There's a (IMHO extremely strong) argument that
ACW tactics were essentially Napoleonic and anacronistic, but that's
Yes,from VMI to West Point, grads seemed deadset to refight
Jena and so on, when the time for Column charge and the
Grande Batterie were both as dead as the Corsican Ogre himself.
The End of the Conflict showed the way of the following Wars
would be, Trenches, small units,etc.
The carbines look about what I expected, but the Spencers? When were
from 1860 in protype form till the end. Spencer had a hard time
ramping up production enen after the go ahead contracts were signed.
The # produced for Spencers are all over the place, as some don't
list the ones Burnside subcontracted, Navy and Militia orders.
Numbers to be noticable on the battlefield, late 1862
Longterm they broke (in the 2nd War) and saw massive investment from
Didn't one British arms manufacturer go broke, as they had
accepted CSA Cotton Bonds as payment?
GDP of Union = ~ 60 billion (assuming PC GDP of US and CS are
indentical. CS should be higher so this would be an over-estimate)
GDP of British Isles only = ~ 87 billion (excluding colonial GDP)
GDP of CS = ~ 20 billion (same assumptions)
This is what ultimately defeated the CS, a much smaller economy
devestated by the lack of trade vs the quite prosperous North.
but a much closer run in WWII.
Countries that try to punch *far* above thier weight are asking
for disaster:that the preWII GDP of the USA was still 475% larger
than Japan, and while Japan was running at about full tilt
(only able to increase GDP by 16%) The USA was running at near idle,
pumping up GDP 87% when in near full production mode in 1944
A vague factoid is that the US put about 20% of its effort
into the Pacific War, and that 20% includes the very spendy
Manhatten Project and FY1940 Long Range Bomber program
(B-29, and the Convair B-32 had the Boeing effort failed)
The Sleeping Giant. Best not to wake him with a kick to the nuts.
Back to ACW, the North had room to grow, while the Souths
growth had to create/replace missing capacity for deciding
to fight the first Industrialized War.
a USA/CSA matchup is very much like USA/Japan.
A USA/CSA+UK matchup roughly equal Axis vs UK
An advantage, but not of the 'Why in Hell didn't they
Sue for Peace: they were DOOMED!' like you get with
the US/Japan matchup, but a long grinding war that
would not be settled soon.
To do what? Defend Canada? 67,000 local troops and ~120,000 regulars
67k? When? Canadian Premier John A. Macdonald tried for funding 50k
Militia and his government crumbled, with him resigning, and a
change to the Liberals. ITYM 37k, I think thats what the Sedentary
Militia was authorized at.
Stacking up 120k regulars won't be of much use, as most would have
been piled up in Halifax,New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. travel
westwards was difficult. Supplying them, worse.
Assuming the US gets over the Great Lakes (i.e. the British don't send
a single Erebus class Ironclad down the St. Lawence and sink the
entire US flotilla on the lakes)
you mean try not to get sunk passing the 125 gun Fort Montgomery
into Lake Champlain(if it even had the draft to get there) or
the Batteries by Fort Niagra?
they are operating in a cold winter
climate facing scattered militia troops striking their supply line.
Like Folks from Wisconsin, Minnisota, Michigan and upstate New York
didn't know what that cold, white flaky stuff was?
soon as conditions improve, the RN stemas down the St. Lawence cutting
their lines entirely and delivering what in US terms would be a ~10
Corps Field Army.
Interior lines are to the US advantage
Which ISTR relied on *South* American trade.
a big chunk from a period report:
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR
NEUTRAL RIGHTS, BELLIGERENT CLAIMS AND AMERICAN COMMERCE IN THE YEARS
Contrary to the general impression, our main exports to Europe have
not been the weapons of war. It is not possible to find the exports of
big guns; they are not listed in the government statistics. But our
ordnance shipments have not been large. For the nine months from
September 1, 1914, to May 31, 1915, we shipped $34,000,000 of
munitions, compared with $6,000,000 in the same nine months of the
previous year. In munitions are included: firearms, cartridges,
gunpowder and other explosives except dynamite. The increase in
munitions exports is seen to be only $28,000,000. To be sure, shrapnel
is not included in the munitions list; it also cannot be found in the
official export figures. Even if we could add the statistics for
ordnance and shrapnel, the larger figure would not go far towards
explaining the vast growth of our export balance since November, 1914.
The explanation for our great increase in exports is found rather in
the group we call food, especially in breadstuffs. By breadstuff's are
meant flour and grain, except oats, the latter cereal being more
correctly classed as forage. Some of the reasons why the European
demand for our food was especially heavy have already been noted.
