Discussion:
AHC:Hitler starts WWII in 1939 with an alliance with Japan, and no deal with Stalin
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Rob
2017-05-27 02:46:09 UTC
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Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.

So how can we make it come to fruition?

Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
Alex Milman
2017-05-27 03:32:01 UTC
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Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
I'm not sure how would they be able to make any serious assessment without
a benefit of at least some Soviet military action which, of course, does
not mean that they did not :-). But if they had such an opinion, then the
OTL agreement meant little (as it did): all these territories would be easily
taken back.

But the question is interesting. Obviously, Stalin would not rush to help
Poland: there were no mutual defense agreement and Poland was an openly
hostile state. OTOH, would he risk to move into the Western Ukraine and
Belorussia? Why not unless the Germans were already moving there? Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia are less clear cases but let's say that unless Hitler
explicitly declared them under his protection before or immediately after
invasion of Poland, how Soviet occupation could be prevented?

As an option, Hitler annexes the Baltic republics while Stalin stays neutral.
Quite obviously, after defeat of Poland the Brits and French
would be more than eager to offer almost anything to convince Stalin to join
anti-Hitler coalition.

How is your scenario going to develop after defeat of Poland? Is Hitler
acting pretty much like in OTL by turning to the West or is he moving
further East occupying ALL Poland (including Western Ukraine and Belorussia)
and then doing something to the Baltic republics before that?
SolomonW
2017-05-27 09:33:20 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
I'm not sure how would they be able to make any serious assessment without
a benefit of at least some Soviet military action which, of course, does
not mean that they did not :-). But if they had such an opinion, then the
OTL agreement meant little (as it did): all these territories would be easily
taken back.
But the question is interesting. Obviously, Stalin would not rush to help
Poland: there were no mutual defense agreement and Poland was an openly
hostile state. OTOH, would he risk to move into the Western Ukraine and
Belorussia? Why not unless the Germans were already moving there? Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia are less clear cases but let's say that unless Hitler
explicitly declared them under his protection before or immediately after
invasion of Poland, how Soviet occupation could be prevented?
Russia would not dare to move against these countries if Germany was seen
as hostile. If Hitler grabs these countries that put Leningrad much closer
to the German border.
Post by Alex Milman
As an option, Hitler annexes the Baltic republics while Stalin stays neutral.
Quite obviously, after defeat of Poland the Brits and French
would be more than eager to offer almost anything to convince Stalin to join
anti-Hitler coalition.
How is your scenario going to develop after defeat of Poland? Is Hitler
acting pretty much like in OTL by turning to the West or is he moving
further East occupying ALL Poland (including Western Ukraine and Belorussia)
and then doing something to the Baltic republics before that?
One change here is that the German border with Russia is not half way
through Poland but at the Russian border, that extra distance would be very
handy for an assault on Russia.

Coversely no Russian raw materials for Germany including oil.
Alex Milman
2017-05-27 17:43:08 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
I'm not sure how would they be able to make any serious assessment without
a benefit of at least some Soviet military action which, of course, does
not mean that they did not :-). But if they had such an opinion, then the
OTL agreement meant little (as it did): all these territories would be easily
taken back.
But the question is interesting. Obviously, Stalin would not rush to help
Poland: there were no mutual defense agreement and Poland was an openly
hostile state. OTOH, would he risk to move into the Western Ukraine and
Belorussia? Why not unless the Germans were already moving there? Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia are less clear cases but let's say that unless Hitler
explicitly declared them under his protection before or immediately after
invasion of Poland, how Soviet occupation could be prevented?
Russia would not dare to move against these countries if Germany was seen
as hostile.
This is a big IF with a great dependency upon the timing:

1. It would take Hitler a longer time to occupy the WHOLE Poland: in OTL
there were still noticeable number of the Polish troops at the time Stalin
did interfere and, anyway, we are talking about occupation of a noticeably
greater territory.

2. Within that extra time the French and Brits can reassess their policy
toward Stalin: Poland is out of the picture and so are Polish objections
regarding the SU. Stalin's conditions are known: buffer at the expense of
the Baltic republics. The Allies would most probably agree to give him a
free hand. At least Estonia is within his easy reach, Latvia is realistic
and with Lithuania it is a question who gets first where. Most probably the
Soviet occupation starts with the individual agreements regarding the
military bases.

3. What Hitler is doing in a meantime? Is he going to get the Baltic
republics or is he going to the West? Each decision has visible drawbacks:
going East means starting war with the SU with the French and Brits in the
rear and getting West means having a hostile Soviet Union in the back.
Post by SolomonW
If Hitler grabs these countries that put Leningrad much closer
to the German border.
But "grabbing" them clearly implies the risk of getting the SU involved
(most probably Stalin would have a mutual defense treaty with one or two
of these republics) while the France and Britain are still undefeated.
SolomonW
2017-05-27 23:37:30 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
I'm not sure how would they be able to make any serious assessment without
a benefit of at least some Soviet military action which, of course, does
not mean that they did not :-). But if they had such an opinion, then the
OTL agreement meant little (as it did): all these territories would be easily
taken back.
But the question is interesting. Obviously, Stalin would not rush to help
Poland: there were no mutual defense agreement and Poland was an openly
hostile state. OTOH, would he risk to move into the Western Ukraine and
Belorussia? Why not unless the Germans were already moving there? Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia are less clear cases but let's say that unless Hitler
explicitly declared them under his protection before or immediately after
invasion of Poland, how Soviet occupation could be prevented?
Russia would not dare to move against these countries if Germany was seen
as hostile.
1. It would take Hitler a longer time to occupy the WHOLE Poland: in OTL
there were still noticeable number of the Polish troops at the time Stalin
did interfere and, anyway, we are talking about occupation of a noticeably
greater territory.
Poland was already beaten by then; the German forces actually pulled back
to allow the Russians in.
Post by Alex Milman
2. Within that extra time the French and Brits can reassess their policy
toward Stalin: Poland is out of the picture and so are Polish objections
regarding the SU. Stalin's conditions are known: buffer at the expense of
the Baltic republics. The Allies would most probably agree to give him a
free hand. At least Estonia is within his easy reach, Latvia is realistic
and with Lithuania it is a question who gets first where. Most probably the
Soviet occupation starts with the individual agreements regarding the
military bases.
At this stage, what the allies are agreeing is not so important.
Post by Alex Milman
3. What Hitler is doing in a meantime? Is he going to get the Baltic
going East means starting war with the SU with the French and Brits in the
rear and getting West means having a hostile Soviet Union in the back.
Agreed.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
If Hitler grabs these countries that put Leningrad much closer
to the German border.
But "grabbing" them clearly implies the risk of getting the SU involved
(most probably Stalin would have a mutual defense treaty with one or two
of these republics) while the France and Britain are still undefeated.
Those garantees by the SU are now meaningless.
SolomonW
2017-05-29 11:10:35 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Coversely no Russian raw materials for Germany including oil.
On the other hand the Germans would have the east Polish oil fields, they
were not small.
c***@gmail.com
2017-05-27 14:38:47 UTC
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Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
You can't. There has been much discussion about a joint attack on the SU by Japan and Germany. Such a joint attack would be much more to German's benefit than Japan's. What would Japan gain by such an attack? Japan needed oil, rubber, etc. from Southeast Asia and the East Indies. Besides which, Japan had already tangled with the SU and had gotten mauled, and had her scalp from the 1905 war against Russia. Besides which, again, Japan was involved in a war with a continental power, China.

