes. It gave him everything he asked for with a guarantee and without complications (like a need to go to a major war) which was more than could be expected from the French and the Brits. Plus, it was ideologically more acceptable to make an agreement with the brotherly workers' state (Germany) than with the imperialistic vultures (France and Britain) and their henchmen (Poland).
Post by WolfBear
Thus, I am wondering if Britain and France would have been willing to offer Stalin similar concessions (annexation of the Baltic states, expansion up to the Curzon Line, annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, et cetera) in exchange for an alliance with them in 1939.
1st, none of them was a regional power so such an offer would most probably mean complications (all the way to an open war) with Germany. Then, part of these concessions would go at Polish expense making an agreement impossible: in OTL Polish government in exile was driving WC crazy by its stubborn refusal to discuss any post-war territorial adjustments.
Post by WolfBear
Also, would Stalin have actually made territorial revision a precondition for an alliance with Britain and France in 1939?
He did.
Post by WolfBear
Or would he have been willing to compromise in regards to this--feeling that a common front to stop Hitler is more important?
Why would he? There was no Soviet-German border and, as along as the 2nd Polsish Republic was in the schema conversation of the "common front" was a pure theory because the Poles were refusing to consider anything of the kind.

Of course, it can be said that the Poles had all reasons to be suspicious of a schema that would put the Red Army on their territory but, anyway, Poland was governed by Pilsudski's successors, which implies more than an ordinary degree of paranoia ("Germany may take away our statehood but Russia will take away our soul").

However, he WAS trying to push schema through until failure of the whole idea became obvious on Moscow conference: the French and Brits sent reasonably low-ranking delegations with no power to make any decisions. At that point Litvinov's policy of aligning with the "West" was pocketed, Litvinov was replaced with Molotov and the rest is a history.
Post by WolfBear
Anyway, any thoughts on this?
Eric Van De Hey
2018-03-31 00:26:09 UTC
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@WolfBear The answer is essentially "Yes."

In order to understand Soviet interwar diplomacy, you pretty much have to realize the nature of the Soviet state and Bolshevik Ideology. Which was basically that it was the vanguard of the coming global revolution, rejected all other polities as being reactionary anachronisms (the only question was how reactionary they were viewed), and essentially was committed to overruning all competition in either the medium or long term. We see this =displayed In SPAAADESS with Lenin's more or less all out offensives against his borders from about 1918 to....1920 or so.

Now some may argue about the ideological purity Stalin had, if he were a real Bolshevik, etc. etc etc. Though I personally think a close study of Salin the man shows he was a sincere (if cynical) Bolshevik committed to revolution, even if not always in the exact same way Lenin was. (For instance, it's worth noting that the October Revolution/Coup happened near the end of Lenin's life, as did the results of the revolution. So it probably seemed like the culmination of his life's work, as it was. While Stalin was middle aged at the time, and during the humilitating defeats inflicted on the cause at places like Daugapilis, Tampere, and the Vistula Bend. Which would meant he'd have to grow old with the legacy of those events). So I think he was ocmmitted to buffing up the Soviet State as the "Vanguard"/forward position of the Workers' Revolution, in order to better prepare it for the "Next Round" of expansion.

But even if we assume he Wasn't a true communist like Trotsky and a bunch of other critics say, he was still one of Lenin's heirs. He inherited the Bolshevik State, Bolshevik Party, the previous foreign policies, and rhetoric. So whatever agenda he was going to push would be constrained by the need to mesh them with Communist ideology, however awkwardly.

So what does this translate to?

It translates to the desire to expand at the expense of the "Reactionary" states- especially those newly created or fragile after WWI-, to foster revolution and coups amidst those he could not absorb outright, and to generally stir international instability in order to better weaken the Versailles Peace Settlement and its main benefactors.

It was ALSO why the Bolsheviks launched an ambitious program to actually support their ideological arch-enemies, the German militarists hiding out in the tangled web of the Reichswehr, in illegal rearmament. Both the original "Old Imperialists"/Monarchists, and later the National Socialists when Hitler ascended. Hence why you see the Foreign Ministry casing the Germans as far back as 1919 (!!!) about the prospects of a joint attack on Poland, and Stalin offering a VERy sweetheart loan deal to Hitler sometime in 1934-6 (I forget which) for the EXPRESS purposes of rearmament. This was not because the Bolsheviks TRUSTED either the Monarchists or National Socialists. But because they recognized they were enemies of the Western Allies and many of their beneficiaries like Poland and Estonia. That the re-emergence of the German Empire would upend Versailles, compromise the security of the Central/Eastern European states due to the prospect of getting hit from both sides, and generally ease the way for an advance Westwards.

