Discussion:
Hitler demands peace in 1941.
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SolomonW
2017-06-03 13:30:29 UTC
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In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.

While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.

As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Don Phillipson
2017-06-03 14:32:28 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Problem #1: the boundaries drawn at Brest Litovsk in 1917 were
superseded by those fixed in 1918-19 by local wars, ultimately
approved by the League of Nations and thereafter accepted de
facto even by non-signatories (the USSR and Weimar Germany)
(although Mein Kampf's treatment of Lebensraum ignored all
official boundaries.)
Post by SolomonW
. . . states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
Omission: some reason for Stalin to accept this promise after (1) the
anti-Comintern Axis, (2) Barbarossa 1941 in breach of the Nazi-Soviet
pact on Poland of 1939.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
SolomonW
2017-06-04 02:19:38 UTC
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Post by Don Phillipson
Post by SolomonW
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Problem #1: the boundaries drawn at Brest Litovsk in 1917 were
superseded by those fixed in 1918-19 by local wars, ultimately
approved by the League of Nations and thereafter accepted de
facto even by non-signatories (the USSR and Weimar Germany)
(although Mein Kampf's treatment of Lebensraum ignored all
official boundaries.)
This is not a major issue
Post by Don Phillipson
Post by SolomonW
. . . states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
Omission: some reason for Stalin to accept this promise after (1) the
anti-Comintern Axis, (2) Barbarossa 1941 in breach of the Nazi-Soviet
pact on Poland of 1939.
Well we do know at the begining of Operation Barbarossa Stalin was willing
to make terms.
John Dallman
2017-06-03 14:50:00 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the
German forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet
capital. Does Stalin accept the peace offer???
That depends if he thinks he has a better chance to win in a later war.
He would be sure that another war would be inevitable, and that Hitler
would think the same way.

As of autumn 1941, he's beginning to get some aid from the British, but
it isn't very significant. The factories that were evacuated eastwards
are beginning to come back on-line, but only beginning.

Stalin needs Soviet industry to be on a war footing to try to catch up
with Germany if he takes the peace offer, and that's easier if there's an
actual war. He doesn't care much about the suffering of his people, but
needs them alive to work, and fight in the new war.

It could go either way, really.

John
SolomonW
2017-06-04 02:20:07 UTC
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Post by John Dallman
It could go either way, really.
That is my view too.
Alex Milman
2017-06-03 16:50:58 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Among quite a few other things about which you seemingly did not hear was
a fact that Moscow was evacuated: aka, its potential fall was not considered
by the Soviets as a token event for capitulation.

Of course, as was already pointed out, why would at that point Stalin trust
anything Hitler said and why, out of all possible proposals, would Hitler
chose something as irrelevant as Brest-Litovsk?

Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
SolomonW
2017-06-04 02:27:28 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Among quite a few other things about which you seemingly did not hear was
a fact that Moscow was evacuated: aka, its potential fall was not considered
by the Soviets as a token event for capitulation.
Moscow would still be a major blow, that is why so much of the SU forces
were devoted to trying to save it.
Post by Alex Milman
Of course, as was already pointed out, why would at that point Stalin trust
anything Hitler said and why, out of all possible proposals,
Stalin at this time was considering to make terms

http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/06/20/archives-show-stalin-was-ready-to-give-hitler-ukraine-and-the-baltics-euromaidan-press/#arvlbdata


One advantage is Stalin would gain are as by this time SU had lost this
territory already, so he is giving up nothing, plus Stalin gains back much
territory SU had already lost.
Post by Alex Milman
would Hitler
chose something as irrelevant as Brest-Litovsk?
Just because its a quasi-legal contact that sometimes works.
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
We move into Hitler is not Hitler.
Alex Milman
2017-06-04 13:07:40 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Among quite a few other things about which you seemingly did not hear was
a fact that Moscow was evacuated: aka, its potential fall was not considered
by the Soviets as a token event for capitulation.
Moscow would still be a major blow, that is why so much of the SU forces
were devoted to trying to save it.
Any big city was a "major blow" but its fall did not mean the end of a war.
In practical terms, government and industry had been moved out of Moscow
and propaganda worked 24x7 on the analogies with 1812 so both practical and
ideological sides of an issue had been covered.

On the top of the above, the German chances to take Moscow had been looking
more and more slim closer to the end of 1941.

As for the big forces, the Red Army numbers in the area had been roughly
corresponding to those of the Germans: Germans 1,183,693–1,929,406 men, Red Army
1,250,000–1,400,000 men; Germans 1,000 tanks, Red Army 3,232 tanks; Germans
14,000 guns, Red Army 7,600 guns; Germans 549 aircraft, Red Army 936 (545 serviceable), at time of counter offensive: 1,376. German lower tank numbers
clearly show that their offensive capacity was exhausted (and there are numerous
facts confirming it).
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Of course, as was already pointed out, why would at that point Stalin trust
anything Hitler said and why, out of all possible proposals,
Stalin at this time was considering to make terms
http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/06/20/archives-show-stalin-was-ready-to-give-hitler-ukraine-and-the-baltics-euromaidan-press/#arvlbdata
Sorry but Euro Maidan publication is not a credible source. Not
that the text contains anything but unsupported statement.
Post by SolomonW
One advantage is Stalin would gain are as by this time SU had lost this
territory already, so he is giving up nothing, plus Stalin gains back much
territory SU had already lost.
And he would also be able to buy Brooklyne Bridge with a spare change. :-)

Isn't it quite obvious that at this point nobody would trust Hitler?
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
would Hitler
chose something as irrelevant as Brest-Litovsk?
Just because its a quasi-legal contact that sometimes works.
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
We move into Hitler is not Hitler.
For this to be taken seriously you have to start with defining your ATL Hitler,
which you did not.
The Horny Goat
2017-06-05 05:08:04 UTC
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On Sun, 4 Jun 2017 06:07:40 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Really? You mean Stalin didn't have a sister for marriage bait for old
'dolph?

(uh what other parallels can I randomly pull out of my posterior?)

Plus I don't think Stalin ever fawned over Hitler the way Alexander
originally did over Bonaparte. Besides except for people like Moseley,
Quisling and deGrelle I don't think anybody ever saw Hitler in
idealistic terms the way a lot of intellectuals (including Beethoven)
saw Napoleon earlier on.

Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
jerry kraus
2017-06-05 13:11:28 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Sun, 4 Jun 2017 06:07:40 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Really? You mean Stalin didn't have a sister for marriage bait for old
'dolph?
(uh what other parallels can I randomly pull out of my posterior?)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post by The Horny Goat
Plus I don't think Stalin ever fawned over Hitler the way Alexander
originally did over Bonaparte.
Trotsky felt otherwise. And stated so publicly. That's one of the reasons Stalin had him assassinated.

Besides except for people like Moseley,
Post by The Horny Goat
Quisling and deGrelle I don't think anybody ever saw Hitler in
idealistic terms the way a lot of intellectuals (including Beethoven)
saw Napoleon earlier on.
Oh, my oh my Horny. What about Canada's longest serving Prime Minister, Sir William Lyon Mackenzie King, Horny??? Prime Minister King described Hitler as a transcendental philosopher following his fawning state visit to the German Fuhrer in 1937. How quickly we forget, eh Horny? Especially when we'd rather forget, eh?
Post by The Horny Goat
Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
Possibly, exactly the same thing as Prime Minister King, of Canada, saw in him, in 1937. A very determined individual who might be useful to him. Politics makes strange bedfellows.