Excepting for North America, the grain crops of extra-European
countries in 1914 were below normal. The closing of the Dardanelles
and German control of the Baltic held the great Russian and Balkan
supplies of grain away from belligerent Western Europe. Neutrals like
Scandinavia, Holland, Italy and Greece, which had always bought
largely from the Black Sea, now turned to America. The great rise in
the exports and the price of breadstuffs, especially wheat and wheat
flour, were reviewed in Chapter II. In the nine months ended with May
we shipped $431,000,000 of breadstuffs, compared with $107,000,000 in
the previous year. The growth of $324,000,000 showed that the
disappearance of Germany as an export market for our wheat was far
more than counterbalanced by the great demand of the rest of Europe.
In this one item the growing balance of trade is chiefly explained.
In the case of meat products, a similar development occurred. For some
time the communication of the Allies with the Argentine was unsafe,
owing to German cruisers in the South Atlantic. Even when those seas
were cleared, our shipments continued large, the vast supplies
required to provision the armies of the Allies causing a recovery of
our export meat trade, which for a decade had been on the decline. The
demands for a fighting army are far above those for the same number of
men in peaceful occupations.(26) The European population in the field
has advanced to a scale of living which it never knew before. Further
contributing causes to the large meat orders from this country
included the German occupation of part of the producing area of
France; and the large. purchases made by American relief bodies on
behalf of the Belgians. We exported in the nine months $160,000,000 of
meat products, $54,000,000 more than in the same months of the
previous year. We sent $11,000,000 of dairy products, an increase of
A similar advance was in our shipments of sugar. The stoppage of
German exports to England resulted in keeping nearly half a million
tons of German sugar at home, where it was made into cattle fodder.
England therefore had to turn to us for her supply. To prevent a too
great increase in price, she tried the experiment, which was not
altogether happy, of a government monopoly of the purchase and
distribution of sugar. Our sugar exports in the nine months to the end
of May amounted to $21,000,000, which was $20,000,000 more than in the
same months of the year before. Finally, there was a growth of
$4,600,000 in our shipments of vegetables.
In forage there has been another remarkable increase. In the nine
months' period we exported $71,000,000 of forage: oats, hay,
cottonseed cake and meal. This was $60,000,000 more than in the same
months of the year before. Five-sixths of the increase was in the item
of oats alone. As will appear later, our exports of forage were
paralleled by our shipments of horses and mules to eat the forage;
that is, to eat it for the brief period during which an army horse or
mule continues to enjoy the gustatory pleasures of this world.
Another great group of exports was hides, leather and, footwear, not
including harness and saddlery, which belong better in the category of
war supplies. The largest increase was in unworked leather and
miscellaneous leather products, though there has been a notable
movement of men's shoes and of hides. In the whole group we exported
$68,000,000 or $48,000,000 more than in the same months a year ago.
Somewhat closer to the business of war were our exports of textile
manufactures, mostly the result of great equipment orders from the
Allies. Probably the largest single item was blankets, then woolen
uniforms, then cotton knit goods. Of these items and of wool and
woolen rags we sent abroad $35,000,000, which is $30,000,000 more than
Nearer yet to the direct equipment of war we may make a group called
war supplies. It includes horses, mules, harness and saddles,
aeroplanes, commercial automobiles, automobile tires, wagons, gas oil
and fuel oil, barbed wire, horseshoes and surgical appliances. The
largest increase in this group was in the means of transport: horses,
mules, commercial automobiles. In nine months ending May 31, 1915, we
sent to the war 250,000 horses, compared with 18,000 in the same
period of the year before. We sent 53,000 mules, compared with 4,000
in 1913-1914. We exported $30,000,000 of commercial automobiles, which
is $29,000,000 more than in the previous year. In the whole group of
war supplies we sent abroad $148,000,000, an increase of $119,000,000
over the year before.
It is apparent that up to the present time our great contributions to
the carrying on of the war have been indirect contributions rather
than munitions. Greater than the increase in munitions exports has
been the increase in material for making munitions. Under this head
should be included lead, zinc, brass and brass manufactures, wire
rods, steel billets and metal working machinery. The last item means
lathes for turning out shrapnel. American lathe makers have been
totally unable to meet the demand for their product on the part of
those in this country and abroad who have shell orders to fill. In
this whole group the exports of zinc---generally called
spelter---overshadow all others. This is because the German and
Belgian stocks of spelter, which normally supply the world outside the
United States, are cut off from the Allies. Spelter accounts for over
one-third of the increase in the group, the foreign sales of which
amounted to $62,000,000 in the nine months ending May 31, $46,000,000
more than in the same months of the year before.
you can see where the bullets and beans were coming from.
A lot to lose, IMHO, esp if the US was to drift into the CP camp,
rather than neutrality
That last paragraph directly impacts on small arms and QF cannons.
Postwar, it was related that DuPont literally made a 'killing'
on ordnance and shrapnel sales, alluded to in the first paragraph.