Discussion:
What If: War with Britain at out break of American Civil War?
(too old to reply)
President William Jennings Bryan
2003-07-05 18:50:25 UTC
Permalink
At the start of the American Civil War, the Confederates sent two
delegates on the ship "Trent" to Britain and France to negotiate
military aide. Before they could reach there destination, they were
captured by the U.S. and sent back to the States. After this, the
British government wrote a letter which would have started war with
the U.S., but, Prince Albert, on his deathbed, toned down the note
enough to prevent war. What if Prince Albert had already died, and the
note was sent as written, and started war with the United States? How
would this war go? How would it effect the ACW? What would be some of
the long term happenings?

~ President William Jennings Bryan

"There's a hole in the world
Like a great black pit
And it's filled with people
Who are filled with shit
And the vermin of the world
Inhabit it —
But not for long!"
- from "Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street"
Raymond Speer
2003-07-05 19:31:00 UTC
Permalink
I saw a TV docudrama in which Prince Albert refuses to go to bed,
murmuring "this will bring war!" He is looking at some letter, which
appears to be on a single sheet of paper, but apparently it will be A
Gigantic Effort to revise the note.

Victoria flutters out, foreseeing the future. "Oh, my dearest, your body
cannot stand the strain."

Last scene, Albert is virtually dead but he sends off the Magic Letter,
knowing that he has Kept the Peace!

All absolute hooey. There never was a letter so effective as to cause
war to break out had it been mailed. I guess it is a more dignified end
than "Vickie, I have diarrhea."
Angus McLellan
2003-07-05 19:58:30 UTC
Permalink
On Sat, 5 Jul 2003 14:31:00 -0500 (CDT), ***@webtv.net (Raymond
Speer) wrote:

<snip>
Post by Raymond Speer
All absolute hooey. There never was a letter so effective as to cause
war to break out had it been mailed. I guess it is a more dignified end
than "Vickie, I have diarrhea."
Letters ? Maybe not, but if we can extend that to communications in
general the Ems Telegram did a pretty good job and so did the
Zimmermann Telegram.

Angus
jlk7e
2003-07-06 01:50:59 UTC
Permalink
Post by Angus McLellan
<snip>
Post by Raymond Speer
All absolute hooey. There never was a letter so effective as to cause
war to break out had it been mailed. I guess it is a more dignified end
than "Vickie, I have diarrhea."
Letters ? Maybe not, but if we can extend that to communications in
general the Ems Telegram did a pretty good job and so did the
Zimmermann Telegram.
This would also have been a telegram, no? And while I don't think
that Albert's changes single handedly prevented war, I do think that
it significantly reduced the risk of war.
Raymond Speer
2003-07-06 12:37:25 UTC
Permalink
Prince Albert looked at the note with grave concern.

---------------------
Dear Arsehole Lincoln:

If you don't kiss our ass, you mother****ing ****sucker f****t, Britain
will ram our massive member up your ******* till America bleeds.

Yours Sincerely,

Palmerston

PS: I will strap your b****h Mary to a barrel and have my donkey ****
her while I molest your *******ing ****** sons.
-------------------------

VICTORIA: "Albert, you should go to bed and eat some chicken soup."

ALBERT: "I know, my dear. But I have to edit the Prime Minister's latest
letter to the President first."
Coyu
2003-07-06 15:12:23 UTC
Permalink
Post by Raymond Speer
Yours Sincerely,
Palmerston
Little Robert Elliott Palmerston? Yeesh.
Doug Hoff
2003-07-06 12:55:00 UTC
Permalink
Post by jlk7e
Post by Angus McLellan
<snip>
Post by Raymond Speer
All absolute hooey. There never was a letter so effective as to cause
war to break out had it been mailed. I guess it is a more dignified end
than "Vickie, I have diarrhea."
Letters ? Maybe not, but if we can extend that to communications in
general the Ems Telegram did a pretty good job
Only because it was calculated to. And the French were fairly eager for
war.
Post by jlk7e
Post by Angus McLellan
and so did the
Zimmermann Telegram.
This would also have been a telegram, no?
IIRC, the Atlantic Cable was down, so it probably would have been a letter.
Post by jlk7e
And while I don't think
that Albert's changes single handedly prevented war, I do think that
it significantly reduced the risk of war.
I think it made a face-saving exit easier for the US. Lincoln was pretty
adamant on his 'one war at a time' stance, so I think that even if something
had happened that made more people yell more loudly for war with the UK, he
would still have found a way to avoid it.
--
-------------------

Doug Hoff

***@dhoff5767.eiomail.com

www.althist.com
Sydney Webb
2003-07-07 01:48:46 UTC
Permalink
Doug Hoff wrote:

<the Zimmerman Telegram>
Post by Doug Hoff
IIRC, the Atlantic Cable was down, so it probably would have been a letter.
IIRC Transatlantic cable went through London, the ZT was decoded, the
original passed on to the German ambassador in Mexico with a clear copy
being forwarded to the US State department.

More than a hundred thousand Americans then died, a reminder of the
dangers of passing on electronic mail to those other than the intended
recipient.

- Syd
--
"Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been
written, directly or indirectly, _against_ totalitarianism and _for_
democratic socialism."
- George Orwell, _Why I Write_ (1947)
Doug Hoff
2003-07-07 22:31:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by Sydney Webb
<the Zimmerman Telegram>
Post by Doug Hoff
IIRC, the Atlantic Cable was down, so it probably would have been a letter.
IIRC Transatlantic cable went through London, the ZT was decoded, the
original passed on to the German ambassador in Mexico with a clear copy
being forwarded to the US State department.
Exactly, but I was actually thinking about a hot-headed response to Seward
by the Palmerson govt. Many who wish to make the Trent Affair into a point
for British intervention in the ACW argue that if the Cable had been up,
there would have been no lag-time in the correspondence between the UK and
US and haughty words could have been exchanged without the cooling off
period involved in transporting mail across the Atlantic. Fortunately the
the Atlantic Cable was an idea ahead of the available tech and was not
reliable.
Post by Sydney Webb
More than a hundred thousand Americans then died, a reminder of the
dangers of passing on electronic mail to those other than the intended
recipient.
What just boggles the mind is that the Germans, so confident in their code,
figured the US must have gotten the ZT from some other source. And then
_admitted_ that it was genuine. The combination of stupidity and arrogance
is amazing.
--
-------------------

Doug Hoff

***@dhoff5767.eiomail.com

www.althist.com
david
2003-07-05 20:22:12 UTC
Permalink
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
At the start of the American Civil War, the Confederates sent two
delegates on the ship "Trent" to Britain and France to negotiate
military aide. Before they could reach there destination, they were
captured by the U.S. and sent back to the States. After this, the
British government wrote a letter which would have started war with
the U.S., but, Prince Albert, on his deathbed, toned down the note
enough to prevent war. What if Prince Albert had already died, and the
note was sent as written, and started war with the United States? How
would this war go? How would it effect the ACW? What would be some of
the long term happenings?
Well, Britain didn't particularly want to be at war with the USA.
Britain had a fair amount that it stood to lose (Canada, the Caribbean)
if things went badly, and nothing significant that it could gain from a
war. Fighting wars - especially at such a distance - can be pretty
bloody expensive. Thus in any war, Britain would be spending a lot in
order to put a lot at stake for little possible gain.

Likewise, the USA didn't particularly want to be at war with Britain.
The USA already had its hands full with the Confederacy, and taking on
the foremost naval power in the world while trying to impose a blockade
with totally inadequate resources in order to prevent the Confederacy
from getting supplies that Britain could easily provide was likewise an
act from which it could gain little and lose a lot.

Sometimes opinion and pressures can start a war, but in this instance,
both sides have excellent reasons for getting out as quickly as
possible, and certainly keeping it as localised as possible. Neither
side has any reason to extend the war.

In all probability, any war at this time would quickly fizzle out.
Neither side has much to gain and a lot to lose from being at war, and
as soon as a peace can be conveniently declared with both sides being
able to declare themselves the winner, it would be.
--
David Flin
jlk7e
2003-07-05 23:34:49 UTC
Permalink
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
At the start of the American Civil War, the Confederates sent two
delegates on the ship "Trent" to Britain and France to negotiate
military aide. Before they could reach there destination, they were
captured by the U.S. and sent back to the States. After this, the
British government wrote a letter which would have started war with
the U.S.,
a letter which *probably* would have started a war with the US, or
perhaps only "would have made war with the US more likely than the
note that was actually sent"

but, Prince Albert, on his deathbed, toned down the note
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
enough to prevent war. What if Prince Albert had already died, and the
note was sent as written, and started war with the United States? How
would this war go? How would it effect the ACW? What would be some of
the long term happenings?
I tend to think Lincoln would, even with a more belligerent British
note, have done what it took to prevent such a war. But if not, well,
how much resources could the British devote to attacking the US from
Canada? Would that even be feasible. Presumably, the Union naval
blockade is DOA. Does Napoleon decide to offer his mediation?
Al Montestruc
2003-07-06 21:22:11 UTC
Permalink
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
At the start of the American Civil War, the Confederates sent two
delegates on the ship "Trent" to Britain and France to negotiate
military aide. Before they could reach there destination, they were
captured by the U.S. and sent back to the States. After this, the
British government wrote a letter which would have started war with
the U.S., but, Prince Albert, on his deathbed, toned down the note
enough to prevent war. What if Prince Albert had already died, and the
note was sent as written, and started war with the United States? How
would this war go? How would it effect the ACW? What would be some of
the long term happenings?
~ President William Jennings Bryan
Assume your POD for it's face value and Lincoln is an idiot and goes
to war over the British note, then:

1)South cannot be effectivly blockaded due to Royal Navy being in the
fight early on.

2)USA suffers much more losses much earlier on, and these include
major naval losses to the UK.

3) Naval technogy race on both sides of the atlantic.

4) USA fully mobilizes early, war with Canada. US gains ground in
both south and Canada, but at great price, casualties much higher than
IOTL by any given date as both confederates and canadians have access
to supplies and troops from the UK and Europe.

5) IMHO Lincoln will lose bid for re-election, war comes to negociated
end soon after with rump USA streaching from "sea to shining sea" but
does not include confederate states other than Mo, WV, part of TN and
some other more minor adjustments in state borders (largest in west
texas & indian territory), US -Canada border same but for minor
adjustments.

6) The UK and France durin the war "may" prevail upon the
confederates to end slavery in a way more acceptable to the CSA than
defeat to the yankees. VAT on cotton and other cash crops will be
used to fund war, might be used to fund freedom of slaves after war.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-07 03:13:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
At the start of the American Civil War, the Confederates sent two
delegates on the ship "Trent" to Britain and France to negotiate
military aide. Before they could reach there destination, they were
captured by the U.S. and sent back to the States. After this, the
British government wrote a letter which would have started war with
the U.S., but, Prince Albert, on his deathbed, toned down the note
enough to prevent war. What if Prince Albert had already died, and the
note was sent as written, and started war with the United States? How
would this war go? How would it effect the ACW? What would be some of
the long term happenings?
~ President William Jennings Bryan
Assume your POD for it's face value and Lincoln is an idiot and goes
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.

First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe. The first engagements are
likely to be a RN attack on New York. It's been over 80 years since
they last had to do anything like this. Getting past Hells Gate in the
face of shore batteries is not going to be fun. To get some idea what
that harbor's defenses are like I asked a native of the area who had
some naval experience. Heavy ships of that era going off the Hell's
Gate Channel is a Bad Idea.) Boston is not a lot better. The Union
learned a lesson about this in places like Charleston Harbor in OTL.
And they were not facing the same level of guns the RN will be.

The second problem is that the RN has been testing it's armor against
Dahlgrens listed powder charges (adjusted down to reflect the
Admiralty beliefs, partly justified, that the USN powder was not as
good as the RN powder), not the charges that will be used by the
gunners in real life, as some of them get to taking risks. A double
charged XI Dahlgren can go thru any armor a RN ship caries in 1861/2.
And shore battteries in this time line will be getting them. Double
charges were standard by late 1862.

Second are the Ellit ram style ships made from converted tugs that are
going to be used. Given that the RN campaign plan almost certainly
calls for the shelling of New York and other harbors to force a peace,
this could get rather nasty, even if Monitor never gets made. Ellits
are likely to be able to severly hurt the RN flotilla before being
sunk.

Third, the UK is unlikley to, in any Trent scenario, ally itself with
the CSA. Not going to happen. That would constitute a widening of the
conflict in the eyes of Britain, which simply wants the US to
recognize British Rights on the seas.Once that is done they are gone.
And they may be gone sooner. It really does come down to a
cost/benifit analysis for the UK. And that is a bad thing for any hope
of them being in long.

As for the US, several contemporary British accounts not the extent to
which the US populace go fired up over this. If war comes it will
increase US troop availability and that is not good for either the CSA
nor the UK. Expect that the 100,000 troops that one British officer
(later a general, currently Quartermaster General for the Canadian
garrison forces) estimated were needed to take out Canada without
problem to be raised easily and another 200,000 for the main war with
the CSA rebels.

Any net advantage for the CSA is fleeting and backfires when the other
effects become known to the CSA.
Al Montestruc
2003-07-07 11:22:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
At the start of the American Civil War, the Confederates sent two
delegates on the ship "Trent" to Britain and France to negotiate
military aide. Before they could reach there destination, they were
captured by the U.S. and sent back to the States. After this, the
British government wrote a letter which would have started war with
the U.S., but, Prince Albert, on his deathbed, toned down the note
enough to prevent war. What if Prince Albert had already died, and the
note was sent as written, and started war with the United States? How
would this war go? How would it effect the ACW? What would be some of
the long term happenings?
~ President William Jennings Bryan
Assume your POD for it's face value and Lincoln is an idiot and goes
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.
First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe.
I never said the CSA was cool. I said that IMHO they had a right to
seceed under US Constitutional law. The difference is large.
Post by Wesley Taylor
The first engagements are
likely to be a RN attack on New York.
Bullshit, for the reasons you state that it would cost the RN too much
and the RN does not NEED to do a frontal assault on anything.
Commerce raiding, seeking a large scale engagement with the USN at
sea, and keeping canadian and southern ports open will keep them quite
busy enough thanks.

----snip
Post by Wesley Taylor
The second problem is that the RN has been testing it's armor against
Dahlgrens listed powder charges (adjusted down to reflect the
Admiralty beliefs, partly justified, that the USN powder was not as
good as the RN powder), not the charges that will be used by the
gunners in real life, as some of them get to taking risks. A double
charged XI Dahlgren can go thru any armor a RN ship caries in 1861/2.
And shore battteries in this time line will be getting them. Double
charges were standard by late 1862.
Good reason to avoid shore batteries.
Post by Wesley Taylor
Second are the Ellit ram style ships made from converted tugs that are
going to be used. Given that the RN campaign plan almost certainly
calls for the shelling of New York and other harbors to force a peace,
Why? War with Canada and UK, commerce raiding and the CSA's ports
being kept open will force the USA to fold it's hand in due time.
Frontal assaults using His Majesties Ships is very expensive in both
skilled British seamen's lives and very costly hardware, especially
when you can get allies (CSA), colonials and natives (Canadian and
Indian (both sorts) troops) to do the frontal assaults for you and
only pay for their ammo and some trinkets.
Post by Wesley Taylor
this could get rather nasty, even if Monitor never gets made. Ellits
are likely to be able to severly hurt the RN flotilla before being
sunk.
Third, the UK is unlikley to, in any Trent scenario, ally itself with
the CSA. Not going to happen.
Co-belligerant status is quite good enough. That was what Finland did
with Germany in WWII and in large meansure was why the Finns were not
occupied like Germany was. The German and Finnish navy ran
interfearance for each other IIRC.

Co-belligernat just means that the UK would not have a treaty with the
CSA, and that a seperate peace was possible.
Post by Wesley Taylor
That would constitute a widening of the
conflict in the eyes of Britain, which simply wants the US to
recognize British Rights on the seas. Once that is done they are gone.
Which is why I said it is an absurd POD, Lincoln was not an idiot.
But if he was dumb enough to get into a fight with the UK at the same
time as the southern states were seceeding, he might well have been
dumb enough to keep fighting a long time. The USA could do a
knock-down drag out with the UK at the time that would last years, and
might even win, it would be horribly expensive to all however.
Post by Wesley Taylor
And they may be gone sooner. It really does come down to a
cost/benifit analysis for the UK. And that is a bad thing for any hope
of them being in long.
As for the US, several contemporary British accounts not the extent to
which the US populace go fired up over this. If war comes it will
increase US troop availability and that is not good for either the CSA
nor the UK. Expect that the 100,000 troops that one British officer
(later a general, currently Quartermaster General for the Canadian
garrison forces) estimated were needed to take out Canada without
problem to be raised easily and another 200,000 for the main war with
the CSA rebels.
Any net advantage for the CSA is fleeting and backfires when the other
effects become known to the CSA.
The advantages to the CSA are the opening of ports and the supplies,
food, arms and ammo that trade can bring. With better logistics the
south can last much, much longer. Point of fact, the big thing that
beat the south was logistics, southern troops were literally starving
by the end of the war, many of the men that surrendered with Lee were
barefoot, and had gone without food for days and had been underfed a
long time. Armies must be fed to be able to hold a position. Given
the food and other supplies (boots, clothing, bandages, ammo and so
on) the CSA need not have surrendered that spring.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-08 03:26:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.
First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe.
I never said the CSA was cool. I said that IMHO they had a right to
seceed under US Constitutional law. The difference is large.
You have given a credible imitation of saying the CSA was cool.
Cite?
In every discussion of the problems or failures of the CSA you have
behaved like a high school kid whose secret crush has been impugned.
When the CSA is castigated for something you immediatly trot out the
irrelevant and distracting view that the North was worse. And usually
fail to clearly make anything like a good case of it.
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
The first engagements are
likely to be a RN attack on New York.
Bullshit, for the reasons you state that it would cost the RN too much
and the RN does not NEED to do a frontal assault on anything.
Commerce raiding, seeking a large scale engagement with the USN at
sea, and keeping canadian and southern ports open will keep them quite
busy enough thanks.
Naval warfar is changing very rapidly in this timeframe. And yes, the
RN does need to shell places like New York. Standard practice in
dealing with a land power like the US at that time is to either shell
their cities and force them to the negotiating table or to cut off
commerce and force them to negotiate.
Even when said power has a credible navy, and fairly stout shore
batteries?? I would not think it wise to make such an attack until I
was *SURE* that I could outgun both the enemy fleet, and their shore
batteries at the same time.
The Crimean War is an example of the standard practice, as is the
behavior of the Union Navy in attempting to reduce harbor
fortifications. See Mobile Bay, Charleston, Williamsburg, New Orleans,
several Russian ports I do not remember the names of (I believe one
was something like Kinross)

The RN and French Navy developed armored gun platforms to solve the
problem of shell guns vs wooden bombardment ships. They dealt with the
Russian forts quite well and so believed they could do the same
elsewhere. Unfortunately the USN had some of the heaviest guns in the
world, far heavier than the rather anachronistic Russian Navy. And
better than the RN believed them to be.
I will take your word on it that they underestimated the shore
batteries ability to punch through armor, but even so not all british
ships of that era were armored, and sending a small number of armored
ships in alone to deal with shore batteries when the other side has a
navy that might well be able to cut off their retreat, is a dumb idea.
The unarmored ones are kindling. Shell (not shot, but cased gunpowder
shells) will blow them up quite readily. In most of the simulations I
have run or seen run the RN ships actually have two problems. First
they are in a very heavy current in the Hell's Gate and tend, as smoke
stacks (needed for engine draft) get shot up or the engine gets
damaged in other ways, to fall back, unable ot fight the current.
Second is the problem that the armor does more than stop the lighter
shells, it absorbs damage that on the wooden hulled gets dumped into
the ship. IX and XI Dahlgrens tend to do massive damage to such ships.
On the armored ones the results tend to take longer, but with double
loaded guns the results are no less bad for a RN shelling.
If you send in the armored ships with support, then you are going to
get the supporting ships shot up.
The later will not really work
as the UK is the one the commercial pressures are on (one tenth of the
UK's grain comes from American farms. Prices go up and so does
political unrest in the lower classes in the UK)
Thus making the POD even less plausible.
As you could see from the later material I wrote, we are actually in
agreement there. I can see no real chance of Trent spinning into a
war.
As for a large scale engagement with the USN, that will not happen
until the USN has, over the course of 1862, finished off a dozen or so
Passaic class. Armed as the designer wanted. Probably happen in late
summer or (more likely) early fall. And it will be an RN disaster.
As for keeping southern ports open, the impact on the war is often
overrated. The blockade was useful, but so were the extremely poor
state of the CSA's rail 'network'. A rail net so bad that crops rotted
on siddings because no transprot was available to take the produce to
cities where bread riots were occuring.
The rail net was bad in large measure because IIRC union units were
periodically tearing up the tracks in many areas. This was in part
due to a less extensive rail net to start, and in part due to a
shortage of forces to stop such raiders, which in turn could have been
helped by having ports open.
Bi, the Rail net was in bad shape because it started in such. It later
became in truly abominable shape.
Post by Al Montestruc
----snip
Post by Wesley Taylor
The second problem is that the RN has been testing it's armor against
Dahlgrens listed powder charges (adjusted down to reflect the
Admiralty beliefs, partly justified, that the USN powder was not as
good as the RN powder), not the charges that will be used by the
gunners in real life, as some of them get to taking risks. A double
charged XI Dahlgren can go thru any armor a RN ship caries in 1861/2.
And shore battteries in this time line will be getting them. Double
charges were standard by late 1862.
Good reason to avoid shore batteries.
If they knew about the guns.
They did know about the guns, they just underestimated them some.
They would not be sending unarmored units in range of them if they
could help it, and that meant if USN units were in the area, or might
be in the area, or the USN may have laid mines/torpedos they would
avoid the areas with armored ships as they were bloody expensive.
But usless if not risked. They will of course minimize the risks in
thier estimation, but risk have to be taken, even with expensive stuff
like Warrior.
That is the point. The RN has convinced
itself that the armor on Warrior and other Armored Frigates is proof
against any gun in the world. Finding out it is not during the attack
on a major American city is likley going to be a huge shock.
Agree, but not as huge as you may think.
Actually it does not have to be that big a shock. All it has to do is
unnerve enough people who, like the entire RN, have not faced real
opposition in decades, to create severe havok.
especially when they find out about Dahlgren XV guns.
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
Second are the Ellit ram style ships made from converted tugs that are
going to be used. Given that the RN campaign plan almost certainly
calls for the shelling of New York and other harbors to force a peace,
Why? War with Canada and UK, commerce raiding and the CSA's ports
being kept open will force the USA to fold it's hand in due time.
Frontal assaults using His Majesties Ships is very expensive in both
skilled British seamen's lives and very costly hardware, especially
when you can get allies (CSA), colonials and natives (Canadian and
Indian (both sorts) troops) to do the frontal assaults for you and
only pay for their ammo and some trinkets.
1) the UK cannot stop the fall of British North America on land. Not
going to happen.
They can delay it, possibly by years.
No they cannot. The US can, without compromising its ability to fight
the CSA, raise and send in something like 100,000 troops, 4 times the
effective fighting strength of the provinial and professional troops
available to the Brits. The majority (aside from something like 10,000
regulares) are baddly armed and ill trained. While the total manpower
(on paper) is something over 200,000 canadians of military age , most
are unlikely to be called up in any case and many are already in the
Union Army and unlikely to side with the British if they are
intervening in what will be seen as support of the CSA.
They can slow it and hope to bring the war to an end
before it happens, but with enough time it will happen.
2) The US will finally, with the war with the UK bringing popular
sentiment firmly behind the wars, get onough troops to do the job (ie
they will fully mobilize) this means initially about 300,000 more
troops, a third or half of which go into Canada.
Given the history in OTL, draft riots and all, this seems a bit far
fetched.
Given the history, it is all perfectly reasonable.
Richard VanHouten
2003-07-08 12:01:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wesley Taylor
The unarmored ones are kindling. Shell (not shot, but cased gunpowder
shells) will blow them up quite readily. In most of the simulations I
have run or seen run the RN ships actually have two problems. First
they are in a very heavy current in the Hell's Gate and tend, as smoke
stacks (needed for engine draft) get shot up or the engine gets
damaged in other ways, to fall back, unable ot fight the current.
Hells Gate? The junction of the East and Harlem Rivers and Long Island
Sound? Why in the world would the RN be attacking through there, rather
than the Narrows, or is that where you really mean?
Al Montestruc
2003-07-08 18:24:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.
First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe.
I never said the CSA was cool. I said that IMHO they had a right to
seceed under US Constitutional law. The difference is large.
You have given a credible imitation of saying the CSA was cool.
Cite?
In every discussion of the problems or failures of the CSA you have
behaved like a high school kid whose secret crush has been impugned.
When the CSA is castigated for something you immediatly trot out the
irrelevant and distracting view that the North was worse. And usually
fail to clearly make anything like a good case of it.
The above is not a cite, it is a personal attack.
Abraxus
2003-07-09 15:38:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.
First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe.
I never said the CSA was cool. I said that IMHO they had a right to
seceed under US Constitutional law. The difference is large.
You have given a credible imitation of saying the CSA was cool.
Cite?
In every discussion of the problems or failures of the CSA you have
behaved like a high school kid whose secret crush has been impugned.
When the CSA is castigated for something you immediatly trot out the
irrelevant and distracting view that the North was worse. And usually
fail to clearly make anything like a good case of it.
The above is not a cite, it is a personal attack.
If you consider a (rather accurate) description of your posting
history to be a "personal attack", then perhaps you should take the
sign for what it is.