By the way, Horny. There's something I've always wondered about, but never found an answer to. When Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King of Canada held seances with a professional medium to communicate with his dead dog, to find out how to run the country, how, exactly, did the dog communicate with him? One bark for yes, two barks for no?
The Horny Goat
2017-06-05 19:07:08 UTC
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On Mon, 5 Jun 2017 06:11:28 -0700 (PDT), jerry kraus
Post by The Horny Goat
Besides except for people like Moseley,
Post by The Horny Goat
Quisling and deGrelle I don't think anybody ever saw Hitler in
idealistic terms the way a lot of intellectuals (including Beethoven)
saw Napoleon earlier on.
Oh, my oh my Horny. What about Canada's longest serving Prime Minister, Sir William Lyon Mackenzie King, Horny??? Prime Minister King described Hitler as a transcendental philosopher following his fawning state visit to the German Fuhrer in 1937. How quickly we forget, eh Horny? Especially when we'd rather forget, eh?
Canada entered WW2 about a week after the UK and Australia. The reason
was that unlike the other two the Canadian parliament was not in
session at the time and this was before the days politicians routinely
flew - thus King felt a week was the fastest he could reconvene
Parliament.

Once convened the motion to declare war on Germany took under 30
minutes with the leaders from all parties (and there were definitely
more than two!) wanting to speak before the vote mostly to demonstrate
their patriotism.

Sure King and Charles Lindburgh fawned over Hitler but when war came
there was no doubt that Canada would be involved - not like South
Africa where there was a serious move for neutrality. (Ditto in the
Irish Republic but unlike Canada / Aus / NZ / RSA no one really
expected them to join the Allies)
Post by The Horny Goat
Post by The Horny Goat
Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
Possibly, exactly the same thing as Prime Minister King, of Canada, saw in him, in 1937. A very determined individual who might be useful to him. Politics makes strange bedfellows.
By the way, Horny. There's something I've always wondered about, but never found an answer to. When Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King of Canada held seances with a professional medium to communicate with his dead dog, to find out how to run the country, how, exactly, did the dog communicate with him? One bark for yes, two barks for no?
I have no idea about the dog. It's well known in Canada that King was
highly interested in spirtualism particularly atter his mother's death
but there's equally no doubt that none of this affected his job as
prime minister - he'd have been quickly turfed if it had.

King mostly depended on his Defence minister and Clarence Decauter
Howe (who nickname was "Minister of Everything" - meaning the wartime
economy - Howe was at LEAST as important to King as Beaverbrook was to
Churchill) while King himself forcussed on getting his Liberal party
re-elected in 1940 and 1945 (which he did both times with large
majorities)
Dimensional Traveler
2017-06-05 15:17:29 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Sun, 4 Jun 2017 06:07:40 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Really? You mean Stalin didn't have a sister for marriage bait for old
'dolph?
(uh what other parallels can I randomly pull out of my posterior?)
Plus I don't think Stalin ever fawned over Hitler the way Alexander
originally did over Bonaparte. Besides except for people like Moseley,
Quisling and deGrelle I don't think anybody ever saw Hitler in
idealistic terms the way a lot of intellectuals (including Beethoven)
saw Napoleon earlier on.
Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
Hitler was anti-communist.
--
"That's my secret, Captain: I'm always angry."
The Horny Goat
2017-06-05 19:10:28 UTC
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On Mon, 5 Jun 2017 08:17:29 -0700, Dimensional Traveler
Post by Dimensional Traveler
Post by The Horny Goat
Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
Hitler was anti-communist.
So were Hugenberg and Stresemann - and it was one thing to be a Hitler
supporter in 1933 compared to 1924-25 when Ludendorff supported him.

I've always wondered whether Stresemann surviving longer would have
prevented the Nazis - he was younger than Adenauer after all so it's
NOT ASB territory to have him politically active in the 1930s and 40s.
Alex Milman
2017-06-05 16:05:19 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Sun, 4 Jun 2017 06:07:40 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Really? You mean Stalin didn't have a sister for marriage bait for old
'dolph?
Actually, it was other way around: Nappy made a proposal but was rebuked. :-)
Post by The Horny Goat
(uh what other parallels can I randomly pull out of my posterior?)
Plus I don't think Stalin ever fawned over Hitler the way Alexander
originally did over Bonaparte.
Here you go again: Alexander was playing a role he was forced to play, while
he never ceased to hate Nappy. Can't tell about "fawning" but other than that
Stalin went much further cooperating with Hitler than Alexander with
Napoleon.
Post by The Horny Goat
Besides except for people like Moseley,
Quisling and deGrelle I don't think anybody ever saw Hitler in
idealistic terms the way a lot of intellectuals (including Beethoven)
saw Napoleon earlier on.
How Beethoven is relevant to the Peace of Tilsit, Alexander or anything
else that we discussed?
Post by The Horny Goat
Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
Keep trying ...
The Horny Goat
2017-06-05 19:23:07 UTC
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On Mon, 5 Jun 2017 09:05:19 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
On Sun, 4 Jun 2017 06:07:40 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Really? You mean Stalin didn't have a sister for marriage bait for old
'dolph?
Actually, it was other way around: Nappy made a proposal but was rebuked. :-)
Post by The Horny Goat
(uh what other parallels can I randomly pull out of my posterior?)
Plus I don't think Stalin ever fawned over Hitler the way Alexander
originally did over Bonaparte.
Here you go again: Alexander was playing a role he was forced to play, while
he never ceased to hate Nappy. Can't tell about "fawning" but other than that
Stalin went much further cooperating with Hitler than Alexander with
Napoleon.
Yes I'd say you're definitely right about that. That part about his
sister was a joke and labelled as such.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
Besides except for people like Moseley,
Quisling and deGrelle I don't think anybody ever saw Hitler in
idealistic terms the way a lot of intellectuals (including Beethoven)
saw Napoleon earlier on.
How Beethoven is relevant to the Peace of Tilsit, Alexander or anything
else that we discussed?
My point was that many non-French intellectuals admired Napoleon at
least through 1805 some later. Beethoven was one who did - you
undoubtedly know about his original dedication to the Eroica and how
he changed the subtitle of the second movement.

Lots of Germans admired Hitler but almost no non-German intellectuals
did other than foreign fascists or Nazis.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
Keep trying ...
Actually that was a serious comment - lots of Germans admired him
starting in 1930-31 or thereabouts once the Nazi party had begun to
gather steam - very few admired Hitler in 1924 which is when
Ludendorff joined with the Beer Hall putsch men. Bear in mind in 1924
Ludendorff was a 60 year old distinguished general while Hitler was a
35 year old who at that point had accomplished very little.
jerry kraus
2017-06-06 13:26:22 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Mon, 5 Jun 2017 09:05:19 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
On Sun, 4 Jun 2017 06:07:40 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Really? You mean Stalin didn't have a sister for marriage bait for old
'dolph?
Actually, it was other way around: Nappy made a proposal but was rebuked. :-)
Post by The Horny Goat
(uh what other parallels can I randomly pull out of my posterior?)
Plus I don't think Stalin ever fawned over Hitler the way Alexander
originally did over Bonaparte.
Here you go again: Alexander was playing a role he was forced to play, while
he never ceased to hate Nappy. Can't tell about "fawning" but other than that
Stalin went much further cooperating with Hitler than Alexander with
Napoleon.
Yes I'd say you're definitely right about that. That part about his
sister was a joke and labelled as such.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
Besides except for people like Moseley,
Quisling and deGrelle I don't think anybody ever saw Hitler in
idealistic terms the way a lot of intellectuals (including Beethoven)
saw Napoleon earlier on.
How Beethoven is relevant to the Peace of Tilsit, Alexander or anything
else that we discussed?
My point was that many non-French intellectuals admired Napoleon at
least through 1805 some later. Beethoven was one who did - you
undoubtedly know about his original dedication to the Eroica and how
he changed the subtitle of the second movement.
Lots of Germans admired Hitler but almost no non-German intellectuals
did other than foreign fascists or Nazis.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post by The Horny Goat
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
Am still trying to figure out what Ludendorff saw in Hitler in the mid
1920s.....
Keep trying ...
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post by The Horny Goat
Actually that was a serious comment - lots of Germans admired him
starting in 1930-31 or thereabouts once the Nazi party had begun to
gather steam - very few admired Hitler in 1924 which is when
Ludendorff joined with the Beer Hall putsch men. Bear in mind in 1924
Ludendorff was a 60 year old distinguished general while Hitler was a
35 year old who at that point had accomplished very little.
Ok, Horny, I'll try to give you a "serious" answer to this question. I think the key point here isn't really Hitler, per se. The key point here is Ludendorff.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Ludendorff

"Ludendorff had assiduously sought all of the credit, now he was rewarded with all of the blame. Widely despised, and with revolution breaking out, he was hidden by his brother and a network of friends until he slipped out of Germany disguised in blue spectacles and a false beard,[53] settling in a Swedish admirer’s country home, until the Swedish government asked him to leave in February 1919."