Assuming such a joint attack, would the SU survive? Who knows? But there's at least a reasonable chance that it would survive, and with the US embargo, Japan would be stretched in obtaining the raw materials it needed, and the Navy would play merely a defensive role.

Let's suppose that this happens, say, circa June 22, 1941. The US, not being at war, moves strong military, naval, and air forces to the Philippines. Japan is embroiled in major wars with China and the SU. Japan's only reasonable choice then is to play the long game, wait for a successful outcome in China and the SU, and (re)build up for a conflict with the US.

What does Hitler do? He didn't respect the Japanese, called them "yellow rats" as I recall. He's not is a good position to support Japan against the S as a common foe. What's he going to do --- invade North America across the Atlantic? Ship the German Army across Asia so they can engage in island hopping with the Japanese? No, if anything, he will direct his attention to Africa, the Near East, Caucasus, Anatolia, Persia, and ultimately India.

CC
SolomonW
2017-05-28 00:34:16 UTC
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Post by c***@gmail.com
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
You can't. There has been much discussion about a joint attack on the SU by Japan and Germany. Such a joint attack would be much more to German's benefit than Japan's. What would Japan gain by such an attack? Japan needed oil, rubber, etc. from Southeast Asia and the East Indies. Besides which, Japan had already tangled with the SU and had gotten mauled, and had her scalp from the 1905 war against Russia. Besides which, again, Japan was involved in a war with a continental power, China.
Assuming such a joint attack, would the SU survive? Who knows? But there's at least a reasonable chance that it would survive, and with the US embargo, Japan would be stretched in obtaining the raw materials it needed, and the Navy would play merely a defensive role.
Let's suppose that this happens, say, circa June 22, 1941. The US, not being at war, moves strong military, naval, and air forces to the Philippines. Japan is embroiled in major wars with China and the SU. Japan's only reasonable choice then is to play the long game, wait for a successful outcome in China and the SU, and (re)build up for a conflict with the US.
What does Hitler do? He didn't respect the Japanese, called them "yellow rats" as I recall. He's not is a good position to support Japan against the S as a common foe. What's he going to do --- invade North America across the Atlantic? Ship the German Army across Asia so they can engage in island hopping with the Japanese? No, if anything, he will direct his attention to Africa, the Near East, Caucasus, Anatolia, Persia, and ultimately India.
CC
In this POD, its unlikely that Japan will attack the SU.
Rob
2017-05-28 00:51:51 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
In this POD, its unlikely that Japan will attack the SU.
Thanks SolomonW. That's an appropriate, and far more succinct, response to ***@gmail.com's post than mine, which is rather long winded and convoluted.
Rob
2017-05-28 00:45:57 UTC
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Post by c***@gmail.com
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
You can't. There has been much discussion about a joint attack on the SU by Japan and Germany.
snip the part where CC takes my proposed 1939 to use a different, 1941, strike north, scenario as a straw man.
Post by c***@gmail.com
What does Hitler do? He didn't respect the Japanese, called them "yellow rats" as I recall.
What do you recall this from? Never heard it, usually I hear quite the opposite.
He's not is a good position to support Japan against the S as a common foe. What's he going to do --- invade North America across the Atlantic?

No

Ship the German Army across Asia so they can engage in island hopping with the Japanese?

No

No, if anything, he will direct his attention to Africa, the Near East, Caucasus, Anatolia, Persia, and ultimately India.
The action in Africa, the Near East, Persia and India in this strawman scenario may not be directly against US forces, but it surely engages the *British* common enemy. And action against India, if it ever came to that, is great for undermining supply to China, another of Japan's enemies.

----Reacting to the scenario I actually proposed, a German-Japanese alliance in the summer of 1939, yields different bilateral match ups than any kind of 1941 scenario.

The Germans, having the Italian and Japanese alliances in their pocket, at first have high confidence that Britain and France will refrain from actually declaring war on Germany over Poland.

As I said, the Germans are discounting Soviet potential and don't anticipate the Soviets cooperating with Poland. So Germany starts the fight in Poland in September or August 1939 assuming that Britain and France are bluffing or will be deterred.

After all, Hitler probably sees a Japanese alliance as an even a better deterrent to Britain than a Soviet nonaggression pact or alliance. Unlike the USSR, Japan has a blue water naval capability, and is in closer quarters with British forces and interests in China and Southeast Asia than the Soviets are to British territories and forces (neutral Turkey and Iran and Afghanistan are buffers between the USSR and British possessions).

Hitler strikes Poland in August or September 1939 and...

a) he's right, Britain (and France) do not declare war, fearing fighting on two or three fronts, or

b) he's wrong, Britain and France do declare war, but still fight it phony on land.

At that point, the Japanese (and Italians), have a choice to make, declare war on the British and French as implied in the alliance terms, or do not.

The estimation of Rome that Tokyo will get into the war, or the estimation by Tokyo that Rome will enter the war, each *could* encourage each other to enter the war at that point, since the amount of British and French naval force either one has to contend with is diminished by the involvement of the other.

Leaving aside Italy for a moment, if Japan declares war on Britain and France in the fall of 1939 as part of its alliance with Germany, it will likely capture British and French enclaves throughout China and then in Indochina (probably would not be invading Malaya and Singapore in the initial offensive). On the other hand, at least while the phony war goes on, the British and French will do *some* reinforcing of the Far East and aiding of China as part of anti-Japanese resistance. Maybe in a few months however, the Japanese campaign extends down to Malaya and Borneo [but not yet the Philippines or the DEI, because the USA and Netherlands are still neutrals, trading partners and only at the very beginning of any process of restricting trade.]

Japanese war on Britain and France in the Far East will have the knock-on effect of keeping Australian and Indian troops employed almost entirely in their local areas, and lead to correspondingly greater demands for South African, Canadian and British troops for battlefronts in Europe and later Africa and the Middle East.

-----alternatively, the Japanese could take a pass on immediate declaration of war on Britain and France as Italy did, only joining the assault in May 1940. [and if joining at that stage, the Netherlands are getting invaded, so it becomes logical for the Japanese to extend the fight to the DEI].


---Now the Soviet factor, which I have not dealt with. The very PoD possibly enabling the German-Japanese alliance in 1939 might be the lack of a big summer engagement with the Soviets in summer 1939 [in OTL the simultaneity of the Danzig crisis and Nomonhan was bad for German-Japanese cooperation]. Or, if the change is earlier, and internal to Japan, resulting in an alliance with Hitler by spring or summer 1939, in the context of diplomatic tension with Britain and France, Tokyo might have a tighter leash on the Kwangtung Army and a looser leash on the North China Army that was hassling the British at Tientsin as a result, perhaps resulting in the Japanese never seizing Mongolian territory, or them backing away earlier with an overall lesser scale of skirmishing with Mongolian or Soviet forces.

Or, confidence buoyed by the alliance with Germany, the Japanese could get into a battle as big as Nomonhan. They could react to their defeat as in OTL, by backing off, or, they could refuse to settle and try to prepare to do better in later rounds in the not too distant future, once they've reinforced Manchuria and the Germans have gotten to the Soviet border, possibly advocating a "Soviets-first" approach to the Germans.

In turn the Soviets could react to the emerging situations in a variety of ways. Alex for one is *not* assuming Soviet cooperation with Poland and the WAllies. In Europe, maybe the Soviets cross their western border or maybe they don't. If they do cross their border they either come to a meeting engagement with the Germans or achieve tactical deconfliction and de facto partition.

Europe is still the main show, so the Soviets reacting to Nomonhan by escalating beyond just squashing the offending Japanese trespassers to launch a full invasion of Manchuria is still low.