That a pathological devotion to the Confederacy is a bad thing, for
instance.
Al Montestruc
2003-07-10 03:51:35 UTC
Permalink
Post by Abraxus
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Wesley Taylor
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.
First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe.
I never said the CSA was cool. I said that IMHO they had a right to
seceed under US Constitutional law. The difference is large.
You have given a credible imitation of saying the CSA was cool.
Cite?
In every discussion of the problems or failures of the CSA you have
behaved like a high school kid whose secret crush has been impugned.
When the CSA is castigated for something you immediatly trot out the
irrelevant and distracting view that the North was worse. And usually
fail to clearly make anything like a good case of it.
The above is not a cite, it is a personal attack.
If you consider a (rather accurate)
Hardly
Post by Abraxus
description of your posting
history to be a "personal attack", then perhaps you should take the
sign for what it is.
That a pathological devotion to the Confederacy
I am not devoted to the Confederacy. Only to the proposition that
secession was lawful and constitutional and fit the principles of the
founders better than the Hotel California/Roach Motel interpritation
of the constitution of the USA. And that above is a personal attack.
I defy you to find a place where I showed a "pathological devotion to
the Confederacy" as opposed to a devotion to the ideals of popular
soverignty and the right of secession, and rule of law.
Post by Abraxus
is a bad thing, for
instance.
Your assertion that that the supremacy clause means states cannot
seceed seems deeply pathoilogical based upon:

1)The supremacy clause does not specifically forbid it, as in say
secession is not allowed.

2)The tenth amendment says states and/or people can do anything not
forbidden.

3)Your arguement requires deeply convoluted logic to get to the
position you wish including the assumption that the USA is somehow
more soverign than the states when the treaty of paris says each of
the states is sovereign and does not state that the USA as a whole is,
and that very treaty is held as supreme law of the land by the
supremacy clause you tout as being your proof.

http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/paris.html
Abraxus
2003-07-11 04:45:37 UTC
Permalink
<snip>

The fact that your entire post is nothing but a repetition of your
neo-confederate position (for the umpteenth time, no less) does more
to substantiate Wes's position than anything I could possibly add.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-11 14:42:13 UTC
Permalink
Post by Angus McLellan
<snip>
The fact that your entire post is nothing but a repetition of your
neo-confederate position (for the umpteenth time, no less) does more
to substantiate Wes's position than anything I could possibly add.
And is largely why I have not responded to him. No real need. Any who
will see him for what he is have done so.
Doug Hoff
2003-07-11 22:40:48 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Angus McLellan
<snip>
The fact that your entire post is nothing but a repetition of your
neo-confederate position (for the umpteenth time, no less) does more
to substantiate Wes's position than anything I could possibly add.
And is largely why I have not responded to him. No real need. Any who
will see him for what he is have done so.
I see, declare victory and run away.
There _is_ something to be said for not flogging a dead horse. Of what
utility is Round 1,XXX of Secession Was/Was Not Constitutional? Al and I
disagree totally on the question, but I am not jumping in on it. He wont
convince me, I wont convince him, and the topic has been gone over so many
times that I doubt if it will have any educational effect upon the
observers.

Just my US$.02
--
-------------------

Doug Hoff

***@dhoff5767.eiomail.com

www.althist.com
Angus McLellan
2003-07-11 18:13:23 UTC
Permalink
Post by Angus McLellan
<snip>
The fact that your entire post is nothing but a repetition of your
neo-confederate position (for the umpteenth time, no less) does more
to substantiate Wes's position than anything I could possibly add.
You are the one who asserts that the confederacy was all about
slavery, so why do you call me a neoconfederate??
Let me hazard a wild guess. Could it possibly be because
Neo-confederates *deny* that was fundamentally about slavery ?

Angus
Al Montestruc
2003-07-12 08:09:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
<snip>
The fact that your entire post is nothing but a repetition of your
neo-confederate position (for the umpteenth time, no less) does more
to substantiate Wes's position than anything I could possibly add.
You are the one who asserts that the confederacy was all about
slavery, so why do you call me a neoconfederate??
Let me hazard a wild guess. Could it possibly be because
Neo-confederates *deny* that was fundamentally about slavery ?
Deny that the war was fundamentally about slavery? The president of
US federal government of 1861 did not hold slavery to be the
fundamental issue of the war, he held that secession was. He was
willing to make a compromise that would amend the constitution to
protect slavery where it was legal. Does that make Abe Lincoln a
neoconfederate??


SHEESH!! the lengths some buffoons will go to defend a prejudice. I
conceed that the issue that started the argument was slavery, but that
is not the issue that burned so much gunpowder, that issue was whether
states had a right to secession.

You are making about as much sense as saying that walking out of a
store with a TV set can get you arrested or shot. When the real issue
is not walking out of the store with the TV, the issue is taking it
w/o paying for it.
Al Montestruc
2003-07-12 17:10:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
<snip>
The fact that your entire post is nothing but a repetition of your
neo-confederate position (for the umpteenth time, no less) does more
to substantiate Wes's position than anything I could possibly add.
You are the one who asserts that the confederacy was all about
slavery, so why do you call me a neoconfederate??
Let me hazard a wild guess. Could it possibly be because
Neo-confederates *deny* that was fundamentally about slavery ?
Deny that the war was fundamentally about slavery? The president of
US federal government of 1861 did not hold slavery to be the
fundamental issue of the war, he held that secession was. He was
willing to make a compromise that would amend the constitution to
protect slavery where it was legal. Does that make Abe Lincoln a
neoconfederate??
<snip more block capital thinking>
"You are the one who asserts that **the confederacy** was all about
slavery, so why do you call me a neoconfederate??" (your words,
emphasis added).
Do you see any mention of a war there ?
Yes. The confederacy only existed during the american civil war, and
because of it. Without the fear that the federal government would
attack them for secession, the confederacy might not have formed at
all. Without the attitude that secession was unconstitutional and
treason, it is less likely that the confederacy forms at all.
Possibly the states in question ( the lower south as the upper south
will not seceed w/o Lincoln's threats of violence) will exist as
independent nations for a while and take a wait and see attitude.
Some might apply for readmission after the Lincoln administration if
attitudes changed
The only thing I can see is
"the [C]onfederacy" which indubitably was "all about slavery".
Angus
Angus McLellan
2003-07-12 17:52:40 UTC
Permalink
<snipped>
Post by Al Montestruc
"You are the one who asserts that **the confederacy** was all about
slavery, so why do you call me a neoconfederate??" (your words,
emphasis added).
Do you see any mention of a war there ?
Yes. The confederacy only existed during the american civil war, and
because of it. Without the fear that the federal government would
attack them for secession, the confederacy might not have formed at
all. Without the attitude that secession was unconstitutional and
treason, it is less likely that the confederacy forms at all.
Possibly the states in question ( the lower south as the upper south
will not seceed w/o Lincoln's threats of violence) will exist as
independent nations for a while and take a wait and see attitude.
Some might apply for readmission after the Lincoln administration if
attitudes changed
<snip>

You're able to read things in your posts that I can't see no matter
how hard I look. There's still no mention of a war in the post I
replied to. It does not matter what you post *now*. Just as your
say-so doesn't alter the fact that secession *was* treason, it also
doesn't alter what you posted here.

Angus
Al Montestruc
2003-07-11 05:03:38 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
I am not devoted to the Confederacy. Only to the proposition that
secession was lawful and constitutional and fit the principles of the
founders better than the Hotel California/Roach Motel interpritation
of the constitution of the USA. And that above is a personal attack.
That is hardly the case, and you know it. You also have argued quite
recently that secession was not only lawful and constitutional, but
also that it was a sensible decision by the southerners in 1861,
NO! I argued that from their point of view it was. There is a
difference.

Nor in the absolute do I think their secession was it was in and of
itself a bad thing. If one takes a morally neutral position about
slavery, as the US Federal government did as of 1860, then arguably
southerners were being treated shabbily by the federal government and
northerners. They paid a disproportionate share of federal taxes, and
were being discriminated against in the use of federal lands in the
west.

Only with 20/20 hindsight, and/or by taking a (proper) position
against slavery can one argue that the confederacy was immoral.

Slavery was a bad thing, the end of slavery was good, but it was an
utterly unintended consiquence of the war, further the federal
government and the USA as a whole as of 1860 was pro-slavery, as some
union states were. As a result, I think that slavery should not be
dragged into the issue as to whether the south was wrong to seceed.
which
has absolutely nothing to do with the argument which you claim is the
only one you make, which is that secession was constitutional. In
this thread, you have also argued a more pro-confederate case than
anybody else has been willing to argue. Can you point us to any
threads where you have argued bad things about the Confederacy?
Most of them.
Post by Al Montestruc
Your assertion that that the supremacy clause means states cannot
1)The supremacy clause does not specifically forbid it, as in say
secession is not allowed.
2)The tenth amendment says states and/or people can do anything not
forbidden.
It is forbidden to states to nullify federal laws.
And stay in the USA sure. And leave the USA as an organization, that
is begging the question and using the conveluted logic I pointed out.
An ordinance of
secession is a state act that nullifies federal laws, and thus is
implicitly unconstitutional unless there is a federal law to enable
secession, which there was not.
Post by Al Montestruc
3)Your arguement requires deeply convoluted logic to get to the
position you wish including the assumption that the USA is somehow
more soverign than the states when the treaty of paris says each of
the states is sovereign and does not state that the USA as a whole is,
and that very treaty is held as supreme law of the land by the
supremacy clause you tout as being your proof.
The Constitution was not yet in existence at the time of the Treaty of
Paris.
EXACTLY!! and the constitution SPECIFICALLY states in the SUPREMACY
CLAUSE that all treaties entered into BY THE USA before the
constitution were the LAW OF THE LAND.


----snip
Emperor
2003-07-09 02:49:10 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Bullshit, for the reasons you state that it would cost the RN too much
and the RN does not NEED to do a frontal assault on anything.
Commerce raiding, seeking a large scale engagement with the USN at
sea, and keeping canadian and southern ports open will keep them quite
busy enough thanks.
And then you got to keep the flotilla supplied with coal and provisions, while
scouring the Atlantic Ocean looking for Union shipping.

That's very expensive. What's more, it takes a long time.

See Al, I don't know if you've noticed this, but the US is kind of big. Even
the portion that constituted the Union in the ACW is geographically larger than
whole European countries. You have rich farmland, vast coalfields, and large
amounts of industrial plant. And many of these resources are inland enough to
be out of the RN's reach.

The RN blockade of Union shipping and ports would hurt it, and eventually begin
to starve it....but it's going to take quite a while. And that's the kicker:
Britain is not going to want a long, costly war over Trent. Not worth it.

From the British PoV, simply blasting the harbors and forcing a peace is the
best strategy. Much quicker, much cheaper, and more likely to leave an
impression on the American public and politicians as well.
President William Jennings Bryan
2003-07-07 12:20:36 UTC
Permalink
Wesley Taylor <***@comcast.net> wrote in message news:<

Really fascinating, I was not sure how true the account was, or if it
was enough to cause war, or even if the UK had become isolationist
enough at this point for war to even occur, but bravo for such a
detailed and very informative theory. Keep the thoughts coming.

~ President William Jennings Bryan

"Attend the tale of Sweeney Todd.
His skin was pale and his eye was odd.
He shaved the faces of gentlemen
Who never thereafter were heard of again.
He trod a path that few have trod,
Did Sweeney Todd,
The Demon Barber of Fleet Street."
- From "Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street"
Invid Fan
2003-07-07 15:58:04 UTC
Permalink
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
"Attend the tale of Sweeney Todd.
His skin was pale and his eye was odd.
He shaved the faces of gentlemen
Who never thereafter were heard of again.
He trod a path that few have trod,
Did Sweeney Todd,
The Demon Barber of Fleet Street."
- From "Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street"
We need a POD where they release the original version of this on dvd.
My taping from PBS years ago is wearing out.
--
Chris Mack "Refugee, total shit. That's how I've always seen us.
'Invid Fan' Not a help, you'll admit, to agreement between us."
-'Deal/No Deal', CHESS
Angus McLellan
2003-07-07 21:36:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
Really fascinating, I was not sure how true the account was, or if it
was enough to cause war, or even if the UK had become isolationist
enough at this point for war to even occur, but bravo for such a
detailed and very informative theory. Keep the thoughts coming.
Apart from the nits I picked already Mr Taylor has a track record of
being mistaken on this subject. You would be wise to do your own
spaedework. Here's two mistakes picked at random, no corrigenda found.

<***@4ax.com>
"As I noted elsewhere, the RN was about the same size as
the late 1862 USN."

Well, no, it wasn't. The usual dubious assertion (i.e. MacPherson in
_Battle Cry of Freedom_, but don't ask me which page) is that the USN
was larger than the RN in *1864*. This assertion cannot be qualified
as false but it's only true in one very narrow sense.

And what sense is that ? There is an excerpt from Donald L. Canney at
http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1862foreignnavies.htm . Canney is
an authority on the United States Navy of this period.

"Again, the French navy was a formidable force. Though the US fleet
would outnumber them in vessels by 1865, as will be seen, the majority
of the American ships were hastily converted merchant ships suited for
little more than their intended role: maintaining the blockade of
southern coasts."

So the USN of *1864* (or 1865) is comparable to the RN or French Navy
only if we were to count a former Staten Island ferry as being of the
same value as a 7000 ton steam battleship carrying 131 guns. Whether
this is logical would be for the reader to decide.

<***@NEWS.TELEPORT.COM>
"It was also proof that half measure responses were not going to work.
The Virginia was basically destroyed at the end of the fight. She
never sailed again, and Monitor was using reduced powder loads."

Even I know that Virginia/Merrimac sailed out a couple of times
*after* the battle of Hampton Roads (specifically 11 April and 8 May)
to try and fight round two. To all appearances Monitor remained well
away from Virginia and there was no round two.

Is this too subtle an argument ? Let's hope not.

Angus
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-08 05:49:25 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, 07 Jul 2003 23:36:26 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
Really fascinating, I was not sure how true the account was, or if it
was enough to cause war, or even if the UK had become isolationist
enough at this point for war to even occur, but bravo for such a
detailed and very informative theory. Keep the thoughts coming.
Apart from the nits I picked already Mr Taylor has a track record of
being mistaken on this subject. You would be wise to do your own
spaedework. Here's two mistakes picked at random, no corrigenda found.
"As I noted elsewhere, the RN was about the same size as
the late 1862 USN."
Well, no, it wasn't. The usual dubious assertion (i.e. MacPherson in
_Battle Cry of Freedom_, but don't ask me which page) is that the USN
was larger than the RN in *1864*. This assertion cannot be qualified
as false but it's only true in one very narrow sense.
Actually, it was of a similar size, as that is a somewhat nebulous
term and can refer to a simple ship count, as the context made clear.

If you actually want a discussion, then the question changes from
relative size of the navy to the size, relative commitments and
compostion. And the poster I was responding to had made a blanket
statement that was baldly oversimplifying.

Just exactly how does one go about comparing sizes of navies? Tonnage?
Ship hulls? both have flaws. As you point out.

If you look into the subject with some more than surface detail, the
RN numbered about 75% IIRC the hulls of the USN in 1863-4. Of this
most of the USN was converted merchantmen, but the difference between
some sizes of warship and a somewhat larger converted merchantman is
not as great as later. Does this mean the USN was a third stronger?
Hardly. Never said it was. Questions of strength of various navies are
related to but different from the easier 'size' estimates many folks
are so fond of.

The RN has a fair amount of commitments already in place. So, however,
does the USN.

There is Fleet composition to look at. Something like half the RN
hulls are gunboats, 4-8 gun vessels of under 900 tons. This tends to
balance the USN converted ships numbers. The RN has, however, a heavy
and unanswered edge in unarmored Ship of the Line types and similar
heavy units. The Union has a similar edge of ironclads, despite many
being river monitors. Not as many as Angus believes, IIRC, but many
are not capable of sea work. The ones that are would be quite
dangerous, especially if the RN really does not know about chilled
steel shot (as Angus indirectly implies in another post), but I think
they do know about such material.

Was the USN as a whole the equal of the RN in combat strength?
Probably not a fight I really want to see. Part of the answer depends
on the date of the fight. In 1864, not much left of either side, but
I suspect the RN loses. Not because the two non-ironclad fleets are
comparable, they are not. But because the Union ironclad fleet is
better. In late 1861? No contest, the RN mops up the smaller and less
well armed Union fleet. In 1868? No Contest again, but this time a
clear RN victory. not because the USN lost numbers but because gun
technology caught up and the Union stopped work. By 1868 the large
caliber RBL guns are fixed. That alone will help balance the scales.

But whole fleet actions never happen. In realistically set scenarios
(a concept, Angus, I wonder if you understand) both sides try to set
the stage in their favor.They also have to deal with doings so with
the forces available, in the setting at hand, with the people at hand.
And dealing with the war aims as set by the government.
Post by Angus McLellan
And what sense is that ? There is an excerpt from Donald L. Canney at
http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1862foreignnavies.htm . Canney is
an authority on the United States Navy of this period.
"Again, the French navy was a formidable force. Though the US fleet
would outnumber them in vessels by 1865, as will be seen, the majority
of the American ships were hastily converted merchant ships suited for
little more than their intended role: maintaining the blockade of
southern coasts."
So the USN of *1864* (or 1865) is comparable to the RN or French Navy
only if we were to count a former Staten Island ferry as being of the
same value as a 7000 ton steam battleship carrying 131 guns. Whether
this is logical would be for the reader to decide.
So I was right that the USN and the RN were the same size. I never
said anything about the strength or utility for some task, just it's
size.

A 350 Lb linebacker and a 350 lb couch potato could be considered the
same size, but only in the strict sense of the same mass. Says nothing
about any other descriptors of the people.
Post by Angus McLellan
"It was also proof that half measure responses were not going to work.
The Virginia was basically destroyed at the end of the fight. She
never sailed again, and Monitor was using reduced powder loads."
Even I know that Virginia/Merrimac sailed out a couple of times
*after* the battle of Hampton Roads (specifically 11 April and 8 May)
to try and fight round two. To all appearances Monitor remained well
away from Virginia and there was no round two.
Is this too subtle an argument ? Let's hope not.
Interesting. I wrote that 5 years ago. Yes, I got it wrong, but, on my
side, I had just finished a naval history that got the same point
wrong. Not long after I found the error.Not overly happy with the
author. So, Angus, you never have any howlers in your posting
carreer?

And I doubt that was a random pull, Angus. You bring it up every time
this discussion happens. Thanks for reminding me who you are.
Post by Angus McLellan
Angus
l***@geocities.com
2003-07-08 18:07:22 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wesley Taylor
Just exactly how does one go about comparing sizes of navies? Tonnage?
Ship hulls? both have flaws. As you point out.
Number of guns afloat. The effect of armour hasn't had itself felt
yet, and this is adequate.

For the British, they have roughly 14,200 guns afloat in early 1861.
Of these 5,781 guns are sailing vessels, about 40%

The Americans of 1861 had 821 guns afloat. Of these 407 guns are
sailing vessels, about 50%.

The British have thus a 17.3:1 advantage in firepower, and greater
than a 22:1 ratio in combat power.

I'd like to find a 1864 USN Orbat.
Post by Wesley Taylor
There is Fleet composition to look at. Something like half the RN
hulls are gunboats, 4-8 gun vessels of under 900 tons. This tends to
balance the USN converted ships numbers. The RN has, however, a heavy
and unanswered edge in unarmored Ship of the Line types and similar
heavy units. The Union has a similar edge of ironclads, despite many
being river monitors. Not as many as Angus believes, IIRC, but many
are not capable of sea work. The ones that are would be quite
dangerous, especially if the RN really does not know about chilled
steel shot (as Angus indirectly implies in another post), but I think
they do know about such material.
Pallisier shot was the standard round for RN shotguns as of 1863, and
the standard source for US AP shot was the UK (although US common shot
was of better quality than UK shot).

Bryn

"Two modern vessels of war would have done us up in thirty minutes."
-Admiral Robeley D. Evans, Fleet Commander USN, 1873 on the prospect
of war with Spain
l***@geocities.com
2003-07-09 14:07:28 UTC
Permalink
Almost all sailing vessels are of no value apart from blockading
unprotected ports or commerce raiding in far flung waters. That was
true when Busk wrote his book two years earlier and has to be even
truer in 1861. As far as the RN was concerned almost everything that
was of value had been fitted with a steam engine by 1862.
The Sailing ships seem to mostly be used on the China station etc.
rather than the Home, Med and NA&WI Stations.
Much larger guns though. To be fair the RN could easily have crammed
in more guns on large frigates. But why would you in peacetime ?
Not much larger, most are US pattern 32 pounders, with some Dahlgren
VIII and IX as chasers. These are only roughly equivalent to UK 32
pounders, 8 and 10 inch shell guns. Charged with shot the few (2 that
I know of) XI afloat should be equivalent to 68's.
The manpower ratio was around 6 or 7:1 pre-war and since there are no
river craft and the like to queer the comparison that looks like a
reasonable estimate. We know that the USN expanded by around 40,000
men during the ACW and the plausible upper limit for short-term RN
expansion on mobilisation of reserves and some extra recruitment would
be in the rrange of 40,000 to 60,000. That would make the ratio a bit
over 2:1 in the favour of the RN. I would take that as being one leg
of a comparison. IIRC the NA&WI squadron wasn't far short of the whole
USN in manpower at the end of the Trent Affair. Citations on request.
Trent affair saw the NA&WI station reinforced to 1 Casemate Ironclad
(Terror), 9 Steam Battleships (Flag: Nile) and 7 Frigates (including
Mersey and Orlando), with the Channel Squadron (Warrior, Black Prince,
Defence and Resistance included, plus ISTR Queen and some ~9 frigates)
moved to Lisbon, where they could be on station in the Americas in
less than a week. (All from Lamberts Battleships in Transision)
As it happens I have one *almost* finished for 3rd class steamers &
above. I'll email it when it gets from almost to finished.
Thanks
Post by l***@geocities.com
"Two modern vessels of war would have done us up in thirty minutes."
-Admiral Robeley D. Evans, Fleet Commander USN, 1873 on the prospect
of war with Spain
I suppose it depends on *how* modern. Admirals don't usually have much
interest in overstating the power of their ships. It tends to reduce
funding for new ones.
His force has 6 Monitors (the larger ones left over from the Civil
War, Dictator et. al.), 5 steam frigates and 14 gunboats, being the
combined Atlantic and European squadrons.

