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Years ago there was a great ATL timeline developed in s.h.w-i with Hughes in the White House. A different approach to armed neutrality working with other neutral carriers (e.g., no Wilson to alienate Netherlands, Norway, etc. in the early war years), and different consequences to the map of Europe post WWI.
If Woodrow Wilson is elected President in 1920, Grover Cleveland style, and lives for a substantial amount of his term 1921-25, I wonder what domestic reform legislation he would pursue and what his foreign policy would involve.
In all three of the substantial President Hughes TLs I've seen, Hughes and the Republicans lose the election of 1920 from postwar backlash and hangover. In at least two of them, Woodrow Wilson makes a comeback in 1920 (in Mike Stone's, he dies between election and inauguration, in another, he lives out most or all of his term in the 1920s).
The most common presumptions about what Hughes would have left him would be:
a) a "Reservationist" League of Nations without Article X
b) a joint Anglo-American guarantee of France
c) the US signing the same peace treaty with Germany everybody else does
However, Wilson will of course criticize Hughes, including the peacemaking, in the election campaign.
How would Wilson deal with foreign policy questions of the day (1921 and after) in comparison to the Harding Administration of OTL which featured Hughes as Secretary of State?
Issues would include questions of reparations in Europe, and war debts,
Would Wilson keep the French guarantee or repudiate it or go on record saying it should not be renewed?
Would Wilson or a Democratic successor recognize the USSR in the 1920s?
Would he perhaps set a date for Filipino independence to occur earlier than OTL, i.e. in the 1920s or 1930s?
Would naval treaties and Far Eastern policy go similarly to OTL's Washington Treaties?
---Here I could think of a few reasons it might be different-
a) Wilson might favor unilateral fleet cuts (or might not), possibly changing the US bargaining position.
b) He might deal differently, perhaps being more confrontational with Japan over questions like Shantung and Siberia, than President Harding was.
c) An Anglo-American alliance covering France could change the dynamics of arms control and diplomacy in the Far East.
For instance, with a precedent established for an alliance in Europe supplementing the League of Nations, can and will America still persuade London to end the Japanese alliance? Perhaps the French alliance is an excuse to keep the Japanese? Even if the US presses Britain to drop the Anglo-Japanese alliance and London goes along with that, Japan will have to be concerned that the Anglo-American-French guarantee extends to the Far East as well as Europe, whatever the letter of the agreement says.
The Japanese will not be convinced that Anglo-American collusion will not happen in the Far East. If the Japanese reckon they are facing an Anglo-American alliance that applies to the Pacific (possible also encompassing French Indochina) the Japanese may find the 5:5:3 ratio of capital ships absolutely unacceptable.
In Europe, will an Anglo-American guarantee of France raise the question in Rome and Brussels, "why don't we have the same guarantee?"
Will Anglo-American allies, now more embroiled by France in the affairs of the continent, either insist or try to discourage France from making alliances in Central Europe, because those could daisy-chain them into a war over "a far away place of which they know little?"