On the other hand, Stalin might think that a grab for Manchuria is at this point a perfect move against a Japan that is also tangling with China, France and Britain. He might think of the westerners as being more open to cooperation on the Far Eastern front than in Europe. Or, he might hold back in the Far East unless and until he gets terms he wants from Britain and France in Europe. At least as likely, even with developing dangers in Europe and the Far East, would be Stalin not crossing his borders and reinforcing them (and the borders of Mongolia) and preparing for all sorts of unpredictable contingencies without committing himself to anything [except perhaps invasions of Estonia and maybe Latvia].
The Horny Goat
2017-05-28 17:52:32 UTC
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Post by c***@gmail.com
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
You can't. There has been much discussion about a joint attack on the SU by Japan and Germany. Such a joint attack would be much more to German's benefit than Japan's. What would Japan gain by such an attack? Japan needed oil, rubber, etc. from Southeast Asia and the East Indies. Besides which, Japan had already tangled with the SU and had gotten mauled, and had her scalp from the 1905 war against Russia. Besides which, again, Japan was involved in a war with a continental power, China.
Assuming such a joint attack, would the SU survive? Who knows? But there's at least a reasonable chance that it would survive, and with the US embargo, Japan would be stretched in obtaining the raw materials it needed, and the Navy would play merely a defensive role.
Let's suppose that this happens, say, circa June 22, 1941. The US, not being at war, moves strong military, naval, and air forces to the Philippines. Japan is embroiled in major wars with China and the SU. Japan's only reasonable choice then is to play the long game, wait for a successful outcome in China and the SU, and (re)build up for a conflict with the US.
What does Hitler do? He didn't respect the Japanese, called them "yellow rats" as I recall. He's not is a good position to support Japan against the S as a common foe. What's he going to do --- invade North America across the Atlantic? Ship the German Army across Asia so they can engage in island hopping with the Japanese? No, if anything, he will direct his attention to Africa, the Near East, Caucasus, Anatolia, Persia, and ultimately India.
Well this is what makes me question the entire "Japanese northern
strategy" - sure it keeps Japan out of war with the United States and
even if the Japanese capture as far west as Lake Baikal (which I think
is a best case scenario for them) there's still the need to
simultaneously supply their troops (which would be considerable) while
shipping resources home from Siberia all the while keeping up their
attacks in China.

It is not enough for Japan simply to capture Siberian resources - they
need to be moved somewhere where they can be utilized - and I don't
think Manchuria and/or Korea has enough industrial capacity in this
era to do so.

It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
SolomonW
2017-05-29 11:21:50 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
The SU was actually more dependent on oil than Germany.

Most likely much of the SU offensive war would be halted, so the Eastern
Front would grind to a stalemate.
Alex Milman
2017-05-29 17:22:52 UTC
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Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.

Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
The Horny Goat
2017-05-30 00:29:37 UTC
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On Mon, 29 May 2017 10:22:52 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
For the record the >> comments were by me the > by Solomon.

My whole point was suppose Japan attacks Siberia and swiftly conquers
both Vladivostok and everything east of Baikal. For the geological
reasons you cite this is pretty much a best case scenario for them.

Further suppose that this means Japan now owns 100 million barrels of
oil and 100 million ounces of gold or any other resource you name -
but it's all in Siberia.

Let's make it "easy" for the Japanese - give them NO damage to the
Soviet rail lines but complete destruction of Soviet rolling stock
(i.e. the Japanese now have to either build Soviet gauge rolling stock
or convert the tracks)

Can Japan continue its offensive against China while dealing with
Soviet partisan activity while exploiting these resources
effecctively?

There's no way that kind of rail network could move the amount of oil
refined or crude that a few tankers could and that's why I think that
unless Germany in this scenario quickly beats the Soviets in the west,
long run it's a world of hurt for the Japanese - and I've made several
assumptions here that heavily favor them.

In short I'm mystified what "Japanese victory" means in this context -
the Man in the High Castle is great science fiction but in terms of
being a plausible WI it's bovine kaka - I think most of the regulars
here know that.
SolomonW
2017-05-30 05:52:55 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Mon, 29 May 2017 10:22:52 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
For the record the >> comments were by me the > by Solomon.
My whole point was suppose Japan attacks Siberia and swiftly conquers
both Vladivostok and everything east of Baikal. For the geological
reasons you cite this is pretty much a best case scenario for them.
Further suppose that this means Japan now owns 100 million barrels of
oil and 100 million ounces of gold or any other resource you name -
but it's all in Siberia.
Let's make it "easy" for the Japanese - give them NO damage to the
Soviet rail lines but complete destruction of Soviet rolling stock
(i.e. the Japanese now have to either build Soviet gauge rolling stock
or convert the tracks)
Can Japan continue its offensive against China while dealing with
Soviet partisan activity while exploiting these resources
effecctively?
There's no way that kind of rail network could move the amount of oil
refined or crude that a few tankers could and that's why I think that
unless Germany in this scenario quickly beats the Soviets in the west,
long run it's a world of hurt for the Japanese - and I've made several
assumptions here that heavily favor them.
In short I'm mystified what "Japanese victory" means in this context -
I agree
Post by The Horny Goat
the Man in the High Castle is great science fiction but in terms of
being a plausible WI it's bovine kaka - I think most of the regulars
here know that.
The central point in the "Man in the High Castle" is not oil but that the
NAZIs have an atomic bomb.



Spoiler alert to those that have not read the book
..
...
..
..
..
Interesting point is that in the book, the conclusion is that the world
where the NAZIs won is not possible and that there world is not real.
Alex Milman
2017-05-30 16:37:08 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Mon, 29 May 2017 10:22:52 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
For the record the >> comments were by me the > by Solomon.
My whole point was suppose Japan attacks Siberia and swiftly conquers
both Vladivostok and everything east of Baikal.
You understand that "everything" amounts to a coastal area and a reasonably
narrow stretch of a territory along the Trans Siberian railroad: most of the
areas to the North are either completely or almost uninhabitable.
Post by The Horny Goat
For the geological
reasons you cite this is pretty much a best case scenario for them.
Further suppose that this means Japan now owns 100 million barrels of
oil and 100 million ounces of gold or any other resource you name -
but it's all in Siberia.
Actually, it owns no oil except one from Sakhalin (for which, as I understand,
Japanese had a concession): there were no known oil fields in the area you
are talking about in the 1940's. Oil discovery and extraction in the East
Siberia (link to the map below) belongs to 1970's - 90's.

(Loading Image...)

So the Japanese would have to conduct an extensive geological research in the
areas well away from the TS railroad while not having a clue that there is
any oil (or anything else) in that huge region AND get lucky with finding the
oil AND to create infrastructure from the scratch to extract and transport
it. Taking into an account that at the time of planning the conquest they
would not have a clue about its existence, the whole thing looks rather
improbable to me comparing to plan based on getting the KNOWN oil from
elsewhere. It makes it even less probable taking into an account that the
SU was the only country from which they had been getting a lot of oil
without any fighting.

Not too much luck with the gold either: the main gold extraction is to the West
of Baikal.