The Spanish had 7 armoured frigates of a reasonably modern type (based
on French, rather than British patterns).

Americas big hope in this war was that the British would come to their
aid (British citizens made up a large part of the crew of the
Virginius who were executed). The Spanish blinked at the possibility.

Bryn
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-09 18:19:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by l***@geocities.com
Trent affair saw the NA&WI station reinforced to 1 Casemate Ironclad
(Terror), 9 Steam Battleships (Flag: Nile) and 7 Frigates (including
Mersey and Orlando), with the Channel Squadron (Warrior, Black Prince,
Defence and Resistance included, plus ISTR Queen and some ~9 frigates)
moved to Lisbon, where they could be on station in the Americas in
less than a week. (All from Lamberts Battleships in Transision)
You might check out Conway's. Accordong to that tome Black Prince was
not completed until September 12 of 1862. Resistence was not completed
until July of that year.
Post by l***@geocities.com
As it happens I have one *almost* finished for 3rd class steamers &
above. I'll email it when it gets from almost to finished.
Thanks
Post by l***@geocities.com
"Two modern vessels of war would have done us up in thirty minutes."
-Admiral Robeley D. Evans, Fleet Commander USN, 1873 on the prospect
of war with Spain
I suppose it depends on *how* modern. Admirals don't usually have much
interest in overstating the power of their ships. It tends to reduce
funding for new ones.
The USN got no new ships larger than a sloop for the nearly twenety
years of the post Civil War period. By the time Evans made the above
quote the ships of any other navy (including several very second rate
ones) had much better ships, supproting newer guns, including some
with RBL guns. Evans seems to be expressing the view of a very large
part of the Navy over the abandonment they faced after the ACW.
Post by l***@geocities.com
His force has 6 Monitors (the larger ones left over from the Civil
War, Dictator et. al.), 5 steam frigates and 14 gunboats, being the
combined Atlantic and European squadrons.
The Spanish had 7 armoured frigates of a reasonably modern type (based
on French, rather than British patterns).
Americas big hope in this war was that the British would come to their
aid (British citizens made up a large part of the crew of the
Virginius who were executed). The Spanish blinked at the possibility.
Bryn
Angus McLellan
2003-07-09 19:27:05 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 18:19:45 GMT, Wesley Taylor
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by l***@geocities.com
Trent affair saw the NA&WI station reinforced to 1 Casemate Ironclad
(Terror), 9 Steam Battleships (Flag: Nile) and 7 Frigates (including
Mersey and Orlando), with the Channel Squadron (Warrior, Black Prince,
Defence and Resistance included, plus ISTR Queen and some ~9 frigates)
moved to Lisbon, where they could be on station in the Americas in
less than a week. (All from Lamberts Battleships in Transision)
You might check out Conway's. Accordong to that tome Black Prince was
not completed until September 12 of 1862. Resistence was not completed
until July of that year.
<snip>

SFAICT the 1860-1905 volume of ATWFS is not 100% reliable anyway. The
Russian section contradicts Taras & the Galeia books I mentioned
elsewhere. I know which I'd believe under the circumstances. It's hard
to match the Spanish section with what I found on the web. Under
normal circumstances that would be no contest, but I find the info on
the web quite convincing. None of which has anything to do with this.

As for Warrior, sending her to Lisbon can only have been bluff. She
wasn't considered to be ready for action until June 1862 [Lambert
_Warrior_, p32]. And even if she were ready, where is there a dock
large enough to take her in the event of damage or when her hull
rapidly becomes a jungle of weed and giant molluscs ? The RN didn't
have a "Warrior capable" dry dock in NA&WI waters until she and Black
Prince towed one to Bermuda *after* the American Civil War. Before
that the limit on docking is likely to have been something less than
350'. And over and above those reasons, what would Warrior *do* in
American waters that a wooden ship couldn't do in the winter of
1861-1862 ? Not very much ISTM. Bluff.

Concerning Resistance (aka Old Rammo), the chances are that she was
ready for sea long before the date given in ATWFS. Her completion,
like that of Warrior, was surely delayed waiting for deliveries of
proofed 82 cwt Armstrongs, the original 72 cwt versions having proved
to be unsuitable. And by extended trials. In case of need they would
most likely have been armed with with 68 pounders, as originally
planned, and despatched to sea with all haste. Which would have been
an improvement.

As for Black Prince, "her completion was delayed until September 1862
by a drydock accident during outfitting" [http://www.history.navy.mil
, page on Black Prince]. When, exactly, was this accident ? Before or
after a putative POD ?

Angus
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-11 03:43:30 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 21:27:05 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 18:19:45 GMT, Wesley Taylor
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by l***@geocities.com
Trent affair saw the NA&WI station reinforced to 1 Casemate Ironclad
(Terror), 9 Steam Battleships (Flag: Nile) and 7 Frigates (including
Mersey and Orlando), with the Channel Squadron (Warrior, Black Prince,
Defence and Resistance included, plus ISTR Queen and some ~9 frigates)
moved to Lisbon, where they could be on station in the Americas in
less than a week. (All from Lamberts Battleships in Transision)
You might check out Conway's. Accordong to that tome Black Prince was
not completed until September 12 of 1862. Resistence was not completed
until July of that year.
<snip>
SFAICT the 1860-1905 volume of ATWFS is not 100% reliable anyway. The
Russian section contradicts Taras & the Galeia books I mentioned
elsewhere. I know which I'd believe under the circumstances. It's hard
to match the Spanish section with what I found on the web. Under
normal circumstances that would be no contest, but I find the info on
the web quite convincing. None of which has anything to do with this.
Conway's is a good place to start, but no, it is a bit too general and
often does not seem to fact check material closely. They also leave,
as you noted, rather annoying holes in things. I think I have figured
out, however, why they left out the battery ships (like HMS Terror).
It is in the title, Fighting Ships. They were not designed to do
anything but bombard shore targets, so they do not qualify (feh). Most
of the USN in the civil war is left out as they are not 'fighting'
ships but converted merchants. The same applies to just about the
entire CSN.
Post by Angus McLellan
As for Warrior, sending her to Lisbon can only have been bluff. She
wasn't considered to be ready for action until June 1862 [Lambert
_Warrior_, p32]. And even if she were ready, where is there a dock
large enough to take her in the event of damage or when her hull
rapidly becomes a jungle of weed and giant molluscs ? The RN didn't
have a "Warrior capable" dry dock in NA&WI waters until she and Black
Prince towed one to Bermuda *after* the American Civil War. Before
that the limit on docking is likely to have been something less than
350'. And over and above those reasons, what would Warrior *do* in
American waters that a wooden ship couldn't do in the winter of
1861-1862 ? Not very much ISTM. Bluff.
Concerning Resistance (aka Old Rammo), the chances are that she was
ready for sea long before the date given in ATWFS. Her completion,
like that of Warrior, was surely delayed waiting for deliveries of
proofed 82 cwt Armstrongs, the original 72 cwt versions having proved
to be unsuitable. And by extended trials. In case of need they would
most likely have been armed with with 68 pounders, as originally
planned, and despatched to sea with all haste. Which would have been
an improvement.
68 pdrs might have been an overall improvement, given the problems
witth RBLs that caused their withdrawal. I have seen reports on just
exactly how bad that problems was that are all over the map, from
minor but dangerous to potential gun killer if the Rate of Fire is
rushed. I would be curious about more reliable reports on just how bad
hte breach seal problem was that caused the removals afte 1863.
Post by Angus McLellan
As for Black Prince, "her completion was delayed until September 1862
by a drydock accident during outfitting" [http://www.history.navy.mil
, page on Black Prince]. When, exactly, was this accident ? Before or
after a putative POD ?
And What exactly was the accident?
Post by Angus McLellan
Angus
Angus McLellan
2003-07-09 22:35:50 UTC
Permalink
On 9 Jul 2003 07:07:28 -0700, ***@geocities.com
(***@nospam.com) wrote:

<much deleted>
<this is me>
Post by Wesley Taylor
As it happens I have one *almost* finished for 3rd class steamers &
above. I'll email it when it gets from almost to finished.
Thanks
I have a longer version which I will email when done, but here's the
short version as at the end of 1864.

Caveat lector: For ironclads this includes everything in
ATWFS1860-1905 and thus no river craft. For steamers it excludes
everything listed by Silverstone under "Mississippi River Fleet",
hulks and anything rated 4th class. Prewar the USN had *no* 4th class
steamers. No sailing ships either. The subtotals were added up on my
fingers.

USN, end 1864.

1 armoured frigate (more reasonably "armoured battery")
New Ironsides
1 turret ship
Roanoke
21 monitors
8 Passaic class, Onondaga, Dictator, 4 Canonicus class, 2 Casco class,
4 Milwaukee class, Miantonomoh

A total of 23 armoured ships of about 52,000 displacement tons with an
installed power of around 14,000 indicated horsepower.

[For the benefit of non-anoraks and just for the sake of comparison,
at the end of 1864 the new Regia Marina had 8 armoured ships in
commission totalling 30,000 tons and 13,500 horsepower, Austria 5 of
16,000 tons and 9,500 horsepower, Denmark 3 of 9,000 tons and 3,000
horsepower and France 17 ships of 53,000 tons and 21,500 horsepower.
Lastly Britain had 12 armoured ships in commission of about 69,000
tons and 35,500 horsepower.]

32 Frigates, corvettes & sloops

Wabash, Minnesota, Colorado, San Jacinto, Niagara, Hartford, Brooklyn,
Lancaster, Pensacola, Richmond, Kearsarge, Mohican, Wyoming,
Tuscarora, Datotah, Iroquois, Oneida, Wachusett, Pawnee, Narragansett,
Seminole, Juniata, Ossipee, Canadaigua, Shenandoah, Sacramento,
Ticonderoga, Lackawanna, Monongahela, Saranac, Susquehanna, Powhatan.

65 "Gunboats" (i.e. gunvessels, 2nd class sloops, despatch boats)

Aroostook, Cayuga, Chippewa, Chocura, Huron, Kanawha, Katahdin,
Kennebec, Kineo, Marblehead, Ottawa, Pembina, Penobscot, Pinola,
Sagamore, Seneca, Tahoma, Unadilla, Winona, Wissahickon, Kansas,
Maumee, Nipsic, Nyack, Pequot, Saco, Shawmut, Yantic, Miami,
Maratanza, Mahaska, Sebago, Conemaugh, Sonoma, Tioga, Genesee,
Cimarron, Octorara, Port Royal, Paul Jones plus 24 Sassacus class
"double ender" paddle gunvessels.

31 Captured merchant ships - 2nd & 3rd class steamers

Lilian, Magnolia, Malvern, Merrimac, Gettysburg, Dumbarton, Cornubia,
Clyde, Adela, Advance, Arizona, Banshee, Bat, Britannia, Memphis,
Stettin, Fort Donelson, Tennessee, Tristram Shandy, Wando, Antona,
Aries, Calypso, Cherokee, Gertrude, Emma, Hendrick Hudson, Ladona,
Peterhoff, Princess Royal, Virginia.

41 Other merchant ships - 2nd & 3rd class steamers

Connecticut, Eolus, Alabama, Florida, Bienville, De Soto, Flag, Iuka,
Fort Jackson, Harvest Moon, James Adger, Keystone State, Quaker City,
Rhode Island, Santiago de Cuba, State of Georgia, Vanderbilt, Niphon,
Albatross, Augusta Dinsmore, Cambridge, Galatea, Flambeau, Nereus,
Proteus, Neptune, Glaucus, Governor Buckingham, Grand Gulf, Penguin,
Montgomery, Huntsville, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Mercedita,
Monticello, Mount Vernon, R.R. Cutler, Stars & Stripes, Vicksburg,
Young Rover.

A total of around 170 unarmoured steam ships.

Now I know where to find this if I'm looking for it.

Angus
mike
2003-07-10 02:14:20 UTC
Permalink
Post by Angus McLellan
I have a longer version which I will email when done, but here's the
short version as at the end of 1864.
<snip list>

Few Q's & remarks

Given a warscare with the UK, the Italians would have lost
thier Webb-built Ironclads, Dunderberg commisioned,and the
Stevens Battery might have actually been finished.

Might even see USS Frankin cut to something like Dunderberg
or Roanoke too.

Lafayette was powerfull enough to be used in the Gulf,
and its outline in a British Spyglass would have been
enough to suggest adjusting the rum ration at first.

Other missing bits were the various CSA ironclads that were captured
and put into USN service.

Wasn't Vanderbilt rated as a 1st Class? Being over 3000B tons
and overgunned seems a bit much for a 2nd.
Post by Angus McLellan
Now I know where to find this if I'm looking for it.
I am outraged you did not include the Ram 'Spuyten Duyvil'
as IJLS Spuyten Duyvil.

**
mike
**
Angus M McLellan
2003-07-10 10:32:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by mike
Post by Angus McLellan
I have a longer version which I will email when done, but here's the
short version as at the end of 1864.
<snip list>
Few Q's & remarks
I'll attempt to provide a logical reply.
Post by mike
Given a warscare with the UK, the Italians would have lost
thier Webb-built Ironclads, Dunderberg commisioned,and the
Stevens Battery might have actually been finished.
Might even see USS Frankin cut to something like Dunderberg
or Roanoke too.
More than likely. The two Kings were not very lucky ships in the Regia
Marina. Maybe they'd have more luck sailing under Old Glory.

Given the amount of work I am not so sure about Dunderberg or the
dreaded Stevens Battery. An armoured conversion of Franklin would have
been easy enough. ISTM that a simple broadside conversion like the
RN's Royal Oak et al, the Danish Dannebrog and so on would be a lot
faster than making a Dunderberg or Roanoke/Royal Sovereign out of
Franklin. Also could have been done, but with more work, to sailing
ships as well. Pensacola [or Lancaster ?] would have been another
candidate for conversion as I believe she was greatly in need of new
engines anyway. Stopping the Cascos would have freed up more than
enough armour to fit out Franklin, Pensacola and several others
without having to find any extra resources at all.

I had the impresssion that Puritan's hull was well advanced and that
the only reason for delay was the lack of XX-inch Dahlgrens.
Presumably it would have been quite straightforward to have fitted her
with XV-inch or some other alternative.

Of course the same arguments apply in GB and in France. Most of the
Italian Navy's armoured ships in service in 1864 were built at Toulon.
Construction may not have been fast but commissioning after launch was
positively lethargic. The Laird Rams didn't commission until about two
years after they were seized.
Post by mike
Lafayette was powerfull enough to be used in the Gulf,
and its outline in a British Spyglass would have been
enough to suggest adjusting the rum ration at first.
SFAICT she never served outside of the Mississippi, unlike some of the
river monitors. An ugly scow but IMO rubber backing for armour wasn't
such a dumb idea. It had been tested in the 1840s when the RN was
having second thoughts about iron hulls. The results don't seem to
have been any worse than for wood and maybe a little better. As for
Lafayette, or Neosho or any other river ironclad, the usual arguments
about ability to fight *at sea* apply, but in coastal waters they'd be
perfectly able to make things difficult for an attacker. Although
Lafayette's 2" armour is far from impervious it's quite enough to keep
out most shells at all ranges and solid shot from the ubiquitous
32-pounder guns at longer ranges.

As for their non-inclusion, don't blame me, blame Conway's. I followed
their logic - such as it is - and so there are no Crimean batteries in
the RN numbers either.
Post by mike
Other missing bits were the various CSA ironclads that were captured
and put into USN service.
Now I had entirely forgotten those. Have to fix my data. For the
record Atlanta recommissioned in February and Tennessee August
although it looks as though she was under repair for some time after
that. Were there any others used during the war ? The original CSS
Tennessee forex ?
Post by mike
Wasn't Vanderbilt rated as a 1st Class? Being over 3000B tons
and overgunned seems a bit much for a 2nd.
Silverstone just lumps them as 2nd/3rd class steamers. The DANFS on
Hazegray didn't say that I noticed. The Navy OR (Series 2, Volume 1,
page 230) says 2nd rate. [Online as part of Cornell's Making of
America collection IMS.] OTOH Niagara, the world's largest sloop, was
rated a frigate, so the rating system isn't all that logical. Nothing
new there.
Post by mike
Post by Angus McLellan
Now I know where to find this if I'm looking for it.
I am outraged you did not include the Ram 'Spuyten Duyvil'
as IJLS Spuyten Duyvil.
My dodgy list said commissioned 1865 otherwise I would have done.

Angus
l***@geocities.com
2003-07-10 15:32:16 UTC
Permalink
Nice list, but I find a lot are missing data in DANFS. Any other
sources? For example, the Cruisers:32 Cruisers (Frigates, Sloops and
Corvettes)

Vessels Type Displacement Dimensions Speed Armament Crew
Wabash Screw Frigate 4,808 301'6 length51'4 beam23' draught 9 2 10"
D24 9" D14 8" D
Minnesota
Colorado Screw Frigate 3,425 263'8 length52'6 beam22'1 draught 9 2 10"
D28 9" D14 8" D
San Jacinto Screw Frigate 1,567 234' length37'9 beam23'3 draught 8 2
8"4 32pdr 278
Niagara
Hartford Screw Sloop 2,900 220' length?44' beam17'2 draught 13.5 20 9"
D2 20pdr P2 12pdr 302
Brooklyn Screw Sloop 2,532 233' length43' beam16'3 draught 11.5 1 10"
D20 9" D 335
Lancaster
Pensacola
Richmond Steam Sloop 2,604 225' length42'6 beam17'4 draught 1 80pdr
D20 9" D1 30pdr P 259
Kearsarge Screw Sloop 1,550 201'4 length30'10 beam14'3 draught 11 2
11" D4 32pdr1 30pdr P 163
Mohican
Wyoming Screw Sloop 1,457 198'6 length33'2 beam14'10 draught 11 2 11"
D1 60pdr P3 32pdr 198
Tuscarora
Datotah
Iroquois Steam Sloop 1,016 198'11 length33'10 beam13' draught 11 1
50pdr4 32pdr1 12pdr H
Oneida
Wachusett
Pawnee
Narragansett Screw Sloop 1,235 188' length30'4 beam11'6 draught 1 11"
D4 32pdr
Seminole
Juniata
Ossipee Screw Sloop 1,240 207' length38' beam16'10 draught 10 1 100pdr
P1 11" D3 30pdr DR6 32pdr1 12pdr1 12pdr R 141
Canadaigua Screw Sloop 1,395 228' length38'5 beam15' draught 10 2 11"
D1 8"3 20pdr R
Shenandoah
Sacramento Screw Sloop 2,100 229'6 length38' beam8'10 draught 12.5 1
150pdr P2 11" D1 30pdr2 24pdr H2 12pdr R2 12pdr 161
Ticonderoga
Lackawanna Screw Sloop 1,533 237' length38'2 beam16'3 draught 10.5 1
150 pdr P2 11" D2 9" D1 50pdr DR2 24pdr H2 12pdr H2 12pdr R
Monongahela
Saranac Sidewheel Sloop 1,463 215'6 length37'9 beam26'6 draught 9 8"
Susquehanna
Powhatan
Post by Angus M McLellan
Given the amount of work I am not so sure about Dunderberg or the
dreaded Stevens Battery.
Dunderburg isn't launched until 1867, even rushed I doubt she can be
advanced without compromising her design. The Stevens Battery would
need considerable conversion to fight in the 60's environment.
Post by Angus M McLellan
I had the impresssion that Puritan's hull was well advanced and that
the only reason for delay was the lack of XX-inch Dahlgrens.
Presumably it would have been quite straightforward to have fitted her
with XV-inch or some other alternative.
ISTR the hull was due for lauching 1866.
Post by Angus M McLellan
Of course the same arguments apply in GB and in France. Most of the
Italian Navy's armoured ships in service in 1864 were built at Toulon.
Construction may not have been fast but commissioning after launch was
positively lethargic. The Laird Rams didn't commission until about two
years after they were seized.
However, they were complete, all that was required was assigning
ordnance and a crew. British often kept complete vessels in ordinary
for a period after completion.

Not being commissioned didn't stop Dictator from clearing for action
and turning her guns in NYC....

Bryn
Angus McLellan
2003-07-10 19:41:16 UTC
Permalink
Post by l***@geocities.com
Nice list, but I find a lot are missing data in DANFS. Any other
sources? For example, the Cruisers:32 Cruisers (Frigates, Sloops and
Corvettes)
<snipped>

I used Silverstone's _Civil War Navies_ (USNI). I can't really
recommend it unless it's going cheap. Overpriced, sketchy and hopeless
quality of illustration. ISTM that Donald Canney's even more expensive
books look like a better buy all things considered. The sailing navy
one looked superb. Still's article in Conway's _Steam, Steel and
Shellfire_ is goodIMO. Maybe _Mr Lincoln's Navy_ edited by Canney ? I
think I'd ask on SMN once Andy Breen's sickie is over unless Mike has
an opinion he'd like to share.

Online, apart from the DANFS on Hazegray, you could try the Navy OR at
Cornell :-

http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/browse.monographs/ofre.html

Ship lists in series 2, volume 1. Hoorah. You can download whole
volumes no problem but the OCR is very poor.

You can read stuff like Sue's History of the French Navy or
Bazancourt's history of the French Navy in the Crimean war (account of
Kinburn on p197 of volumeII) on http://gallica.bnf.fr . There's a
complete index to the Revue Maritime et Coloniale for 1861-1868 at
this URL
http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=n034520.htm
the navigation is a bit naff but it works after it's fashion. My
limited testing suggested that all the issues are digitised apart from
1861-1862. May 1863 contains "Wood or iron in the construction of
armoured ships in England", "Experience of naval artillery in England"
and "The Netherlands Navy as at 1 January 1863" (*). In theory it's
possible to d/l a pdf or tiff but it's sometimes unreliable for large
articles.

I'd like to mention some sites on other navies in the steam/sail/steel
era, just for the record. Most are offered at least partly in English
or are in languages easily decipherable by Anglophones.

http://www.armada1500-1900.net - Spanish Navy 1500-1900.
http://candamo.iespana.es/candamo/Naval/principa.htm - Large section
on the Spanish Navy of Isabel II.
http://www.navalhistory.dk - Danish Navy 1801-2001.
http://www.milhist.dk - Danish military history, excellent articles on
the adoption of steam in the Danish Navy and of the "monitor" Rolf
Krake.
http://www.marina.difesa.it/storia/Almanacco/Navi000.htm - Official
Italian Navy site with a (huge but not yet complete) list of ships
since the beginning.
http://members.lycos.co.uk/Juan39/PERUVIAN_MARITIME_CAMPAIGNS.html -
History of the Peruvian Navy ! There's a version in Spanish elsewhere.
http://www.naviosdeguerrabrasileiros.hpg.ig.com.br/NGB-New.htm - Ships
of the Brazilian Navy since 1822, sketchy for the period but
enormously better than the nothing that's available elsewhere.

Cheers,

Angus

(*) The article on the Royal Netherlands Navy listed it as having the
following steamships at the start of 1863 :-

5 frigates of 45 to 51 guns & 300 to 450 nhp;
2 corvettes of 19 guns & 150 nhp;
6 1st class screw steamers of 16 guns & 250 nhp;
3 2nd class screw steamers of 14 guns & 250 nhp;
7 3rd class screw steamers of 10 guns & 120 nhp;
2 4th class screw steamers of 7 to 10 guns & 70 to 100 nhp;
3 1st class paddle steamers of 8 guns & 300 nhp;
2 2nd class paddle steamers of 8 guns & 220 nhp;
4 3rd class paddle steamers of 6 guns & 140 to 220 nhp;
3 4th class paddle steamers of 1 to 6 guns & 70 to 110 (or 140) nhp;
1 3rd class colonial paddle steamer of 4 guns & 150 nhp;
5 floating batteries of 26 to 32 guns;
1 iron armoured screw gunboat of 2 guns & 120 nhp.