.....

"In exile, Ludendorff wrote numerous books and articles about the German military's conduct of the war while forming the foundation for the Dolchstosslegende, the "stab-in-the-back theory," for which he is considered largely responsible."

....


"Ludendorff was extremely suspicious of the Social Democrats and leftists, whom he blamed for the humiliation of Germany through the Versailles Treaty. Ludendorff claimed that he paid close attention to the business element (especially the Jews), and saw them turn their backs on the war effort by - as he saw it - letting profit, rather than patriotism, dictate production and financing.

Again focusing on the left, Ludendorff was appalled by the strikes that took place towards the end of the war and the way that the home front collapsed before the military front did, with the former poisoning the morale of soldiers on temporary leave. Most importantly, Ludendorff felt that the German people as a whole had underestimated what was at stake in the war; he was convinced that the Entente had started the war and was determined to dismantle Germany completely."

....

On 12 March 1920 5,000 Freikorps troops under the command of Walther von Lüttwitz marched on the Chancellery, forcing the government led by Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Bauer to flee the city. The putschists proclaimed a new government with a right-wing politician, Wolfgang Kapp as new "chancellor". Ludendorff and Max Bauer were part of the putsch. The Kapp Putsch was soon defeated by a general strike that brought Berlin to a standstill. The leaders fled, Ludendorff to Bavaria, where a right-wing coup had succeeded. He published two volumes of annotated —and in a few instances pruned — documents and commentaries documenting his war service.[61]

....

"In May 1923 Ludendorff had an agreeable first meeting with Adolf Hitler, and soon he had regular contacts with National Socialists. On 8 November 1923, the Bavarian Staatskomissar Gustav von Kahr was addressing a jammed meeting in a large beer hall, the Bürgerbräukeller. Hitler, waving a pistol, jumped onto the stage, announcing that the national revolution was underway. The hall was occupied by armed men who covered the audience with a machine gun, the first move in the Beer Hall Putsch. Hitler announced that he would lead the Reich Government and Ludendorff would command the army. The latter was driven over by his surviving stepson Heinz and their servant. He addressed the now enthusiastically supportive audience and then spent the night in the War Ministry, unsuccessfully trying to obtain the army’s backing. The next morning 3,000 armed Nazis formed outside of the Bürgerbräukeller and marched into central Munich, the leaders just behind the flag bearers. They were blocked by a cordon of police, firing broke out for less than a minute. Most of the Nazi leaders were hit or dropped to the ground. Ludendorff and his adjutant Major Streck marched to the police line where they pushed aside the rifle barrels. He was respectfully arrested. He was indignant when sent home while the other leaders remained in custody. Four police officers and 16 Nazis had been killed, including Ludendorff’s servant."



--------------------------------------------------------------------------

As you can see, Horny, General Ludendorff's experiences following and towards the end of the first world war, in particular his humiliation and exile, made him the perfect "comarade in arms" for the young Adolf Hitler. Ludendorff's late life experiences had made him totally paranoid. Hitler, abused as a child, humiliated, impoverished and manipulated as an adult, had every reason to be paranoid, almost from birth. But, Ludendorff had suffered almost comparable humiliations after being one of the greatest men in the German Empire! So, in effect, the older, experienced, well connected paranoid -- Ludendorff -- and the younger, very energetic and determined, up and coming paranoid -- Hitler -- had identical motivations and perfectly complementary abilities! It was a match made in heaven, or, perhaps in HELL!!

Does that answer your question, Horny? It was rather an interesting question, actually.
SolomonW
2017-06-07 11:46:13 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Among quite a few other things about which you seemingly did not hear was
a fact that Moscow was evacuated: aka, its potential fall was not considered
by the Soviets as a token event for capitulation.
Moscow would still be a major blow, that is why so much of the SU forces
were devoted to trying to save it.
Any big city was a "major blow" but its fall did not mean the end of a war.
True but Moscow was no ordinary large city.
Post by Alex Milman
In practical terms, government and industry had been moved out of Moscow
and propaganda worked 24x7 on the analogies with 1812 so both practical and
ideological sides of an issue had been covered.
Much depends on wheher Stalin made it out which he probably would.
Post by Alex Milman
On the top of the above, the German chances to take Moscow had been looking
more and more slim closer to the end of 1941.
As for the big forces, the Red Army numbers in the area had been roughly
corresponding to those of the Germans: Germans 1,183,693–1,929,406 men, Red Army
1,250,000–1,400,000 men; Germans 1,000 tanks, Red Army 3,232 tanks; Germans
14,000 guns, Red Army 7,600 guns; Germans 549 aircraft, Red Army 936 (545 serviceable), at time of counter offensive: 1,376. German lower tank numbers
clearly show that their offensive capacity was exhausted (and there are numerous
facts confirming it).
At the time, it was not seen as impossible by either side.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Of course, as was already pointed out, why would at that point Stalin trust
anything Hitler said and why, out of all possible proposals,
Stalin at this time was considering to make terms
http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/06/20/archives-show-stalin-was-ready-to-give-hitler-ukraine-and-the-baltics-euromaidan-press/#arvlbdata
Sorry but Euro Maidan publication is not a credible source. Not
that the text contains anything but unsupported statement.
It comes out of Novaya Gazeta which is a credible source.

The wikipedia has this to say about it. It does accept that it happened but
it does claim that it happened.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavel_Sudoplatov

In late July 1941, under the orders of Lavrentiy Beria, he met (in a
Georgian restaurant in the centre of Moscow) with the Bulgarian ambassador,
who was the representative of Germany in USSR, at the time. Sudoplatov
asked the ambassador if Hitler would stop penetration of the USSR, in
exchange for giving Germany, a large part of USSR. (No one knows if this
proposition was true or if it was an attempt of USSR to gain time)
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
One advantage is Stalin would gain are as by this time SU had lost this
territory already, so he is giving up nothing, plus Stalin gains back much
territory SU had already lost.
And he would also be able to buy Brooklyne Bridge with a spare change. :-)
It is hardly spare change if the offer was real.
Post by Alex Milman
Isn't it quite obvious that at this point nobody would trust Hitler?
Nor Stalin.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
would Hitler
chose something as irrelevant as Brest-Litovsk?
Just because its a quasi-legal contact that sometimes works.
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Already answered by "The Horny Goat"
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
We move into Hitler is not Hitler.
For this to be taken seriously you have to start with defining your ATL Hitler,
which you did not.
Done see orginal post
Alex Milman
2017-06-07 15:52:44 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Among quite a few other things about which you seemingly did not hear was
a fact that Moscow was evacuated: aka, its potential fall was not considered
by the Soviets as a token event for capitulation.
Moscow would still be a major blow, that is why so much of the SU forces
were devoted to trying to save it.
Any big city was a "major blow" but its fall did not mean the end of a war.
True but Moscow was no ordinary large city.
You have a habit of repeating the same thing time and again totally ignoring
any explanations, just as the correspondents accredited at WH. :-)
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
In practical terms, government and industry had been moved out of Moscow
and propaganda worked 24x7 on the analogies with 1812 so both practical and
ideological sides of an issue had been covered.
Much depends on wheher Stalin made it out which he probably would.
Not "probably", "definitely". To start with, the Germans never had been too
close to Moscow itself in any significant numbers: the anecdotes about seeing
<whatever> in the binoculars related to some patrol and even then rather
questionable and the term "outskirts of Moscow" had been used quite
liberally (anyway, in a vernacular it includes a big territory outside city
proper). The attempts of a wide encirclement failed so an assault would be
a frontal offensive against the big widely-spread city with an extensive
defensive ring around it (the works started in the summer by the big numbers
of mobilized civilians). Affairs like that tend to last for a while if the
defenders are ready to fight and in this specific case they'd have an advantage
of an open rear. So Stalin would have all the time he needed.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
On the top of the above, the German chances to take Moscow had been looking
more and more slim closer to the end of 1941.
As for the big forces, the Red Army numbers in the area had been roughly
corresponding to those of the Germans: Germans 1,183,693–1,929,406 men, Red Army
1,250,000–1,400,000 men; Germans 1,000 tanks, Red Army 3,232 tanks; Germans
14,000 guns, Red Army 7,600 guns; Germans 549 aircraft, Red Army 936 (545 serviceable), at time of counter offensive: 1,376. German lower tank numbers
clearly show that their offensive capacity was exhausted (and there are numerous
facts confirming it).
At the time, it was not seen as impossible by either side.
You keep changing the points you are arguing. :-)