There will be also an issue to extraction and transportation, at least as
oil is involved: nowadays it is done by a pipeline but building one in the
early 1940's would be a serious problem for Japan: besides technology needed
to produce the pipes the task would require a LOT of steel and as you well
know Japan had serious shortages with it. Building a railroad also would not
be an easy solution: it would need the whole brand new infrastructure (and a
lot of steel as well).
The Horny Goat
2017-05-30 16:45:56 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Tue, 30 May 2017 09:37:08 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
My whole point was suppose Japan attacks Siberia and swiftly conquers
both Vladivostok and everything east of Baikal.
You understand that "everything" amounts to a coastal area and a reasonably
narrow stretch of a territory along the Trans Siberian railroad: most of the
areas to the North are either completely or almost uninhabitable.
I'm indulging in my usual 'straw man' argument - setting up a
ridiculously favorable scenario for the Japanese then saying "even
with all these advantages they're STILL screwed"
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
For the geological
reasons you cite this is pretty much a best case scenario for them.
Further suppose that this means Japan now owns 100 million barrels of
oil and 100 million ounces of gold or any other resource you name -
but it's all in Siberia.
Again I was setting up a silly scenario simply to demolish it.

If I own 100 million ounces of gold on the moon how does that enrich
my life? It doesn't.
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, it owns no oil except one from Sakhalin (for which, as I understand,
Japanese had a concession): there were no known oil fields in the area you
are talking about in the 1940's. Oil discovery and extraction in the East
Siberia (link to the map below) belongs to 1970's - 90's.
(http://www.capabletranslations.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/East-Siberia-Oil-and-Gas-Provinces.jpg)
Thanks for the link.
Post by Alex Milman
So the Japanese would have to conduct an extensive geological research in the
areas well away from the TS railroad while not having a clue that there is
any oil (or anything else) in that huge region AND get lucky with finding the
oil AND to create infrastructure from the scratch to extract and transport
it. Taking into an account that at the time of planning the conquest they
would not have a clue about its existence, the whole thing looks rather
improbable to me comparing to plan based on getting the KNOWN oil from
elsewhere. It makes it even less probable taking into an account that the
SU was the only country from which they had been getting a lot of oil
without any fighting.
Not too much luck with the gold either: the main gold extraction is to the West
of Baikal.
There will be also an issue to extraction and transportation, at least as
oil is involved: nowadays it is done by a pipeline but building one in the
early 1940's would be a serious problem for Japan: besides technology needed
to produce the pipes the task would require a LOT of steel and as you well
know Japan had serious shortages with it. Building a railroad also would not
be an easy solution: it would need the whole brand new infrastructure (and a
lot of steel as well).
Well again my argument was pretty much 'how does all this help Japan
reach their war aims" and improve their place in the world.

And pretty much "the only sane response is not to play" and since the
Japanese high command had delusions they played and paid the price.
Alex Milman
2017-05-30 16:52:27 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 09:37:08 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
My whole point was suppose Japan attacks Siberia and swiftly conquers
both Vladivostok and everything east of Baikal.
You understand that "everything" amounts to a coastal area and a reasonably
narrow stretch of a territory along the Trans Siberian railroad: most of the
areas to the North are either completely or almost uninhabitable.
I'm indulging in my usual 'straw man' argument - setting up a
ridiculously favorable scenario for the Japanese then saying "even
with all these advantages they're STILL screwed"
OK. :-)
Post by The Horny Goat
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
For the geological
reasons you cite this is pretty much a best case scenario for them.
Further suppose that this means Japan now owns 100 million barrels of
oil and 100 million ounces of gold or any other resource you name -
but it's all in Siberia.
Again I was setting up a silly scenario simply to demolish it.
If I own 100 million ounces of gold on the moon how does that enrich
my life? It doesn't.
Post by Alex Milman
Actually, it owns no oil except one from Sakhalin (for which, as I understand,
Japanese had a concession): there were no known oil fields in the area you
are talking about in the 1940's. Oil discovery and extraction in the East
Siberia (link to the map below) belongs to 1970's - 90's.
(http://www.capabletranslations.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/East-Siberia-Oil-and-Gas-Provinces.jpg)
Thanks for the link.
Any time. :-)

[But I'm still p---off with you for not taking a bite and not asking how
Kutuzov screwed up at Borodino :-)]
The Horny Goat
2017-05-30 19:04:15 UTC
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On Tue, 30 May 2017 09:52:27 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Any time. :-)
[But I'm still p---off with you for not taking a bite and not asking how
Kutuzov screwed up at Borodino :-)]
I've got a pretty good idea what you're going to say but ok since you
insist I'll bite.
Alex Milman
2017-05-30 22:14:36 UTC
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Raw Message
Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 09:52:27 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Any time. :-)
[But I'm still p---off with you for not taking a bite and not asking how
Kutuzov screwed up at Borodino :-)]
I've got a pretty good idea what you're going to say but ok since you
insist I'll bite.
OK, what is your idea about what I was going to say? If you guess correctly,
you are off the hook. :-)
The Horny Goat
2017-05-30 23:21:28 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Tue, 30 May 2017 15:14:36 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 09:52:27 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Any time. :-)
[But I'm still p---off with you for not taking a bite and not asking how
Kutuzov screwed up at Borodino :-)]
I've got a pretty good idea what you're going to say but ok since you
insist I'll bite.
OK, what is your idea about what I was going to say? If you guess correctly,
you are off the hook. :-)
basically that he ordered attacks on French fortifications making his
"butcher's bill" far larger than anyone commited to preserving his
troops would have done.
Alex Milman
2017-05-31 00:57:05 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 15:14:36 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 09:52:27 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Any time. :-)
[But I'm still p---off with you for not taking a bite and not asking how
Kutuzov screwed up at Borodino :-)]
I've got a pretty good idea what you're going to say but ok since you
insist I'll bite.
OK, what is your idea about what I was going to say? If you guess correctly,
you are off the hook. :-)
basically that he ordered attacks on French fortifications making his
"butcher's bill" far larger than anyone commited to preserving his
troops would have done.
[splork (if you know what it means)]

Not even close, starting with an absence of the "French fortifications" at
Borodino.. :-)

But of course, I'm not cruel enough to lecture you on a subject you are not
interested in.
The Horny Goat
2017-05-31 01:03:24 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Tue, 30 May 2017 17:57:05 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
basically that he ordered attacks on French fortifications making his
"butcher's bill" far larger than anyone commited to preserving his
troops would have done.
[splork (if you know what it means)]
Not even close, starting with an absence of the "French fortifications" at
Borodino.. :-)
But of course, I'm not cruel enough to lecture you on a subject you are not
interested in.
My main interest in Borodino comes from my former wargaming days long
ago. Fortifications is undoubtedly the wrong word - 'prepared
positions' would be more accurate.

I'd be happy to be lectured particularly if you cite books I have a
hope in hell of finding in my local library. Over the years I've read
a minimum of 20 books I first heard of in this newsgroup.

If you say something heated that provokes me to seek out a library in
order to enlighten myself in my world that's a "win-win".

If you want a subject I'm not really interested in you might cite some
of David's more obscure postings of US Congressional politics in the
Gilded Age.

As a subject I >am< interested in learning more about it's British
politics in the middle third of the 19th century since that is when
most of the parliamentary traditions we take for granted now were
being formed.
Alex Milman
2017-05-31 03:18:31 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 17:57:05 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Post by The Horny Goat
basically that he ordered attacks on French fortifications making his
"butcher's bill" far larger than anyone commited to preserving his
troops would have done.
[splork (if you know what it means)]
Not even close, starting with an absence of the "French fortifications" at
Borodino.. :-)
But of course, I'm not cruel enough to lecture you on a subject you are not
interested in.
My main interest in Borodino comes from my former wargaming days long
ago. Fortifications is undoubtedly the wrong word - 'prepared
positions' would be more accurate.
Well, strictly speaking the French did not have any "prepared positions"
if you mean some defensive works.
Post by The Horny Goat
I'd be happy to be lectured particularly if you cite books I have a
hope in hell of finding in my local library. Over the years I've read
a minimum of 20 books I first heard of in this newsgroup.
Sorry, no references by 2 main reasons: 1st, most of the recent materials
that I read are in Russian (they are traditionally good at criticism :-)) but
if you didn't read "1812" by Clausewitz, I'd highly recommend it; 2nd, most
of them I read/downloaded on/from internet and simply don't remember the
authors and can't get the titles from my library.