Why floating batteries would be listed with steamships I have no idea.
The iron gunboat was in the sail section. Must have made sense at the
time.
mike
2003-07-11 12:48:42 UTC
Permalink
Post by Angus McLellan
I used Silverstone's _Civil War Navies_ (USNI). I can't really
recommend it unless it's going cheap. Overpriced, sketchy and hopeless
quality of illustration.
A new printing is out, 2nd edition. Not bad at discount.
Post by Angus McLellan
ISTM that Donald Canney's even more expensive
books look like a better buy all things considered. The sailing navy
one looked superb. Still's article in Conway's _Steam, Steel and
Shellfire_ is goodIMO. Maybe _Mr Lincoln's Navy_ edited by Canney ? I
think I'd ask on SMN once Andy Breen's sickie is over unless Mike has
an opinion he'd like to share.
Canney's 'Old Steam Navy' series is about the best, but Major $$$
now.

Now very old, Chapelles's 'American Sailing Navy' is still the
best pre-steam volume, with Canney's book a welcome add-on
for smaller ships.

Other helpful bits is a big boxful of period _Harpers Weekly_ and
_Scientific American_ that I grabbed before a local library
sent to the dump.

thanks for the links.

**
mike
**
mike
2003-07-08 02:02:42 UTC
Permalink
Coastal batteries were equipped with Columbiads rather than Dahlgrens.
Coastal artillery was part of the *Army* and used *Army* guns. I would
have said "obviously", but apparently it's not.
Dahlgen complained to the Secretary of War in Oct 1860 that
Rodmans new 15" Columbiad was a copy of his gun and should not be
fielded, but while similar, the Rodman lacked a powder chamber[1],
was about a caliber longer with Army seige gun type elevation gear.

One more difference: Rodman was getting Royalties for each gun
cast, while Dalhgren did not.

the old style 1844 Columbiad 10" had these stats
Finally, given the small number of ironclads available in 1862
compared to the vast number of steam gunboats, mortar floats and the
like left over from the Crimean War,
Some were of green timber,and all old: couldn't be counted on for
an Atlantic transit without rebuilds.

[1] in 1860 Rodman developed his solid disk perforated cake powder,
soon followed by his hexagonal prism grains: these allowed
massive amounts of powder to be burned, 125 pounds of
hexagonal grains for the 1864+post-ACW era. The UK did not follow
suit till the Elswick Ordnance Co. reworked some MLRs years later.

However: given the bad blood between Rodman and Dahlgren,
I've not been able to confirm if the hex powder got into USN
service during the ACW. Postwar, yes. During???

The only Warshots the Rodmans ever did seems to be firing
some 15" potshots at CSS Virginia at extreme(3+mile) range from
Ft. Monroe before Monitor showed.

**
mike
**
Angus McLellan
2003-07-08 18:55:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by mike
Coastal batteries were equipped with Columbiads rather than Dahlgrens.
Coastal artillery was part of the *Army* and used *Army* guns. I would
have said "obviously", but apparently it's not.
Dahlgen complained to the Secretary of War in Oct 1860 that
Rodmans new 15" Columbiad was a copy of his gun and should not be
fielded, but while similar, the Rodman lacked a powder chamber[1],
was about a caliber longer with Army seige gun type elevation gear.
I was under the impression that Rodman was the originator of
water-core casting, or did Dahlgren mean that Rodman copied the form
of his guns rather than the method of manufacturing ?
Post by mike
One more difference: Rodman was getting Royalties for each gun
cast, while Dalhgren did not.
That's patriotic. Was Rodman's royalty for the design or the
manufacture ? Anyway Dahlgren made Admiral (acting I guess, presumably
his susbstantive rank was much less), so maybe it worked out better
for him in the end.

Campbell's article I mentioned (in Robert Smith (ed), _British Naval
Armaments_, Royal Armouries Conference Proceedings No. 1, 1989) has a
paragraph on a giant smoothbore "Horsfall gun" which may be of
interest. Never seen it mentioned before (which proves little) :-

<quote>
The Horsfall gun was a larger version of the guns mounted in the USS
Princeton and resembled those guns as they were originally built, made
from a forged mass of wrought iron and not hooted. The gun weighed 24
tons, of 13 in bore and was 12.3 calibres long. The solid cast-iron
shot was 280 lb with a windage of only 0.2 in - the normal charge
being 50 lb, although up to an 80 lb charge could be used. During
trials in November 1856, a 50 lb charge reached a range of 5000 yards
at 18 degrees elevation. The high-air resistance of large spherical
projectiles was shown by the 8 in Lancaster rifle,while ranged 300
yards more at the same elevation. Incidentally, the Horsfall shot
fired point-blank, stopped 5346 yards from the gun. In 1862 a muzzle
velocity of 1631 ft/sec was achieved with a 74 lb charge. The vent was
bushed after 70 rounds, which compares well with 250 rounds for a 32
pounder. Such a large gun was perhaps an anomaly for the time. As an
armour piercer it would have compared well with the 15 in smooth-bores
used in the American Civil War.
</quote>

I don't think I'd have cared to stand anywhere close to a wrought iron
gun being fired with those sorts of shot and charges, most especially
not on a cold winter's morning. Alas there's no description of the
dreaded Lancaster elliptical barrel "rifled" gun as used in the
Crimean War. The book also has a short article by the late Adrian
Caruana - mid-C19th designers Monk and Dundas are not spared.
Post by mike
the old style 1844 Columbiad 10" had these stats
I believe that coast defence lurks at the bottom of the story of how
the Armstrong RBL came to be adopted. The Army was responsible for the
Royal Navy's guns at that point and for many years after.
Post by mike
Finally, given the small number of ironclads available in 1862
compared to the vast number of steam gunboats, mortar floats and the
like left over from the Crimean War,
Some were of green timber,and all old: couldn't be counted on for
an Atlantic transit without rebuilds.
Well we're looking at a starting count of 156. Even half of that is a
huge flock of gunboats. Most seem to have lasted to 1863-1864. Only a
cynic would see any connection between their mass scrapping and the
ending of any possibility of intervention in the Civil War in America
and the end of any immediate chance of war with Russia. A
non-scientific survey suggests that there were still a fifth to a
quarter of them left as late as 1869.
Post by mike
[1] in 1860 Rodman developed his solid disk perforated cake powder,
soon followed by his hexagonal prism grains: these allowed
massive amounts of powder to be burned, 125 pounds of
hexagonal grains for the 1864+post-ACW era. The UK did not follow
suit till the Elswick Ordnance Co. reworked some MLRs years later.
However: given the bad blood between Rodman and Dahlgren,
I've not been able to confirm if the hex powder got into USN
service during the ACW. Postwar, yes. During???
My understanding is that it was used in field trials *during* the war
but I couldn't find a source for that. There's an article by
Guilmartin _Ballistics in the Black Powder Era_ (Smith's collection
again) that has some interesting thoughts on this but doesn't answer
your question. Guilmartin suggests that scientific testing of powder
with mortar-like eprouvettes ensured that old-fashion giant powder was
dropped from use and that it remained untried until Rodman did tests
using *real* guns instead of testing apparatus. YA example of the Law
of Unintended Consequences.

Whenever exactly giant powder was fielded, thanks to Rodman's work the
US was certainly well ahead of the field in the first half of the
1860s. No other country appears to have been anywhere near issuing
such propellant. There may have been some very experimental work in GB
during the ACW and Guilmartin suggests that the US lost it's
*theoretical* lead during the war. But I imagine that Rodman had more
pressing concerns during the war.
Post by mike
The only Warshots the Rodmans ever did seems to be firing
some 15" potshots at CSS Virginia at extreme(3+mile) range from
Ft. Monroe before Monitor showed.
Apart from the Virginia which was built in situ, any ship that might
reasonably expect come out of the experience undamaged probably
wouldn't be able to make the passage anyway. Always assuming it was
able to get past the blockading squadrons in the first place. The
sortie at Charleston showed that wasn't going to happen outside the
pages of *Harry Harrison's _Stars & Bars Forever_.

I remain curious as to the USN and US Army coast artillery love affair
with giant guns. No doubt it's all explained in one of Tucker's books.
Anybody selling one cheap ?

<plug>
The estimable Maritime Books in Liskeard were flogging John Beeler's
_Birth of the Battleship_ cheap so I bought one of those. Well worth a
look, especially if you live somewhere where a library might have or
be able to borrow a copy. It covers 1870 to 1881 and Beeler spends
most of the book disagreeing with Sandler and Parkes. Lots of nice
pictures. They also had Brown's _Warrior to Dreadnought_ which is back
in print in with a glossy picture cover under the dustwrapper. It's
quite a bit cheaper than the original Conway/USNI book but perhaps
only available in .uk.
</plug>

Angus
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-08 04:24:44 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, 07 Jul 2003 22:16:53 +0200, Angus McLellan
On Mon, 07 Jul 2003 03:13:47 GMT, Wesley Taylor
<snip>
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Al Montestruc
Assume your POD for it's face value and Lincoln is an idiot and goes
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.
So this isn't McGregoring then ? Good.
I don't know if you were here then, but several years ago we had a
number of rounds of the Warrior vs Monitor debates. Lots of fun for
some, lots of annoyance for others.
Post by Wesley Taylor
First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe. The first engagements are
likely to be a RN attack on New York. It's been over 80 years since
they last had to do anything like this. Getting past Hells Gate in the
face of shore batteries is not going to be fun. To get some idea what
that harbor's defenses are like I asked a native of the area who had
some naval experience. Heavy ships of that era going off the Hell's
Gate Channel is a Bad Idea.) Boston is not a lot better. The Union
learned a lesson about this in places like Charleston Harbor in OTL.
And they were not facing the same level of guns the RN will be.
80 years ? I wonder what happened in 1782 that's relevant to this.
Not a good sign, Angus. You cannot seem to parse simple english. If
you are looking for a fight, drop dead. If you want to discuss the
merits of things, do.
Working backwards from 1862 the RN has had to contend with significant
fortifications ashore in the 1860s (Second Opium War revisited), the
1850s (Second Opium War, Crimean War), the 1840s (Syria, First Opium
War), the 1810s (Algiers), the 1800s (Copenhagen) and so on. And those
are only the moderately large efforts. It seems almost superfluous
after that to remark that the RN's principle plan for war with France
from the middle 1840s onwards involved a massive attack on the
powerful fortifications at Cherbourg in the opening phase of the war.
This remained Plan A for many years after 1860 as well (see HMS
Glatton of 1871 for physical evidence of the seriousness of this
plan).
The Russian Navy certainly took the RN's shore attack ability
seriously in the 1860s, especially during the Polish crisis of
1862-1863. The Russian Admiralty employed almost all of their limited
resources and industrial capacity to build coast defence ships to
protect Kronstadt and Saint Petersburg through the 1860s. The Russians
had recent experience of the RN attacking Sveaborg, Kinburn, Kerch and
so on.
1) none of those fortifications in the first paragraph are either

A) as dificult to navigate freely in as New York harbor
or
B) Defended by artillery heavy enough to seriously endanger the
bombardment units.

Copenhagen is the closest to the degree of danger to the bombarders,
and may actually mean I should have said 60 years, but the Opium Wars
and Crimea certainly do not fit the kind of model proposed in the
bombardment of New York.
Post by Wesley Taylor
The second problem is that the RN has been testing it's armor against
Dahlgrens listed powder charges (adjusted down to reflect the
Admiralty beliefs, partly justified, that the USN powder was not as
good as the RN powder), not the charges that will be used by the
gunners in real life, as some of them get to taking risks. A double
charged XI Dahlgren can go thru any armor a RN ship caries in 1861/2.
And shore battteries in this time line will be getting them. Double
charges were standard by late 1862.
Coastal batteries were equipped with Columbiads rather than Dahlgrens.
Coastal artillery was part of the *Army* and used *Army* guns. I would
have said "obviously", but apparently it's not.
Interesting. So the photographs I just checked showing Dahlgren cannon
in coastal defense instalations must have been faked or post war,
despite the fact that the photographer clearly labeled it as a civil
war photo. As you note below you seem to be aware that the Army used
the Dahlgren,calling it the Rodman, in this manner.
When an XV-inch Dahlgren was tested against a Lord Warden target it
was with a *double charge* and 484lb steel shot and it did not
penetrate (1). The Minotaur target *was* penetrated by 150lb cast iron
shot, but that was inadvertently fired at an incredible 1720 feet per
second, far beyond the performance of a Dahlgren or any other gun in
sea service at the time (2). The Warrior target tested in October 1861
resisted, among the ton and a half of shot and shell fired at it, six
200lb cylindroconoidal wrought iron solid shot, heavier and better
formed to penetrate armour than the 170lb spherical cast iron shot of
used with the XI-inch Dahlgren (3). A subsequent Warrior target
resisted a 452lb cast iron shot fired with a 60lb *double charge* from
a 15 inch Rodman gun (4).
There is nothing like fixing the test. Cast iron was NOT used in the
field against armor. What was used was wrought iron or chilled steel.
CAst iron tends to break apart violently, reducing it's ability to
penetrate the target. This was well known at the time and indicates
to me a not unusual tendency to cook the test by the RN.
(1) Brown, _Warrior to Dreadnought_, p25.
(2) ibid, p24.
(3) Brown, _Before the Ironclad_, p181.
(4) Campbell, _Development of Naval Guns 1850-1890_ in Smith (ed),
_British Naval Armaments_.
You might want to take a look at Nathan Okun's site,
http://www.warships1.com/index_nathan/Hstfrmla.htm

It deals with period guns and the penetration formulae involved. It
does indicate by implication that the RN tests you mentioned were a
bit, shall we say, suspicious. But we have already mentioned the cast
iron problem.

One of the problems is so little knowledgable material on historical
ballistics is done. Most is of the variety of reporting various
peoples prejudices as reality.
Now I'm *not* claiming to be an expert yet I can provide sources which
flatly discount the assertions made here. Hmm.
No, they do not. They do tend to indicate the self deluding manner in
which the RN operated in the lack of a major and credible (to them)
threat. You do, however, indicate you do not really understand the
meaning of cast iron in this context (hint, cast iron shot is not used
against armor plate Against stone or masonry, sure, but not plate.
Nasty tendecy to shatter on impact.)
Indeed, in spite of testing all manner of guns from 5" Armstrong and
Whitworth rifled guns through XI-inch Dahlgren and 13" Horsfall
smoothbore guns, the RN had enormous difficulty reliably penetrating
the Warrior target and almost never succeeded in firing a shell
through the target which exploded afterwards. French experience was
not very different, nor do the results of naval actions in the 1860s
and 1870s contradict this impression.
Until considerably later shell were not used to penetrate armor. Shot
was for that. Remember, this is the core of the transitional period
between shot guns and shell guns.
Finally, given the small number of ironclads available in 1862
compared to the vast number of steam gunboats, mortar floats and the
like left over from the Crimean War, it seems unlikely that any attack
on New York or Boston would be planned around the use of armoured
vessels. An attack like that planned on Kronstadt in 1856, mainly
employing very large numbers of gunboats with long-range rifled guns
and mortar craft with heavy mortars seems altogether more likely. Had
armoured ships been used the reader should not imagine HMS Warrior
leading the assault but a number of Crimean War-vintage steam
batteries. These were expendable and shallow-draft and Warrior was
neither.
At Kronstadt the RN could stand off the half mile or so and bombard.
They could even stand off a full mile and do so. To bombard the
equivalent in New York harbor puts you into the Hells Gate and into
equally ranged fire from heavier land based guns. This is more like
trying to shell Charleston or Copenhagen. Further, at Kronstadt, they
were not faceing the on foe that was truly on a technological par with
them.

As for the small number of ironclads, they are the only ones that
could have much of a chance. That is why the French built the
batteries in the Crimean War and why the RN followed suit. To go
after a major port in 1862 with mostly wooden vessels was risky.
Sometimes done, but risky.

And we have not even gotten into the problems with RN weaponry.
<snipped>
Angus
Angus McLellan
2003-07-08 21:41:29 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 04:24:44 GMT, Wesley Taylor
Post by Wesley Taylor
On Mon, 07 Jul 2003 22:16:53 +0200, Angus McLellan
On Mon, 07 Jul 2003 03:13:47 GMT, Wesley Taylor
<snip>
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Al Montestruc
Assume your POD for it's face value and Lincoln is an idiot and goes
AS some of you already know, I do a bit of research on this era and
subject.
So this isn't McGregoring then ? Good.
I don't know if you were here then, but several years ago we had a
number of rounds of the Warrior vs Monitor debates. Lots of fun for
some, lots of annoyance for others.
There have been innumerable arguments. Not quite S?>l^$n but not far
off. They have tended, IMVFFHO, to suffer from a lack of facts and a
surfeit of opinion.
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Wesley Taylor
First, the US/UK force balance is not exactly what Al "The CSA Is
Cool" Montestruc would have you believe. The first engagements are
likely to be a RN attack on New York. It's been over 80 years since
they last had to do anything like this. Getting past Hells Gate in the
face of shore batteries is not going to be fun. To get some idea what
that harbor's defenses are like I asked a native of the area who had
some naval experience. Heavy ships of that era going off the Hell's
Gate Channel is a Bad Idea.) Boston is not a lot better. The Union
learned a lesson about this in places like Charleston Harbor in OTL.
And they were not facing the same level of guns the RN will be.
80 years ? I wonder what happened in 1782 that's relevant to this.
Not a good sign, Angus. You cannot seem to parse simple english. If
you are looking for a fight, drop dead. If you want to discuss the
merits of things, do.
I can't think of anything that happened prior to 1782 either.
Attacking fortifications ashore was Just Not Done in the days of sail.
Not unless there was no choice. SFAIK the rule of thumb one gun ashore
being equal to four afloat comes from that period. Certainly wasn't
the case in the steam era. Navies did little else.
Post by Wesley Taylor
Working backwards from 1862 the RN has had to contend with significant
fortifications ashore in the 1860s (Second Opium War revisited), the
1850s (Second Opium War, Crimean War), the 1840s (Syria, First Opium
War), the 1810s (Algiers), the 1800s (Copenhagen) and so on. And those
are only the moderately large efforts. It seems almost superfluous
after that to remark that the RN's principle plan for war with France
from the middle 1840s onwards involved a massive attack on the
powerful fortifications at Cherbourg in the opening phase of the war.
This remained Plan A for many years after 1860 as well (see HMS
Glatton of 1871 for physical evidence of the seriousness of this
plan).
The Russian Navy certainly took the RN's shore attack ability
seriously in the 1860s, especially during the Polish crisis of
1862-1863. The Russian Admiralty employed almost all of their limited
resources and industrial capacity to build coast defence ships to
protect Kronstadt and Saint Petersburg through the 1860s. The Russians
had recent experience of the RN attacking Sveaborg, Kinburn, Kerch and
so on.
1) none of those fortifications in the first paragraph are either
A) as dificult to navigate freely in as New York harbor
or
B) Defended by artillery heavy enough to seriously endanger the
bombardment units.
Of (A) I cannot speak. I have no idea as to the relative navigability
of the the waters in question and even with a map it wouldn't mean
much. I have never been a sailor nor do I like sailing. I do like
kayaking but that's of no relevance at all. All the same I do not
think that we can characterise all of these attacks as taking place in
open waters.

As far as (B) is concerned I am not quite convinced. Wooden ships are
by no means immune to 6" guns, especially sloops, gunboats and the
like. All the same German (or Prussian ?) *field* artillery destroyed
the Danish line of battle ship Christian den Ottende at the
Eckernfjorde in 1849.

As for a specific example, the Russian guns at Sebastopol fired 16,000
rounds from coastal and naval guns at the Franco-British fleet on
October 17 1854. They sank nothing although they might have claimed
Arethusa and Albion had they been lucky. Agamemnon was hit 214 times
with very little results. Russian coastal and naval artillery was said
to be lighter than foreign equivalents. Most guns were 6" or perhaps
less and the heaviest naval guns about 8" although shell guns were
probably of larger calibre. Doubtless bigger guns would, all things
being equal, have done more damage when they hit. But since there
would have been fewer of them and they would have fired slower and
thus hit less often, it seems to me that it would be hard to say
whether they would have been more, less or equally ineffective.
Post by Wesley Taylor
Copenhagen is the closest to the degree of danger to the bombarders,
and may actually mean I should have said 60 years, but the Opium Wars
and Crimea certainly do not fit the kind of model proposed in the
bombardment of New York.
I suspect that Kinburn and Sveaborg are closer than you think. The
attack on Kerch cannot have been straightforward either. The Peiho
Forts represented a difficult target as well.
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Wesley Taylor
The second problem is that the RN has been testing it's armor against
Dahlgrens listed powder charges (adjusted down to reflect the
Admiralty beliefs, partly justified, that the USN powder was not as
good as the RN powder), not the charges that will be used by the
gunners in real life, as some of them get to taking risks. A double
charged XI Dahlgren can go thru any armor a RN ship caries in 1861/2.
And shore battteries in this time line will be getting them. Double
charges were standard by late 1862.
Coastal batteries were equipped with Columbiads rather than Dahlgrens.
Coastal artillery was part of the *Army* and used *Army* guns. I would
have said "obviously", but apparently it's not.
Interesting. So the photographs I just checked showing Dahlgren cannon
in coastal defense instalations must have been faked or post war,
despite the fact that the photographer clearly labeled it as a civil
war photo. As you note below you seem to be aware that the Army used
the Dahlgren,calling it the Rodman, in this manner.
No, the Army used the Columbiad, aka the Rodman. You'll note that
Mike, whose posts I will happily accept, along with that of Ken Young,
as being of enormous weight in this argument, didn't disagree.
Post by Wesley Taylor
When an XV-inch Dahlgren was tested against a Lord Warden target it
was with a *double charge* and 484lb steel shot and it did not
penetrate (1). The Minotaur target *was* penetrated by 150lb cast iron
shot, but that was inadvertently fired at an incredible 1720 feet per
second, far beyond the performance of a Dahlgren or any other gun in
sea service at the time (2). The Warrior target tested in October 1861
resisted, among the ton and a half of shot and shell fired at it, six
200lb cylindroconoidal wrought iron solid shot, heavier and better
formed to penetrate armour than the 170lb spherical cast iron shot of
used with the XI-inch Dahlgren (3). A subsequent Warrior target
resisted a 452lb cast iron shot fired with a 60lb *double charge* from
a 15 inch Rodman gun (4).
Nota bene: PEBKAC here. In fact (4) doesn't say that the Warrior
target resisted the shot, it says it was penetrated at 100yds and
resisted at all greater ranges. MMC & so on.
Post by Wesley Taylor
There is nothing like fixing the test. Cast iron was NOT used in the
field against armor. What was used was wrought iron or chilled steel.
CAst iron tends to break apart violently, reducing it's ability to
penetrate the target. This was well known at the time and indicates
to me a not unusual tendency to cook the test by the RN.
Actually the "cast iron" in (3) is added by me as a comparison. The
test doesn't mention Dahlgren guns. And you are quite right, wrought
iron shot was used with Dahlgren guns. However :-

<quote>
Monitor's 11-inch shell guns were Nos. 27 nnd 28 made at the West
Point Foundry in 1859. Forty-one cast iron shot weighing approximately
170 pounds were fired with 15-pound charges and hit Merrimack 20
times, breaking six o the top layer o plates. Merrimack's armor was
two layers of 2-inch thick rolled plntes sloping at an anlge of 35
degrees. It was later determined that charges of 30 pounds could be
used in 11-inch guns.
</quote>