It was not but the points are (a) that the Soviets did not consider it as
the end of a war and (b) that what you said about the big forces was not the
case: the forces defending Moscow were just equal for the task, aka,
approximately equal (or even smaller) in infantry and greater in the mobile
branch, the tanks but smaller in the defensive one (artillery). As a result,
successful counter-offensive could not develop in something much greater
than its immediate task, removal of a direct danger to the city.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Of course, as was already pointed out, why would at that point Stalin trust
anything Hitler said and why, out of all possible proposals,
Stalin at this time was considering to make terms
http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/06/20/archives-show-stalin-was-ready-to-give-hitler-ukraine-and-the-baltics-euromaidan-press/#arvlbdata
Sorry but Euro Maidan publication is not a credible source. Not
that the text contains anything but unsupported statement.
It comes out of Novaya Gazeta which is a credible source.
Novaya Gazeta is, AFAIK, is not a source of the serious scientific researches:
its "credibility" does not go beyond reporting on the current scandals.
In today's Russia you can easily find writings supporting anything including
the direct intervention of the ASB's so unless there is a reference to a
provable contemporary document, I would not give them a second thought.

What, AFAIK, did exist was a fear of FDR & WC that the Soviet defeats of the
1942 may force Stalin to start negotiations with Hitler but this fear was
based not on the discovered activities but rather on the logical conclusions
from the massive losses of territory in the summer of 1942.
Post by SolomonW
The wikipedia has this to say about it. It does accept that it happened but
it does claim that it happened.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavel_Sudoplatov
Look, if you want to keep digging in a pile of a manure, it is entirely up
to you but Sudoplatov as a reliable source was compromised long ago.
Post by SolomonW
In late July 1941, under the orders of Lavrentiy Beria, he met (in a
Georgian restaurant in the centre of Moscow) with the Bulgarian ambassador,
who was the representative of Germany in USSR, at the time. Sudoplatov
asked the ambassador if Hitler would stop penetration of the USSR, in
exchange for giving Germany, a large part of USSR. (No one knows if this
proposition was true or if it was an attempt of USSR to gain time)
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
One advantage is Stalin would gain are as by this time SU had lost this
territory already, so he is giving up nothing, plus Stalin gains back much
territory SU had already lost.
And he would also be able to buy Brooklyne Bridge with a spare change. :-)
It is hardly spare change if the offer was real.
Even if it was, Stalin would be extremely naïve to take it and, if anything,
naiveté was not something routinely associated with him. Most probably, he
would assume that Hitler has some serious problems (of which Stalin may not
be aware) and that agreeing to his proposal is helping him to deal with these
issues and then attack again. Actually, I suspect that his reasoning would be
much more convoluted than mine. :-)
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Isn't it quite obvious that at this point nobody would trust Hitler?
Nor Stalin.
Wrong: FDR, rather naively, was considering him a trustworthy person and
even (as late as 1944) said something to the effect that he agrees to Stalin's
requests in expectation that in response he'll also behave as a gentleman and
fulfill his obligations.

It seems that similar views were not limited to FDR, at least in the US.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
would Hitler
chose something as irrelevant as Brest-Litovsk?
Just because its a quasi-legal contact that sometimes works.
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Already answered by "The Horny Goat"
You mean the part related to the absence of Stalin's sister? :-)
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
We move into Hitler is not Hitler.
For this to be taken seriously you have to start with defining your ATL Hitler,
which you did not.
Done see orginal post
Not done: you simply stated that Hitler suddenly decided to play diplomacy.
The Horny Goat
2017-06-07 16:34:19 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
On Wed, 7 Jun 2017 08:52:44 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Already answered by "The Horny Goat"
You mean the part related to the absence of Stalin's sister? :-)
Oh come on - that was clearly identified as a joke at the time. Unless
you have a WI related to it it needs to die. Besides marriage
alliances only took place between royal houses not Hitler or Stalin.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
We move into Hitler is not Hitler.
Which unfortunately happens all the time here. People here routinely
suggest things which are completely out of character. I hope I'm
joking but about the only things we haven't had here are Napoleon or
Hitler adopting Islam or Sikhism. (please don't!!)
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
For this to be taken seriously you have to start with defining your ATL Hitler,
which you did not.
Done see orginal post
Not done: you simply stated that Hitler suddenly decided to play diplomacy.
The essential point as you've already said is that you can only make a
diplomatic agreement when the other side believes you will actually
carry out your agreement. By 1939 Hitler no longer had that
credibility and even less so by 1941 particularly if preceded by an
attack on the Soviet Union without declaration of war. (By September
1941 the only agreement Hitler was interested in was a surrender)

Which of course is exactly your point.
Alex Milman
2017-06-07 18:03:29 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by The Horny Goat
On Wed, 7 Jun 2017 08:52:44 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Already answered by "The Horny Goat"
You mean the part related to the absence of Stalin's sister? :-)
Oh come on - that was clearly identified as a joke at the time.
Didn't you notice ":-)"?
Post by The Horny Goat
Unless
you have a WI related to it it needs to die.
Which one? Nappy marrying Alexander's sister? Well, there are the following
options:

(a) No further war between France and Russia (had been discussed)
(b) Everything continues as in OTL regardless the marriage with a possible
interesting twist of Nappy's son getting Alexander's support as Napoleon II
(the Brits & Austrians will be against this candidate)
Post by The Horny Goat
Besides marriage
alliances only took place between royal houses not Hitler or Stalin.
Well, just as absence of the available females (a joke). :-)
Post by The Horny Goat
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
We move into Hitler is not Hitler.
Which unfortunately happens all the time here. People here routinely
suggest things which are completely out of character.
Exactly. The premise means a somewhat fundamental change in Hitler's
personality to make such an offer (especially in the midst of the military
successes). It probably means an equally fundamental change for Stalin to
take it.
Post by The Horny Goat
I hope I'm
joking but about the only things we haven't had here are Napoleon or
Hitler adopting Islam or Sikhism. (please don't!!)
Actually, during his Egyptian Campaign Bonaparte was discussing with the
religious authorities of Egypt a possibility for conversion of his army
into Islam (the issues of pork and wine proved to be easily resolvable by
special fatwa). Of course, Nappy was not quite serious but his successor
in Egypt, general Menou, did convert.
Post by The Horny Goat
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
For this to be taken seriously you have to start with defining your ATL Hitler,
which you did not.
Done see orginal post
Not done: you simply stated that Hitler suddenly decided to play diplomacy.
The essential point as you've already said is that you can only make a
diplomatic agreement when the other side believes you will actually
carry out your agreement. By 1939 Hitler no longer had that
credibility
Well, he still did with Stalin. But, of course, not in 1941.
Post by The Horny Goat
and even less so by 1941 particularly if preceded by an
attack on the Soviet Union without declaration of war. (By September
1941 the only agreement Hitler was interested in was a surrender)
Which of course is exactly your point.
And my.
kenney@ cix.co.uk (Kenneth Young)
2017-06-07 17:45:00 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Alex Milman
You have a habit of repeating the same thing time and again totally ignoring
any explanations, just as the correspondents accredited at WH. :-)
You and everybody else seem to be ignoring the point Moscow was a major
railway hub, if it fell there would have been disruption to transport
until alternative routes were built.
The Horny Goat
2017-06-07 18:02:10 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by kenney@ cix.co.uk (Kenneth Young)
You and everybody else seem to be ignoring the point Moscow was a major
railway hub, if it fell there would have been disruption to transport
until alternative routes were built.
That would be a problem even if Moscow were captured and re-taken in
the winter counter-offensive (which I think is the most likely case in
a 'no Kiev pocket' scenario) since there's no way the rail lines would
be intact after changing hands twice.

Actually of all the major European capitals Berlin is about the only
one that isn't a major rail hub though to be sure there are many more
rail lines in Europe generally than in 1945.
Alex Milman
2017-06-07 23:17:15 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by kenney@ cix.co.uk (Kenneth Young)
Post by Alex Milman
You have a habit of repeating the same thing time and again totally ignoring
any explanations, just as the correspondents accredited at WH. :-)
You and everybody else seem to be ignoring the point Moscow was a major
railway hub,
I'm not ignoring that at all. You just fall a victim of the small maps. :-)
Post by kenney@ cix.co.uk (Kenneth Young)
if it fell there would have been disruption to transport
until alternative routes were built.
But there were numerous alternative routes available. The trick is that, with
the Soviet obsession with a secrecy, the generally available maps (or rather
schemas) had been showing only the main railroads. Once I had a chance to
make a look at more detailed map of the railroads in Moscow region: there
were numerous railroads NOT centered on Moscow.

Even without such a map, use very simple logic based on what is easily known.
(a) The major railroads were NOT going THROUGH Moscow: each of them had
passenger and cargo terminals (as in "the last station") inside the city.
(b) There was a SINGLE railroad encircling Moscow, big part of which had only
2 tracks.

In a hub schema all transit traffic would have to go along that encircling
railroad, which simply would not be able to handle that volume. Which means
that most of the transit traffic simply never was getting into Moscow, which
means that there were alternative routes.

The main reason for Moscow being a hub was a fact that it was the major
industrial center, aka, needed a lot of supplies to go in and a lot of
production to go out. Not the case with most of the industry and a big part
of a population being evacuated.
SolomonW
2017-06-08 10:02:00 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Among quite a few other things about which you seemingly did not hear was
a fact that Moscow was evacuated: aka, its potential fall was not considered
by the Soviets as a token event for capitulation.
Moscow would still be a major blow, that is why so much of the SU forces
were devoted to trying to save it.
Any big city was a "major blow" but its fall did not mean the end of a war.
True but Moscow was no ordinary large city.
You have a habit of repeating the same thing time and again totally ignoring
any explanations, just as the correspondents accredited at WH. :-)
Huh? I am reading the above discusion and I do not believe that I have.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
In practical terms, government and industry had been moved out of Moscow
and propaganda worked 24x7 on the analogies with 1812 so both practical and
ideological sides of an issue had been covered.
Much depends on wheher Stalin made it out which he probably would.
Not "probably", "definitely". To start with, the Germans never had been too
close to Moscow itself in any significant numbers: the anecdotes about seeing
<whatever> in the binoculars related to some patrol and even then rather
questionable and the term "outskirts of Moscow" had been used quite
liberally (anyway, in a vernacular it includes a big territory outside city
proper). The attempts of a wide encirclement failed so an assault would be
a frontal offensive against the big widely-spread city with an extensive
defensive ring around it (the works started in the summer by the big numbers
of mobilized civilians). Affairs like that tend to last for a while if the
defenders are ready to fight and in this specific case they'd have an advantage
of an open rear. So Stalin would have all the time he needed.
When I was in Moscow, I saw Stalin bunker and the massive effort to protect
him. I am certian he would have escaped too.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
On the top of the above, the German chances to take Moscow had been looking
more and more slim closer to the end of 1941.
As for the big forces, the Red Army numbers in the area had been roughly
corresponding to those of the Germans: Germans 1,183,693–1,929,406 men, Red Army
1,250,000–1,400,000 men; Germans 1,000 tanks, Red Army 3,232 tanks; Germans
14,000 guns, Red Army 7,600 guns; Germans 549 aircraft, Red Army 936 (545 serviceable), at time of counter offensive: 1,376. German lower tank numbers
clearly show that their offensive capacity was exhausted (and there are numerous
facts confirming it).
At the time, it was not seen as impossible by either side.
You keep changing the points you are arguing. :-)
It was not but the points are (a) that the Soviets did not consider it as
the end of a war
Agreed the Soviet goverment did not but they were very worried.
Post by Alex Milman
and (b) that what you said about the big forces was not the
case: the forces defending Moscow were just equal for the task, aka,
approximately equal (or even smaller) in infantry and greater in the mobile
branch, the tanks but smaller in the defensive one (artillery). As a result,
successful counter-offensive could not develop in something much greater
than its immediate task, removal of a direct danger to the city.
I never said, "big forces," also at the time greatly outnumbered German
forces were defeating SU forces.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Of course, as was already pointed out, why would at that point Stalin trust
anything Hitler said and why, out of all possible proposals,
Stalin at this time was considering to make terms
http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/06/20/archives-show-stalin-was-ready-to-give-hitler-ukraine-and-the-baltics-euromaidan-press/#arvlbdata
Sorry but Euro Maidan publication is not a credible source. Not
that the text contains anything but unsupported statement.
It comes out of Novaya Gazeta which is a credible source.
its "credibility" does not go beyond reporting on the current scandals.
In today's Russia you can easily find writings supporting anything including
the direct intervention of the ASB's so unless there is a reference to a
provable contemporary document, I would not give them a second thought.
It's written by a reputable historian.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikita_Petrov
Post by Alex Milman
What, AFAIK, did exist was a fear of FDR & WC that the Soviet defeats of the
1942 may force Stalin to start negotiations with Hitler but this fear was
based not on the discovered activities but rather on the logical conclusions
from the massive losses of territory in the summer of 1942.
It would be a logical conclusion.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The wikipedia has this to say about it. It does accept that it happened but
it does claim that it happened.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavel_Sudoplatov
Look, if you want to keep digging in a pile of a manure, it is entirely up
to you but Sudoplatov as a reliable source was compromised long ago.
The main source quoted here is
https://www.amazon.com/Special-Tasks-Memoirs-Unwanted-Spymaster/dp/0316773522/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1496915593&sr=8-1&keywords=Special+Tasks%3A+The+Memoirs+of+an+Unwanted+Witness%2C+a+Soviet+Spymaster.