Molotov-Ribbentrop is the big, sexy, ugly thing everybody focuses on but it was really just the culmination of nearly twenty years of foreign policy. Not always a straight or Narrow path, but still so.

So I don't see Stalin signing up for some kind of great Anti-Fuhrer coalition without getting his pound of flesh UNLESS he for some reason believes Hitler is some kind of extraordinary, imminent threat to him and international Communism. Which he didn't IOTL.

Now, in terms of the Western Allies offering concessions ala M-R to the Soviets...I don't see it.

For starters, it would in many cases be a violation of the League Covenants and treaties. It would also justifiably irk the heck out of the nations in question being ground under, who in this period are either directly or indirectly Allied beneficiaries, the "Cordon Sanitaire" states that Western Allied diplomacy and military force ha spent the interbellum trying to build up.

And finally, there's the fact that I don't see this working at all. When the British and French tried to appease Mussolini's aggression in Ethiopia by offering him a vast chunk of the North in exchange for a small strip of land connecting Ethiopia to the sea, not only did they fail to persuade either a bellicose Italian Moose or Ethiopia (in spite of the latter's great weakness), but they also couldn't sell it to their own publics. This would involve appeasement on a far more massive scale, MUCH closer to home. I don't see it working.

At the absolute MOST, I could see the Western Allies tacitly acccepting a fait accompli that emerged as a result of said alliance. For instance, if during the Sudeten Crisis the Poles decided to let the Red Army pass, and as a result detatchments of the Red Army and "Organs" stayed behind to shoot anti-Communists, undermine the Polish state, and prop up a Bolshevik regime, I could see the Western Allies despairing but ultimately being unable to do anything about it. Sort of like what we saw in OTL with first Yalta, and then the Soviet backstab of Yalta.

But I don't see them openly carving up Eurasia with the Soviets before the fact like Hitler did.
SolomonW
2018-03-31 04:18:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by WolfBear
I've been curious about this--if Britain and France would have actually managed to ally with the Soviet Union in 1939, would Stalin have insisted on territorial revisions in Eastern Europe--specifically around the Soviet periphery--as the price for this alliance?
Not as long as the deal is made before Max Litvinov was sacked.
Post by WolfBear
I mean, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact looked like a pretty good deal for Stalin
in 1939 (and it would have been, had France not fallen and had the Soviet Union not been invaded).
Agreed.
Post by WolfBear
Thus, I am wondering if Britain and France would have been willing to offer Stalin similar concessions (annexation of the Baltic states, expansion up to the Curzon Line, annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, et cetera) in exchange for an alliance with them in 1939.
No even during ww2, when the allies were desparate for Stalin's help they
never agreed to this.
Post by WolfBear
Also, would Stalin have actually made territorial revision a precondition for an alliance with Britain and France in 1939? Or would he have been willing to compromise in regards to this--feeling that a common front to stop Hitler is more important?
As I stated no. Hitler was always seen as the enemy.
Post by WolfBear
Anyway, any thoughts on this?
Alex Milman
2018-03-31 17:01:14 UTC
Permalink
Post by SolomonW
Post by WolfBear
I've been curious about this--if Britain and France would have actually managed to ally with the Soviet Union in 1939, would Stalin have insisted on territorial revisions in Eastern Europe--specifically around the Soviet periphery--as the price for this alliance?
Not as long as the deal is made before Max Litvinov was sacked.
IIRC, an issue of the "adjustments" (or "security concerns") was always on the table.
Post by SolomonW
Post by WolfBear
I mean, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact looked like a pretty good deal for Stalin
in 1939 (and it would have been, had France not fallen and had the Soviet Union not been invaded).
Agreed.
Post by WolfBear
Thus, I am wondering if Britain and France would have been willing to offer Stalin similar concessions (annexation of the Baltic states, expansion up to the Curzon Line, annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, et cetera) in exchange for an alliance with them in 1939.
No even during ww2, when the allies were desparate for Stalin's help they
never agreed to this.
But they DID agree. Of course, Polish government in exile was making unhappy noises but that was it.
Post by SolomonW
Post by WolfBear
Also, would Stalin have actually made territorial revision a precondition for an alliance with Britain and France in 1939? Or would he have been willing to compromise in regards to this--feeling that a common front to stop Hitler is more important?
As I stated no. Hitler was always seen as the enemy.
By whom? M-R Pact was considered to be something of a happy family reunion on both sides.