Note 7 from Canfield's article in DANFS, taken from Hazegray, errors
included.

http://www.hazegray.org/danfs/civ_ord.txt

As for the general point, were that true that the navy was interesting
in stacking the tests you might wonder why they bothered doing the
tests. And tests of guns and armour had been carried out frequently
since 1854 or 1855 and occasionally before that. And using beefed-up
non-standard guns. For example the October 1861 test used an early
model 7" "shunt" RML gun and stacked the odds in favour of the feeble
Armstrong RBL by using solid steel shot and steel shell and also by
firing 200lb wrought iron shot. And why use steel shot with a gun that
fired cast or wrought iron shot in practice ? And so on.
Post by Wesley Taylor
(1) Brown, _Warrior to Dreadnought_, p25.
(2) ibid, p24.
(3) Brown, _Before the Ironclad_, p181.
(4) Campbell, _Development of Naval Guns 1850-1890_ in Smith (ed),
_British Naval Armaments_.
You might want to take a look at Nathan Okun's site,
http://www.warships1.com/index_nathan/Hstfrmla.htm
I confess to having skimmed this in the past when I came across a
mention of it on smn. For the record and IIRC, you don't agree with
everything he has to say anyway. I believe that you didn't like his
take on laminate armour (root of sum of squares of individual layers
AIUI).
Post by Wesley Taylor
It deals with period guns and the penetration formulae involved. It
does indicate by implication that the RN tests you mentioned were a
bit, shall we say, suspicious. But we have already mentioned the cast
iron problem.
Up to a point. If you look at the programs he provides none are very
relevant for this period. Very few projectiles - most likely none -
fulfilled the rules he assumed for his simulators. IMO. Perhaps I'm
missing the point.
Post by Wesley Taylor
One of the problems is so little knowledgable material on historical
ballistics is done. Most is of the variety of reporting various
peoples prejudices as reality.
Tests were carried out for the purpose of determining what armour
should *ideally* be fitted to ships. It seems rather bizarre to
suppose that the tests were rigged when almost every ship was built
with more armour than the previous one. Since the results almost never
dictated the armour actually fitted to ships, weight and cost
limitations and seakeeping requirements did that to a far greater
extent than any theoretical consideration, there was little reason for
anyone to fudge them. The same is *not* true of manufacturers '
"benchmarketing" tests which had the objective of selling more guns.
Post by Wesley Taylor
Now I'm *not* claiming to be an expert yet I can provide sources which
flatly discount the assertions made here. Hmm.
No, they do not. They do tend to indicate the self deluding manner in
which the RN operated in the lack of a major and credible (to them)
threat. You do, however, indicate you do not really understand the
meaning of cast iron in this context (hint, cast iron shot is not used
against armor plate Against stone or masonry, sure, but not plate.
Nasty tendecy to shatter on impact.)
Cast iron shot *was* used. Even by the USN aboard Monitor if Canfield
is right. Wrought iron was expensive. As for steel and chilled iron
those were restricted to "benchmarketing" and trials in the main.
Steel was of unreliably quality in the 1860s (and arguably in the
1870s unless we restrict ourselves to a very few manufacturers).
Post by Wesley Taylor
Indeed, in spite of testing all manner of guns from 5" Armstrong and
Whitworth rifled guns through XI-inch Dahlgren and 13" Horsfall
smoothbore guns, the RN had enormous difficulty reliably penetrating
the Warrior target and almost never succeeded in firing a shell
through the target which exploded afterwards. French experience was
not very different, nor do the results of naval actions in the 1860s
and 1870s contradict this impression.
Until considerably later shell were not used to penetrate armor. Shot
was for that. Remember, this is the core of the transitional period
between shot guns and shell guns.
It's true that shells did not penetrate armour well but RN tests (and
field experience) suggest that solid shot did not manage enormously
better. Practical or not it would, in an ideal world, be preferable to
fire an exploding shell into an armoured compartment than to fire a
mass of inert metal.

As noted guns were available, and on the open market, which could and
did, at least in trials, fire shell through heavy armour which
survived to explode. Since these were only used to any degree by the
Imperial Brazilian Navy during the War of the Triple Alliance, and
since Paraguay did not possess much in the way of a navy, the
Whitworth got little chance to show whether it would perform as well
in practice as on the firing range. Most likely it would not have
done.
Post by Wesley Taylor
Finally, given the small number of ironclads available in 1862
compared to the vast number of steam gunboats, mortar floats and the
like left over from the Crimean War, it seems unlikely that any attack
on New York or Boston would be planned around the use of armoured
vessels. An attack like that planned on Kronstadt in 1856, mainly
employing very large numbers of gunboats with long-range rifled guns
and mortar craft with heavy mortars seems altogether more likely. Had
armoured ships been used the reader should not imagine HMS Warrior
leading the assault but a number of Crimean War-vintage steam
batteries. These were expendable and shallow-draft and Warrior was
neither.
At Kronstadt the RN could stand off the half mile or so and bombard.
They could even stand off a full mile and do so. To bombard the
equivalent in New York harbor puts you into the Hells Gate and into
equally ranged fire from heavier land based guns. This is more like
trying to shell Charleston or Copenhagen. Further, at Kronstadt, they
were not faceing the on foe that was truly on a technological par with
them.
The RN wouldn't have been facing the Imperial French Navy at New York
either, or did you intend some other meaning by the last sentence in
that paragraph.
Post by Wesley Taylor
As for the small number of ironclads, they are the only ones that
could have much of a chance. That is why the French built the
batteries in the Crimean War and why the RN followed suit. To go
after a major port in 1862 with mostly wooden vessels was risky.
Sometimes done, but risky.
Also risky in 1802, 1807, 1817 and the rest. Paixhans propaganda aside
the main threat to wooden ships came not from shell, which rarely
functioned as advertised. Some tests in the 1840s [and if you insist I
can doubtless provide a citation] showed that the great majority of
shells which penetrated the side of a wooden target ship failed to
explode. Impact-fused shells did explode but rarely did much damage.
This remained the case until much better explosives were introduced
many years later. Had armour been wanted *only* to stop shell then
there would have been no need to adopt 4+ inches of wrought iron.

The main danger in 1802, 1840, 1849, 1855 and thereafter was from
incendiary weapons and effects. That includes the very rare shot or
shell which produced such effects as a byproduct, but mainly means
rockets - which could rarely hit a ship-sized target - or red hot
shot. IOW the main threat in 1861 or 1863 is not really very different
from the threat in 1807 or 1854.
Post by Wesley Taylor
And we have not even gotten into the problems with RN weaponry.
No, we have not. I'm more than happy to discuss it. If the subject is
of interest to you I can make you up a PDF file of an article on the
matter I got. Or for anyone else who would like it.

We also haven't discussed the experience of foreign users of US,
British and French designs of ship and gun. The case of Peru would be
of particular value but I know nothing whatsoever about it. There is a
book out in Spanish on the War of the Pacific but unless I happen to
be in Spain I'm unlikely to buy it. The case of Russia would also be
of relevance and there I do know something if not very much. It might
be illuminating to know why the Imperial Brazilian Navy did not
purchase any monitors from the United States after the Civil War.
Perhaps it was tried and failed ? And finally there could be a useful
comparison between Sweden-Norway, last adopters of the Ericsson
monitor, compared with Denmark, which used broadside ironclads and a
Coles/Reed "monitor".

It's likely that the USN would favour American designs, the RN would
favour British designs and the Imperial French Navy would favour
French designs. Amour propre all but guarantees it. Where we might
usefully get a more objective insight would be from navies which used
a mixture of these or a combination of imported and locally built
ships.

Angus
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-09 06:43:18 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 23:41:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by Wesley Taylor
Interesting. So the photographs I just checked showing Dahlgren cannon
in coastal defense instalations must have been faked or post war,
despite the fact that the photographer clearly labeled it as a civil
war photo. As you note below you seem to be aware that the Army used
the Dahlgren,calling it the Rodman, in this manner.
No, the Army used the Columbiad, aka the Rodman. You'll note that
Mike, whose posts I will happily accept, along with that of Ken Young,
as being of enormous weight in this argument, didn't disagree.
The Rodman may be considered a Columbiad but not all Columbiads are
Rodmans. And the photo I referenced is explicitly labeled as a
Dahlgren, not a Rodman.

The discussion you referenced also does note some differences between
the two guns. I had not been aware of the differences, so that was
interesting. It is possible that the photographer was also not aware
of the difference, but the gunss are close enough that your origional
objection looks to me somewhat like a nitpicking exercise. Especially
since you do not seem to have been aware of the differences when you
made the objection.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-09 07:28:25 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 23:41:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by Wesley Taylor
1) none of those fortifications in the first paragraph are either
A) as dificult to navigate freely in as New York harbor
or
B) Defended by artillery heavy enough to seriously endanger the
bombardment units.
Of (A) I cannot speak. I have no idea as to the relative navigability
of the the waters in question and even with a map it wouldn't mean
much. I have never been a sailor nor do I like sailing. I do like
kayaking but that's of no relevance at all. All the same I do not
think that we can characterise all of these attacks as taking place in
open waters.
As far as (B) is concerned I am not quite convinced. Wooden ships are
by no means immune to 6" guns, especially sloops, gunboats and the
like. All the same German (or Prussian ?) *field* artillery destroyed
the Danish line of battle ship Christian den Ottende at the
Eckernfjorde in 1849.
As for a specific example, the Russian guns at Sebastopol fired 16,000
rounds from coastal and naval guns at the Franco-British fleet on
October 17 1854. They sank nothing although they might have claimed
Arethusa and Albion had they been lucky. Agamemnon was hit 214 times
with very little results. Russian coastal and naval artillery was said
to be lighter than foreign equivalents. Most guns were 6" or perhaps
less and the heaviest naval guns about 8" although shell guns were
probably of larger calibre. Doubtless bigger guns would, all things
being equal, have done more damage when they hit. But since there
would have been fewer of them and they would have fired slower and
thus hit less often, it seems to me that it would be hard to say
whether they would have been more, less or equally ineffective.
This was my point about Crimea, that the guns did not sink anything.
214 hits with no significant damage is a good indication that the guns
were too lite for the job.

If the guns are below the threshold for doing even cumulative damage
to a vessel, rate of fire becomes irrelevant. Increasing the damage
and you start getting some impact, even with hafved rate of fire. The
net result is that the heavier shot, even if much slower, is
considerably more effective. Unioin batteries use that heavier fire,
unlike most of the foes the RN has faced in recent years.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-14 06:20:55 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 19:05:34 +0200, Angus McLellan
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 07:28:25 GMT, Wesley Taylor
<my post snipped, it's all on Google>
Post by Wesley Taylor
This was my point about Crimea, that the guns did not sink anything.
214 hits with no significant damage is a good indication that the guns
were too lite for the job.
If the guns are below the threshold for doing even cumulative damage
to a vessel, rate of fire becomes irrelevant. Increasing the damage
and you start getting some impact, even with hafved rate of fire. The
net result is that the heavier shot, even if much slower, is
considerably more effective. Unioin batteries use that heavier fire,
unlike most of the foes the RN has faced in recent years.
And that is bound to be more effective. Bigger guns, slower fire. And
since the 15" Rodman/Columbiad was introduced not long before the
Civil War there can't have been vast numbers available. That means
that in 1861/1862 the defences of New York did not mount noticeably
heavier guns than others. If you disagree feel free to provide a
citation to the contrary. You'll be looking for evidence that US
fortifications mounted large numbers of shot guns of over 8" bore
and/or shell guns of over 9" or 10" bore.
Took a few days to have the time to search the OR, but here is an
interesting item from the Commander of the Engineers working on New
York Harbors defenses in Summer 1861.
Note that fairly large numbers of large guns, for example the Fort
Richmond guns (126 of the 8 and 10 inch guns)

The US has a tendency to heavier guns than most people were using
right up unitl WWI. This is fairly much in the mold of that tendency.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON,
SIR: A memorial to Congress from the Chamber of Commerce of the city of New York,
asking prompt action in arming and extending the fortifications of that harbor, has been
put in my hands, from the House <ar122_334> of Representatives, for report, which I
proceed to make to you. I refer to the several > fortifications in the order in which the
Fort Schuyler, on Throg's Neck, the only defensive work on the East River approach
to the city, is a very strong and efficient work, and has for several years been ready for
its armament. The entire armament is to be about 250 guns, most of which will bear upon
the water; may be of the largest caliber, and may be put in place as soon as supplied by
the Ordnance Department. The remaining engineering work here is not material to
efficiency, though required for preservation and personal accommodation, but for these
no further appropriation is now needed. For the proper defense of this East River passage
a strong fort is needed on Willets Point, opposite, and for the commencement of this an
appropriation of $100,000 is included in the estimate now before Congress.
Fort Richmond, on Staten Island, a very important battery, is now ready for its armament
of 126 8-inch and 10-inch guns and 24 flanking guns--total, 150 guns. A little finishing
work now in hand, which will not interfere with the mounting or service of the guns,
requires a further grant of $10,000, which we hope to receive from this Congress.
Fort Tompkins, situated on the heights back of Fort Richmond, is unfinished. Work
there has been ordered to be resumed energetically with money now
applicable, and will be continued with the $50,000 now asked of Congress.
Fort at Sandy Hook is in an early stage of progress, but from the efforts that have
been made of late there is reason to believe that about 60 8-inch
columbiads may be mounted in the course of the autumn. The sum of
$100,000 in the estimates, if granted at this session, will enable us
to continue these efforts throughout the working season, and to
prepare materials during the winter for rapid progress next spring.
Forts Hamilton and Lafayette, at the Narrows, are finished works,
prepared for the kind of armament the Ordnance Department may be able
to give them to the extent of about 110 guns. The same as to
readiness is true of Battery Hudson, on the Fort Richmond side, and
of the fortifications on Bedloe's Island, Ellis' Island, and
Governor's Island--the last three being near the city.
It should here be remarked that in the older of these finished forts and
batteries the platforms for the barbette guns were to some extent made
for lighter guns than are now thought to be necessary for such
important positions. Such platforms are to be altered to suit the
heavier guns, but it is certainly most judicious to retain the old
guns--generally 32-pounders--and the present platforms until there is
a supply of 8-inch and 10 inch columbiads to be substituted.
I will give below a statement showing the number of guns bearing
NARROWS.
Guns.
Battery Hudson 50
Battery Morton 10
Fort Richmond 126
Fort Hamilton 40
Fort Lafayette 71
EAST RIVER.
Fort Schuyler 225
OPPOSITE THE CITY.
Guns.
Fort Gibson, Ellis' Island 12
Fort Wood, Bedloe's Island 55
Fort Columbus, Governor's Island 87
Castle William, Governor's Island 78
South Battery, Governor's Island 13
Giving a total of 767 guns, independent of about 140 pieces for which preparations
have been made as flanking guns or as guns commanding land approaches.
I am not informed to what extent the above-named forts are actually supplied with
guns and carriages, but this will of course be quickly learned at the
Ordnance Department, as also the extent to which it can supply
deficiencies. I may, perhaps, be allowed to add, on this point, that
that department, having for years urged in vain an enlarged
appropriation for the purchase of ordnance for the new
fortifications, may now need heavy guns to make good the deficiency
within any brief period; and I may be allowed to repeat that the old
guns, as far as they are on hand, should occupy the prepared places
until the more powerful ones are actually ready to be substituted.
I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to bring to the attention of the War
Department and of Congress projects that have been long entertained of
ncreasing the force of the batteries at the Narrows of New York
Harbor.
On the Staten Island side the Government domain includes positions for
which batteries have been designed by the Board of Engineers that will
contribute powerfully to the defense of the channel.
On the Long Island side of the Narrows also must there be additional batteries,
as recommended by the same Board. Here also are excellent positions,
from which heavy artillery will bear upon passing vessels with great
effect. These Long Island batteries should be carried at the same
time with those just recommended for the other side of the strait;
there will be no interference, and with a liberal appropriation
material progress may be made in both during the remainder of this
working season.
I accordingly, in view of the importance of giving the greatest strength to this
vital point, recommend, in addition to the appropriations that have
been asked for fortifications already sanctioned by Congress, that
the sum of $200,000 be granted for the commencement of new batteries
at the Narrows of New York Harbor, thereby adding to the defense of
this passage, in the most advantageous positions, about 200 guns,
that may be of the most formidable calibers.
I will venture to add, in conclusion, that by reference of this subject to
the Ordnance Department precise information can be obtained as to the
state of armament preparation.
I have the honor to be, &c.,
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Brevet Brigadier-General and Colonel Engineers.
Angus McLellan
2003-07-14 21:54:37 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, 14 Jul 2003 06:20:55 GMT, Wesley Taylor
Post by Wesley Taylor
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 19:05:34 +0200, Angus McLellan
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 07:28:25 GMT, Wesley Taylor
<snip>
Post by Wesley Taylor
Took a few days to have the time to search the OR, but here is an
interesting item from the Commander of the Engineers working on New
York Harbors defenses in Summer 1861.
Note that fairly large numbers of large guns, for example the Fort
Richmond guns (126 of the 8 and 10 inch guns)
The US has a tendency to heavier guns than most people were using
right up unitl WWI. This is fairly much in the mold of that tendency.
<Totten's letter snipped>

I read this I felt compelled to agree with it the in the same sort of
way that politicians do when they can't think of exactly what to say
without sounding stupid, callous or otherwise losing votes.

Fortunately, I didn't have to make up an answer on the spot.

Before I start disagreeing, thanks for posting Totten's letter [OR,
Series 3, Volume 1, p333ff] of July 12, 1861. There's likely a great
deal more correspondence dealing with this subject but this seems like
a good place to start.

I agree that the letter, combined with the knowledge that the US would
produce some 300 15-inch Rodmans and many more smaller ones, shows
that it was intended to arm these fortifications with large guns,
larger on the average than employed outside the US in the same period.
However Totten is writing in July 1861 and new guns are not plentiful.
The fortifications still include many 32-pounders which should
eventually be replaced. Note also that some of the guns he mentions
are not yet funded let alone cast.

I am happy to agree that with time New York would receieve a very many
more 8" and 10" Columbiads, as well a sizable number of 15" ones.
OTOH, it doesn't really seem that as of the outbreak of the ACW US
seacoast fortifications were much heavier armed than, for example,
those in Britain or France. As I said yesterday, I am happy to agree
that at some point New York would have such strong defences that no
attack could have much chance of success. I am not convinced that this
was so in 1861 or even in 1862.

FWIW Busk [1] says Cherbourg's defences comprised not more than 320
guns and 40 mortars ashore plus up to 80 gund on the breakwater. The
theoretical maximum he gives as over 3,000 while dismissing this
possibility out of hand. He quotes a French officer as saying of the
batteries : "They all cross fire with and support the forts on the
breakwater, and comprise altogether, in round numbers, 314 guns and 32
mortars; a sufficiently formidable number." He does not give any
information on size of guns involved. At Lorient Busk says there were
"upwards of 200 heavy guns" at Port Louis alone. No numbers of guns
are mentioned for Brest, Rochefort or Toulon. Even if Busk is not so
helpful as to state the sizes of the guns in question, we know that
the French Navy and Artillerie de Marine employed a very limited
selection of calibres which were broadly comparable with the types
available in Britain and the US. [2]

Back to the US. At the start of the rebellion Fort Moultrie had a
heterogenous armament of 16 24- & 19 32-pounder guns, 10 8-inch
Columbiads, 1 10-inch mortar and 4 6-, 2 12- and 4 24-pounder
howitzers. Fort Pickens in December 1861 was better armed, 26
24-pounder howitzers, 2 42-, 64 32-, 59 24-, 6 18- and 12 12-pounder
guns, 24 8- and 1 10-inch Columbiads plus 4 10-inch mortars. [These
numbers from web and thus open to question.] A mixed bag and not large
guns in the main. At the outbreak of the rebellion Fort Pulaski had
only 20 guns of 146 intended and Fort Sumter 60 of 135. There is said
to be no reserve of heavy guns available when the Civil War began. [3]
The US could and did produce cast-iron heavy artillery in very large
quantities, but it seems unlikely that these very large gaps were
filled overnight or even within a year.

As an aside, it's surprising that the US had no reserves of heavy
guns. [4] Perhaps Lewis means the Army alone. The USN ought to have
had large numbers of guns since the smaller VIII- and IX-inch Dahlgren
guns had rendered many older heavy guns surplus to requirements. It's
hardly possible that these had all been scrapped. In this ATL it might
be that the Navy has to hand over such guns to the army. It also
doesn't make much sense to leave quite large numbers of such guns
aboard sailing vessels which are of almost no military value. Surely
it would be far better to mount them in fortresses and in temporary
batteries where they can do some good ?

[Apologies for the illogical sequence, but I'm getting bored
renumbering the refs.]

I find that Sveaborg in 1855 had some 800 guns. OTOH in spite of it's
impact on events the fortress at Kinburn had only 80. The guns were
smaller and less powerful than those used in the US, Britain or
France. [5] The defences at Kronstadt, which the Allies planned to
attack in the spring of 1856, were extremely impressive by any
standard. The total number of guns must have been large, the four
invulnerable offshore forts alone had 300 guns, and there were many
man-made obstacles as well as a flotilla of 23 large screw gunboats to
support the defences. Plans for the attack on Kronstadt appear to be
well-considered and included the use of divers to place demolition
charges to clear the man-made obstructions. [6]

As the RN and the USN found out, attacking fortified ports was not an
easy task. Failure was about as common as success. OTOH in this case
the attacker has the advantage of needing to succeed just the once.


Angus



[1] Busk, _The Navies of the World_, pp164-179.
[2] Busk, op cit, p270.
[3] Lewis, _Seacoast Fortifications of the United States_, p65.
[4] Lambert, _The Last Sailing Battlefleet_, p107, states that in 1839
RN stores there were over 4,000, perhaps over 10,000, 32-pounder guns
& carronades or lesser calibres which could be bored out to take
32-pound shot. I cannot see why the USN would not be in the similar
position of having a surfeit of older or unloved patterns of gun even
if the Army was not. It seems most unlikely that many of the guns
fitted to merchant ships taken into the USN were newly cast.
[5] Absolutely no evidence for this assertion.
[6] Brown, _Before the Ironclad_, pp150-158 (Sveaborg, Kinburn, &c) &
p208 (Kronstadt plans).
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-09 07:29:57 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 23:41:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
I suspect that Kinburn and Sveaborg are closer than you think. The
attack on Kerch cannot have been straightforward either. The Peiho
Forts represented a difficult target as well.
Dificult or dangerous. If the fire is as you descibed above then the
targets represent a techical but not physically dangerous challenge,
save from natural obstacles.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-09 07:48:14 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 23:41:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
As for the general point, were that true that the navy was interesting
in stacking the tests you might wonder why they bothered doing the
tests. And tests of guns and armour had been carried out frequently
since 1854 or 1855 and occasionally before that. And using beefed-up
non-standard guns. For example the October 1861 test used an early
model 7" "shunt" RML gun and stacked the odds in favour of the feeble
Armstrong RBL by using solid steel shot and steel shell and also by
firing 200lb wrought iron shot. And why use steel shot with a gun that
fired cast or wrought iron shot in practice ? And so on.
The Navy is not necessarily interested in stacking the tests.
Institutions tend to have a number of competing interests some of
which act in an almost automatic manner. Some of the parts of stacking
the tests are chauvinistic assumptions, others result from brass
polishing subordinates. The tests results do not seem to match the
real world results, and the announced work does not match the results.
The tests results at 1000 yards were given more weight than the
results from 100 yards, a more typical combat range.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-09 07:49:55 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 23:41:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
I confess to having skimmed this in the past when I came across a
mention of it on smn. For the record and IIRC, you don't agree with
everything he has to say anyway. I believe that you didn't like his
take on laminate armour (root of sum of squares of individual layers
AIUI).
AVerage of linear sum and root sum.
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by Wesley Taylor
It deals with period guns and the penetration formulae involved. It
does indicate by implication that the RN tests you mentioned were a
bit, shall we say, suspicious. But we have already mentioned the cast
iron problem.
Up to a point. If you look at the programs he provides none are very
relevant for this period. Very few projectiles - most likely none -
fulfilled the rules he assumed for his simulators. IMO. Perhaps I'm
missing the point.
Actually a few o fht earlier ones do apply.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-09 07:52:01 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 23:41:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
Cast iron shot *was* used. Even by the USN aboard Monitor if Canfield
is right. Wrought iron was expensive. As for steel and chilled iron
those were restricted to "benchmarketing" and trials in the main.
Steel was of unreliably quality in the 1860s (and arguably in the
1870s unless we restrict ourselves to a very few manufacturers).
Cast iron was NOT used against armored targets, it shatters and is not
effective.
Angus McLellan
2003-07-09 17:41:29 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 07:52:01 GMT, Wesley Taylor
Post by Wesley Taylor
On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 23:41:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
<as the record shows I actually posted something much longer including
a quotation from the DANFS in support of my argument>
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Angus McLellan
Cast iron shot *was* used. Even by the USN aboard Monitor if Canfield
is right. Wrought iron was expensive. As for steel and chilled iron
those were restricted to "benchmarketing" and trials in the main.
Steel was of unreliably quality in the 1860s (and arguably in the
1870s unless we restrict ourselves to a very few manufacturers).
Cast iron was NOT used against armored targets, it shatters and is not
effective.
So if Canfield & the DANFS won't do, would contemporary observers be
any better ?