I note that a highly respected historian Robert Conquest wrote the foreword
to it should be an indicator of its value and quality.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In late July 1941, under the orders of Lavrentiy Beria, he met (in a
Georgian restaurant in the centre of Moscow) with the Bulgarian ambassador,
who was the representative of Germany in USSR, at the time. Sudoplatov
asked the ambassador if Hitler would stop penetration of the USSR, in
exchange for giving Germany, a large part of USSR. (No one knows if this
proposition was true or if it was an attempt of USSR to gain time)
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
One advantage is Stalin would gain are as by this time SU had lost this
territory already, so he is giving up nothing, plus Stalin gains back much
territory SU had already lost.
And he would also be able to buy Brooklyne Bridge with a spare change. :-)
It is hardly spare change if the offer was real.
Even if it was, Stalin would be extremely naïve to take it and, if anything,
naiveté was not something routinely associated with him. Most probably, he
would assume that Hitler has some serious problems (of which Stalin may not
be aware) and that agreeing to his proposal is helping him to deal with these
issues and then attack again. Actually, I suspect that his reasoning would be
much more convoluted than mine. :-)
Yes it would be at best a cease fire.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Isn't it quite obvious that at this point nobody would trust Hitler?
Nor Stalin.
Wrong: FDR, rather naively, was considering him a trustworthy person and
even (as late as 1944) said something to the effect that he agrees to Stalin's
requests in expectation that in response he'll also behave as a gentleman and
fulfill his obligations.
It seems that similar views were not limited to FDR, at least in the US.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
would Hitler
chose something as irrelevant as Brest-Litovsk?
Just because its a quasi-legal contact that sometimes works.
By 1941 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approximately as relevant as Treaty of
Tilsit.
Already answered by "The Horny Goat"
You mean the part related to the absence of Stalin's sister? :-)
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, why would, prior to the winter of 1941, Hitler even consider making
any peace proposals?
We move into Hitler is not Hitler.
For this to be taken seriously you have to start with defining your ATL Hitler,
which you did not.
Done see orginal post
Not done: you simply stated that Hitler suddenly decided to play diplomacy.
Indeed
Alex Milman
2017-06-08 17:21:44 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In this POD, Hitler attacks Russia in 1941, as in the OTL. The major
difference in this POD is diplomatic.
While the attack on Russia is taking place Hitler declares publicly that in
its response to SU violations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He then
quietly states to the SU through intermediaries that if the Russian in
accept this treaty and renounce its territorial claims in the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine, he will make peace
based on these borders.
As in the OTL, the SU losses all these territories and more as the German
forces move on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, to seize the Soviet capital
does Stalin accept the peace offer???
Among quite a few other things about which you seemingly did not hear was
a fact that Moscow was evacuated: aka, its potential fall was not considered
by the Soviets as a token event for capitulation.
Moscow would still be a major blow, that is why so much of the SU forces
were devoted to trying to save it.
Any big city was a "major blow" but its fall did not mean the end of a war.
True but Moscow was no ordinary large city.
You have a habit of repeating the same thing time and again totally ignoring
any explanations, just as the correspondents accredited at WH. :-)
Huh? I am reading the above discusion and I do not believe that I have.
It is just below your remark.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
In practical terms, government and industry had been moved out of Moscow
and propaganda worked 24x7 on the analogies with 1812 so both practical and
ideological sides of an issue had been covered.
Much depends on wheher Stalin made it out which he probably would.
Not "probably", "definitely". To start with, the Germans never had been too
close to Moscow itself in any significant numbers: the anecdotes about seeing
<whatever> in the binoculars related to some patrol and even then rather
questionable and the term "outskirts of Moscow" had been used quite
liberally (anyway, in a vernacular it includes a big territory outside city
proper). The attempts of a wide encirclement failed so an assault would be
a frontal offensive against the big widely-spread city with an extensive
defensive ring around it (the works started in the summer by the big numbers
of mobilized civilians). Affairs like that tend to last for a while if the
defenders are ready to fight and in this specific case they'd have an advantage
of an open rear. So Stalin would have all the time he needed.
When I was in Moscow, I saw Stalin bunker and the massive effort to protect
him. I am certian he would have escaped too.
Stalin had more than one of those plus a special subway line. But the point
which you are seemingly ignoring is that taking Moscow would be a long and
complicated operation, especially taking into an account that the German
logistics was already stretched to the extreme.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
On the top of the above, the German chances to take Moscow had been looking
more and more slim closer to the end of 1941.
As for the big forces, the Red Army numbers in the area had been roughly
corresponding to those of the Germans: Germans 1,183,693–1,929,406 men, Red Army
1,250,000–1,400,000 men; Germans 1,000 tanks, Red Army 3,232 tanks; Germans
14,000 guns, Red Army 7,600 guns; Germans 549 aircraft, Red Army 936 (545 serviceable), at time of counter offensive: 1,376. German lower tank numbers
clearly show that their offensive capacity was exhausted (and there are numerous
facts confirming it).
At the time, it was not seen as impossible by either side.
You keep changing the points you are arguing. :-)
It was not but the points are (a) that the Soviets did not consider it as
the end of a war
Agreed the Soviet goverment did not but they were very worried.
There is a huge distance between being "worried" and being ready to cede a
huge part of your territory without any guarantees.

[]
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Of course, as was already pointed out, why would at that point Stalin trust
anything Hitler said and why, out of all possible proposals,
Stalin at this time was considering to make terms
http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/06/20/archives-show-stalin-was-ready-to-give-hitler-ukraine-and-the-baltics-euromaidan-press/#arvlbdata
Sorry but Euro Maidan publication is not a credible source. Not
that the text contains anything but unsupported statement.
It comes out of Novaya Gazeta which is a credible source.
its "credibility" does not go beyond reporting on the current scandals.
In today's Russia you can easily find writings supporting anything including
the direct intervention of the ASB's so unless there is a reference to a
provable contemporary document, I would not give them a second thought.
It's written by a reputable historian.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikita_Petrov
Please, do yourself a favor and read what you are referencing: his
specialization are Soviet political repressions, not top level politics.
But, putting this aside, he can write whatever he wants but unless there is
nothing besides the ancient story told by Sudoplatov, it can't be taken quite seriously.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
What, AFAIK, did exist was a fear of FDR & WC that the Soviet defeats of the
1942 may force Stalin to start negotiations with Hitler but this fear was
based not on the discovered activities but rather on the logical conclusions
from the massive losses of territory in the summer of 1942.
It would be a logical conclusion.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The wikipedia has this to say about it. It does accept that it happened but
it does claim that it happened.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavel_Sudoplatov
Look, if you want to keep digging in a pile of a manure, it is entirely up
to you but Sudoplatov as a reliable source was compromised long ago.
The main source quoted here is
https://www.amazon.com/Special-Tasks-Memoirs-Unwanted-Spymaster/dp/0316773522/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1496915593&sr=8-1&keywords=Special+Tasks%3A+The+Memoirs+of+an+Unwanted+Witness%2C+a+Soviet+Spymaster.
I note that a highly respected historian Robert Conquest wrote the foreword
to it should be an indicator of its value and quality.
Conquest is well known but this is rather irrelevant to the fact that
Sudoplatov not to be trusted unless there was a corroborating source.

At least part of his memoirs related to the Manhattan Project "has been disputed by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia and the F.B.I., and
dismissed by American and Russian scientists and historians."
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
In late July 1941, under the orders of Lavrentiy Beria, he met (in a
Georgian restaurant in the centre of Moscow) with the Bulgarian ambassador,
who was the representative of Germany in USSR, at the time. Sudoplatov
asked the ambassador if Hitler would stop penetration of the USSR, in
exchange for giving Germany, a large part of USSR. (No one knows if this
proposition was true or if it was an attempt of USSR to gain time)
You see: nobody knows because Sudoplatov's word could not be trusted.

To be fair, episode like that really could take place as a part of the
routine espionage games in which spreading disinformation was at least as
important as collecting information.

Of course, the quote above (from Wiki) raises couple questions:

(a) Why Sudoplatov would be used for such a task? In 1941 he was a head of
NKVD's Administration for Special Tasks, the principal task of which was to carry out sabotage operations behind enemy lines in wartime (and assassinations
abroad, like murder of Trotsky) and the alleged episode in Aragvi belongs to
a completely different area of competence.