Now to the fun part.

Let's assume that you are c-in-c of the Russian forces and that you have
2 field armies of unequal strength under your command. You keep retreating
until some more or less good defensive position is found. Those are few and
rare in the area so this one is almost as good as it gets. It has a small
river at the front (Kolocha) and on its right that river flows into a much
bigger one (Moscow River) which makes your right flank quite secure. Even
better, there is a deep ravine in front of the right half of your position
which makes a frontal attack in that sector very difficult.
Approximately at 2/3rd (from the right flank) of the front there is a deep
ravine with a small spring going at the right angle to Kolocha river.

Unfortunately, your left flank is not secured from being bypassed and there
is even an Old Smolensk Road coming behind it (most of the French are
advancing by the New Smolensk Road which is crossing your position).

Now, being a c-in-c, which of 2 armies would you put on the dangerous left
flank? Think hard .... Right answer: the weaker one (the 2nd Army) and
you will also put a part of it to defend your center. After accomplishing
this , would you try to build some field fortifications before the front
of the 2nd Army to make crossing Kolocha River as hard as possible? Think
hard ... Neah... You are ordering construction of a single redoubt almost
2 km behind the river so that when Nappy with the main force arrive and attack
it, your troops would have to abandon this position (after a stubborn defense).
After this happened, your front is bent at almost straight angle allowing
French artillery to arrange for a concentrated fire on your main fortification
at the center, Raevsky battery (the French and the Brits are calling it a
redoubt which it most definitely was not: at the back it had just a wooden
fence eventually taken by a cavalry attack).

Your left flank is now in a deep dodo so wouldn't it make sense to move it
a little bit further back behind the deep ravine in the center... You guessed
correctly: it is left with its back to the ravine with the weak earthworks
in front.

But you still have some important card in your sleeve: while Nappy has 587
guns, you have 624 and while a big percentage of his artillery are 3 pounders,
your main caliber are 6 pounders (IIRC, practically no 3 pounders) with some
heavier guns as well. What to do? The answer is quite obvious: form an
artillery reserve, place it well behind the lines and never use it. A naïve
person will ask why? Because when you inevitably lose, your artillery is
saved and your report does not look too bad.

What else did you overlook? Ah yes, spread your reserves behind the front
line and subordinate them to the sector commanders so that you will not be
bothered with the requests for reinforcements and you can have your lunch
in peace. Place yourself in the place safely removed from the anticipated
center of fighting. Now you can relax.

Almost forgot: don't even bother to review position personally. Trust this
to the quartermaster of the 1st Army who is a talented guy (no irony) known
to you since he was a cadet. Unfortunately, Karl Toll is not experienced
enough and extremely self-assured. Position he chose at Tsarevo-Zaimische
managed to invoke criticism from BOTH Barclay and Bagration which tells a
lot. Disposition at Borodino has the same "trademark": the 2nd and 3rd lines
placed too close to the front and are going to suffer massive losses even
before brought into action (remember Prince Andrew from "W&P"?). Clausewitz
wrote that just moving the 2nd line 1000 steps back would save a lot of
lives.

Of course, Nappy launched massive attacks on the weak left flank which was
held for a while by extraordinary bravery of the defenders and thanks to
the reserves that Barclay started sending on his own initiative from his
1st Army placed on the right flank. Later the same pattern was repeated in
the center: Barclay was gradually moving his troops from a secure position
to the area of fighting but this was done without any preliminary plan
and in a piecemeal fashion. Unlike Kutuzov, he placed himself close to the
front where he could see what happens and react (he had 6 horses killed
under him during the battle). Eventually, Kutuzov also ordered to do more of
the same. What else could he do at the absence pf a general reserve?

At some point Kutuzov ordered a cavalry raid (1st Cavalry Corps and Platov's
Cossacks) on the French rear but nobody ever could tell what was the intended
purpose and one of its participants (certain Carl von Clausewitz) left almost
humorous description of that operation (the 1st Cavalry Corps had been
stopped by a single French battalion and the Cossacks did not do much
better).


It probably worth noticing that the highest award for Borodino went to
Barclay (St George of the 2nd class) and probably even higher token of
appreciation was the fact that after the battle the same troops that considered
him almost a traitor had been cheering him. Even his arch-opponent, Bagration
(who got a deadly wound) sent apologies for his earlier behavior. It goes
without a saying that Kutuzov did everything in his power to get rid of
Barclay ASAP.
The Horny Goat
2017-06-01 16:25:50 UTC
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Raw Message
On Tue, 30 May 2017 20:18:31 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Sorry, no references by 2 main reasons: 1st, most of the recent materials
that I read are in Russian (they are traditionally good at criticism :-)) but
if you didn't read "1812" by Clausewitz, I'd highly recommend it; 2nd, most
of them I read/downloaded on/from internet and simply don't remember the
authors and can't get the titles from my library.
I will have to find it elsewhere than my local library (which is
normally pretty good)

When I entered 'Clausewitz' it came back with
"Did you mean Auschwitz (55 results)"

The sound you hear from your router is me banging my head against the
wall....
Alex Milman
2017-06-01 17:32:40 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 20:18:31 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Sorry, no references by 2 main reasons: 1st, most of the recent materials
that I read are in Russian (they are traditionally good at criticism :-)) but
if you didn't read "1812" by Clausewitz, I'd highly recommend it; 2nd, most
of them I read/downloaded on/from internet and simply don't remember the
authors and can't get the titles from my library.
I will have to find it elsewhere than my local library (which is
normally pretty good)
When I entered 'Clausewitz' it came back with
"Did you mean Auschwitz (55 results)"
Wow! You can get the PDF version on
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf
Post by The Horny Goat
The sound you hear from your router is me banging my head against the
wall....
Be careful: fixing a wall may be costly....
The Horny Goat
2017-06-02 04:40:19 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Thu, 1 Jun 2017 10:32:40 -0700 (PDT), Alex Milman
Post by Alex Milman
Wow! You can get the PDF version on
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf
Post by The Horny Goat
The sound you hear from your router is me banging my head against the
wall....
Be careful: fixing a wall may be costly...
Thank you VERY much for the link. To get THAT response from my local
library was every bit as egregious as "a black man stole my car"! (Go
to Scopes if you don't get the reference)
Rich Rostrom
2017-06-01 04:25:57 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by The Horny Goat
I'm indulging in my usual 'straw man' argument -
setting up a ridiculously favorable scenario for the
Japanese then saying "even with all these advantages
they're STILL screwed"
What in a legal trial is a motion for summary judgment
by the defense: even if all the evidentiary claims of
the prosecution or plaintiff are true, they still can't
make a case.
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
The Horny Goat
2017-06-01 16:27:01 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Wed, 31 May 2017 23:25:57 -0500, Rich Rostrom
Post by Rich Rostrom
Post by The Horny Goat
I'm indulging in my usual 'straw man' argument -
setting up a ridiculously favorable scenario for the
Japanese then saying "even with all these advantages
they're STILL screwed"
What in a legal trial is a motion for summary judgment
by the defense: even if all the evidentiary claims of
the prosecution or plaintiff are true, they still can't
make a case.
Yup.