Alban Stimers wrote "[w]e fired nothing but solid cast-iron shot ...".
As for which shot was best Stimers opinion was "[t]he bronze shot
which Captain Dahlgren has sent us I consider as superior for our
purposes to the wrought iron". Reading through the other letters I
assume that Stimers means "[t]he bronze cast over the hollow 9-inch
shot".

Louis Goldsborough wrote to William Jeffers to ask whether cast or
wrought iron shot was used. Jeffers replied "... I have to report that
the Monitor expended forty-one solid cast-iron shot in her engagement
with the Merrimack ...". Presumably Jeffers was wrong there and wrong
again when he said "[t]he wrought-iron shot I shall send on shore to
remove the temptation to fire them".

[ Letters in the Navy OR, copies found online with Google at :-
http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1862hamptonroads_usn.htm ]

Angus
l***@geocities.com
2003-07-08 02:34:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
1)South cannot be effectivly blockaded due to Royal Navy being in the
fight early on.
The British Squadron slated for intervention included 5 Ironclads
(Warrior, Black Prince, Defence, Resistance and Terror), 10
Battleships and roughly 16 frigates and sloops. These are primarily
high seas forces rather than littoral forces (some of the sloops and
Terror were shallow draught). The 9 Blockships, some shallow draught
frigates and sloops and the 7 casemate ironclads remaining in the UK
could have been brought up given time.
Post by Al Montestruc
2)USA suffers much more losses much earlier on, and these include
major naval losses to the UK.
3) Naval technogy race on both sides of the atlantic.
Well both sides advanced as quickly as they could in this era.
Post by Al Montestruc
4) USA fully mobilizes early, war with Canada. US gains ground in
both south and Canada, but at great price, casualties much higher than
IOTL by any given date as both confederates and canadians have access
to supplies and troops from the UK and Europe.
This is questionable. The US relies on the UK to support its war
effort. Britain is the US's only source of saltpetre (one of the main
ingredients of gunpowder). It is the main source of infantry smallarms
(the Enfield was by far the best weapon available in any major
numbers, even as it was US front line units were equipped with
smoothbore muskets until post-Gettysburg). Finally, the money to hire
all those troops came from finaciers in the City of London.

A simple case of UK armed neutrality effectively removes the US's
capacity to make war on the scale it did. God knows what would happen
if those resources were turned against the US.

Bryn
mike
2003-07-08 08:00:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by l***@geocities.com
This is questionable. The US relies on the UK to support its war
effort. Britain is the US's only source of saltpetre (one of the main
ingredients of gunpowder).
There was domestic supply: it was just cheaper to import. Given
a demand for nitre, mines/caves that were last used during
the Mexican War (and some back to 1812) thruout the Appalachian
Plateau, and the nearby powdermills, would re-open

The CSA was in worse shape as far as nitre sources, and using
nitre beds, never ran out of powder during the war.

Since the North is in better shape, I really don't think
the Union will lack powder either.
Post by l***@geocities.com
(the Enfield was by far the best weapon available in any major
numbers, even as it was US front line units were equipped with
smoothbore muskets until post-Gettysburg).
I've fired both replicas of Springfields and Enfields.

both are just fine at blasting away at 100 yards distance.

No difference really.

for the smoothbores, both sides respected what a unit with them
would do to a charging enemy, when using 'Buck and Ball' loads.

Shotgun city.

Besides, Spencer or Henry repeaters beat the hell out of any
muzzleloader.
Post by l***@geocities.com
Finally, the money to hire
all those troops came from finaciers in the City of London.
Abe has the treasury print more Greenbacks. The South didn't collapse
from the fact that thier currency was worth less than asswipe
in 1865.

Same for Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany.

Wasn't lack of money that stopped them.
Post by l***@geocities.com
A simple case of UK armed neutrality effectively removes the US's
capacity to make war on the scale it did.
" There was also untold wealth in the North, good crops, and a
great tide of immigration flowing in. Even if the South had been
more successful, the North would only have untied the other hand
from behind its back. There's no scenario I can dream of that would
have allowed the South to win - not even the capture of Washington.
Most Northerners think Southerners had a chance to win the war.
Southerners think that since they didn't win, they never had a chance."

Shelby Foote, someone who knows a few things about the ACW.

The Union never came close to full mobilization.
Post by l***@geocities.com
God knows what would happen
if those resources were turned against the US.
The Empire slips away sooner than OTL.

The UK won't have a friend across the Atlanic in 1914.

**
mike
**
mike
2003-07-10 07:09:56 UTC
Permalink
ISTR they did, but the quantities that could be produced weren't too
great. Great for a few thousand troops in Texas, nowhere near enough
for an army of half a million. Even with the British supply, the
infantry were so short they couldn't conduct target practice and the
standard of marksmanship remained consistantly low.
Short, but never out, like happened during the early parts of the AWI.
The CSA was more worried about shortages of Lead than powder supplies.

No such shortages of Pb in the North with the mines of the Midwest.

for the linear tactics in use,and smoky BP weapons,target
practice wasn't as important as being able to march,
follow orders and resist running away[1]

The theoretical 1000 yard range didn't often come into play, Gen.
Sedgwick aside. 200 yards and under was the norm, just as in other wars.
Except the Springfield isn't a particularly common weapon in 1862,
with ISTR only 34,000 produced in the previous year (the bulk of
production occurs 1863-4) compared to 1,000,000 Enfields imported from
the UK.
1859 report of Gov. stocks

14,765 1840 muskets with Maynard Tape prime
28,207 M1855 Springfield Rifles(HarperFerry&Springfield)
33,631 1840 pattern S/B converted to rifles and percussion lock
43,375 .54cal old pattern rifles(awaiting conversion to .58)
275,744 1840 S/B fitted with percussion lock

265,129 M1861 Springfields made 1861-1862

I have 428,292 1853 pattern Enfield[2] and 8000 Short Sea Service
being imported, 730k coming from European sources.

70K of the Austrian M1854 'Lorenze' rifles were well liked, however
many of the other Austrian muskets(Mules) were not, and many other
Belgian and other substandard guns were hated.

Over the War the North had private companies making rifles&carbines
as well as the prewar Springfield and Harpers Ferry Arsenals

production totals of US rifles& carbines of types used in ACW

820,000 Springfield Armory .58cal ML
500,000 (aprox) .69cal SB,ML rifles, old style
430,000 Enfield .577cal ML(ordered from UK)
160,000 Springfield ML made under contract by Hale,Colt,Remington,etc
70,000 Austrian Lorenze rifles

now for the BreechLoaders&Repeaters

5,000 Starr .52RF carbine
8,000 Sharps&Hankins .52RF carbine
9,000 Colt revolving rifles
13,000 Henry .44RF repeating rifle
16,000 Joslyn .52calRF carbines
20,000 Starr 54.cal BL linen cartridge carbine
20,000 Maynard .50cal BL metallic cartridge carbine
50,000 Remington .50calRF carbines(developed into the FallingBlock)
55,000 Burnside .54calBL metallic cartridge carbine
80,000 Smith .50calBL paper cartridge carbine
115,000 Sharps .52calBL linen cartridge carbine
144,000 Spencer .52calRF repeater
Except they're much harder to produce. ISTR it took the same effort to
build a repeater as 3-4 Rifled muskets. Extending the argument from
above it would be ~1877 before universal repeater armament.
Springfield $15-20
Enfield $18-25(cost to US,UK cost is lower, Profit and all)
Spencer $25
Henry $35
However, there's a different motivation for the troops. The US Army
was required to offer huge enlistment bounties to get men in.
Many though 'To Hell with the South' Ashooting war with the UK, well,
that brings many inline. Hard sell to get the Irish to fight
to free the Slaves, Now a chance to shoot at Brits....
Yes, it was. http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgeconhi.htm
Neither Japan or Germany had a slowdown of production from
lack of foreign investments(well they did steal others)

fighting the two countries on Earth with the potential
to become Superpowers(USA&USSR) when ramped up to full
production is what happened.

Squashed like bugs.

Thier economies could not match the potential of the USA

Festüng Europa had no roof vs B-17s and the Co-Prosperity
Sphere was open to B-29s and USN pigboats

no Speer saying 'Herr Hitler- we must end the war. Our
incoming currency limits us: an Liquidity trap is on
the Horizon. We must ask for terms else the Bankers will
be unhappy'

It was GIs and Russians sitting in the rubbled capitals
of Berlin and Tokyo that finished the war.

The UK could not bring to forces to bear to do that in the 1860s.
Post by mike
The Union never came close to full mobilization.
That's something I hear a lot. I take it you mean the entire adult
male population wasn't put in arms?
There was around a million men in Union Blue at one time,
but many more than that had mustered out. Put the Union in a big war,
(say an invasion by the UK)they come back.
Post by mike
The Empire slips away sooner than OTL.
Why? With a trounced US, the domino effect caused (ultimately) by the
Fenian Brotherhood won't happen.
No trouncing. As the war goes on, USN raiders raising the cost
to Lloyds each year, causing trouble in other British areas,
loss of most of Canada[2],the Irish troubles only getting worse,
thier CSA ally is split in two at the Mississippi, there is no
light at the end of the tunnel.
It doesn't really need one. The US had essentially no military impact
on the Great War
except for all the explosives&chemicals for shells, foodstuffs and
contract smallarms that were sold. The USA going pure neutral, 1915
looks really ugly with the ShellShortage.


[1] Blücher said something like 'All men run, it's whether the come
back for more fighting' But he also said he was pregnant with
an elephant after being raped by a Frenchman, so YMMV
[2] BNA if you insist.

**
mike
**
mike
2003-07-13 14:28:26 UTC
Permalink
There's a (IMHO extremely strong) argument that
ACW tactics were essentially Napoleonic and anacronistic, but that's
another topic.
Yes,from VMI to West Point, grads seemed deadset to refight
Jena and so on, when the time for Column charge and the
Grande Batterie were both as dead as the Corsican Ogre himself.
The End of the Conflict showed the way of the following Wars
would be, Trenches, small units,etc.
The carbines look about what I expected, but the Spencers? When were
they produced?
from 1860 in protype form till the end. Spencer had a hard time
ramping up production enen after the go ahead contracts were signed.

The # produced for Spencers are all over the place, as some don't
list the ones Burnside subcontracted, Navy and Militia orders.

Numbers to be noticable on the battlefield, late 1862
Longterm they broke (in the 2nd War) and saw massive investment from
abroad.
Didn't one British arms manufacturer go broke, as they had
accepted CSA Cotton Bonds as payment?
GDP of Union = ~ 60 billion (assuming PC GDP of US and CS are
indentical. CS should be higher so this would be an over-estimate)
GDP of British Isles only = ~ 87 billion (excluding colonial GDP)
GDP of CS = ~ 20 billion (same assumptions)
This is what ultimately defeated the CS, a much smaller economy
devestated by the lack of trade vs the quite prosperous North.
but a much closer run in WWII.

Countries that try to punch *far* above thier weight are asking
for disaster:that the preWII GDP of the USA was still 475% larger
than Japan, and while Japan was running at about full tilt
(only able to increase GDP by 16%) The USA was running at near idle,
pumping up GDP 87% when in near full production mode in 1944

A vague factoid is that the US put about 20% of its effort
into the Pacific War, and that 20% includes the very spendy
Manhatten Project and FY1940 Long Range Bomber program
(B-29, and the Convair B-32 had the Boeing effort failed)

The Sleeping Giant. Best not to wake him with a kick to the nuts.

Back to ACW, the North had room to grow, while the Souths
growth had to create/replace missing capacity for deciding
to fight the first Industrialized War.

a USA/CSA matchup is very much like USA/Japan.

A USA/CSA+UK matchup roughly equal Axis vs UK

An advantage, but not of the 'Why in Hell didn't they
Sue for Peace: they were DOOMED!' like you get with
the US/Japan matchup, but a long grinding war that
would not be settled soon.
To do what? Defend Canada? 67,000 local troops and ~120,000 regulars
67k? When? Canadian Premier John A. Macdonald tried for funding 50k
Militia and his government crumbled, with him resigning, and a
change to the Liberals. ITYM 37k, I think thats what the Sedentary
Militia was authorized at.

Stacking up 120k regulars won't be of much use, as most would have
been piled up in Halifax,New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. travel
westwards was difficult. Supplying them, worse.
Assuming the US gets over the Great Lakes (i.e. the British don't send
a single Erebus class Ironclad down the St. Lawence and sink the
entire US flotilla on the lakes)
you mean try not to get sunk passing the 125 gun Fort Montgomery
into Lake Champlain(if it even had the draft to get there) or
the Batteries by Fort Niagra?
they are operating in a cold winter
climate facing scattered militia troops striking their supply line.
Like Folks from Wisconsin, Minnisota, Michigan and upstate New York
didn't know what that cold, white flaky stuff was?
soon as conditions improve, the RN stemas down the St. Lawence cutting
their lines entirely and delivering what in US terms would be a ~10
Corps Field Army.
Interior lines are to the US advantage
Which ISTR relied on *South* American trade.
a big chunk from a period report:
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR
NEUTRAL RIGHTS, BELLIGERENT CLAIMS AND AMERICAN COMMERCE IN THE YEARS
1914-1915

http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/comment/Clapp/Clapp5.htm
------------------------------------------------------
Contrary to the general impression, our main exports to Europe have
not been the weapons of war. It is not possible to find the exports of
big guns; they are not listed in the government statistics. But our
ordnance shipments have not been large. For the nine months from
September 1, 1914, to May 31, 1915, we shipped $34,000,000 of
munitions, compared with $6,000,000 in the same nine months of the
previous year. In munitions are included: firearms, cartridges,
gunpowder and other explosives except dynamite. The increase in
munitions exports is seen to be only $28,000,000. To be sure, shrapnel
is not included in the munitions list; it also cannot be found in the
official export figures. Even if we could add the statistics for
ordnance and shrapnel, the larger figure would not go far towards
explaining the vast growth of our export balance since November, 1914.

The explanation for our great increase in exports is found rather in
the group we call food, especially in breadstuffs. By breadstuff's are
meant flour and grain, except oats, the latter cereal being more
correctly classed as forage. Some of the reasons why the European
demand for our food was especially heavy have already been noted.
Excepting for North America, the grain crops of extra-European
countries in 1914 were below normal. The closing of the Dardanelles
and German control of the Baltic held the great Russian and Balkan
supplies of grain away from belligerent Western Europe. Neutrals like
Scandinavia, Holland, Italy and Greece, which had always bought
largely from the Black Sea, now turned to America. The great rise in
the exports and the price of breadstuffs, especially wheat and wheat
flour, were reviewed in Chapter II. In the nine months ended with May
we shipped $431,000,000 of breadstuffs, compared with $107,000,000 in
the previous year. The growth of $324,000,000 showed that the
disappearance of Germany as an export market for our wheat was far
more than counterbalanced by the great demand of the rest of Europe.
In this one item the growing balance of trade is chiefly explained.

In the case of meat products, a similar development occurred. For some
time the communication of the Allies with the Argentine was unsafe,
owing to German cruisers in the South Atlantic. Even when those seas
were cleared, our shipments continued large, the vast supplies
required to provision the armies of the Allies causing a recovery of
our export meat trade, which for a decade had been on the decline. The
demands for a fighting army are far above those for the same number of
men in peaceful occupations.(26) The European population in the field
has advanced to a scale of living which it never knew before. Further
contributing causes to the large meat orders from this country
included the German occupation of part of the producing area of
France; and the large. purchases made by American relief bodies on
behalf of the Belgians. We exported in the nine months $160,000,000 of
meat products, $54,000,000 more than in the same months of the
previous year. We sent $11,000,000 of dairy products, an increase of
$9,000,000.

A similar advance was in our shipments of sugar. The stoppage of
German exports to England resulted in keeping nearly half a million
tons of German sugar at home, where it was made into cattle fodder.
England therefore had to turn to us for her supply. To prevent a too
great increase in price, she tried the experiment, which was not
altogether happy, of a government monopoly of the purchase and
distribution of sugar. Our sugar exports in the nine months to the end
of May amounted to $21,000,000, which was $20,000,000 more than in the
same months of the year before. Finally, there was a growth of
$4,600,000 in our shipments of vegetables.

In forage there has been another remarkable increase. In the nine
months' period we exported $71,000,000 of forage: oats, hay,
cottonseed cake and meal. This was $60,000,000 more than in the same
months of the year before. Five-sixths of the increase was in the item
of oats alone. As will appear later, our exports of forage were
paralleled by our shipments of horses and mules to eat the forage;
that is, to eat it for the brief period during which an army horse or
mule continues to enjoy the gustatory pleasures of this world.

Another great group of exports was hides, leather and, footwear, not
including harness and saddlery, which belong better in the category of
war supplies. The largest increase was in unworked leather and
miscellaneous leather products, though there has been a notable
movement of men's shoes and of hides. In the whole group we exported
$68,000,000 or $48,000,000 more than in the same months a year ago.

Somewhat closer to the business of war were our exports of textile
manufactures, mostly the result of great equipment orders from the
Allies. Probably the largest single item was blankets, then woolen
uniforms, then cotton knit goods. Of these items and of wool and
woolen rags we sent abroad $35,000,000, which is $30,000,000 more than
last year.

Nearer yet to the direct equipment of war we may make a group called
war supplies. It includes horses, mules, harness and saddles,
aeroplanes, commercial automobiles, automobile tires, wagons, gas oil
and fuel oil, barbed wire, horseshoes and surgical appliances. The
largest increase in this group was in the means of transport: horses,
mules, commercial automobiles. In nine months ending May 31, 1915, we
sent to the war 250,000 horses, compared with 18,000 in the same
period of the year before. We sent 53,000 mules, compared with 4,000
in 1913-1914. We exported $30,000,000 of commercial automobiles, which
is $29,000,000 more than in the previous year. In the whole group of
war supplies we sent abroad $148,000,000, an increase of $119,000,000
over the year before.

It is apparent that up to the present time our great contributions to
the carrying on of the war have been indirect contributions rather
than munitions. Greater than the increase in munitions exports has
been the increase in material for making munitions. Under this head
should be included lead, zinc, brass and brass manufactures, wire
rods, steel billets and metal working machinery. The last item means
lathes for turning out shrapnel. American lathe makers have been
totally unable to meet the demand for their product on the part of
those in this country and abroad who have shell orders to fill. In
this whole group the exports of zinc---generally called
spelter---overshadow all others. This is because the German and
Belgian stocks of spelter, which normally supply the world outside the
United States, are cut off from the Allies. Spelter accounts for over
one-third of the increase in the group, the foreign sales of which
amounted to $62,000,000 in the nine months ending May 31, $46,000,000
more than in the same months of the year before.
__________________________________________________

you can see where the bullets and beans were coming from.

A lot to lose, IMHO, esp if the US was to drift into the CP camp,
rather than neutrality

That last paragraph directly impacts on small arms and QF cannons.

Postwar, it was related that DuPont literally made a 'killing'
on ordnance and shrapnel sales, alluded to in the first paragraph.

**
mike
**
Alexander Cohen
2003-07-07 05:34:44 UTC
Permalink
The general idea has already been looked at in detail in Harry Harrison's
Stars and Stripes trilogy

http://www.iol.ie/~carrollm/hh/n28-menu.htm for some information about those
books

(definantly worth a read)

--- Alex
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
At the start of the American Civil War, the Confederates sent two
delegates on the ship "Trent" to Britain and France to negotiate
military aide. Before they could reach there destination, they were
captured by the U.S. and sent back to the States. After this, the
British government wrote a letter which would have started war with
the U.S., but, Prince Albert, on his deathbed, toned down the note
enough to prevent war. What if Prince Albert had already died, and the
note was sent as written, and started war with the United States? How
would this war go? How would it effect the ACW? What would be some of
the long term happenings?
~ President William Jennings Bryan
"There's a hole in the world
Like a great black pit
And it's filled with people
Who are filled with shit
And the vermin of the world
Inhabit it -
But not for long!"
- from "Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street"
l***@geocities.com
2003-07-08 02:17:57 UTC
Permalink
Well, I guess it's worth a read if you don't care about realism,
plausibility, verisimilitude, or competent alternate history.
Vegard has reviewed this book far better than I could. Suffice it to say
that Harry Harrison has one or two implausibilities taking place in the
book. The book is beyond ASB territory.
One or two! The research doesn't appear to of gone so far as to get
Glory out of the video store!

Bryn
President William Jennings Bryan
2003-07-13 13:54:59 UTC
Permalink
Anyway,I was wondering if I could get a little more discussion on if
this war would be winnable, and by whom. Also, what the long term
effectsw fo the war would be? Thanks.

~ President William Jennings Bryan

"Inconspicuous Sweeney was,
Quick and quiet and clean 'e was.
Back of his smile, under his word,
Sweeney heard music that nobody heard.
Sweeney pondered and Sweeney planned,
Like a perfect machine 'e planned.
Sweeney was smooth, Sweeney was subtle,
Sweeney would blink and rats would scuttle."
- from "Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street"
Charlie Thorne
2003-07-13 14:58:31 UTC
Permalink
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
Anyway,I was wondering if I could get a little more discussion on if
this war would be winnable, and by whom. Also, what the long term
effectsw fo the war would be? Thanks.
~ President William Jennings Bryan
The major change the British could make would be to protect the
Southern exports of cotton and to ship war materiale to the South.
They could harass the Northern trade but could not fight against a
land-based power anymore than they could in the Revolution when they
were relatively stronger.

Perhaps this would speed up the unification of Germany while Britain
was tied up in the West and the French would be destroyed earlier.

Charlie
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
"Inconspicuous Sweeney was,
Quick and quiet and clean 'e was.
Back of his smile, under his word,
Sweeney heard music that nobody heard.
Sweeney pondered and Sweeney planned,
Like a perfect machine 'e planned.
Sweeney was smooth, Sweeney was subtle,
Sweeney would blink and rats would scuttle."
- from "Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street"
Angus McLellan
2003-07-13 18:52:29 UTC
Permalink
Post by Charlie Thorne
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
Anyway,I was wondering if I could get a little more discussion on if
this war would be winnable, and by whom. Also, what the long term
effectsw fo the war would be? Thanks.
~ President William Jennings Bryan
The major change the British could make would be to protect the
Southern exports of cotton and to ship war materiale to the South.
They could harass the Northern trade but could not fight against a
land-based power anymore than they could in the Revolution when they
were relatively stronger.
It largely depends on why the war starts, but assuming it's declared
in Washington rather than in London, and that seems the only way to
get a war at this point, Britain will not be very interested in
helping the Confederacy directly. Regardless of the opinions of some
(many) among the aristocracy it would be most inexpedient from an
electoral POV. Were it the EBE (c the late and lamented Alison Brooks,
1998), that would be different story.