(b) Why would Beria give such an order to him directly? At that time espionage
activities were under control of Merkulov.

Not that these two factors would make the whole thing absolutely impossible
but combination makes it quite unlikely.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]

Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"

:-)
SolomonW
2017-06-10 22:08:34 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.


http://russia-insider.com/en/society/legendary-georgian-restaurant-aragvi-reopens-moscow/ri14141


http://vectornews.eu/newshead/22506-stalin-was-ready-to-sacrifice-the-baltic-states-and-ukraine.html

According to this book the Bulgarian ambassador is recorded here in
confirming the facts
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=zSJjYFyf-MkC&pg=PA427&lpg=PA427&dq=Ivan+Stamenov&source=bl&ots=sUYCY8kLzw&sig=flLzVUMhgzpRaGHYp_rPb9txgKg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiL3oaKpLTUAhXGG5QKHQMBBKo4ChDoAQg9MAU#v=onepage&q=Ivan%20Stamenov&f=false
Alex Milman
2017-06-11 14:34:07 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.
What is provable is that restaurant existed.
SolomonW
2017-06-11 20:17:10 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.
What is provable is that restaurant existed.
Indeed
Alex Milman
2017-06-11 21:10:25 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.
What is provable is that restaurant existed.
Indeed
Let's try to think logically. The legend says that Beria ordered Sudoplatov
to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador and make a proposal.

Question #1 is why initiative would go through Beria who had nothing to do
with the foreign politics and had zero experience in the diplomatic (or any
other) negotiations?

Question #2 is IF (a BIG "IF") we assume that Beria was by whatever reason
assigned to such a task, why didn't the whole thing went through the normal
chain of command, from Beria to Merkulov?

Question #3 is why <whoever> would chose as a messenger someone who so far
was known just as a master of the high-profile assassinations?

And the obvious question #4 why would any professional diplomat take all that
combination seriously if it obviously looked as a rather clumsy attempt of the
disinformation/provocation/whatever?


So, IF we assume that the meeting did take place it strongly looks as Beria's
clumsy attempt to play games of his own. Keep in mind that he just "ate"
GRU (from 1937 till 1941 there were 7 heads of this organization, 6 of
them executed including de facto creator of the Soviet military intelligence,
Berzin; you can imaginehow many field agents had been executed for the links
to their bosses) and was trying to position GB as its replacement (pretty much
as happened later with SS vs. Abwehr). This can explain a lot of things
including selection of Sudoplatov (at least some "foreign experience").
SolomonW
2017-06-12 01:07:43 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.
What is provable is that restaurant existed.
Indeed
Let's try to think logically. The legend says that Beria ordered Sudoplatov
to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador and make a proposal.
Question #1 is why initiative would go through Beria who had nothing to do
with the foreign politics and had zero experience in the diplomatic (or any
other) negotiations?
Because there was no diplomatic channel to Germany then.
Post by Alex Milman
Question #2 is IF (a BIG "IF") we assume that Beria was by whatever reason
assigned to such a task, why didn't the whole thing went through the normal
chain of command, from Beria to Merkulov?
Assuming that Beria was in charge, I doubt it would have gone to Merkulov.
Post by Alex Milman
Question #3 is why <whoever> would chose as a messenger someone who so far
was known just as a master of the high-profile assassinations?
Sudoplatov could be counted on to keep it quiet.
Post by Alex Milman
And the obvious question #4 why would any professional diplomat take all that
combination seriously if it obviously looked as a rather clumsy attempt of the
disinformation/provocation/whatever?
Well that is what happened, Bulgarian ambassador told the Russians to keep
fighting and that they would no lose.
Post by Alex Milman
So, IF we assume that the meeting did take place it strongly looks as Beria's
clumsy attempt to play games of his own. Keep in mind that he just "ate"
GRU (from 1937 till 1941 there were 7 heads of this organization, 6 of
them executed including de facto creator of the Soviet military intelligence,
Berzin; you can imaginehow many field agents had been executed for the links
to their bosses) and was trying to position GB as its replacement (pretty much
as happened later with SS vs. Abwehr). This can explain a lot of things
including selection of Sudoplatov (at least some "foreign experience").
I doubt Beria would have dared to do any like this without Stalin approval.


Now having said this if you read the following two reports there are major
differences in the meeting, who was there, who said what etc.


(a)
http://vectornews.eu/newshead/22506-stalin-was-ready-to-sacrifice-the-baltic-states-and-ukraine.html

(b)

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=zSJjYFyf-MkC&pg=PA427&lpg=PA427&dq=Ivan+Stamenov&source=bl&ots=sUYCY8kLzw&sig=flLzVUMhgzpRaGHYp_rPb9txgKg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiL3oaKpLTUAhXGG5QKHQMBBKo4ChDoAQg9MAU#v=onepage&q=Ivan%20Stamenov&f=false
Alex Milman
2017-06-12 02:03:45 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.
What is provable is that restaurant existed.
Indeed
Let's try to think logically. The legend says that Beria ordered Sudoplatov
to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador and make a proposal.
Question #1 is why initiative would go through Beria who had nothing to do
with the foreign politics and had zero experience in the diplomatic (or any
other) negotiations?
Because there was no diplomatic channel to Germany then.
Sorry, but this is well beyond plain foolishness. The question was why would
Stalin ordered to handle diplomatic issue to Beria, a person who had no
relation to the foreign politics? Why the meeting was not between Bulgarian
ambassador and a Soviet diplomat?
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Question #2 is IF (a BIG "IF") we assume that Beria was by whatever reason
assigned to such a task, why didn't the whole thing went through the normal
chain of command, from Beria to Merkulov?
Assuming that Beria was in charge, I doubt it would have gone to Merkulov.
You have a long standing tendency of having doubts on the subjects about which
you have no clue so I'll disregard this one. At that time Merkulov was Beria's
subordinate AND in charge of the foreign espionage.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Question #3 is why <whoever> would chose as a messenger someone who so far
was known just as a master of the high-profile assassinations?
Sudoplatov could be counted on to keep it quiet.
Sorry, but this is one more idiotic answer: ANY person involved would keep
quiet because otherwise a lifespan of that person would be rather short and
painful. Sudoplatov's experience was in the area of assassinations, not
diplomatic negotiations or foreign policy. Why would a foreign diplomat trust
anything coming from such a person?
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
And the obvious question #4 why would any professional diplomat take all that
combination seriously if it obviously looked as a rather clumsy attempt of the
disinformation/provocation/whatever?
Well that is what happened, Bulgarian ambassador told the Russians to keep
fighting and that they would no lose.
Which, if this happened as reported, was a polite form of FY: the whole thing
clearly was not serious and he treated it as such.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
So, IF we assume that the meeting did take place it strongly looks as Beria's
clumsy attempt to play games of his own. Keep in mind that he just "ate"
GRU (from 1937 till 1941 there were 7 heads of this organization, 6 of
them executed including de facto creator of the Soviet military intelligence,
Berzin; you can imaginehow many field agents had been executed for the links
to their bosses) and was trying to position GB as its replacement (pretty much
as happened later with SS vs. Abwehr). This can explain a lot of things
including selection of Sudoplatov (at least some "foreign experience").
I doubt Beria would have dared to do any like this without Stalin approval.
How about, just for change, reading carefully what's written and using a
little bit of your brain power? Stalin's approval was not needed for a routine
spy game.
SolomonW
2017-06-12 05:49:03 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.
What is provable is that restaurant existed.
Indeed
Let's try to think logically. The legend says that Beria ordered Sudoplatov
to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador and make a proposal.
Question #1 is why initiative would go through Beria who had nothing to do
with the foreign politics and had zero experience in the diplomatic (or any
other) negotiations?
Because there was no diplomatic channel to Germany then.
Sorry, but this is well beyond plain foolishness. The question was why would
Stalin ordered to handle diplomatic issue to Beria, a person who had no
relation to the foreign politics? Why the meeting was not between Bulgarian
ambassador and a Soviet diplomat?
see (a) below
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Question #2 is IF (a BIG "IF") we assume that Beria was by whatever reason
assigned to such a task, why didn't the whole thing went through the normal
chain of command, from Beria to Merkulov?
Assuming that Beria was in charge, I doubt it would have gone to Merkulov.
You have a long standing tendency of having doubts on the subjects about which
you have no clue so I'll disregard this one. At that time Merkulov was Beria's
subordinate AND in charge of the foreign espionage.
see (a) below
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Question #3 is why <whoever> would chose as a messenger someone who so far
was known just as a master of the high-profile assassinations?
Sudoplatov could be counted on to keep it quiet.
Thanks
Post by Alex Milman
ANY person involved would keep
quiet because otherwise a lifespan of that person would be rather short and
painful. Sudoplatov's experience was in the area of assassinations, not
diplomatic negotiations or foreign policy. Why would a foreign diplomat trust
anything coming from such a person?
(a)