Regular readers know that that's one of my favorite arguments to
deflate a silly WI - and I'm not the only one here who engages in
that.
SolomonW
2017-06-02 06:47:24 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by The Horny Goat
On Wed, 31 May 2017 23:25:57 -0500, Rich Rostrom
Post by Rich Rostrom
Post by The Horny Goat
I'm indulging in my usual 'straw man' argument -
setting up a ridiculously favorable scenario for the
Japanese then saying "even with all these advantages
they're STILL screwed"
What in a legal trial is a motion for summary judgment
by the defense: even if all the evidentiary claims of
the prosecution or plaintiff are true, they still can't
make a case.
Yup.
Regular readers know that that's one of my favorite arguments to
deflate a silly WI - and I'm not the only one here who engages in
that.
Additionally, mine too, many people get distracted by trivial and forget
the main theme.
The Horny Goat
2017-06-02 14:21:35 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
Regular readers know that that's one of my favorite arguments to
deflate a silly WI - and I'm not the only one here who engages in
that.
Additionally, mine too, many people get distracted by trivial and forget
the main theme.
By the way by "I'm not the only one here who engages in that." I
didn't mean silly WIs I meant that method of arguing against them.

(Though to be sure I've posed silly WIs some to ridicule another
related WI some because of temporary insanity on my part - I am pretty
sure all us grognards can say 'been there done that')
SolomonW
2017-05-30 05:49:52 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
Alex Milman
2017-05-30 16:48:10 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
To cut the transportation system you have to know its whereabouts. The only
"system" known to the Nazi was Volga and they cut this route quite successfully.
The problem was that (a) the Soviets built an alternative route and (b) started
extraction elsewhere. Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible. The process of "cutting" would be the
next major problem taking into an account the Soviet paranoia about security
and a general difficulty destroy a railroad in the enemy's deep rear for a
considerable amount of time.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
It would create some temporary difficulties.
SolomonW
2017-05-31 09:24:46 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
To cut the transportation system you have to know its whereabouts. The only
"system" known to the Nazi was Volga and they cut this route quite successfully.
The problem was that (a) the Soviets built an alternative route and (b) started
extraction elsewhere. Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible. The process of "cutting" would be the
next major problem taking into an account the Soviet paranoia about security
and a general difficulty destroy a railroad in the enemy's deep rear for a
considerable amount of time.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
It would create some temporary difficulties.
It would not take much of a "temporary difficulties" here to change the war
dramatically. Stalingrad ends on the 2 Feb 1943 in the OTL. If Stalingrad
holds that puts the Germans in a fine position for an offensive against the
Russian oil in Summer of 1943. That means the earliest Russian offensive
will be in 1944, and it starts much to the East. The war will be very
different.
Alex Milman
2017-06-02 17:48:34 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
To cut the transportation system you have to know its whereabouts. The only
"system" known to the Nazi was Volga and they cut this route quite successfully.
The problem was that (a) the Soviets built an alternative route and (b) started
extraction elsewhere. Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible. The process of "cutting" would be the
next major problem taking into an account the Soviet paranoia about security
and a general difficulty destroy a railroad in the enemy's deep rear for a
considerable amount of time.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
It would create some temporary difficulties.
It would not take much of a "temporary difficulties" here to change the war
dramatically. Stalingrad ends on the 2 Feb 1943 in the OTL. If Stalingrad
holds that puts the Germans in a fine position for an offensive against the
Russian oil in Summer of 1943.
If by "Stalingrad holds" you mean that the Germans are still in Stalingrad,
you have to start with explaining how exactly did they manage to survive
the winter in any considerable numbers and what exactly the Red Army was
doing with all the reserves it amassed in Stalingrad area? Surely, you are
talking about the massive changes in WWII.


What this has to do with a fact that the Germans DID capture the oil fields
of the Northern Caucasus but could not exploit them because they were put
out of order by the Soviets?

What this has to do with a fact that getting to Baku would require a new
massive effort from the Germans?