That said, British actions will indirectly aid the Confederates to a
huge extent. It's impossible to imagine the USN being able to sustain
any sort of expeditionry force by sea. Attacks on Port Royal or New
Orleans are out. Since the rebels will be able to purchase warships
openly in Britain (and in France), it seems unlikely that Forts
Pickens, Taylor and Jefferson could be held by the government for very
long. Foreign purchases of armour or machinery together with no
seaborne attack on New Orleans means a stronger Confederate force on
the Mississippi which in turn means a slower advance down the river by
US forces. All of this is bad news for Washington. In the very worst
case, but probably only if we assume active assistance by Britain (or
France), the Confederates will take Fort Monroe.

Ignoring the benefits to the CSA, the war between the USA and Britain
(and France in all likelihood) is likely to follow the plans prepared
by the British Colonial Secretary. [The War Office was subordinated to
the Colonial Secretary after the less than stellar performance of the
Army's administrative machinery in the Crimean War.] These plans
called for attacks on US ports as mentioned already. The most obvious
targets were New York and Boston, and since they were obvious targets
they were very well protected by forts. Although geography protected
New York to a degree it also meant that the defences at any point were
far weaker than simple addition would suggest.

The RN was well provided with gunboats, mortar ships and the like and
had plenty of vessels overall. There were also a few shallow draft
armoured ships of left over from the Crimean War. The French Navy also
had a fair number of gunboats &c and had a larger number of shallow
draft armoured ships. Except where shallows kept large ships from
approaching the shore forts would be far from invulnerable.

The main purpose of a British, French or Anglo-French attack on New
York or elsewhere would be to destroy "military" targets. That would
include shipyards, government buildings & stores and anything nearby.
The least dangerous (from the attacker's POV) weapons to use would be
rockets and mortars which were very far from being precision weapons.
[Readers who doubt that this sort of thing would be compatible with
the sensibilities of the age are referred to (a) Farragut's serious
threat to bombard New Orleans, (b) Fox's proposals to force Charleston
to surrender by threat of bombardment rather than attacking the forts.
Also Callao, Sveaborg, Franco-British operations in the sea of Azov &
so on.] While this sort of incendiarism would be a difficult operation
at some locations, most ports on the northern coast were not defended
at all. On a smaller scale attacks on bridges, cuts and the like in
sight of the coast would be also be likely

Certainly a blockade of the east coast of the USA would be a major
operation. On the other hand the US coast during the civil was is only
a third or a quarter of the length it was before or after. Unlike in
1812 the USN of 1861-1862 was not insiginificant. The USN had over a
dozen major steam vessels which *could* have a reasonable chance of
defeating any single ship they encountered - five very large screw
frigates plus one very near to completion, six large screw sloops and
four large paddle frigates & sloops. So blockades of ports where US
warships were gathered would need to be backed by considerable force.

Although US consruction IOTL was not at all suited to a war with
Britain, it seems unlikely that the USN would have continued the
programmes of OTL. Ships like Kearsarge - the US had 8 of these in
1860 and received 14 more to 1865 - represented a much better ship
than famous Confederate raiders such as Alabama. With a good turn of
speed and shallow draft they would find it much easier than slower,
deeper ship to break through any blockade. It's easy to see that the
US could have built many more such ships in place of less useful
gunboats. Although such ships could be built in six months they
normally took about a year. That rather suggests that even if the
raider problem would be of containable proportions at the outbreak of
war it would tend to become much more serious within a year or so. Of
course if the RN can burn such ships on the stocks there's no problem.

Whatever defects Ericsson's monitors had, and they had many, they were
ideally suited to defending coasts and harbours. It seems likely that
OTL's production of monitors was the best that could be achieved in
the first half of the Civil War. It's unlikely that there would be
significantly more or different monitors in the case of war with
Britain. A significant shipbuilding industry could turn out small
gunboats rather quickly. In 1861 the record was probably held by the
La Seyne shipyard which built five 150-ton armoured steam gunboats in
39 days in 1859. Major US shipyards are unlikely to be far behind
that.

And there's always the damn torpedos which were hardly a great secret.
The Russians had made considerable, if ineffectual use of mines in the
Crimean War. Since the USN was one of the best (probably *the* best)
trained and led navies in the world, I imagine that American mines
would be a great deal more effective.

But it's one thing to build sloops, gunboats or coastal monitors, lay
mines and so on. It's another to build the sort of ships that could
sail out and break up the blockade for good. It seems reasonable to
assume that building a wooden battlefleet from scratch would not even
be considered. Which leaves an armoured one.

The US built relatively few large seagoing ships, armoured or
otherwise, and built only four armoured ships during the Civil War
which more or less fall into that category. Two of these were built
for Italy. Conversions are possible, although the examples of
*completed* wooden steamships converted to ironclads suggests that a
seagoing ship is unlikely to result IIRC there were only threee
conversions from completed ships - USS Roanoke, CSS Virginia, HMS
Royal Sovereign - none enormously successful.

Converting incomplete ships was very common, unfortunately the USN
didn't have very many suitable ships under construction. The list
appears to reduce to the large frigate Franklin, a ship which would
seem to be well suited for armouring, and the sailing line of battle
ships Alabama and Virginia. Converting the sailing ships to steam and
armour would not be entirely straightforward nor terribly fast except
in comparison with building new ships. As for new ships, these would
ideally be as robust as the USS New Ironsides but faster and deeper
draft.

If it's easy enough to see how the US could make it's coastal cities
very difficult, in some cases impossible, to attack, it's much harder
to see how the US could expect to win a war. Occupying large parts
Canada will doubtless cause The Times' readership annoyance as they
read it at the breakfast table. OTOH,. it's far from obvious how the
US could expect to occupy *all* of Canada. Or to hold the Pacific
Coast if the war dragged on. Building a railway across the continental
United States would take some time. Until then the Pacific States are
on their own. If Britain could send 12,000 men to China over a minor
spat, I'd imagine it would be possible to send considerably more to
California in the event of a real war.

The summary is that it would be messy and indecisive and would
generate a great deal of ill-will in the years to come. And it's quite
possibly enough to allow the CSA to make it's independence stick. All
very dystopian really.
Post by Charlie Thorne
Perhaps this would speed up the unification of Germany while Britain
was tied up in the West and the French would be destroyed earlier.
Prussia is likely to do the nothing it was doing at this time. It
wasn't exactly surrounded by admiring neighbours and hadn't yet had
the chance to swallow any of them up. In 1862-1863 the Prussians would
probably be more worried about events in Russian Poland than anything
else. Russian intervention is almost unthinkable although the US can
almost certainly rely on great deal of Russian assistance if it
doesn't bring any risk of war. However I'm not sure that such
assistance would be worth very much in practice.

Along with Russia, Prussia is unlikely to recognise the CSA at any
early date. As has been mentioned, the USA might well seize the
Italian ironclads being built at New York. That might change the
Italian position on recognition. Of course France might do the same
were she to be a belligerent. If *both* France and the US seized
Italy's ships then Archduke Ferdinand Max would be delighted. What
effect it would have on whether Italy recognises the CSA I do not
know.

France will definitely recognise the CSA if (in this TL, when) Britain
does. Spain would have no cause to want an independent CSA, then again
the US hadn't done much to endear itself to Spain either. On balance
I'd anticipate Spain following Britain and France in recognising the
CSA. Austria and Belgium might well recognise the CSA soon after
Britain, as for the rest, no idea.

IMO the chances of a war between Britain & the US spreading to Europe
(other than the quite strong possibility of France joining in on the
British side) are minimal to nonexistent in 1861-1863.

Angus
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-15 04:04:27 UTC
Permalink
On Sun, 13 Jul 2003 20:52:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
It largely depends on why the war starts, but assuming it's declared
in Washington rather than in London, and that seems the only way to
get a war at this point, Britain will not be very interested in
helping the Confederacy directly. Regardless of the opinions of some
(many) among the aristocracy it would be most inexpedient from an
electoral POV. Were it the EBE (c the late and lamented Alison Brooks,
1998), that would be different story.
Actually, unless the British do something that forces Lincolns hand
(not likely, but miscalculations (happen) I can see NO way to get the
Lincoln administration to declare war. I can see damn few ways to get
the miscalculation. That is my core problem with the POD here. It is
the entire reason why I think Trent is a bust as a POD for a UK/US
war.
Post by Angus McLellan
That said, British actions will indirectly aid the Confederates to a
huge extent. It's impossible to imagine the USN being able to sustain
any sort of expeditionry force by sea. Attacks on Port Royal or New
Orleans are out. Since the rebels will be able to purchase warships
openly in Britain (and in France), it seems unlikely that Forts
Pickens, Taylor and Jefferson could be held by the government for very
long. Foreign purchases of armour or machinery together with no
seaborne attack on New Orleans means a stronger Confederate force on
the Mississippi which in turn means a slower advance down the river by
US forces. All of this is bad news for Washington. In the very worst
case, but probably only if we assume active assistance by Britain (or
France), the Confederates will take Fort Monroe.
Actully, if the usual Trent crisis is used, the British are unlikely
to recognize the CSA as anything, ignoring it if possible. The same
objections that existed before (which had more to do with law and
precedent than with the specifics of the US or its repsonse. The same
domestic problems exist with the CSA as well.The wars are, like the
Napoleonic and 1812 wars, seperate but coincident in time.
Post by Angus McLellan
Ignoring the benefits to the CSA, the war between the USA and Britain
(and France in all likelihood) is likely to follow the plans prepared
by the British Colonial Secretary. [The War Office was subordinated to
the Colonial Secretary after the less than stellar performance of the
Army's administrative machinery in the Crimean War.] These plans
called for attacks on US ports as mentioned already. The most obvious
targets were New York and Boston, and since they were obvious targets
they were very well protected by forts. Although geography protected
New York to a degree it also meant that the defences at any point were
far weaker than simple addition would suggest.
One secondary impact of the Britsh war will be increasing the
popularity of signing up with certain sections of the populace. The
Trent crisis helped recruitment. Actual war will help more, giving the
US some extra troops. How many depends on the details.
Post by Angus McLellan
The RN was well provided with gunboats, mortar ships and the like and
had plenty of vessels overall. There were also a few shallow draft
armoured ships of left over from the Crimean War. The French Navy also
had a fair number of gunboats &c and had a larger number of shallow
draft armoured ships. Except where shallows kept large ships from
approaching the shore forts would be far from invulnerable.
The main purpose of a British, French or Anglo-French attack on New
York or elsewhere would be to destroy "military" targets. That would
include shipyards, government buildings & stores and anything nearby.
The least dangerous (from the attacker's POV) weapons to use would be
rockets and mortars which were very far from being precision weapons.
[Readers who doubt that this sort of thing would be compatible with
the sensibilities of the age are referred to (a) Farragut's serious
threat to bombard New Orleans, (b) Fox's proposals to force Charleston
to surrender by threat of bombardment rather than attacking the forts.
Also Callao, Sveaborg, Franco-British operations in the sea of Azov &
so on.] While this sort of incendiarism would be a difficult operation
at some locations, most ports on the northern coast were not defended
at all. On a smaller scale attacks on bridges, cuts and the like in
sight of the coast would be also be likely
The problem is that for New York the military targets, IIRC are on
the south side of the city or are in difficult to close on places. To
approach one has to go throught the channels (on either side of
Manhattan) or come up the Hell's Gate. Navigation is restricted and
can be difficult (dangerous) for ships under fire.
Post by Angus McLellan
Certainly a blockade of the east coast of the USA would be a major
operation. On the other hand the US coast during the civil was is only
a third or a quarter of the length it was before or after. Unlike in
1812 the USN of 1861-1862 was not insiginificant. The USN had over a
dozen major steam vessels which *could* have a reasonable chance of
defeating any single ship they encountered - five very large screw
frigates plus one very near to completion, six large screw sloops and
four large paddle frigates & sloops. So blockades of ports where US
warships were gathered would need to be backed by considerable force.
Although US consruction IOTL was not at all suited to a war with
Britain, it seems unlikely that the USN would have continued the
programmes of OTL. Ships like Kearsarge - the US had 8 of these in
1860 and received 14 more to 1865 - represented a much better ship
than famous Confederate raiders such as Alabama. With a good turn of
speed and shallow draft they would find it much easier than slower,
deeper ship to break through any blockade. It's easy to see that the
US could have built many more such ships in place of less useful
gunboats. Although such ships could be built in six months they
normally took about a year. That rather suggests that even if the
raider problem would be of containable proportions at the outbreak of
war it would tend to become much more serious within a year or so. Of
course if the RN can burn such ships on the stocks there's no problem.
Whatever defects Ericsson's monitors had, and they had many, they were
ideally suited to defending coasts and harbours. It seems likely that
OTL's production of monitors was the best that could be achieved in
the first half of the Civil War. It's unlikely that there would be
significantly more or different monitors in the case of war with
Britain. A significant shipbuilding industry could turn out small
gunboats rather quickly. In 1861 the record was probably held by the
La Seyne shipyard which built five 150-ton armoured steam gunboats in
39 days in 1859. Major US shipyards are unlikely to be far behind
that.
And there's always the damn torpedos which were hardly a great secret.
The Russians had made considerable, if ineffectual use of mines in the
Crimean War. Since the USN was one of the best (probably *the* best)
trained and led navies in the world, I imagine that American mines
would be a great deal more effective.
But it's one thing to build sloops, gunboats or coastal monitors, lay
mines and so on. It's another to build the sort of ships that could
sail out and break up the blockade for good. It seems reasonable to
assume that building a wooden battlefleet from scratch would not even
be considered. Which leaves an armoured one.
The US built relatively few large seagoing ships, armoured or
otherwise, and built only four armoured ships during the Civil War
which more or less fall into that category. Two of these were built
for Italy. Conversions are possible, although the examples of
*completed* wooden steamships converted to ironclads suggests that a
seagoing ship is unlikely to result IIRC there were only threee
conversions from completed ships - USS Roanoke, CSS Virginia, HMS
Royal Sovereign - none enormously successful.
Converting incomplete ships was very common, unfortunately the USN
didn't have very many suitable ships under construction. The list
appears to reduce to the large frigate Franklin, a ship which would
seem to be well suited for armouring, and the sailing line of battle
ships Alabama and Virginia. Converting the sailing ships to steam and
armour would not be entirely straightforward nor terribly fast except
in comparison with building new ships. As for new ships, these would
ideally be as robust as the USS New Ironsides but faster and deeper
draft.
If it's easy enough to see how the US could make it's coastal cities
very difficult, in some cases impossible, to attack, it's much harder
to see how the US could expect to win a war. Occupying large parts
Canada will doubtless cause The Times' readership annoyance as they
read it at the breakfast table. OTOH,. it's far from obvious how the
US could expect to occupy *all* of Canada. Or to hold the Pacific
Coast if the war dragged on. Building a railway across the continental
United States would take some time. Until then the Pacific States are
on their own. If Britain could send 12,000 men to China over a minor
spat, I'd imagine it would be possible to send considerably more to
California in the event of a real war.
The summary is that it would be messy and indecisive and would
generate a great deal of ill-will in the years to come. And it's quite
possibly enough to allow the CSA to make it's independence stick. All
very dystopian really.
Nice summary. While I disagree on a few points, on many I think we are
in agreement.

The first major problem is noting that the British have ill defined
war aims and I am not sure the American ones are any better. My
thoughts on them would be as follows:

UK aims are to get the US to the negotiating table and deal with
whatever started the war. If Trent, to agree about the US mistake and
get the war over status quo antebellem. If other, what ever started
the war. The worst case is an entrance pursuant to the late 1863
Russel intervention proplsals, as they utimately commit the UK to save
the CSA.

US aims, to defend their territory and make the cost to the UK more
than the UK populace will tolerate. Destruction of the CSA as part of
the plan, but also taking Canada and hurting the RN where possible.
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by Charlie Thorne
Perhaps this would speed up the unification of Germany while Britain
was tied up in the West and the French would be destroyed earlier.
I am not sure how much speeding up the process will permit, given that
much of the groundwork had to be done in Germany following the war
with Denmark startup.
Post by Angus McLellan
Prussia is likely to do the nothing it was doing at this time. It
wasn't exactly surrounded by admiring neighbours and hadn't yet had
the chance to swallow any of them up. In 1862-1863 the Prussians would
probably be more worried about events in Russian Poland than anything
else. Russian intervention is almost unthinkable although the US can
almost certainly rely on great deal of Russian assistance if it
doesn't bring any risk of war. However I'm not sure that such
assistance would be worth very much in practice.
Along with Russia, Prussia is unlikely to recognise the CSA at any
early date. As has been mentioned, the USA might well seize the
Italian ironclads being built at New York. That might change the
Italian position on recognition. Of course France might do the same
were she to be a belligerent. If *both* France and the US seized
Italy's ships then Archduke Ferdinand Max would be delighted. What
effect it would have on whether Italy recognises the CSA I do not
know.
France will definitely recognise the CSA if (in this TL, when) Britain
does. Spain would have no cause to want an independent CSA, then again
the US hadn't done much to endear itself to Spain either. On balance
I'd anticipate Spain following Britain and France in recognising the
CSA. Austria and Belgium might well recognise the CSA soon after
Britain, as for the rest, no idea.
What France does depends heavily on the exact details of the war
start, as does the behavior of the British.
Post by Angus McLellan
IMO the chances of a war between Britain & the US spreading to Europe
(other than the quite strong possibility of France joining in on the
British side) are minimal to nonexistent in 1861-1863.
Agreed. secondary effects on the european community, but nothing large
for a few years.

Part of this depends on how the US units fare agaist the BNA forces
and how much this gets spread about in Europe and part of that depends
on the details of the POD.
Post by Angus McLellan
Angus
President William Jennings Bryan
2003-07-16 05:10:19 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wesley Taylor
On Sun, 13 Jul 2003 20:52:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Actually, unless the British do something that forces Lincolns hand
(not likely, but miscalculations (happen) I can see NO way to get the
Lincoln administration to declare war. I can see damn few ways to get
the miscalculation. That is my core problem with the POD here. It is
the entire reason why I think Trent is a bust as a POD for a UK/US
war.
Just out of curiosity, what do you think would be a suitable POD for a
UK/US war around this time period? Thanks for your imput.

~ President William Jennings Bryan

"Mrs. Mooney has a pie shop,
Does a business, but I notice something weird —
Lately all her neighbors' cats have disappeared.
Have to hand it to her —
Wot I calls
Enterprise,
Popping pussies into pies.
Wouldn't do in my shop —
Just the thought of it's enough to make you sick.
And I'm telling you them pussy cats is quick."
- from "Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street"
Angus McLellan
2003-07-16 17:24:00 UTC
Permalink
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
Post by Wesley Taylor
On Sun, 13 Jul 2003 20:52:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Actually, unless the British do something that forces Lincolns hand
(not likely, but miscalculations (happen) I can see NO way to get the
Lincoln administration to declare war. I can see damn few ways to get
the miscalculation. That is my core problem with the POD here. It is
the entire reason why I think Trent is a bust as a POD for a UK/US
war.
Just out of curiosity, what do you think would be a suitable POD for a
UK/US war around this time period? Thanks for your imput.
I don't know what Wes thinks, but I would say we can eliminate a
number of wizard wheezes before we start.

(a) Lincoln declaring war as a result of Pam's telegram, also Lincoln
refusing to back down over the Trent, Delivery of the Laird Rams, and
similar.

Even if it's on the lines Ray Speer suggested in
<14520-3F081805-***@storefull-2351.public.lawson.webtv.net> .
Everything we know suggests that Lincoln would have stuck to his
policy of "one war at a time".

All the other suggested PODs have the same problem.

(b) British recognition of the CSA.

This fails the Brooks test - what's in it for Britain ? We could
always quote the PM of the day. "We have no eternal allies and we have
no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and
those interests it is our duty to follow." Those interests are not
served by recognising the CSA unless and until the CSA has clearly
demonstrated that it is independent by winning the Civil War.

And this may even fail for the same reasons as give in (a). Even if we
could finagle British recognition it may not provoke a US declaration
of war. It may make a war over some future crisis more likely, but
that's another matter.

(c) British diplomatic intervention.

Essentially fails for (a) and (b) combined. There is no reason for the
British to try very hard to broker peace if the US says no, there's
nothing in it for Britain. The US is unlikely to declare war unless
the British persist in a very improbable fashion. Again we can quote
the PM of the day on the idea.

"They who in quarrels interpose,
will often get a bloody nose."

Even if PM Gladstone and President Seward could easily have bungled
their way into a war, it's not so easy to imagine Lincoln and
Palmerston achieving the same degree of ineptitude. If we shoot
Lincoln and have Palmerston resign or drop dead would Hamlin & Russell
be more likely to end up on the slippery slope to war ? Dunno, but
ISTM that it would be obvious to TPTW - with the apparent exception of
William Henry Seward - that a war would be in the interest neither of
Britain nor of the USA.

In short, not with OTL's Governments, excepting some utterly bizarre
chain of events. Not that such a chain of accidents is impossible,
history is full of weirdness, but it's not terribly plausible. [I
haven't read Mr Webb's post yet, but perhaps we tend to be overly
impressed by the superficially plausible at the expense of the
byzantine twists and turns that real history is replete with ?]

Alas, reading David Tenner's posts on Millard Fillmore, it does seem
that Chalker's _Now Falls the Cold, Cold Night_ is complete crap. It
would have created an *ACW in which Britain would have been more
likely to intervene. Pity. Failing that a USA which had invaded Cuba
in the 1850s would be more likely to attract British opprobrium. But
the CSA in such a TL would be even more suspect than IOTL. I don't
think "54-40 or Fight" helps much. Sitting here I came come up with an
implausible series of events which produce an *ACW in which Britain is
almost certain to intervene, but I'd have to start somewhere after
1774 and before 1815. That's not very much use even if it would tie
together a lot of good ideas posted here in the past.

Perhaps someone else can come up with a neat solution to the problem.

Angus
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-17 01:27:33 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 16 Jul 2003 19:24:00 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
(b) British recognition of the CSA.
This fails the Brooks test - what's in it for Britain ? We could
always quote the PM of the day. "We have no eternal allies and we have
no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and
those interests it is our duty to follow." Those interests are not
served by recognising the CSA unless and until the CSA has clearly
demonstrated that it is independent by winning the Civil War.
And this may even fail for the same reasons as give in (a). Even if we
could finagle British recognition it may not provoke a US declaration
of war. It may make a war over some future crisis more likely, but
that's another matter.
I agree that a recognition as POD is very unlikely if not ASB time.
Post by Angus McLellan
(c) British diplomatic intervention.
Essentially fails for (a) and (b) combined. There is no reason for the
British to try very hard to broker peace if the US says no, there's
nothing in it for Britain. The US is unlikely to declare war unless
the British persist in a very improbable fashion. Again we can quote
the PM of the day on the idea.
"They who in quarrels interpose,
will often get a bloody nose."
Even if PM Gladstone and President Seward could easily have bungled
their way into a war, it's not so easy to imagine Lincoln and
Palmerston achieving the same degree of ineptitude. If we shoot
Lincoln and have Palmerston resign or drop dead would Hamlin & Russell
be more likely to end up on the slippery slope to war ? Dunno, but
ISTM that it would be obvious to TPTW - with the apparent exception of
William Henry Seward - that a war would be in the interest neither of
Britain nor of the USA.
In short, not with OTL's Governments, excepting some utterly bizarre
chain of events. Not that such a chain of accidents is impossible,
history is full of weirdness, but it's not terribly plausible. [I
haven't read Mr Webb's post yet, but perhaps we tend to be overly
impressed by the superficially plausible at the expense of the
byzantine twists and turns that real history is replete with ?]
Alas, reading David Tenner's posts on Millard Fillmore, it does seem
that Chalker's _Now Falls the Cold, Cold Night_ is complete crap. It
would have created an *ACW in which Britain would have been more
likely to intervene. Pity. Failing that a USA which had invaded Cuba
in the 1850s would be more likely to attract British opprobrium. But
the CSA in such a TL would be even more suspect than IOTL. I don't
think "54-40 or Fight" helps much. Sitting here I came come up with an
implausible series of events which produce an *ACW in which Britain is
almost certain to intervene, but I'd have to start somewhere after
1774 and before 1815. That's not very much use even if it would tie
together a lot of good ideas posted here in the past.
Perhaps someone else can come up with a neat solution to the problem.
Angus
One other possibility.

