r***@gmail.com
2005-02-01 04:34:02 UTC
I'd just like to begin this post to affirming that Andrew Reeves and I
did _not_ meet at the Yonge-Wellesley Starbucks in downtown Toronto
this Sunday afternoon just past to talk about affairs
alternate-historical. Never happened.
One thing that never happened was a discussion about the consequences
of a German victory on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union in
1941-1942. If Leningrad and Moscow fell and the Soviets were driven to
the Urals or beyond (or worse, if the Soviet Union was shattered),
horrid consequences could be expected for the Russian and Ukrainian
populations. Death rates comparable to the one-quarter fatalities among
the Poles seem possible. The situation for minorities singled out for
genocide elsewhere in occupied Europe--particularly though not only the
Jews--and for populations planned to be subjected to colonization would
be fairly grim.
That said, Nazi defeat would become inevitable sometime in the
1945-1946 timeframe once the Americans developed nuclear weapons. The
For All Time scenario of nuclear weapons being treated simply as
larger-than-normal explosive would come to pass, as assembly-line
production of nuclear weapons would allow the Allies to punch holes in
Nazi forces (and German cities, and unlucky occupied territories)
almost at will. Unopposed firebombing raids comparable to those which
devastated the Home Islands would also seem likely.
The net result? By the end of 1946, a continental Europe devastated to
a substantially greater degree than OTL, with the Low Countries
(unfortunate battleground), eastern Europe (site of mass slaughters)
and central Europe (target of nukes and firebombings) in particularly
bad shape. The Soviet Union would be only a minor factor, if a factor
at all; the United States would reign supreme, followed distantly by
Britain.
This world, with a more complete Holocaust and rather greater
atrocities committed against Slavs, and wouldn't be a good one for
Germany already hit worse than OTL. The loss of disputed territories to
German neighbours--Upper Silesia, Danzig and East Prussia to Poland,
the Saar to France--and the whole transfer of ethnic Germans lying
outside of the frontiers of the Reich of 1937 can be taken for granted.
Further punitive territorial losses, particularly to Poland (Pomerania
and Silesia), are a possibility, depending in part on what happens to
Poland's eastern frontiers. Bavarians and Saxons, like Austrians OTL,
might find it convenient to distinguish themselves from "the Germans"
in order to achieve a more speedy rehabilitation. Germany proper will
be a long time recovering, if, in fact, something like the Morgenthau
Plan isn't enacted by Allies appalled by the death toll.
The situation in central and eastern Europe bears comparison. With the
Soviet Union wrecked, the 1939 frontiers--Finnish Karelia remaining
Finnish, Bessarabia remaining Romanian, the Baltic States remaining
independent, Poland keeping the _kresy_--will be restored. Within those
frontiers, there may be a strong possibility of Ukraine gaining its
independence from a non-existent Union. (Expect serious conflicts with
the Poles concerning Galicia.) The outcome of events within the RSFSR
are, I suspect, up for grabs. Poland will be in a relatively stronger
position, without Soviet occupation and likely with some territorial
and other gains.
Despite suffering greater devastation than OTL, post-war events in
Europe may follow a trajectory similar to that of OTL. Although the
Soviet Union won't be a major player, the greater suffering and
inclinations towards domestic radicalisms like Communism might well
propel an alt-Marshall Plan funded by the United States. In this
situation, central Europe won't be excluded: Poland _will_ look like
Italy, Czechoslovakia like Austria, Estonia like Finland, Romania like
Spain. Likewise, there would continue to be an underlying logic for
pan-European integration, though Germany's suitability to be a partner
of France as OTL is open to question. (Perhaps, rather than a
Franco-German economic deal, a Franco-Polish security deal will be the
linchpin of alt-Europe.)
Thoughts?
Later,
Randy
did _not_ meet at the Yonge-Wellesley Starbucks in downtown Toronto
this Sunday afternoon just past to talk about affairs
alternate-historical. Never happened.
One thing that never happened was a discussion about the consequences
of a German victory on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union in
1941-1942. If Leningrad and Moscow fell and the Soviets were driven to
the Urals or beyond (or worse, if the Soviet Union was shattered),
horrid consequences could be expected for the Russian and Ukrainian
populations. Death rates comparable to the one-quarter fatalities among
the Poles seem possible. The situation for minorities singled out for
genocide elsewhere in occupied Europe--particularly though not only the
Jews--and for populations planned to be subjected to colonization would
be fairly grim.
That said, Nazi defeat would become inevitable sometime in the
1945-1946 timeframe once the Americans developed nuclear weapons. The
For All Time scenario of nuclear weapons being treated simply as
larger-than-normal explosive would come to pass, as assembly-line
production of nuclear weapons would allow the Allies to punch holes in
Nazi forces (and German cities, and unlucky occupied territories)
almost at will. Unopposed firebombing raids comparable to those which
devastated the Home Islands would also seem likely.
The net result? By the end of 1946, a continental Europe devastated to
a substantially greater degree than OTL, with the Low Countries
(unfortunate battleground), eastern Europe (site of mass slaughters)
and central Europe (target of nukes and firebombings) in particularly
bad shape. The Soviet Union would be only a minor factor, if a factor
at all; the United States would reign supreme, followed distantly by
Britain.
This world, with a more complete Holocaust and rather greater
atrocities committed against Slavs, and wouldn't be a good one for
Germany already hit worse than OTL. The loss of disputed territories to
German neighbours--Upper Silesia, Danzig and East Prussia to Poland,
the Saar to France--and the whole transfer of ethnic Germans lying
outside of the frontiers of the Reich of 1937 can be taken for granted.
Further punitive territorial losses, particularly to Poland (Pomerania
and Silesia), are a possibility, depending in part on what happens to
Poland's eastern frontiers. Bavarians and Saxons, like Austrians OTL,
might find it convenient to distinguish themselves from "the Germans"
in order to achieve a more speedy rehabilitation. Germany proper will
be a long time recovering, if, in fact, something like the Morgenthau
Plan isn't enacted by Allies appalled by the death toll.
The situation in central and eastern Europe bears comparison. With the
Soviet Union wrecked, the 1939 frontiers--Finnish Karelia remaining
Finnish, Bessarabia remaining Romanian, the Baltic States remaining
independent, Poland keeping the _kresy_--will be restored. Within those
frontiers, there may be a strong possibility of Ukraine gaining its
independence from a non-existent Union. (Expect serious conflicts with
the Poles concerning Galicia.) The outcome of events within the RSFSR
are, I suspect, up for grabs. Poland will be in a relatively stronger
position, without Soviet occupation and likely with some territorial
and other gains.
Despite suffering greater devastation than OTL, post-war events in
Europe may follow a trajectory similar to that of OTL. Although the
Soviet Union won't be a major player, the greater suffering and
inclinations towards domestic radicalisms like Communism might well
propel an alt-Marshall Plan funded by the United States. In this
situation, central Europe won't be excluded: Poland _will_ look like
Italy, Czechoslovakia like Austria, Estonia like Finland, Romania like
Spain. Likewise, there would continue to be an underlying logic for
pan-European integration, though Germany's suitability to be a partner
of France as OTL is open to question. (Perhaps, rather than a
Franco-German economic deal, a Franco-Polish security deal will be the
linchpin of alt-Europe.)
Thoughts?
Later,
Randy