What this has to do with a fact that in 1942 the Soviets already started
developing the alternative oil resources far away from Caucasus?
SolomonW
2017-06-03 13:17:10 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
To cut the transportation system you have to know its whereabouts. The only
"system" known to the Nazi was Volga and they cut this route quite successfully.
The problem was that (a) the Soviets built an alternative route and (b) started
extraction elsewhere. Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible. The process of "cutting" would be the
next major problem taking into an account the Soviet paranoia about security
and a general difficulty destroy a railroad in the enemy's deep rear for a
considerable amount of time.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
It would create some temporary difficulties.
It would not take much of a "temporary difficulties" here to change the war
dramatically. Stalingrad ends on the 2 Feb 1943 in the OTL. If Stalingrad
holds that puts the Germans in a fine position for an offensive against the
Russian oil in Summer of 1943.
If by "Stalingrad holds" you mean that the Germans are still in Stalingrad,
you have to start with explaining how exactly did they manage to survive
the winter in any considerable numbers and what exactly the Red Army was
doing with all the reserves it amassed in Stalingrad area?
If the Germans had concentrated on Stalingrad and not the Soviet oil
fields, they could have taken Stalingrad to the Volga, then they could have
freed up their troops to reinforce their rear, which was their plan. They
probably could have held Stalingrad in the winter which puts them in a good
position for summer.
Post by Alex Milman
Surely, you are
talking about the massive changes in WWII.
Probably.
Post by Alex Milman
What this has to do with a fact that the Germans DID capture the oil fields
of the Northern Caucasus but could not exploit them because they were put
out of order by the Soviets?
My point is that it denies the SU the oil.
Post by Alex Milman
What this has to do with a fact that getting to Baku would require a new
massive effort from the Germans?
Indeed, its Baku or Stalingrad.
Post by Alex Milman
What this has to do with a fact that in 1942 the Soviets already started
developing the alternative oil resources far away from Caucasus?
Most of SU oil throughout WW2 came from the Caucasus.
Alex Milman
2017-06-03 15:49:41 UTC
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Raw Message
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
To cut the transportation system you have to know its whereabouts. The only
"system" known to the Nazi was Volga and they cut this route quite successfully.
The problem was that (a) the Soviets built an alternative route and (b) started
extraction elsewhere. Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible. The process of "cutting" would be the
next major problem taking into an account the Soviet paranoia about security
and a general difficulty destroy a railroad in the enemy's deep rear for a
considerable amount of time.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
It would create some temporary difficulties.
It would not take much of a "temporary difficulties" here to change the war
dramatically. Stalingrad ends on the 2 Feb 1943 in the OTL. If Stalingrad
holds that puts the Germans in a fine position for an offensive against the
Russian oil in Summer of 1943.
If by "Stalingrad holds" you mean that the Germans are still in Stalingrad,
you have to start with explaining how exactly did they manage to survive
the winter in any considerable numbers and what exactly the Red Army was
doing with all the reserves it amassed in Stalingrad area?
If the Germans had concentrated on Stalingrad and not the Soviet oil
fields, they could have taken Stalingrad to the Volga, then they could have
freed up their troops to reinforce their rear, which was their plan. They
probably could have held Stalingrad in the winter which puts them in a good
position for summer.
Conversation was about the Soviet oil and existing German strategy. Your
flight of imagination is rather irrelevant because it implies German
strategy is completely different from one of OTL while at the same time
assuming that the Soviets would be completely passive for as long as it suits
your schema.
SolomonW
2017-06-04 02:28:58 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
To cut the transportation system you have to know its whereabouts. The only
"system" known to the Nazi was Volga and they cut this route quite successfully.
The problem was that (a) the Soviets built an alternative route and (b) started
extraction elsewhere. Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible. The process of "cutting" would be the
next major problem taking into an account the Soviet paranoia about security
and a general difficulty destroy a railroad in the enemy's deep rear for a
considerable amount of time.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
It would create some temporary difficulties.
It would not take much of a "temporary difficulties" here to change the war
dramatically. Stalingrad ends on the 2 Feb 1943 in the OTL. If Stalingrad
holds that puts the Germans in a fine position for an offensive against the
Russian oil in Summer of 1943.
If by "Stalingrad holds" you mean that the Germans are still in Stalingrad,
you have to start with explaining how exactly did they manage to survive
the winter in any considerable numbers and what exactly the Red Army was
doing with all the reserves it amassed in Stalingrad area?
If the Germans had concentrated on Stalingrad and not the Soviet oil
fields, they could have taken Stalingrad to the Volga, then they could have
freed up their troops to reinforce their rear, which was their plan. They
probably could have held Stalingrad in the winter which puts them in a good
position for summer.
Conversation was about the Soviet oil and existing German strategy.
True but it got diverted to Stalingrad. For Hitler it was Stalingrad or the
oil.
Post by Alex Milman
Your
flight of imagination is rather irrelevant because it implies German
strategy is completely different from one of OTL while at the same time
assuming that the Soviets would be completely passive for as long as it suits
your schema.
Not true.
Alex Milman
2017-06-04 13:20:31 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
Post by The Horny Goat
It's my old German "1942" scenario - where a rampant Wehrmacht takes
the Caucasian oil fields but has no way to either move crude or
refined oil to Germany.
In OTL the fields of the North Caucasus had been taken but the Soviets put
them out of order so the Germans could not even start an extraction.
Yep
Post by Alex Milman
Taking the fields of Baku would be another major operation for which the
Germans probably simply did not have the human resources.
Yep, nor the strategic bombers to destroy it. Cutting some of
transportation system was possible.
To cut the transportation system you have to know its whereabouts. The only
"system" known to the Nazi was Volga and they cut this route quite successfully.
The problem was that (a) the Soviets built an alternative route and (b) started
extraction elsewhere. Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible. The process of "cutting" would be the
next major problem taking into an account the Soviet paranoia about security
and a general difficulty destroy a railroad in the enemy's deep rear for a
considerable amount of time.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
The major effect here would be that the SU would be denied most of its oil.
Baku aside, by mid-1942 the Soviets already started oil extraction from the
areas well outside the Caucasus or the German reach.
Most of the SU came from this region, it loss would cost the SU dearly.
It would create some temporary difficulties.
It would not take much of a "temporary difficulties" here to change the war
dramatically. Stalingrad ends on the 2 Feb 1943 in the OTL. If Stalingrad
holds that puts the Germans in a fine position for an offensive against the
Russian oil in Summer of 1943.
If by "Stalingrad holds" you mean that the Germans are still in Stalingrad,
you have to start with explaining how exactly did they manage to survive
the winter in any considerable numbers and what exactly the Red Army was
doing with all the reserves it amassed in Stalingrad area?
If the Germans had concentrated on Stalingrad and not the Soviet oil
fields, they could have taken Stalingrad to the Volga, then they could have
freed up their troops to reinforce their rear, which was their plan. They
probably could have held Stalingrad in the winter which puts them in a good
position for summer.
Conversation was about the Soviet oil and existing German strategy.
True but it got diverted to Stalingrad. For Hitler it was Stalingrad or the
oil.
Little was "diverted" to Stalingrad: the main priority was Caucasus oil and the
whole Army Group A had been advancing in that direction accompanied by
15,000 oil industry workers.


Advance into Don - Volga direction was necessary to secure its flank (look at the map). Stalingrad itself was important because it is at the junction of
Volga and Akhtuba and controls both waterways. Quite obviously, having front
on the bank of a huge river like Volga is much more secure than to have it by a much smaller river or in the middle of an open steppe.
Post by SolomonW
Post by Alex Milman
Your
flight of imagination is rather irrelevant because it implies German
strategy is completely different from one of OTL while at the same time
assuming that the Soviets would be completely passive for as long as it suits
your schema.
Not true.
But that's the only conclusion one can make out of what you wrote.
Rich Rostrom
2017-06-05 08:23:18 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
True but it got diverted to Stalingrad. For Hitler
it was Stalingrad or the oil.
Little was "diverted" to Stalingrad: the main
priority was Caucasus oil and the whole Army Group A
had been advancing in that direction accompanied by
15,000 oil industry workers.
This posting at AlternateHistory.com goes into much
detail about diversions from Army Group A's drive
into the Caucasus.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/case-blau-is-a-rethinking-in-order.411393/

Short version, AG A commander List diverted a large
force from the drive to the SE to an attempt to
penetrate the Caucasus Mountains, capture Tuapse on
the Black Sea, and clean out the Kuban. This wasted
time and fuel, as did a later attempt to capture Sochi.

There is also an extensive discussion of the Romania
forces at Stalingrad. Short version: they were
understrength, undersupplied, underequipped, overstretched,
outnumbered and outgunned, but still put up considerable
resistance.
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
Alex Milman
2017-06-05 16:00:32 UTC
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Post by Rich Rostrom
Post by Alex Milman
Post by SolomonW
True but it got diverted to Stalingrad. For Hitler
it was Stalingrad or the oil.
Little was "diverted" to Stalingrad: the main
priority was Caucasus oil and the whole Army Group A
had been advancing in that direction accompanied by
15,000 oil industry workers.
This posting at AlternateHistory.com goes into much
detail about diversions from Army Group A's drive
into the Caucasus.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/case-blau-is-a-rethinking-in-order.411393/
Thanks, Rich. Very interesting link.
Post by Rich Rostrom
Short version, AG A commander List diverted a large
force from the drive to the SE to an attempt to
penetrate the Caucasus Mountains, capture Tuapse on
the Black Sea, and clean out the Kuban.
An assumption that an offensive could be successfully conducted
with the right flank hanging in the air with a reasonably strong
enemy behind it is plain silly.

Not to mention that Kuban region was one of the BIG grain suppliers
and its capture fits the narrative of the Soviets dying from starvation
(part of the general pontification).
Post by Rich Rostrom
This wasted
time and fuel, as did a later attempt to capture Sochi.
And Hitler was furious when he learned about the German flag being raised on
Elbrus: he (probably with a good reason) thought that the whole thing was a
fit of an alpinism under the cover of a token event.

Well, one way or another, most (if not all) oil production of the Grozny
area had been halted for at least 6 months by the retreating Russians.


As for <whoever> running of gas due to the relatively limited diversions,
I wonder how these units managed to retreat only few months later if they
did not have gas? I did not hear about them leaving their hardware behind
so where the gas came from? Isn't it at least possible that they were
leaving some reserves? AFAIK, the plan of extricating themselves from the
North Caucasus had been developed before things became really hot allowing
to implement an orderly retreat as soon as Hitler was convinced to give an
agreement to it.

Blocking oil supply by Volga is a good point but there was no need to capture
Astrakhan (or even a railroad passing through Grozny) to do this because it
was pretty much (or completely) stopped during the Battle for Stalingrad.
Even traffic across the river was accompanied by the major casualties.
Not to mention that the traffic on Volga would stop during the winter even
without the Germans.