Stop anyone from explaining to Russell that his beloved precedents and
the nascent international Law of the day make recognition of the CSA
an act of war. This is what, historically, ended Russels interest in
the late 1862 round of 'let's broker a peace and stop the Carnage".
Russel seems, from his commetents and such, to have felt a real
anguish over the carnage and a "Christian Duty as a Englishman" to do
something about it. His devotion to the rule of law, however, allowed
the then Secretary of State for War, George Lewis, to get around it.

This is about the only even vaguely plausible handle I can find to get
such involvement and I am not all that convinced IT does not require
the flapping of wings in a vacuum.
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-17 01:53:07 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 16 Jul 2003 19:24:00 +0200, Angus McLellan
Post by Angus McLellan
Post by President William Jennings Bryan
Post by Wesley Taylor
On Sun, 13 Jul 2003 20:52:29 +0200, Angus McLellan
Actually, unless the British do something that forces Lincolns hand
(not likely, but miscalculations (happen) I can see NO way to get the
Lincoln administration to declare war. I can see damn few ways to get
the miscalculation. That is my core problem with the POD here. It is
the entire reason why I think Trent is a bust as a POD for a UK/US
war.
Just out of curiosity, what do you think would be a suitable POD for a
UK/US war around this time period? Thanks for your imput.
I don't know what Wes thinks, but I would say we can eliminate a
number of wizard wheezes before we start.
(a) Lincoln declaring war as a result of Pam's telegram, also Lincoln
refusing to back down over the Trent, Delivery of the Laird Rams, and
similar.
Even if it's on the lines Ray Speer suggested in
Everything we know suggests that Lincoln would have stuck to his
policy of "one war at a time".
In order to get a war we have to get around this. This means that
either

a) Lincoln does not declare war, Pam (0r the relpacement) does, or

b) something forces Lincolns hand, making him have no choice.

Given that Pam is not an idiot and can see no benifit for such a war
either, that means that some F ing great miscalcultation that cannot
easily be backed away from has to happen. While possible, it ain;t
gonna be easy.

k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
2003-07-12 22:32:26 UTC
Permalink
Legally the federal government based on my read of the constitution
and that treaty has no legal soverignty or power other than that
deligated to it by the states.
The Federal Government did not exist when the Treaty of Paris was
signed come to that neither did IIRC your constitution. What was the
preamble in the treaty that ended the war of 1812?

American constitutional history is not a major interest of mine but
even I know that the government at the end of the war of independence
was not the same as the government set up by the constitutional
conference.

Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk

Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
Al Montestruc
2003-07-13 13:36:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Legally the federal government based on my read of the constitution
and that treaty has no legal soverignty or power other than that
deligated to it by the states.
The Federal Government did not exist when the Treaty of Paris was
signed
WRONG!! the federal government existed since well before the end of
the revolution. The continetal congress was it's first legislative
body.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
come to that neither did IIRC your constitution.
Correct, however THAT constitution, in the very supremacy clause that
Abraxus likes to quote asserts that previous treaties entered into by
the United States were not only valid, but were the law of the land.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
What was the
preamble in the treaty that ended the war of 1812?
Not pertinent
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
American constitutional history is not a major interest of mine but
even I know that the government at the end of the war of independence
was not the same as the government set up by the constitutional
conference.
Reorganized yes, but we did not declare all treaties invalid, exactly
the reverse in fact.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Ken Young
Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
Wesley Taylor
2003-07-13 14:55:24 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Legally the federal government based on my read of the constitution
and that treaty has no legal soverignty or power other than that
deligated to it by the states.
The Federal Government did not exist when the Treaty of Paris was
signed
WRONG!! the federal government existed since well before the end of
the revolution. The continetal congress was it's first legislative
body.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
come to that neither did IIRC your constitution.
Correct, however THAT constitution, in the very supremacy clause that
Abraxus likes to quote asserts that previous treaties entered into by
the United States were not only valid, but were the law of the land.
The same document mentions that it is a successor governing document
to the Articles of Confederation and does not void them, merely
alters. The AoC are EXPLICITLY perpetual in nature with not exit
mechanism provided.
Al Montestruc
2003-07-13 19:20:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wesley Taylor
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Legally the federal government based on my read of the constitution
and that treaty has no legal soverignty or power other than that
deligated to it by the states.
The Federal Government did not exist when the Treaty of Paris was
signed
WRONG!! the federal government existed since well before the end of
the revolution. The continetal congress was it's first legislative
body.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
come to that neither did IIRC your constitution.
Correct, however THAT constitution, in the very supremacy clause that
Abraxus likes to quote asserts that previous treaties entered into by
the United States were not only valid, but were the law of the land.
The same document mentions that it is a successor governing document
to the Articles of Confederation
So? that does not make the articles of confederation law under the
current constitution. If you think it does cite it article section
and paragraph where it references the AoC. I cite article VI,
paragraph 1 and 2

--quote

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption
of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States
under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.

----end quote

The first paragraph establishes continuity of government, the second
ratifies all treaties signed off on VOIDS THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, as the Articles are not a treaty, and not part of "this
constitution". Nowhere does it assert that the articles are still in
force, and they could not be because the basic organizaton of the
federal government under the AoC was very different. You cannot
cherry pick parts of the AoC and assert they apply to the US
government as the whole point of the constitution was to scrap the AoC
and start over.
Post by Wesley Taylor
and does not void them, merely
alters.
Bullshit. The Articles of Confederation are dead as far as law goes.
Post by Wesley Taylor
The AoC are EXPLICITLY perpetual in nature with not exit
mechanism provided.
The Articles are dead as far as law goes.
k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
2003-07-13 17:11:34 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
WRONG!! the federal government existed since well before the end of
the revolution. The continetal congress was it's first legislative
body.
No, the Federal Government as now constituted was the result of the
Constitutional Congress. While I am not going to argue that no Federal
Government existed before that point, this has no bearing on the
Government's powers at the time of your Civil War.
Post by Al Montestruc
Correct, however THAT constitution, in the very supremacy clause
that Abraxus likes to quote asserts that previous treaties entered
into by the United States were not only valid, but were the law of
the land.
Really? While abrogating treaties was frowned on by the International
Community in the 18th and 19th Century the existence of a mutual
defence treaty with France did not involve the US in the Napoleonic
Wars or stop the Quasi War. By the way the recognition of treaties
made by a previous Governmental organisation means sod all, except
that you do not wish to piss off the other treaty partners. It has
nothing to do with the internal legal position of the US
Post by Al Montestruc
Not pertinent
Why not? That was a treaty made under the constitution that was in
force at the start of your Civil War?
Post by Al Montestruc
Reorganized yes, but we did not declare all treaties invalid,
exactly the reverse in fact.
So what, the relevant legal position is that existing when your Civil
War broke out. There are many reasons for not abrogating treaties.
Cancelling the existing ones would have meant that the independence of
the US was no longer on a legal basis in International Law.

Now you seem to be defending a group of states that broke away from
the US because they feared enslaving people of a different colour. You
also seem to want to do it without mentioning slavery. Instead you are
relying on dubious legal arguments. Quite why the South wanted to
continue a system that had been discredited on moral and economic
grounds by just about every other Westernised nation by 1860 escapes
me. It seems to escape you as well, or you would not be arguing legal
fine print but defending slavery instead.

The judgement of Southern leaders of the time does not impress me
either. Their only hope of success was avoiding a conflict instead
they started it. Starving Fort Sumpter out would have been far less
provocative. It seems to me that the only way the South lasted as long
as it did was the total incompetence of the Union.

I have never understood this fascination with the Confederacy, they
are just as revolting as every other side involved in civil war, it
tends to bring out the worst in people. If you want to argue possible
different results fine, but trying to justify any civil war is not.


Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk

Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
Al Montestruc
2003-07-13 23:00:15 UTC
Permalink
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Post by Al Montestruc
WRONG!! the federal government existed since well before the end of
the revolution. The continetal congress was it's first legislative
body.
No, the Federal Government as now constituted was the result of the
Constitutional Congress. While I am not going to argue that no Federal
Government existed before that point, this has no bearing on the
Government's powers at the time of your Civil War.
Agree that the government was reorganized with different powers.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Post by Al Montestruc
Correct, however THAT constitution, in the very supremacy clause
that Abraxus likes to quote asserts that previous treaties entered
into by the United States were not only valid, but were the law of
the land.
Really?
YES really it literally says that the constitution, laws maid by
congress and treaties made by the US are the law of land. look it up
article vi first and second paragraph.

www.constitution.org


--------snip
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Post by Al Montestruc
Not pertinent
Why not? That was a treaty made under the constitution that was in
force at the start of your Civil War?
Post by Al Montestruc
Reorganized yes, but we did not declare all treaties invalid,
exactly the reverse in fact.
So what, the relevant legal position is that existing when your Civil
War broke out.
Which was that states were sovereign as per the treaty of paris of
1783. You can find no documentation of any state surrendering
sovereignty to the federal government, only deligating it. Deligated
powers can be undeligated.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
There are many reasons for not abrogating treaties.
Cancelling the existing ones would have meant that the independence of
the US was no longer on a legal basis in International Law.
Problem is that the states in that treaty were recognized as
independent and sovereign, not the USA as a seperate enetity.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Now you seem to be defending a group of states that broke away from
the US because they feared enslaving people of a different colour. You
also seem to want to do it without mentioning slavery. Instead you are
relying on dubious legal arguments.
They only seem dubious to you because you don't read the supporting
documentation.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Quite why the South wanted to
continue a system that had been discredited on moral and economic
grounds
By 1860?? Hell if you want to assert that slavery was morally
discredited, it was more so by the revolt of Sparticus. That is
neither here nor their. In 1860 slavery was legal in the USA and very
few people in the USA or even the UK were working seriously to end it.

I do not recall any battalions of abolitionists from the UK enlisting
in the US Army to end slavery. I do not recall the UK sending troops
to end slavery in Brazil either. Nor do I see many people of any
nation or race doing much to end slave trading in Africa now which the
Arabs still practice, nor do I see serious effort to end the
enslavement of young women from eastern europe for the sex trade
either.

Slavery continues to this day as a moneymaking enterprise. It is no
longer "officially" legal in any country that I am aware of, however
it is openly practiced in some places and you can get yourself killed
attempting to free a slave.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
by just about every other Westernised nation by 1860 escapes
me.
It was still done in Brazil for many years after that, defacto if not
dejue it is now still done in many latin american countries with
indians taking the place of blacks and the hold over them not being
ownership of the person, but rather ownership of the land they farm,
technically it is surfdom.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
It seems to escape you as well, or you would not be arguing legal
fine print but defending slavery instead.
Why do you think I would ever defend slavery?
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
The judgement of Southern leaders of the time does not impress me
either. Their only hope of success was avoiding a conflict instead
they started it. Starving Fort Sumpter out would have been far less
provocative.
Read the day by day history of the decision made by confederate
leaders, and first UNDERSAND their positions and attitudes.

What they did was reasonable from what they knew at the time.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
It seems to me that the only way the South lasted as long
as it did was the total incompetence of the Union.
I have never understood this fascination with the Confederacy, they
are just as revolting as every other side involved in civil war, it
tends to bring out the worst in people. If you want to argue possible
different results fine, but trying to justify any civil war is not.
It was a vastly different "civil war" than any other. The more
accurate term is that used by the south of the "war between the
states". The south fought because it was invaded, no other reason.
The arguement about the south starting the war at Sumpter requires
that you assume that the union was right in order to assert the south
started the war at sumpter. Southerners were American citizens prior
to secession, and had legitimate claim to a reasonable share of
federal property. For the federal government to assert they have the
right to keep a manned fort with cannon able to shell ships and the
city in charlestown harbor after secession is an act of war.
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Ken Young
Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
jlk7e
2003-07-14 04:43:07 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Why not? That was a treaty made under the constitution that was in
force at the start of your Civil War?
Post by Al Montestruc
Reorganized yes, but we did not declare all treaties invalid,
exactly the reverse in fact.
So what, the relevant legal position is that existing when your Civil
War broke out.
Which was that states were sovereign as per the treaty of paris of
1783. You can find no documentation of any state surrendering
sovereignty to the federal government, only deligating it. Deligated
powers can be undeligated.
The Treaty of Paris of 1783 had little to do with the question of
whether the individual states were sovereign. What it did was
recognize that the states were now independent of Great Britain. And
whatever sovereignty the states may have had in 1783, they gave up
certain aspects of it by adopting the federal constitution of 1787.
Specifically, they no longer had a right to unilaterally nullify
federal law. Federal law prescribed certain obligations of the
states, particularly with regard to tariff collection, and set no
procedure for a state to leave the union.

In what possible way can the ordinances of secession be viewed as
constitutional. Not only was there no mandate in the U.S.
Constitution for an elected convention by the state to decide to
secede from the union (with or without a supporting referendum), but
there was, so far as I no, no procedures of this sort enshrined in any
state constitution. Ordinances of secession were illegal documents
produced by irregularly created bodies with no mandate in either
federal or state law, and they bore no force whatsoever. The
subsequent actions of the legally constituted state governments in
seizing federal facilities and refusing to obey federal laws thus
constituted treason.

Among other things, this was basically found to be the case by the
Supreme Court after the war, and thus is the final word on the
interpretation of that part of the constitution, as far as modern
jurisprudence is concerned. And at the time,

As far as the importance of slavery in causing the
war/confederacy/secession, you constantly focus on how the *north*
didn't consider abolishing slavery to be a cause of the war. But this
is utterly irrelevant. Secession was entirely brought about to
protect slavery. Take a look at Mr. Stephens' Cornerstone Speech,
when he says that Jefferson was wrong to say that all men are created
equal, and that the Confederacy was improving on the founders' work by
creating a country explicitly based on the premise of the inferiority
of black people to white people. Secession, and thus the Confederacy,
were entirely about slavery, and since it was the secession which
brought on the war, the war was as well. To try to deny this is
simply ridiculous.

Further, what exactly are your motives in this question? Why expend
so much energy defending what was, in essence, a morally indefensible
monstrosity? You point out that slavery was not unique to the
Confederacy. On the other hand, as Senator Stephens himself noted,
the Confederacy was unique in being a country whose raison d'etre was
the preservation of a particularly brutal form of slavery.

Even if your legal arguments did hold water, what do you possibly gain
by proving your point? If everyone were to admit you were right, that
secession was legal, and so forth, what then? I mean, there are other
horrible things involving slavery and the federal constitution that no
one debates. That the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was constitutional,
for instance, is not so much debated. But that does not make it
morally justifiable, rather it tarnishes the constitution. I tend to
think that if the constitution did allow a state that is dissatisfied
with the result of a presidential election to leave the country
entirely, this would simply be another blemish on that 200 year old
document, showing that the founders had not particularly thought
through their actions very well. Nor would illegality impugn the
morality of the northern war to restore the union, especially when the
causes for the war expanded to include the abolition of slavery.
After all, the American Revolution was absolutely and completely
illegal by any legal standards in place at the time it was carried
out. Every single signer of the Declaration of Independence, and
everyone who took arms against their lawful king in the continental
army was, according to British and colonial law, a traitor pure and
simple. This is a cut and dry case of treason and illegality, unlike
your arguments about the supposed illegality of the north's war
against the south, which are murky at best. Does this make the
founders' cause immoral and unjustified?
Al Montestruc
2003-07-14 17:31:13 UTC
Permalink
Post by jlk7e
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Why not? That was a treaty made under the constitution that was in
force at the start of your Civil War?
Post by Al Montestruc
Reorganized yes, but we did not declare all treaties invalid,
exactly the reverse in fact.
So what, the relevant legal position is that existing when your Civil
War broke out.
Which was that states were sovereign as per the treaty of paris of
1783. You can find no documentation of any state surrendering
sovereignty to the federal government, only deligating it. Deligated
powers can be undeligated.
The Treaty of Paris of 1783 had little to do with the question of
whether the individual states were sovereign.
Oh my God what a pile of horse manure!! If not then why did we, who
at the time were small in population and poor, fight a very long and
very bloody war with the odds stacked against us with the great
wealthy superpower of that era over the subject of who would be
sovereign over the USA?

Who would be sovereign over the land area that was the USA in 1776 was
THE issue of that war. If as some have claimed King George III or his
agents wrote the treaty giving soverignty to the states, and the
people wanted otherwise it would be simple enough for the states to
surrender sovereignty to the federal government. In fact they did
not, they were very careful to *DELIGATE* authority to the US Federal
Governement.
Post by jlk7e
What it did was
recognize that the states were now independent of Great Britain. And
whatever sovereignty the states may have had in 1783, they gave up
certain aspects of it by adopting the federal constitution of 1787.
Really? What clause states that states surrender as opposed to
DELIGATE sovereignty to the federal government?? NONE.
Post by jlk7e
Specifically, they no longer had a right to unilaterally nullify
federal law.
Not and stay inside the USA, agreed. That does not say one cannot
quit the organization and then nullify it.

----------snip BS
Al Montestruc
2003-07-16 03:43:35 UTC
Permalink
---snip
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by jlk7e
The Treaty of Paris of 1783 had little to do with the question of
whether the individual states were sovereign.
Oh my God what a pile of horse manure!! If not then why did we, who
at the time were small in population and poor, fight a very long and
very bloody war with the odds stacked against us with the great
wealthy superpower of that era over the subject of who would be
Sovereign over the USA?
Huh? The point was that the states were independent of Great Britain,
and that Great Britain gave up sovereignty, not that the states were
each, individually sovereign,
Then why does the treaty say that the states name by name are
sovereign, but does not say the USA as a whole is?
which is, I think, more questionable.
Not to someone who can read unbiased.
Were the Swiss cantons each sovereign?
Possibly, I don' know. It is irrelevant to this case as are the other
cases you mention. Are the various member states of the UN or Nato
sovereign??
Post by Al Montestruc
Who would be sovereign over the land area that was the USA in 1776 was
THE issue of that war. If as some have claimed King George III or his
agents wrote the treaty giving sovereignty to the states, and the
people wanted otherwise it would be simple enough for the states to
surrender sovereignty to the federal government. In fact they did
not, they were very careful to *DELIGATE* authority to the US Federal
Governement.
And to set absolutely no procedures for how to undelegate (fine
spelling, by the way) it.
If it does not specify a way to legally undo something, and does not
say it cannot be done, then you reverse the process you used to do it
in the first place, which is what was done. They unratified the
constitution.


---- As you quibble about my spelling, I snip your sentence fragment.
;-)
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by jlk7e
What it did was
recognize that the states were now independent of Great Britain. And
whatever sovereignty the states may have had in 1783, they gave up
certain aspects of it by adopting the federal constitution of 1787.
Really? What clause states that states surrender as opposed to
DELIGATE sovereignty to the federal government?? NONE.
Wait. Powers are *DELEGATED* to the Federal Government by the
Constitution, not by the states.
Which constitution of the USA was written by representatives of the
state governments, and ratified by the state governments individually.
In other words made by the states or at their direction by their
agents. See this quote of article VII of it.

http://www.constitution.org/cons/constitu.htm

----------quote
Article. VII.
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying the Same.
----pause quote

Note only states "ratifying Same" are subject to the constitution.


---resume quote
done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present
---pause quote

Note; Consent of the states is clearly important else it would not be
mentioned.

-----continue quote

the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United
States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto
subscribed our Names,

-----pause quote

---snip signatures of representatives of states CAREFULLY associated
with the state they represented and no representatives not so
associated see website.

-----continue quote

In Convention Monday, September 17th, 1787.

Present

The States of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, MR. Hamilton from New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

Resolved,

That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States in
Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the Recommendation
of its Legislature,
----pause quote

That the people ratify is important, but note the importance of the
people of each state get to separately choose to ratify or not. All
of these state governments are uniformly in the form of a republic,
and held the ideal of popular sovereignty. That does not mean the
people of the United States ratified the Constitution as a majority of
the whole. It means that the people of each state ratified the
constitution as a majority of that state.

Clearly by the political doctrine of that time, the people of that
state WERE the state government in the larger sense of the word.
Post by Al Montestruc
Post by jlk7e
Specifically, they no longer had a right to unilaterally nullify
federal law.
Not and stay inside the USA, agreed. That does not say one cannot
quit the organization and then nullify it.
But there were no procedures laid out for how to quit the United
States.
10th amendment. Read it sometime.
And, as I pointed out before, there was, so far as I know, no
legal basis on which to call secession conventions into existence,
10th amendment, and the fact that the states are sovereign per the
1783 treaty of Paris.

---snip

The points you assert, that I ignore are moot if the states are
sovereign. I concede that IF the states are not sovereign then
secession would be rebellion and against the constitution, thus you
win if you can prove that states are not sovereign.

However if the states were fundamentally sovereign, then your
arguments on most of these subjects are meaningless, as a state can
simply withdraw delegated power to the federal government.

Thus taking the Fort Sumter situation, if the state of South Carolina
held absolute sovereignty over the territory of that state, and
withdrew delegated sovereignty from the USA, then the Constitution of
the USA had no legal meaning inside that state, and the state had an
absolute right to seize the fort and evict anyone by any means
required. If not, then secession was rebellion. So the whole issue
revolves on what I say it does and your side issues are pretty
meaningless.

Your failure to examine and seriously address the issue is the evasion
in this debate.
k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
2003-07-14 19:22:29 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Agree that the government was reorganized with different powers.
From a logical point of view, the fact that there had to be special
provision recognise treaties made by the Continental Congress
indicates that otherwise they would not have been binding on the new
US government. If it was simply a reorganisation of an existing
government those treaties would still have been binding without any
special provision.

Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk

Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
Al Montestruc
2003-07-15 03:37:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Post by Al Montestruc
Agree that the government was reorganized with different powers.
From a logical point of view, the fact that there had to be special
provision recognise treaties made by the Continental Congress
indicates that otherwise they would not have been binding on the new
US government.
Except for the fact that the Constitution specifically ratifies them
as I showed in article VI of the Constitution.

Look if you don't care what the laws and constitution says, you are in
the same league as a Nazi. Even the communists had more respect for
due process and the letter of the law than you are showing.

Unless you conceed that the constitution ratifies the 1783 Treaty of
Paris (and all other treaties the USA had entered into as of the
ratification of the constitution) and so made it binding on the state
and federal governments and the "LAW OF THE LAND" as is specifically
said in Article VI of the constitution of the United States of
America, then this discussion is over, and you have shown you have no
respect at all for the rule of law, and so are not worthy of debate.
k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
2003-07-15 13:34:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Al Montestruc
Except for the fact that the Constitution specifically ratifies them
as I showed in article VI of the Constitution.
Exactly, special provision to ratify treaties. If the actions of the
Continental Congress had been binding on the Federal Government there
would have been no need for these provisions in article VI.

Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk

Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
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