Of course, it can be argued that Stalin did consider everyone as an enemy (current or potential) just as a matter of principle. :-)
The Horny Goat
2018-03-31 18:25:01 UTC
Permalink
On Sat, 31 Mar 2018 10:01:14 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By whom? M-R Pact was considered to be something of a happy family reunion on both sides.
Of course, it can be argued that Stalin did consider everyone as an enemy (current or potential) just as a matter of principle. :-)
Very true - and that included the Politburo.

I would be interested in your opinion of the movie Death of Stalin -
my impression was that it was historically fairly accurate but had
strong comedic elements similar to Fawlty Towers.

The main historical inaccuracy I saw was how some events that
historically were several months apart were telescoped together. (For
instance Stalin died in March 1953, Beria was executed 3-4 months
later but the movie made it appear there was no more than a week
between the two events)

Lest anybody get the wrong idea I thoroughly enjoyed the movie being
both a historical buff and a Python fan.
Alex Milman
2018-03-31 19:54:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 31 Mar 2018 10:01:14 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By whom? M-R Pact was considered to be something of a happy family reunion on both sides.
Of course, it can be argued that Stalin did consider everyone as an enemy (current or potential) just as a matter of principle. :-)
Very true - and that included the Politburo.
THEM in the 1st place (and held them "even closer", following the popular wisdom). :-)
Post by The Horny Goat
I would be interested in your opinion of the movie Death of Stalin -
Did not see it.
The Horny Goat
2018-04-01 07:31:59 UTC
Permalink
On Sat, 31 Mar 2018 12:54:08 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
I would be interested in your opinion of the movie Death of Stalin -
Did not see it.
Some of the casting surprised me. I would estimate it as about 2/3
history, 1/3 Fawlty Towers.

My daughter recommended it to me and I really enjoyed it.
SolomonW
2018-04-01 09:20:24 UTC
Permalink
Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 31 Mar 2018 12:54:08 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
I would be interested in your opinion of the movie Death of Stalin -
Did not see it.
Some of the casting surprised me. I would estimate it as about 2/3
history, 1/3 Fawlty Towers.
Yep
Post by The Horny Goat
My daughter recommended it to me and I really enjoyed it.
I did too.
Alex Milman
2018-04-01 15:40:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 31 Mar 2018 12:54:08 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
I would be interested in your opinion of the movie Death of Stalin -
Did not see it.
Some of the casting surprised me. I would estimate it as about 2/3
history, 1/3 Fawlty Towers.
My daughter recommended it to me and I really enjoyed it.
OK, just tried to watch it on computer but gave up. As a satire, too boring and primitive (and not too funny). BTW, Beria was not a "Minister of NKVD" (but this is just a nitpicking).
Robert Woodward
2018-04-01 04:36:55 UTC
Permalink
Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 31 Mar 2018 10:01:14 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By whom? M-R Pact was considered to be something of a happy family reunion on both sides.
Of course, it can be argued that Stalin did consider everyone as an enemy
(current or potential) just as a matter of principle. :-)
Very true - and that included the Politburo.
I would be interested in your opinion of the movie Death of Stalin -
my impression was that it was historically fairly accurate but had
strong comedic elements similar to Fawlty Towers.
A review of this movie, published by the Los Angeles Times, was
reprinted in a local newspaper. It described the movie as a "Comedy of
Terrors". Also, the British accents of the cast gave the affect that a
group of British football hooligans had found themselves in control of a
large country.

<SNIP>
--
"We have advanced to new and surprising levels of bafflement."
Imperial Auditor Miles Vorkosigan describes progress in _Komarr_.
-------------------------------------------------------
Robert Woodward ***@drizzle.com
SolomonW
2018-04-01 09:21:54 UTC
Permalink
Post by Robert Woodward
Post by The Horny Goat
On Sat, 31 Mar 2018 10:01:14 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By whom? M-R Pact was considered to be something of a happy family reunion on both sides.
Of course, it can be argued that Stalin did consider everyone as an enemy
(current or potential) just as a matter of principle. :-)
Very true - and that included the Politburo.
I would be interested in your opinion of the movie Death of Stalin -
my impression was that it was historically fairly accurate but had
strong comedic elements similar to Fawlty Towers.
A review of this movie, published by the Los Angeles Times, was
reprinted in a local newspaper. It described the movie as a "Comedy of
Terrors". Also, the British accents of the cast gave the affect that a
group of British football hooligans had found themselves in control of a
large country.
<SNIP>
I am used to Russian accents and yet I prefer for such movies that they use
English accents
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