The relevant question (seemingly skipped) is: was railroad Baku-Astrakhan the
only way to carry the Baku oil?

Somehow I doubt it: there was a sizeable fleet of the tankers on the Caspian
Sea even before the Revolution and probably the sea route was still functional
which means that the whole railroad thing was not critical. As far as the Soviet
communications during WWII are involved, it is necessary to remember that
they were widely using GULAG prisoners to build the new railroads. One of the
most important had been built on the North within few months to provide an
alternative way of carrying the Lend lease goods from Archangelsk after
Leningrad was surrounded. The same goes for the ad hoc railroads elsewhere
(IIRC, Rokossovsky mentioned their construction prior to Stalingrad
counteroffensive). Baku oil could be carried across the Caspian and then
railroad could be built from the terminal (I suspect that there was already
a railroad coming from Astrakhan).


Then comes pure geography. The argument that they should not go here or
there is not very convincing: they DID have to capture a territory, not
just drive happily to the (destroyed) oil fields of Grozny. And, speaking
of the territory and fighting in the region, experience of 2 Chechen Wars
demonstrated at least some of the related problems and any assumption that
it could be just an easy tank drive seems to be in the area of a wishful thinking.
Post by Rich Rostrom
There is also an extensive discussion of the Romania
forces at Stalingrad. Short version: they were
understrength, undersupplied, underequipped, overstretched,
outnumbered and outgunned, but still put up considerable
resistance.
This is not something new and the Soviets planned the Stalingrad
counter-offensive by taking into an account the Romanian weaknesses: shortage
of the tanks and anti-tank artillery. The Germans did put some tanks of their
own into the Romanian sector but this did not solve the problem.

Most of other pontifications are along the lines of "the Soviets should be
dead and defeated based on the numbers we got". Well, somehow this did not
happen. "Food prices" is an interesting thing but one has to remember that
an overwhelming volume of the food supplies had been coming through the
state and what they are talking about is a small volume left in the
hands of a private sector (in which prices were, indeed, skyrocketing but
don't discount a barter trade). The main food supplies remained rationed well
after the war. Regarding deaths from starvation, I suspect that a single biggest case was Leningrad during the blockade, not the unoccupied regions.

Manpower is one of the favorite areas of the speculations (I wonder how all
these 'specialists' could get precise information if the data are not quite
reliable and not necessarily available), one thing I can tell for sure (based
on what I was told by my late father): in the early 1943 mobilization was
extended to the people in their 30's and even early 40's (who in his
recollection made much better soldiers than the youths of early 20's). Wide
usage of the women in industrial production and agriculture allowed much
more efficient mobilization than in Germany.

On the oil the pontificator is completely ignoring new oil production in
Bashkiria and elsewhere and I already addressed the railroad as the only
way to get Baku oil.



What is seemingly totally missing from all that pontification and speculation
is an annoying fact that Hitler had a dilemma with no good way out (just
not enough resources). He could not avoid the offensive in South direction
while not having enough resources to do this on a needed scale.

As a personal observation, and I may be wrong, it seems that both author and
other contributors are more than a little bit infatuated with the Nazis and
consider them truly superior to their opponents all the way to a complete
idiocy. For example, "the SS Panzer Corps IOTL inflicting at least 8 to 1 losses on the Soviets in terms of armor at Kursk". How is this relevant to
the end of 1942/early 1943? Not relevant at all. At Kursk the Germans had
Panthers and Tigers while the Soviets still had T-34 with 75mm gun (model
with a more powerful gun was not yet available) which could not penetrate
front armor of the new German tanks on a distance greater than 300 (IIRC)
meters. But the Panthers were not available before mid-1943, which makes an
argument rather irrelevant.

Rich Rostrom
2017-06-01 04:19:57 UTC
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Post by Alex Milman
Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible.
There was a recent posting on AlternateHistory.com which cited
this blogposting: "Compromise of Soviet codes in WWII"

http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2014/07/compromise-of-soviet-codes-in-wwii.html

The author noted that German cryptanalysts broke a lot of
Soviet traffic, and that

"State ministries, factories, and military units in the
Soviet interior relied on radio communications for a
lot of their traffic because the landline network was
not fully developed to cover the huge areas of the
Soviet Union."

So the Germans actually had a fair amount of information
about Soviet industry.
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
Alex Milman
2017-06-02 17:31:22 UTC
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Raw Message
Post by Rich Rostrom
Post by Alex Milman
Taking into an account that the German intelligence
could not get an adequate information even about the pre-war Soviet
infrastructure, their chance to get information needed for cutting something
they had no idea about was negligible.
There was a recent posting on AlternateHistory.com which cited
this blogposting: "Compromise of Soviet codes in WWII"
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2014/07/compromise-of-soviet-codes-in-wwii.html
The author noted that German cryptanalysts broke a lot of
Soviet traffic, and that
"State ministries, factories, and military units in the
Soviet interior relied on radio communications for a
lot of their traffic because the landline network was
not fully developed to cover the huge areas of the
Soviet Union."
So the Germans actually had a fair amount of information
about Soviet industry.
Not according to Walter Schellenberg: he wrote that by 1941 the German
knowledge of the Soviet industry was absolutely inadequate. Of course,
the modern guys know better.
jerry kraus
2017-05-30 18:05:05 UTC
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Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
No Nazi-Soviet pact, the French and the Russians are going to overrun the Nazis from both sides at once, once the Nazis attack Poland. Game over within six months, for Nazi Germany.

Any impact by Japan on the Soviet Union in the East is going to be minimal, the Japanese army is already tied up in China.
The Horny Goat
2017-05-30 19:06:53 UTC
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Raw Message
On Tue, 30 May 2017 11:05:05 -0700 (PDT), jerry kraus
Post by jerry kraus
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
No Nazi-Soviet pact, the French and the Russians are going to overrun the Nazis from both sides at once, once the Nazis attack Poland. Game over within six months, for Nazi Germany.
Any impact by Japan on the Soviet Union in the East is going to be minimal, the Japanese army is already tied up in China.
I remember some poster here some years ago calculating that at the
rate the French were gaining ground against the Germans in 1939-40
that they would reach Berlin in the early 1990s.....

The serious answer is what evidence do you have that even knowing the
Soviets were on the move that the French (with or without British
support) would attack into Germany in 1939-40?
jerry kraus
2017-05-30 19:15:48 UTC
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Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 30 May 2017 11:05:05 -0700 (PDT), jerry kraus
Post by jerry kraus
Post by Rob
Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.
So how can we make it come to fruition?
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe. Note that both Hitler and the German military rated the Soviet Union as both weak and timid militarily.
No Nazi-Soviet pact, the French and the Russians are going to overrun the Nazis from both sides at once, once the Nazis attack Poland. Game over within six months, for Nazi Germany.
Any impact by Japan on the Soviet Union in the East is going to be minimal, the Japanese army is already tied up in China.
I remember some poster here some years ago calculating that at the
rate the French were gaining ground against the Germans in 1939-40
that they would reach Berlin in the early 1990s.....
The serious answer is what evidence do you have that even knowing the
Soviets were on the move that the French (with or without British
support) would attack into Germany in 1939-40?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive

Well, the French did actually move briefly into the Saar region, as it was, with the Soviets as ostensible Nazi allies, in 1939. Surely, with the Soviets actively counterattacking against the Nazis in Poland as French allies, the French would have been much more inclined to proceed much farther into Germany, don't you think? After all, what would they have to fear? Obviously, the Nazis would be tied up with the Russians and the Poles in the east.
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