I doubt you are aware of Sudoplatov but he was highly experienced in
foreign affairs and had been the deputy director of the Foreign Department.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
And the obvious question #4 why would any professional diplomat take all that
combination seriously if it obviously looked as a rather clumsy attempt of the
disinformation/provocation/whatever?
Well that is what happened, Bulgarian ambassador told the Russians to keep
fighting and that they would no lose.
Which, if this happened as reported, was a polite form of FY: the whole thing
clearly was not serious and he treated it as such.
On this we might agree. From the sources it is unclear whether the
Bulgarian ambassador passed it on and if he did whether it wass ignored by
Hitler. What is clear is that if it did happen, nothing came out of it.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
So, IF we assume that the meeting did take place it strongly looks as Beria's
clumsy attempt to play games of his own. Keep in mind that he just "ate"
GRU (from 1937 till 1941 there were 7 heads of this organization, 6 of
them executed including de facto creator of the Soviet military intelligence,
Berzin; you can imaginehow many field agents had been executed for the links
to their bosses) and was trying to position GB as its replacement (pretty much
as happened later with SS vs. Abwehr). This can explain a lot of things
including selection of Sudoplatov (at least some "foreign experience").
I doubt Beria would have dared to do any like this without Stalin approval.
How about, just for change, reading carefully what's written and using a
little bit of your brain power? Stalin's approval was not needed for a routine
spy game.
Rubbish this if it happened was no routine spy game.
Alex Milman
2017-06-12 14:54:27 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
The provable part of the story: restaurant "Aragvi" did exist (and was one of
my favorite). :-)
Who said anything about this resturant?
[Sight]
Because 'Aragvi' was the ONLY Georgian restaurant in the center of Moscow
all the way until the fall of the SU. It is like to say "a tall steel tower
in the center of Paris" or "a bridge in NY which could be bought very cheep"
So what is provable is that it could have been this resturant.
What is provable is that restaurant existed.
Indeed
Let's try to think logically. The legend says that Beria ordered Sudoplatov
to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador and make a proposal.
Question #1 is why initiative would go through Beria who had nothing to do
with the foreign politics and had zero experience in the diplomatic (or any
other) negotiations?
Because there was no diplomatic channel to Germany then.
Sorry, but this is well beyond plain foolishness. The question was why would
Stalin ordered to handle diplomatic issue to Beria, a person who had no
relation to the foreign politics? Why the meeting was not between Bulgarian
ambassador and a Soviet diplomat?
see (a) below
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Question #2 is IF (a BIG "IF") we assume that Beria was by whatever reason
assigned to such a task, why didn't the whole thing went through the normal
chain of command, from Beria to Merkulov?
Assuming that Beria was in charge, I doubt it would have gone to Merkulov.
You have a long standing tendency of having doubts on the subjects about which
you have no clue so I'll disregard this one. At that time Merkulov was Beria's
subordinate AND in charge of the foreign espionage.
see (a) below
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Question #3 is why <whoever> would chose as a messenger someone who so far
was known just as a master of the high-profile assassinations?
Sudoplatov could be counted on to keep it quiet.
Thanks
Well, how else do you want me to treat answers like that one? The SU of the
1940's was not like the US of 2017: leaking information would not make you
media darling.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
ANY person involved would keep
quiet because otherwise a lifespan of that person would be rather short and
painful. Sudoplatov's experience was in the area of assassinations, not
diplomatic negotiations or foreign policy. Why would a foreign diplomat trust
anything coming from such a person?
(a)
I doubt you are aware of Sudoplatov but he was highly experienced in
foreign affairs and had been the deputy director of the Foreign Department.
In which position he was dealing with the political assassinations (Trotsky),
not with the issues related to diplomacy. FYI, NKVD was not the same as the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its functionality. The routine channels for
the exchanges like one you described the embassies in the neutral countries
(Sweden and Portugal were among the most "popular" places) had special
personnel and there were well-known intermediaries handling the data transfers
involving the opponents.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
And the obvious question #4 why would any professional diplomat take all that
combination seriously if it obviously looked as a rather clumsy attempt of the
disinformation/provocation/whatever?
Well that is what happened, Bulgarian ambassador told the Russians to keep
fighting and that they would no lose.
Which, if this happened as reported, was a polite form of FY: the whole thing
clearly was not serious and he treated it as such.
On this we might agree. From the sources it is unclear whether the
Bulgarian ambassador passed it on and if he did whether it wass ignored by
Hitler. What is clear is that if it did happen, nothing came out of it.
Taking into an account that the "sources" are highly suspicious, the only
clear thing is that nothing happened.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
So, IF we assume that the meeting did take place it strongly looks as Beria's
clumsy attempt to play games of his own. Keep in mind that he just "ate"
GRU (from 1937 till 1941 there were 7 heads of this organization, 6 of
them executed including de facto creator of the Soviet military intelligence,
Berzin; you can imaginehow many field agents had been executed for the links
to their bosses) and was trying to position GB as its replacement (pretty much
as happened later with SS vs. Abwehr). This can explain a lot of things
including selection of Sudoplatov (at least some "foreign experience").
I doubt Beria would have dared to do any like this without Stalin approval.
How about, just for change, reading carefully what's written and using a
little bit of your brain power? Stalin's approval was not needed for a routine
spy game.
Rubbish this if it happened was no routine spy game.
Planting disinformation was a routine spy game. The flow of the espionage
information was going to Merkulov, not Stalin: it was Merkulov's duty to
do the filtering and to present the Boss with the presumably valuable part of
it. On the document attached to the EuroTrash article Stalin's resolution
clearly referencing Merkulov (and the document itself is not something new:
there was plenty of publications related to it and, actually, the material
supplied by the "source" was a disinformation planted by the Nazis).


The alt-version involving Stalin directly is more interesting because it at
least involves the right spokesman, Molotov, who was Minister of the Foreign
Affairs. Unfortunately, there is a tiny problem with the narrative: it was
presented as a part of Beria's testimony and, as such is highly suspicious.
After all, Beria confessed being the British agent and probably many other
things as well.

pyotr filipivich
2017-06-04 02:00:03 UTC
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I thought Hitler had, which is why he was forced to retaliate
against the Jew-Bolshevik betrayal of the peace-loving German People?
--
pyotr filipivich.
For Sale: Uncirculated Roman Drachmas, feature Julius Ceaser's Portrait,
several dated 44 BCE. Comes with Certificate of Authenticity.
SolomonW
2017-06-04 05:58:47 UTC
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Post by pyotr filipivich
I thought Hitler had, which is why he was forced to retaliate
against the Jew-Bolshevik betrayal of the peace-loving German People?
This is a POD.
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